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  ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the present work is to face Heidegger’s claim that philosophy has ended. 
Facing this claim for us has not taken the form of creating a new method or positing a 
new question but that of a search for anomalies in what Heidegger decrees as 
finished, which is philosophy as metaphysics. In his historical confrontation with the 
history of thought Heidegger seems to have left out, dismissed or forgotten those 
authors who do not fit into his definition of metaphysics. We have chosen Giordano 
Bruno and Baruch Spinoza, metaphysical thinkers who have undertaken a 
philosophical practice that does not intend to demolish subjectivity but actually 
begins without any need for it. The birth of the subject as grounding reality finds its 
affirmation with Descartes and inaugurates modernity that, according to Heidegger, 
exhausts philosophy and leads it into the arms of modern science and technology. 
Bruno and Spinoza respectively precede and follow the birth of modernity and of 
modern science, which they look at with an eye that is not that of the modern subject. 
Following their different approaches to philosophy, we shall also explore their 
relation to Renaissance Humanism, dismissed by Heidegger as a historical reiteration 
of the Roman world, perceived as a perversion of the Greek origin of thought. We 
shall show how hasty such a dismissal is. Our goal is to show not merely that 
Heidegger is wrong but that if Western thinking contains the seeds of its own end, it 
also contains the ones of a different understanding of the Western world and its 
achievements. The three authors will engage on the grounds of ontology, gnosiology 
and ethics and yet we have defined the whole enterprise of this work as an ethics 
overall. An ethics of thinking is a practice of thought that wishes to envisage the 
possibility for Western man of inhabiting his own world by understanding himself 
not as an isolated subject and master of nature but as the place where the unity and 
multiplicity of nature come to be thought at the same time. 
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Introduction  
 
 
Section 1 – The view from the Moon 
 
 
 
 
Ahi ahi, ma conosciuto il mondo 
non cresce, anzi si scema, e assai più vasto 
l’etra sonante e l’alma terra e il mare 
al fanciullin, che non al saggio, appare. 
[…] 
Ecco svaniro a un punto, 
e figurato è il mondo in breve carta; 
ecco tutto è simile, e discoprendo, 
solo il nulla s’accresce. 
 
(Giacomo Leopardi, Ad Angelo Mai)1  
 
 
On the 25th of August 2012 Neil Armstrong, the first man to have stepped on the 
Moon, passed away. During the Summer of 1969 the world was watching with 
excitement an event that had, allegedly, changed the history of humanity. «That's one 
small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind», were his first words as he stepped 
lunar soil, on the 20th of July. An Italian commentator and writer, Massimo Fini, in an 
article entitled The last man on the Earth2, observes how appalling it was to hear such 
a trivial sentence from a man who must have been in an emotionally unique state of 
mind, for he was seeing the Earth as no one else had ever seen it, that is, from the 
Moon. It was later revealed that the NASA Press Office had instructed him to say the 
famous sentence. As with Armstrong’s declaration, so too every detail of his actions 
                                                
1 “Ouch, ouch, but once the world is known it does not grow, it is lessened, and the ringing sky, the 
world soul and the sea, appear way larger to the young boy than to the wise. […] There, they [our 
dreams: ed] disappeared at some point and the world is depicted as a small chart; there, everything’s 
the same and, through discovering, nothingness grows”. My translation in prose from Italian. From 
G. Leopardi, “Ad Angelo Mai”, in G. Leopardi, Canti, introduction by F. Gavazzeni, notes by F. 
Gavazzeni and M. M. Lombardi, BUR, Milano 2011, pp. 137-139. 
2 See M. Fini, “L’ultimo uomo sulla Terra”, in Il Fatto Quotidiano [28/08/2012], Rome 2012, p. 22. 
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and the Apollo 11 mission in general was meticulously planned, calculated and 
controlled by the NASA technicians; it could not have been otherwise. That is what 
technology is about. From this Fini moves on to noticing how that event stood for 
something different from what is generally believed to have been a giant leap for 
mankind and that was the end of the human individual, who was now as replaceable 
as a robot: Armstrong, in this sense, had nothing in common with Galileo or 
Columbus, individuals fighting against common sense. This is a fair journalistic 
point, as it raises an interesting issue for the general public. Philosophically, 
nevertheless, we are drawn to read this episode in a completely different manner and 
at a first reading, we could attempt the following interpretation: on July 20th, 1969, 
nothing new really happened. The Apollo 11 mission was a perfectly coherent 
application of Galileo’s mathematical reading of the universe. Columbus was also 
being scientific, basing his voyage on mathematical calculations, however inexact 
and primitive. Due to political or religious isolation, it could be affirmed that Galileo 
and Columbus were, indeed, individuals who stood out as such because of their 
courage and intelligence, but they were also bearers of a thinking that would have led 
straight to Armstrong’s moon-landing. That same thinking would have produced, 
indeed, the “individual”, the “replaceable”, of which Armstrong’s mission did not 
decree the end but provided the utmost historical confirmation. These are all strong 
claims that cannot be justified on the spot because, more than being argued, they are 
in need of being practiced: the philosopher’s point of view is neither assumed nor 
demonstrated, it is exercised. Sometimes a philosopher does not need to go all the 
way to the Moon to know what it feels like to be in Armstrong’s shoes. In 1584 
Giordano Bruno, an Italian philosopher born in Nola, in the Kingdom of Naples, 
published The Ash Wednesday Supper, the first of a series of books written in Italian 
during his sojourn in England. This work was mainly devoted to a philosophical 
exploration of the new Copernican theories, by which Bruno was largely inspired. 
Copernicus allowed Bruno to develop a perspective that was not only too advanced 
for Copernicus himself but that would have sounded much truer, although maybe 
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disappointing for some, had it come out of Armstrong’s lips: «the moon is no more 
heaven for us than we are for the moon»3. This is the perspective of the infinite, 
where everything is at once centre and periphery and man is automatically expelled 
from the centre of the universe. Could that be a more appropriate intuition for 
someone who has just stepped on the Moon and is looking at the Earth, which is now 
his sky? The NASA Press Office, speaking through Armstrong’s lips, on the other 
hand, was re-affirming anthropocentrism. A task is emerging, that of taking man off 
the stage and letting the show of nature begin.  
For Martin Heidegger, science and technology were a thought-provoking issue, 
for he saw them as the outcome of the whole Western metaphysical tradition. He took 
upon himself the heavy burden of facing the whole Western tradition to explore what 
lies at the origin of Western thinking. In 1964 he delivered an important lecture 
entitled The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, where he decreed the end of 
philosophy as metaphysics, which had reached its completion in modern science. 
Heidegger did not undertake an enterprise of philosophical archaeology, for we find 
that neither the origin nor the end of philosophy is expressed in terms of duration in 
his thought. Nor is the origin a historical fact such as the beginning and the end of 
World War II or sinking the flagpole into the ground of the Moon. Duration and 
extension, which characterize historical facts, are not applicable to the notion of the 
origin and the end of philosophy: the origin is present in each movement of thinking 
and instructs it; similarly the end does not denote the conclusion of a civilization but 
it underlies it in its entirety. As Heidegger put it: «We forget that already in the age of 
Greek philosophy a decisive characteristic of philosophy appears: the development of 
the sciences within the field that philosophy opened up. The development of the 
sciences is at the same time their separation from philosophy and the establishment of 
                                                
3 G. Bruno, The Ash Wednesday Supper, edited and translated by E. A. Gosselin and L. S. Lerner, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2008, p. 91. For the original version see G. Bruno, “La Cena 
de le Ceneri”, in G. Bruno, Opere Italiane vol. I, critical edition by G. Aquilecchia, general 
coordination by N. Ordine, UTET, Turin 2007, p. 456: «[…] non più la luna è cielo a noi che noi 
alla luna». 
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their independence. This process belongs to the completion of philosophy»4. Is man a 
protagonist or a puppet in this representation? In Armstrong’s case, we saw that man 
was instructed by NASA and the Press Office in each of his actions but NASA 
themselves were only affirming what was already the case on planet Earth and that is 
a further extension of man understanding himself as the master of nature. This only 
works as long as man places himself outside of nature and becomes its very 
substratum, its grounding, the finest realization of which was conceived by Descartes 
in the cogito ergo sum. From Descartes onwards, the standard for being human 
becomes the rational subject, the so-called thinking thing [res cogitans]. Nature, as an 
extended thing [res extensa], becomes an object of measurement and calculation. In 
this lies, allegedly, the greatest affirmation of Western man, which we call modernity 
in its historical manifestation. 
André Glucksmann, rather theatrically, tells of a conference which was to take 
place in Paris and which is depicted by him more as a match than as an academic 
gathering: French thinkers versus German thinkers, the former representing the 
eradication of man from nature and the latter representing a newly found proximity to 
it: «In 1937, Paris summons a conference on Descartes and counts on celebrating 
with great pomp the three-hundredth anniversary of the Discourse on Method (1637); 
the intellectual eminences are invited to celebrate the great oeuvre under the banner 
of Humanism. Enlightenment against Barbarity! Heidegger proposes himself as the 
leader of the counter-offensive of the Reich by heading the German delegation. […] 
Drum rolls and Wagnerian foghorns! On one side, the mathematisation of nature, 
which has become an object (res extensa) of domination by a subject (res cogitans), 
“master and owner”. Drum! On the other side, “for the first time in the history of the 
West, thanks to the writers and thinkers of the German idealism, a metaphysical 
wisdom of the essence of history has been inaugurated”. To the French the wild and 
devastating exploitation of Nature. To the Germans the rapt and loving meditation 
                                                
4 M. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, in M. Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, edited by D. Farrel Krell, Routledge, Oxon 1993, p. 433. 
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that reinvests man in his own history. […] France had played the wrong card. 
Understood in a Heideggerian fashion, Descartes is the henchman of planetary 
uprooting»5. This ironic, provoking and enjoyable representation of the preparation 
for an event that never took place – due to Nazi diplomatic resistance – contains 
several points that need to be addressed. The representation of Humanism as 
assimilated to the Cartesian philosophy of the subject and to the Enlightenment is a 
twist of Humanism itself and so is the antithesis between French Enlightenment and 
German Idealism. In Heidegger’s opinion the latter is the actual achievement of 
absolute subjectivity, which extends all the way to phenomenology: «From the 
perspective of Hegel and Husserl – and not only from their perspective – the matter 
of philosophy is subjectivity»6. Nevertheless, we are witnessing a conceptual short 
circuit here, for in Heidegger’s opinion Humanism is assimilated to the history of the 
subject: «Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of the human 
being high enough. Of course the essential worth of the human being does not consist 
in his being the substance of beings, as the “Subject” among them, so that the tyrant 
of being he may deign to release the beingness of beings into an all too loudly 
glorified “objectivity”»7. We are sympathetic to Heidegger’s project of thinking man 
in his essence, free from the constraints of the subject/object dichotomy. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger is fighting against the wrong enemy. Humanism and 
                                                
5 A. Glucksmann, Les deux chemins de la philosophie, Plon, Paris 2009, pp. 187-188. My 
translation from French: «En 1937, Paris convoque un congrès Descartes et compte célébrer en 
grande pompe le tricentenaire du Discours de la méthode (1637); les éminences intellectuelles sont 
invitées à fêter le grand œuvre sous la bannière de l’Humanisme. Lumières contre Barbarie ! 
Heidegger propose de diriger la contre-offensive du Reich à la tête de la délégation allemande. […] 
Roulements de tambour et cornes de brume wagnériennes! D’un côté , la mathématisation de la 
Nature qui livre la matière devenue objet (res extensa) à la domination d’un sujet (res cogitans), 
‘maître et possesseur’. Tambour! De l’autre, ‘pour la première fois dans l’histoire de l’Occident, 
grâce aux écrivains et aux penseurs de l’idéalisme allemand, un savoir métaphysique de l’essence 
de l’histoire a été inauguré’. Aux Français l’exploitation effréné et dévastatrice de la Nature. Aux 
Allemands la méditation recueille et amoureuse qui réinvestit l’homme dans son histoire. […] la 
France avait tiré la mauvaise carte. Descartes, heideggériennement compris, est le suppôt du 
déracinement planétaire». 
6 M. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, in M. Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, p. 440. 
7 M. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, in M. Heidegger, Pathmarks, edited by W. McNeill, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 1998, pp. 251-252. 
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Renaissance culture8 – dismissed by Heidegger as a mere renascentia romanitatis – 
does not need or conceive of a subject; on the other hand, it promotes man’s nearness 
to nature as opposed to its mastery. Humanism rejects medieval language and the 
sterile logic of academic disputes, hence man’s stereotype as animal rationale, which 
is hardly a prelude to his identification with the res cogitans. Finally, Humanism and 
the Renaissance find one of their most powerful expressions in the works of Giordano 
Bruno, the man whose thinking stepped on lunar ground much earlier than 
Armstrong’s feet and with a much clearer gaze. That gaze intended to overthrow man 
from his central position as master of nature and opened up the gates of infinity. 
Giordano Bruno from Nola was burnt alive at the stake in Rome on the 17th of 
February 1600 by the secular arm of the Roman Inquisition after an imprisonment 
and a trial that lasted roughly eight years. His death occurred unusually early in the 
morning for an exemplary and public execution of a heretic, almost suggesting how 
hesitant his executioners were. Ingrid D. Rowland, in her intellectual biography of the 
Nolan, reports a dispatch from Rome of February 19th of the same year: «Thursday 
morning in Campo de’ Fiori that wicked Dominican friar from Nola was burned 
alive, the one mentioned before: the most obstinate of heretics, and because in his 
imagination he had formed certain beliefs contrary to our faith, and in particular 
about the Holy Virgin and the Saints, the wicked man wanted to die obstinate in those 
beliefs. And he said that he died a martyr, and willingly, and that his soul would 
ascend with the smoke into paradise. Well, now he will see whether he spoke the 
                                                
8 Although Humanism and the Renaissance seem so closely, even causally, related, the complexity 
of their relationship is often underestimated and is surely not acknowledged by Heidegger, who 
seems to easily assimilate them. Nevertheless, as Nauert notes more recently: «Alongside the 
cultural mastery achieved by fifteenth-century Italian humanism stand the extraordinary artistic 
achievements of the age. The relationship of Renaissance art to humanism seems at first glance to 
be simple and direct, but in reality it is not. Italians of the late Renaissance regarded the flowering 
of humanistic studies and the flowering of art as merely two parallel examples of a comprehensive 
cultural renewal, a rebirth of true civilization». From C. G. Nauert, Humanism and the Culture of 
Renaissance Europe [second edition], New Approaches to European History, Cambridge University 
Press, New York 2006, p. 80.  
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truth»9. Bruno had no vocation for martyrdom; his interminable trial was a 
meticulously defensive attempt to sever his philosophy from theology by 
dissimulating the devastating impact of his thinking on religion. He surely was a 
heretic and looked at religion with no favour, a religion that was seen as responsible 
for the bloodshed raging throughout Europe at the time, a time of crisis that was also 
intellectual. Persecuted by Catholics, excommunicated by Calvinists, scorned by 
Anglicans and hardly tolerated by Lutherans, he toured the whole of Europe from 
Italy to Switzerland, then to France and England, finally from Bohemia to Germany 
and back to Italy. As Michele Ciliberto points out, nevertheless, it would be wrong to 
enclose Bruno’s thinking within a purely Christian horizon and reduce his character 
to that of a mere heretic. As a matter of fact, the length of the trial was in great part 
due to a number of novelties that permeated Bruno’s philosophy, which made it hard 
for the Inquisition itself to grasp the meaning and significance of his work. Says 
Ciliberto: «But with his existential and philosophical experience, Bruno walked, with 
great awareness, along a path that was located beyond Christianity, in a post-
Christian perspective. It is peculiar – even paradoxical – that he enacted this project 
looking “back” and not “ahead”, embracing the “myth” of ancient wisdom, of the 
prisca theologia spread by the Florentine circle of Marsilio Ficino and contributing 
enthusiastically to the dissemination of the fantastic image of Egypt as a place of 
wisdom and home to the gods»10. We are facing a rather eclectic Dominican friar 
who, during his youth at the Neapolitan convent, eagerly consumed the texts of 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, only to become later a fierce critic of Aristotle. The 
encounter with the Neoplatonists was crucial only for Bruno to twist and empty the 
                                                
9 I. D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno. Philosopher/Heretic [2008], Chicago University Press, Chicago 
2009, p. 278. 
10 M. Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno. Il teatro e la vita, Mondadori, Milano 2007, p. 50. My translation 
from the Italian: «Ma con la sua esperienza esistenziale e filosofica Bruno intese muoversi, con 
grande consapevolezza, lungo un orizzonte che si situava dopo il cristianesimo, in una prospettiva 
post-cristiana. È singolare – e perfino paradossale – che egli abbia attuato questo progetto 
procedendo ‘all’indietro’, invece di andare ‘avanti’, facendo suo il ‘mito’ dell’antica sapienza, della 
prisca theologia diffuso dal circolo fiorentino di Marsilio Ficino e contribuendo a divulgare, con 
entusiasmo, l’immagine favolosa dell’Egitto come sede della sapienza e degli dèi». 
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very Neoplatonic notions that he adopted. Although well read in most of the 
philosophy of his time, he looked back to the Hermetic tradition and to the Egyptians 
as the origin of wisdom as proximity to nature.  
Heidegger, a philosopher of the origin, is moved by a similar drive: by 
rediscovering things as opposed to objects, he wishes to reactivate the fourfold of 
mortals, sky, earth and gods, which has been lost and covered up by metaphysics and 
modern science. There is a crucial difference, though, an element that makes Bruno 
extraordinary: Bruno is an enthusiastic supporter of the new science emerging at his 
time and not only the first philosopher to endorse the Copernican Revolution fully but 
to take it to its extreme consequences by opening up a thinking of the infinite. 
Ciliberto is right in claiming that Bruno’s philosophy was, indeed, theologically 
devastating but that religion is not its centre of gravity and that his doctrines were too 
advanced to be understood: Bruno is convinced science on itself is insufficient and it 
needs philosophy to break with old structures and superstitions. Bruno is as far as he 
can be from the anthropocentrism of the modern subject that, despite the advent of 
Copernicus, is still profoundly Ptolemaic: the power of his thinking broke through the 
celestial spheres and landed on the Moon to discover that man is not the centre of the 
universe, for there are no centres and that for this very reason the centre of the 
universe is everywhere. Whereas Heidegger sees science as obstructing any access to 
the origin, Bruno looks at it as an opportunity that he, like a novel Mercury sent by 
the gods, cannot lose to take the world back to that proximity that was dear to the 
ancients. Bruno, the man, was surely aware of his worth and never cared to hide it but 
it was not only the Inquisition that failed to understand Bruno. Academics 
themselves, who had no intention of seeing their practice of reasoning, logic and 
dispute, not to mention the authority of Aristotle, called into question by someone 
they saw as an arrogant homunculus. When Bruno was invited to give a series of 
lectures in Oxford, which had to be interrupted, the reaction, eloquently expressed by 
George Abbot, was the following: «Not long after returning againe, when he had 
more boldly than wisely, got up into the highest place of our best and most renowned 
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schoole, stripping up his sleeves like some Iugler, and telling us much of chentrum 
and chirculus and circumferenchia (after the pronounciation of his Country language) 
he undertooke among very many other matters to set on foote the opinion of 
Copernicus, that the earth did goe round, and the heavens did stand still; whereas in 
truth it was his owne head which rather did run round, and his braines did not stand 
stil»11. If, on one hand, Heidegger deems academic practice needful of deep reforms, 
subsequently failing and aggravating his failure with his temporary enthusiasm for 
Nazism, on the other hand, Bruno is an academic of no academy for he finds no 
academy ready to welcome his practice, despite his ardent desires. Even the 
accusations of plagiarising Ficino, raised by the Oxonian professors, were misplaced: 
if only Bruno’s ontology and cosmology had been understood they could not have 
been mistaken for Ficino’s, still imbued with Neoplatonic hierarchies12. What the 
Oxonian scholars heard were really precise citations of Ficino, due to Bruno’s 
extraordinary memory, the art of which gave him fame at the court of the French king 
Henry III. 
As Bruno’s mortal flesh was incinerated, his philosophical cornerstones were 
overcome, long enough to give way to a modernity that was bearing the restricted 
horizon of an objectified and mathematised nature, brought forth by Descartes and 
Galileo. Fifty-six years after Bruno’s death, after Descartes cogito ergo sum and after 
Galileo’s eppur si muove13, another philosopher, in the most liberal country of the 
time, was to suffer a violent damnatio memoriae at the age of twenty-four: «cursed be 
he by day, and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies down, and cursed be 
he when he rises up. Cursed be he when he goes out and cursed be he when he comes 
in. The Lord will not spare him; but then the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall 
                                                
11 I. D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno. Philosopher/Heretic [2008], p. 146. 
12 See B. P. Copenhaver & C. B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1992, p. 150: «An important and distinctly Neoplatonic element in the Platonic Theology is 
the hierarchy of reality that guarantees man’s immortality and constitutes the order through which 
the soul will rise when it escapes its bodily prison». 
13 «and yet it moves». With these words Galileo is said to have addressed the Roman Inquisition, 
after being forced to abjure his scientific theories showing that the earth moved around the sun. 
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smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon 
him and the Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven. And the Lord shall 
separate him unto evil out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the 
covenant that are written into his book of the law»14. Thus Rabbi Morteira addressed 
his most brilliant pupil, Baruch Spinoza, son of a merchant and member of the 
Amsterdam Jewish community. Spinoza was a Jew of Portuguese descent, whose 
family had fled Portugal to escape anti-Jewish persecutions. Nevertheless, it seemed 
that even in the tolerant Netherlands, where Spinoza’s family had found refuge and 
shelter, the philosopher did not seem to enjoy an absolute freedom of thought, due to 
his cultural and religious heritage. He was cursed but, if we except the failed attempt 
to stab him on the steps of the synagogue, was never executed. Antonio Negri 
attempts an explanation: «Spinoza is the anomaly. If Spinoza, atheist and cursed, 
does not end his days in prison or at the stake, unlike other revolutionary innovators 
between the 500’s and the 600’s, this is only due to the fact that his metaphysics 
represents the actual polarity of an already consolidated antagonistic power structure; 
in seventeenth century Holland, the development of production relations is aware of 
the tendency of a future of antagonism»15. Negri might as well be right in seeing 
Spinoza as the philosopher of mature and absolute materialism in the light of 
ascending capitalism, yet I believe there were other reasons that prevented him from 
ending up like Bruno. Spinoza’s life was characterized by prudence, so much so that 
his personal seal, which he used on the letters directed to his intellectual friends, 
included the following indication in Latin: CAUTE16. Spinoza was a cautious man 
                                                
14 As reported in S. Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell. Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise and the Birth of 
the Secular Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2011, p. 8. 
15 A. Negri, “L’anomalia selvaggia. Potere e potenza in Baruch Spinoza”, in A. Negri, Spinoza, 
Derive e Approdi, Roma 2006, p. 24. My translation from the Italian: «Spinoza è l’anomalia. Se 
Spinoza, ateo e maledetto, non finisce le sue giornate in galera o sul rogo, a differenza di altri 
innovatori rivoluzionari fra il Cinquecento e il Seicento, ciò è solo indicativo del fatto che la sua 
metafisica rappresenta la polarità effettiva di un rapporto di forza antagonistico, già consolidato: 
nell’Olanda del Seicento lo sviluppo dei rapporti di produzione e delle forze produttive conosce la 
tendenza di un avvenire di antagonismo». 
16 For a detailed study of Spinoza’s seal, see F. Mignini, “Il Sigillo di Spinoza” in La Cultura, Year 
19, n. 2 (1981), pp. 351-389. 
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and knew exactly what public exposure could have meant for his personal safety, 
which makes him very different from the ill-tempered Bruno, who did little to divert 
attention from himself. Nevertheless, Spinoza lived in the most liberal European 
country of his time as part of a Jewish community that, in Holland, had found 
hospitality; this very community could not repay such hospitality by letting a 
troublemaker stir dangerous ideas and thereby pushed him away in the 
aforementioned violent manner. Unlike Bruno, he never accepted an academic 
position17 and preferred to earn his living working on optical lenses as a turner. What 
Spinoza was interested in was the achievement of a good life, which he envisaged as 
the centre of his philosophy, whose magnum opus is, not surprisingly, called the 
Ethics – posthumously published in 1677. What makes him similar to Bruno is that, 
in order to achieve such beatitude, man has to reconsider his ontological position in 
the world and such a position is determined only by considering him from the point 
of view of infinity, an aspect underlined by scholars such as Stuart Hampshire: 
«Spinoza, alone of the great figures of that age, seems somehow to have anticipated 
modern conceptions of the scale of the universe, and of man’s relatively infinitesimal 
place within the vast system»18. Although Hampshire captures a crucial element 
within Spinoza’s philosophy, it is important to add that infinity is already present in 
Bruno’s philosophy in a prominent position.  
The notion of modernity is vitiated by an ambiguous relation to Humanism and 
the Renaissance, seen as a still immature version of the modern world, intertwined 
with mysticism and magic. Heidegger seems to endorse a similar assumption, failing 
to see the complexity and variety of Renaissance thinking and civilization; 
particularly in the works of Bruno – which are by no means representative of 
Renaissance Humanism as a whole – such a culture gave rise to a philosophical 
practice that, while appreciating the new development of science, did not wish to 
develop a philosophy that would be ancillary to science. Spinoza has a profound 
                                                
17 He rejected an offer from J.L. Fabritius to take a position at Heidelberg, on the account of the 
Palatine Elector. His reply was that absolute freedom of philosophizing was not negotiable. 
18 S. Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2005, p.123. 
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knowledge of Descartes and Hobbes and, while influenced by them in the 
composition of his works, he still bears the kind of naturalism that is found in Bruno, 
effectively expressed by his Deus sive Natura, the trademark of his pantheism. There 
is an ideal and substantial continuity between Bruno and Spinoza, of which the scorn 
and dangers they had to endure is only a minor detail.  The demarcation line between 
them, represented by Descartes and the different sources and methods, does not 
prevent them from developing common notions that look far beyond our idea of 
modernity, from infinity to materialism, from their pantheism to their admiration and 
respect for science to which they never felt subordinated. Michael Mack reports how 
keen Spinoza was on the new astronomical discoveries carried out by Galileo: «As 
his letters to Henry Oldenburg attest, Spinoza was really interested in Galileo’s work. 
Galileo described the Copernican universe as one that is not dependent on Aristotle’s 
unmoved mover but on the ever-changing. […] Similar to Spinoza, in his discussion 
of the sun, Galileo focused on how different aspects of nature depend on each other. 
Decay is thus not necessarily lethal: it could be part of nature’s regenerative and ever-
changing process»19. The theme of natural vicissitude will also be a central issue in 
Bruno, at the basis of his notion of matter and atomism, whereas in Spinoza this will 
characterize the theory of modal affects: in both cases individual entities will escape 
both the ancient categorization and the modern objectification. What is also 
interesting here, nevertheless, is that Spinoza uses Galileo’s discoveries to refute 
Descartes, who believed the reason planets around Saturn did not move was due to 
Saturn itself not rotating around its own axis. His appreciation for Galileo, then, is 
expressed in virtue of his scientific achievements more than his metaphysical 
statements about a nature that is known and understood only mathematically, a view 
that Spinoza could not share. Spinoza cannot force upon nature a structure that 
depends on the partial and anthropocentric understanding of man understood as a 
subject, a man who has made himself substance. Spinoza’s continuity with 
                                                
19 M. Mack, Spinoza and the Spectres of Modernity. The Hidden Enlightenment of Diversity from 
Spinoza to Freud, Continuum, London 2010, p. 46. 
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Humanism is clear, for the dignity of man is not encountered in his mastery of nature 
but in his proximity and belonging to it. Negri pushes this point even farther in seeing 
the spirit of the Renaissance developing from a hand-made version to a fully 
accomplished one: «In Spinoza transformation is given. The humanist’s workshop is 
no longer hand-made. Surely the spirit animating it is that of the Renaissance, 
similarly determining the constructive horizon of thinking, from the nevertheless 
great craftsmanship of Giordano Bruno or of the late Shakespeare […]»20. Still 
influenced by Frances Yates’ interpretation of Bruno as a mystical magician, Negri 
seems to underestimate Bruno, for he does not speak the language of modernity yet. 
Renaissance thinking does not need the coming of modernity to fulfil its essence; it is 
a radical and multi-coloured move from medieval scholasticism and abstract logic but 
also an ethical alternative of freedom. The brusque interruption brought about by the 
Counter-Reformation and by the Cartesian method of doubt, bring man back to a 
centrality, which is scientifically and technologically advanced, but burdened by the 
old cosmic responsibility. Spinoza attempts to achieve that same freedom by 
affirming and constructing it within the historical and intellectual turn that had 
occurred. What we would like to show is an alternative reading of the Renaissance in 
relation to the issue of modernity and that of the subject, which will become 
increasingly evident through the course of this work, and, in order to achieve such an 
aim, we would like to go back to Heidegger’s history of metaphysics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 A. Negri, “L’anomalia selvaggia. Potere e potenza in Baruch Spinoza”, in A. Negri, Spinoza, p. 
35. My translation from the Italian: «In Spinoza la trasformazione è data. La bottega dell’umanista 
non è più artigianale. Certo, lo spirito che la anima è costruttivo, rinascimentale: ma quale distanza, 
già qui, ora, nello stesso collocarsi davanti al sapere, nello stesso fissare l’orizzonte costruttivo del 
pensiero, dal pur grande artigianato di Giordano Bruno o dell’ultimo Shakespeare […]». 
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Section 2 – Intensive, Extensive 
 
Undertaking an ethics of thinking means changing our inhabiting of the world by 
acquiring a different understanding of ourselves. There is nothing prescriptive in such 
an enterprise and no guidance on how to act. The urge springs from Heidegger’s 
claim that philosophy as metaphysics has ended and that, subsequently, it is a 
philosophical problem to determine what thinking means now. We are in the 
uncomfortable position of being sympathetic to Heidegger and, at the same time, 
having to verify the meaning and the validity of his claim. If, according to Heidegger, 
the positing of the subject as the ground of reality is the turning point that carries 
metaphysics towards its exhaustion into modern science and technology, then our 
discourse is bound to question the role of the subject. We shall do that under our own 
perspective, though, by questioning Heidegger’s history of metaphysics, which seems 
to neglect those very metaphysical thinkers who, at the dawn of modernity, did not 
even seem to take the subject into account. Bruno and Spinoza, in this sense, although 
bearing their own particular histories, styles and methods, provide the kind of 
philosophy that can show whether Western thought can still provide a way of 
inhabiting the world that is not founded upon the subject but on man’s proximity to 
nature. We do not question Heidegger’s claim that modern philosophy, understood as 
history of the subject, has come to dwell in a world where nature is objectified and 
subdued by technological violence. Nor do we question that science and technology, 
in virtue of their claim of stating objective facts about the world, close up any further 
possibility for thinking. Nevertheless, we do question the monolithic and almost 
teleological history of metaphysics provided by Heidegger. 
The greatness of Heidegger, of any great philosopher, is the ability to open up 
questions that maintain their relevance throughout historical changes and alternate 
contingencies; in this sense, we could define such questions as intensive. This is not 
because such questions are somehow universally applicable. First of all, it is hard to 
see how the problem of the task of thinking could be relevant to a Bushman or to a 
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Tibetan monk. That is not because the Bushman and the Tibetan monk do not think 
but because thinking as an issue emerges in the Western tradition – although 
globalisation, nonetheless, makes it a more general problem, extensively speaking. 
Secondly, not everyone – actually, very few people – within the Western tradition 
itself feel such an issue to be a problem at all. In some philosophy departments a few 
thinkers around the world, often those acquainted with Heidegger but not only them, 
feel that the problem of thinking is an issue. Is the issue really urgent or we should 
rather take care of the climate change, poverty and the financial crisis? Is this a 
merely cultural and narcissistic exercise? It is an issue that embraces a whole culture, 
which is also progressively extending over other cultures throughout the Earth, and 
yet it coincides with a few individuals, each of whom expresses it in its entirety. Our 
problem is also the following, then: how can a totality be expressed by a singularity? 
That is what we shall understand as intensive. Such a notion will be encountered in 
Bruno and Spinoza as a necessary consequence of thinking infinity. What is intensive 
escapes determination; therefore it cannot concern poverty, finance or climate change 
and yet it is expressed in all of them. There is a thinking that makes poverty 
something to be understood as a lack of certain primary resources, the financial crisis 
as a lack of reciprocal trust expressed in rates and climate change as the rise of the 
average temperature of the Earth. The issue of why they are thus understood is a non-
issue for the experts of each field because it does not solve their problems and does 
not make their work progress. Each field operates independently and finds its reason 
of existence in specialization. Philosophy itself is not necessarily characterized by 
putting the issue of thinking at stake; in most cases, as a matter of fact, it is not. 
Knowledge, in our universities, is understood extensively, as an ever-expanding field, 
divided into many independent estates. Nietzsche denounced this situation in the 19th 
century, followed by Heidegger in the 20th and yet, historically, they seem to have 
been ineffective: the spirit of modernity is global and stronger than ever – in spite of 
the ephemeral post-modern experiments – whereas man’s inhabiting of the world 
becomes increasingly problematic as his role of master of nature makes him, at the 
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same time, enslaved to technology. Enjoying a view from the Moon, in the sense 
outlined in the previous section, means undertaking an ethics of thinking, it means 
looking at man intensively. This is one of the greatest challenge of the present work, 
for it amounts to holding two thoughts at once: seeing man no longer as the master of 
nature, for he loses any centrality in the indifference of the infinite universe; seeing 
man as an expression of nature in its entirety.  
Neil Armstrong was not thinking when he took «one small step for a man» and 
«one giant leap for mankind» and not simply because NASA instructed him to say so. 
The «giant leap for mankind» is the rhetorical manifestation of the reduction of 
mankind, humanity, to scientific and technological progress. Armstrong, NASA, the 
political will behind them and the enthusiasm of the general public were all instructed 
by a thinking that takes nature to be an object of discovery and dominion. A 
spectacular extension of that dominion, such as stepping on lunar ground, means 
proceeding on a track that has already been traced. Descartes’ method of doubt was 
able to set the subject as the foundational standard that ancient and medieval 
metaphysics could not fully determine. The subject is the outcome of doubt; it is a 
move that sets the standards of truth not by affirming the event of its transition but by 
inquiring upon its being knowable to the subject itself. The alternative to doubt is not 
certainty because certainty is also set against doubt in its claim of being indubitable. 
Modernity as thinking would then appear to be a destinal feature of man’s 
civilization, springing from the culture of the West. In this we are puzzled by the 
question Kierkegaard provokingly asks through his pseudonym Johannes Climacus: 
«Johannes Climacus assumed that modern philosophy began with doubt and now 
asked how it happened, whether it was by accident or by necessity, whether this 
beginning was an accidental or a necessary beginning»21. Heidegger understands 
Western thought as metaphysics inscribed in a monolithic destiny of covering up the 
question of Being and modernity as its final realization in terms of subjectivity. We 
                                                
21 S. Kierkegaard, “Johannes Climacus”, in S. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments / Johannes 
Climacus, edited and translated by H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1987, p. 136. 
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would like to show that within Western thinking man has understood himself 
differently with respect to the historical success of the subjective grounding. In order 
to carry out this work, though, it is not sufficient to practise some history of 
philosophy. What is required is to endorse Heidegger’s challenge and try to re-
inscribe ourselves in Bruno’s and Spinoza’s philosophy through an effort of changing 
our position within nature and our gaze upon it. That is an enterprise of thinking that 
can only be defined as ethical. 
The structure this enterprise has been given represents, extensively, a harmonic, 
almost geometrical array. It is divided into three Parts, each representing one great 
traditional area of Philosophy: Ontology, Gnosiology, Ethics. Each of these Parts is 
divided into three chapters, respectively devoted to Heidegger, Bruno and Spinoza. 
This kind of arrangement, nevertheless, is more numerical than real; it is understood 
only extensively, in its organizational and conceptual exposition. If we really wished 
to divide our philosophical effort into areas, then we would regress to a Cartesian 
tree-structured model, and its progressive foundation of knowledge from 
metaphysics, through physics and ethics. In the Cartesian model each part of the tree 
sets the standard for the following but that is not our case. Each Part can be defined 
as a centre of intensity for it does not merely expose an author’s theories of Being or 
knowledge, it endorses a point of view on thinking that is an expression of the other 
two. If ontology were conceived as a descriptive model of the world, it would just 
deliver us another objectified version of nature. If gnosiology were an application of 
standards of truth based on a pre-determined ontology, then it would be nothing more 
than an epistemology. If ethics were a prescriptive model of behaviour based on a 
certain account of reality, then it would be nothing more than a moral recipe. If Being 
is not to be reduced to the subject, then the search for its truth cannot take place from 
an abstracted and scientific point of view, it involves on the one hand a different 
understanding of man’s position as a knower and an active undertaking of that 
position in the world.  
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Part I, entitled Ontology, will be devoted to the problem of ground, its 
identification with the subject and the consequent reduction of nature to a 
mathematised object. In Chapter I we shall explore how the history of metaphysics 
begins with a loss of memory: the falling into oblivion of truth as recalling and the 
emergence of truth as correspondence will be shown to be responsible for the 
emergence of Being as presence. Furthermore, Heidegger’s history of modern 
metaphysics as history of subjectivity will be shown to be incompatible with his 
views on Renaissance Humanism. Chapter II will explore the notion of infinity in 
Bruno, in relation to his attitude towards science and mathematics. Bruno’s 
mathematics of composition will lead him to conceive of nature not as an object but 
as an animated unity that does not require a subject to be granted reality. Chapter III 
will also explore the notion of infinity in Spinoza, which will provide a different 
understanding of distinction, from numerical to real. Substance will be shown in its 
identity with the modes through the notions of extension and intensity, thereby 
excluding the representation of nature as a mere mechanical network of causal links. 
Part II, entitled Gnosiology, will face the problem of knowledge in the absence 
of a subject and the consequences of the disappearance of truth as correspondence. In 
Chapter IV, knowledge will be explored as witnessing the event of truth within the 
open region of what Heidegger calls the clearing, which is covered up by epistemic 
knowledge, characteristic of science and technology. Actual gnosis, as a knowing 
experience of standing within the clearing, will be extracted from Heidegger’s 
philosophical encounter with Heraclitus’ thought and related back to the notion of 
memory. Instances of truth, understood through the notion of clearing, will be found 
in the Humanist tradition and they will lead to Bruno’s theory of knowledge in 
Chapter V. In Bruno’s philosophy the role of man as a knower will be related back to 
his composition as being endowed with hands and not as a subject. Furthermore, 
Bruno’s notion of shadow will be investigated as the latency of truth encountered in 
Heidegger’s clearing. In Chapter VI we shall explore Spinoza’s theory of knowledge 
tackling it from the perspective of distinction of particular things, encountered in the 
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Heideggerian/Heraclitean notion of gnosis. We shall also explore how this relates to 
the Heideggerian essence of knowing by understanding technology from the 
standpoint of power. 
Part III, entitled Ethics, will expand the notion of dwelling in the absence of a 
subject. For Heidegger, in Chapter VII, we shall inquire into the living relation to 
nature and to others. This inquiry will be carried out respectively through a joint 
understanding of the thing as the coming together of the fourfold of earth, sky, 
mortals and gods and the essence of politics as taking care of the gods. Chapter VIII 
will show Bruno’s art of memory as the practice that shows things to be constituted 
by the coming together of infinite relations, the grasping of which takes us to the 
intuition of divine unity, thus relating it to the Heideggerian fourfold. Imagination 
will be a crucial issue in Bruno’s art of memory, as it will be for Spinoza and his 
third kind of knowledge in Chapter IX. The supreme kind of knowledge in Spinoza is 
revealed as an ethical matter, for the intuition of particular essences is dependent 
upon man’s own dwelling experience under the standpoint of eternity. The 
understanding of man under this new, essential perspective with respect to nature 
will allow for a different approach to the collective being-with-one-another that will 
appear through the notion of the multitude. 
The challenge presented by writing on such diverse philosophers was not an 
easy task to face, as issues of terminology, method and different historical and 
cultural contexts make it difficult to undertake a homogeneous discourse and make 
some peculiar traits of these authors irreducible to one another. Nevertheless we 
decided to take on Heidegger’s challenge and explore a thinking that does not require 
the positing of a subject within the Western tradition. Bruno and Spinoza, 
respectively born before and after the official birth of modernity, have sometimes 
been seen as contributors to, sometimes as opponents of it; they are anomalies in 
Heidegger’s account of the history of metaphysics. The encounter with Bruno will be 
conducted through a large selection of his works, from his first writings of more 
explicit Neoplatonic flavour, such as the De umbris idearum, to his increasingly 
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materialistic ones, the De la causa and the Frankfurt poems. Bruno’s works are 
sometimes written in Latin and sometimes in Italian. His sixteenth-century Italian, 
learned in the Kingdom of Naples, is hostile even for the modern mother tongue 
reader and his writings are a flourishing canvas of images, allegories and dramas that 
mirror his whole philosophical quest. As far as Spinoza is concerned, we shall mainly 
refer to his magnum opus, the Ethics, which reflects our treatment of ontology, 
gnosiology and ethics as a globally ethical matter. We shall also occasionally refer to 
his epistles and to the Theological-Political Treatise and the late Political Treatise – 
mainly concerning the notion of multitude. In none of the three cases, of course, will 
we be able to address the complete work of the author, for it is not our intention to 
give a full account of their philosophy. Distortion, which in its most innocent 
connotation means interpretation, will nevertheless take place, for we are here to 
understand how significant these authors are to us and from this encounter neither we 
nor they can emerge “unharmed”. 
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Chapter I – Ground and Subjectivity 
 
 
Section 1 – Thinking as Mνημοσύνη 
 
Memory reveals by retaining. In Greek mythology Mνημοσύνη is mother to the 
Muses and is therefore the source of any creative production, which amounts to 
saying that looking back to the origin is essentially a productive process. Memory 
does not proceed philologically, i.e. it does not treat what it retains as an object of 
study. It is an effort to turn thinking away from Being as presence22 where presencing 
is guaranteed by an objectified ground, along the lines traced by Heidegger but 
directing our efforts to the anomalies characterizing the history of Philosophy. At 
university we are taught to approach a philosophical text critically, which I have 
always taken to mean something along the lines of measuring a philosopher’s 
thinking against a method apprehended within the academic experience. 
Nevertheless, critical thinking intended as a dialectic between conflicting arguments, 
as fashionable as it is in many Philosophy departments, is a valuable technical 
support but is not sufficient in order to think, meaning that it allows us, at best, to 
have a clearer idea of the validity of a conceptual construction and take sides as to 
which method conforms better to our notion of scientific. Questions about whether 
we should practise abortion, problems such as “linguistic injustice” or even the value 
of the Higgs’ boson discovery and its impact on the model of the universe’s birth, are 
dealt with through the vocabulary and the methodology of the natural and social 
                                                
22 «For since the beginning of Philosophy, and with that beginning, the Being of beings has shown 
itself as the ground (archè, aition, principle). The ground is that from which beings as such are what 
they are in their becoming, perishing and persisting as something that can be known, handled and 
worked upon. As the ground, Being brings beings in each case to presencing. The ground shows 
itself as presence. The present of presence consists in the fact that it brings what is present each in 
its own way to presence. In accordance with the given type of presence, the ground as the character 
of grounding as the ontic causation of the actual, the transcendental making possible of the 
objectivity of objects, the dialectical mediation of the movement of absolute spirit and of the 
historical process of production, and the will to power positing values». From M. Heidegger, “The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, in M. Heidegger, Basic Writings, edited by D. Farrel 
Krell, Routledge, Oxon 1993, p. 432. 
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sciences and virtually do not require any philosophical contribution. As important to 
our lives as they are, such issues are already inscribed in a thinking whose tools we 
are given as we are educated in our Western schools or during public and academic 
debates: thus, they require us to be intelligent, educated, informed and critical 
students, scholars or citizens. In these sense we are owned by the very issues we 
address with so much expertise. Memory carries a different contribution: its way of 
demonstration is practice and the outcome of practice is creation, which derives from 
the re-interpreting of the world through memory, whereas analysis needs the world to 
be a stable and unchangeable object. Let us consider Fellini’s Satyricon, where the 
Roman world is represented as a piece of science fiction, as if the Romans were 
Martians, but where the truth of the director’s encounter with the Roman world 
emerges from the shadows of his characters. We shall seek to account for a particular 
truth by encountering it on the field: the state of Philosophy. Enacting memory means 
reactivating the origin – and Fellini’s example is particularly coherent – not by 
representing it monumentally but by projecting it into a future perspective of 
philosophical renovation. We cannot do this without Heidegger, who paved the way 
in this sense but ignored those anomalies that do not fit into his history of 
metaphysics and that can contribute to his thinking project. In order to do this we 
have to walk along Heidegger’s path and design peripheral and secondary turns in 
order for the main road to be revealed as just one of the many practicable paths.   
The necessity of enacting a practice of memory springs from Heidegger’s claim 
that Philosophy has come to its end. Surely we should qualify this claim. 
Nevertheless, we cannot help wondering how we are supposed to deal with it if 
Philosophy has come to an end. In The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, 
an important lecture delivered in 1964, Heidegger draws our attention on how to deal 
with such an apparent paradox: 
 
Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole – the world, man, 
God – with respect to Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being. 
Metaphysics thinks beings as beings in the manner of a representational thinking that 
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gives grounds. […] What characterizes metaphysical thinking, which seeks out the 
ground for beings, is the fact that metaphysical thinking, starting out from what is 
present, represents it in its presence and thus exhibits it as grounded by its ground. 
What is meant by the talk about the end of philosophy? We understand the end of 
something all too easily in the negative sense as mere cessation, as the lack of 
continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the 
end of philosophy, means the completion of metaphysics. However, completion does 
not mean perfection, as a consequence of which philosophy would have to have attained 
the highest perfection at its end. 23 
 
Heidegger’s diagnosis is precise: he is facing the whole Western tradition, from our 
most advanced sciences to our everyday understanding of the world. The end is not 
an element of duration: metaphysics has not reached its aim, which is the grounding 
of all knowledge on a firm base; it has exhausted itself by its definitive translation 
into modern science and its technological drift: 
 
We forget that already in the age of Greek philosophy a decisive characteristic of 
philosophy appears: the development of the sciences within the field that philosophy 
opened up. The development of the sciences is at the same time their separation from 
philosophy and the establishment of their independence. This process belongs to the 
completion of philosophy.24 
 
Heidegger posits a problem that is potentially easy to ignore: we have evidence that 
technology can actually solve those problems that it creates; we can refine our 
predictions about the environment and about the economy, scientific research has 
known no boundaries yet. There seems to be little reason to worry if Philosophy, as 
such, has become irrelevant to most people. Even universities often promote 
philosophy as a good training in analytical skills that offer their services to the natural 
and the social sciences, thus playing a subordinate role. Alternatively, the general 
public sees it as an enterprise of erudition or as an appendix of poetry and literature. 
If we reflect upon Heidegger’s statement that «metaphysics thinks beings as a whole 
– the world, man, God», we can understand why Western civilization has come to a 
point where ignoring the issue Heidegger posits means covering up the fact that the 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 433. 
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only ground we can provide for our culture is technological strength. Metaphysics has 
found its ground in its very outcome – the modern sciences – and has fulfilled its 
claims for universality through the force of its technology, thus making notions such 
as man, the world and God the only possible ones and Western man the keeper of 
such unitary thought, which, nevertheless, is untenable. This is what Heidegger 
means when he affirms: «The end of philosophy means the beginning of the world 
civilization that is based upon Western European thinking»25.  We can hear the echo 
of the late Husserl who, in the Crisis, illuminates and informs this point better than 
Heidegger himself: 
 
Philosophy and science would accordingly be the historical movement through which 
universal reason, “inborn” in humanity as such, is revealed.  
This would be the case if the as yet unconcluded movement [of modern philosophy] had 
proved to be the entelechy, properly started on the way to pure realization, or if reason 
had in fact become manifest, fully conscious of itself in its own essential form i.e. the 
form of a universal philosophy which grows through consistent apodictic insights and 
supplies its own norms through an apodictic method. Only then could it be decided 
whether European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea, rather than being 
merely an empirical anthropological type like “China” or “India”; it could be decided 
whether the spectacle of the Europeanization of all other civilizations bears witness to 
the rule of an absolute meaning, one which is proper to the sense, rather than to a 
historical non-sense, of the world.26 
 
 
Neither Husserl nor any other thinker has provided that necessary theoretical 
grounding. We can positively claim that modern philosophy has anything but proved 
to be apodictic if not by its historical supremacy derived from the force of its 
technology, thus leading the anthropological types China or India to adopt and adapt 
its ready-made concepts and theories. We are not talking of spontaneous cultural 
contamination, we are talking of a violent imposition. I have allowed myself to use 
such extreme words on the account of the fact that the Western quest for unitary 
thought is indeed at the root of our thinking and is theoretically unresolved and 
                                                
25 Ibid., p. 435. 
26 E. Husserl, The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. An introduction 
to phenomenological philosophy, translated by D. Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 
1970, p. 16. 
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insoluble. In The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot reports and interprets the story of 
Admetus, the founder of dialogue, thus capturing the problem we have introduced 
here: «I think of what Apollo affirms when, through the mouth of the poet 
Bacchylides, he says to Admetus: “You are a mere mortal; therefore your mind must 
harbour two thoughts at once.” In other words, a multiplicity of speech in the 
simultaneity of one language»27. Unitary thought belongs to the gods and yet 
Admetus, on the divine model, wishes to resolve the problem by establishing a 
dialogue between two equals: «It is because dialogue is founded on the reciprocity of 
words and the equality of speakers; only two “I”s can establish a relation of dialogue, 
each one acknowledging in the second “I” the same power to speak as his own, each 
considering himself equal to the other and seeing in the other nothing than another 
“Self”. This is the paradise of decorous idealism. But we know, first of all, that there 
is almost no sort of equality in our societies. […] All speech is a word of command, 
of terror, of seduction, of resentment, flattery or aggression; all speech is violence 
[…]»28. The absolute I, derived from mutual recognition, which finds in Fichte and 
Hegel its supreme theorists, is indeed a form of violence. The message Blanchot is 
delivering is that Western man reduces the irreducible problem of difference to a 
problem of uniformity and conformism; that is the reason, we say, why the 
«anthropological types “China” and “India”» are feared and considered only once 
they have been reduced to interlocutors within our own dialogue, reduced to 
uniformity and thus escaping the warning of Apollo, that humans are not gods and 
thus have to bear two thoughts at once, not mediate between them, else «in the 
interrelational space, dialogue, and the equality dialogue presupposes, tend to do 
nothing other than increase entropy, just as dialectical communication, requiring two 
antagonistic poles charged with contrary words and provoking a common current 
through this opposition, is itself, after brilliant bursts, destined to die out in entropic 
                                                
27 M. Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, translation and foreword by Susan Hanson, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London 2011, p. 80. 
28 Ibid., p. 81. 
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identity»29. The great Western civilization and its achievements have been reached 
through the suppression of difference, thus bearing the seed of a self-dissolution 
within the indifference of unitary thought. This happens politically – Husserl is rather 
prophetic about China and India – but also within the academic world, which bears 
the same seeds. This is exactly the reason why I have therefore embraced the notion 
of the end of philosophy. Heidegger, in this sense, leads the way but we shall see that 
the monolithic history of metaphysics he provides is sometimes an obstacle, as the 
access to that lost multiplicity has to be found within Western thought by recalling to 
memory the secondary paths that have been abandoned or truncated. 
At the dawn of metaphysics, Plato gives memory a prominent role in thinking: in 
the Phaedo30, as a matter of fact, recollection is presented as the access to those forms 
that enable humans to acquire knowledge through everyday sensory interaction with 
objects, a doctrine whose premises had been laid out in the Meno. Memory 
constitutes, then, the access to the disembodied soul, to man’s noblest and eternal 
part. Nevertheless, if we go beyond the mythical image of the soul freed from the 
body, provided by Plato, we realize that in Plato’s doctrine the question of Being still 
resonates, the problem of how man can say that something is: «Our sense perceptions 
must surely make us realize all that we perceive through them is striving to reach that 
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30 «Therefore, if we had this knowledge, we knew before birth and immediately after not only the 
Equal but the Greater and the Smaller and all such things, for our present argument is no more 
about the Equal than about the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just, the Pious and, as I say 
about all those things we mark with the seal of “what it is”, both when we are putting questions and 
answering them. So we must have acquired knowledge of them all before we were born. 
That is so. 
If, having acquired this knowledge in each case, we have not forgotten it, we remain knowing and 
have and have knowledge throughout our life, for to know is to acquire knowledge, keep it and not 
lose it. Do we call the losing of knowledge forgetting?  
Most certainly, Socrates, he said. 
But, I think, if we acquired this knowledge before birth, then lost it at birth, and then later by the use 
of our senses in connection with those objects we mentioned, we recovered the knowledge we had 
before, would not what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge, and we are right to 
call this recollection? 
Certainly». Phaedo 75C-E. From Plato, “Phaedo”, in Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. 
Cooper, Hackett, Indianapolis 1997, p. 66. 
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which is Equal but falls short of it»31. Again, a witness of man’s duality tending 
towards unitary thought; just as in Admetus’ case, difference can only be made sense 
of by appealing to an inborn form of the Equal – Western thinking is in the cradle. In 
this case, though, the appeal to memory complicates matters as it gives in to the fact 
that the reconciliation of our duality is kept in the divine sphere, in which we 
participate by having a soul but which we cannot access completely until we have a 
body. In other words, the multiplicity of beings makes sense only insofar as we 
distinguish them through an act of recollection. As such, Plato can be considered a 
metaphysical thinker if and only if we take his doctrine of the soul in a modern and 
Cartesian sense, thus objectifying the body and all those beings the body interacts 
with. It is the role of memory that prevents Plato’s doctrine from crashing into a 
schematic metaphysical model because memory is the tension that constitutes man’s 
nearness to beings and which keeps them distinguished in their multiplicity. In Plato, 
dialogue is not a dispute of opposing arguments where two interlocutors recognize 
each other’s equality – and Socrates’ irony constitutes evidence for this – it is the 
manifestation of the irreducible difference that makes thinking possible. When Plato 
claims that there must be an inborn form of the Equal in order to recognize that a 
stick is a stick and such a form can only be activated through recollection, he is 
saying that man’s being amongst beings is not that of a perceiving animal amongst 
inert objects; yet, that inborn form has to be recollected through the interaction of the 
senses with the beings themselves. Memory, then, is the thinking that preserves the 
reciprocal belonging of man and beings to Being: beings are not seen as objects, they 
are seen as something whose coming into being has to be recalled. This should be 
compared with Heidegger’s affirmation, found in What is called Thinking?, which 
provides an account of memory: 
 
Memory, in the sense of human thinking that recalls, dwells where everything that gives 
food for thought is kept in safety. We shall call it the “keeping”. It harbours and 
conceals what gives us food for thought. “Keeping” alone gives freely what is to-be-
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thought, what is most thought-provoking, it frees it as a gift. But the keeping is not 
something that is apart from and outside of what is most thought-provoking. The 
keeping itself is the most thought-provoking thing, itself is its mode of giving – giving 
itself which ever and always is food for thought. Memory, as the human recall of what 
must be thought about, consists in the “keeping” of what is most thought-provoking.32 
 
Loss of memory, then, threatens the very possibility of thinking, so much so that, a 
few pages later, Heidegger claims that «the history of Western thought begins, not by 
thinking what is most thought-provoking, but by letting it remain forgotten. Western 
thought, thus begins with an omission, perhaps even a failure. […] The beginning of 
Western thought is not the same as its origin. […] The origin keeps itself concealed 
in the beginning»33. We can interpret this claim in the light of the fact that Western 
thought renounces the mnemonic effort of thinking by covering up under a 
metaphysical structure that which has to be remembered, serving somehow as 
grounding for the physical one: «the ground has the character of ontic causation of 
the actual, the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects»34. That is 
how «Plato’s thinking remains decisive in its sundry forms. Platonism is 
metaphysics»35. Nevertheless, Platonism is metaphysics which recalls an origin that 
is placed and identified precisely within the realm of our disembodied souls, in virtue 
of the fact that our senses could not otherwise recognize that a stick is a stick or that a 
horse is a horse. The abandonment of the mnemonic effort amounts to decreasing the 
tension, it means a definitive objectification of the ground as ὑποκείμενον, the 
ultimate translation of Being as presence and the beginning of the metaphysical 
adventure.  
In Plato «”The good” grants the appearing of the visible form in which whatever 
is present has its stability in that which it is»36, which means that it guarantees the 
                                                
32 M. Heidegger, What is called Thinking?, translated by J. Glenn Gray, Harper Perennial, New 
York 2004, pp. 150-151. 
33 Ibid., p. 152. 
34 See n. 22. 
35 From M. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, in M. Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, p. 433. 
36 M. Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”, in M. Heidegger, Pathmarks, edited by W. McNeill 
Cambridge University Press, New York 2007, p. 176. 
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presencing of beings, and yet this is vitiated, in the crucial myth of the cave, by a 
substantial ambiguity which concerns the essence of truth, where unconcealment 
(ἀλήθεια) is still present but conflates into correctness (ὀρθά), which amounts to 
correspondence with the idea of the Good. Unconcealment, which amounts to 
revelation through retention, characterizes truth in the traditional Greek sense but is 
now subordinated to correctness. Its being congruent with the idea of the Good 
guarantees the unhiddenness of what comes to the fore, what is present. Nevertheless, 
such a relationship of correspondence between truth and Being hides the very 
uncovering of the hidden, thus making presence a relation of cause and effect, and 
shutting off memory, which keeps and frees what is «most thought-provoking», 
namely unconcealment. Unconcealment is forgotten if Being is understood as 
presence, which progressively turns, through Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and 
Scholasticism, into adaequatio intellectus ad rem. On the other hand, memory is what 
makes possible the recalling of unconcealment, as opposed to its crystallization into 
presence. If unconcealment as such is the transition of truth from what is kept to what 
is free, then truth as correctness represents the denial of such a transition; in practical 
terms, truth as correctness abstracts beings by turning them into isolated objects. The 
very possibility for Being to let beings appear is granted by the fact that beings are in 
virtue of Being revealing itself through its own concealing. This revelation is 
constituted by nothing but the beings themselves: Being retreats and is kept in safety 
for beings to be. The ambiguity in relation to Plato permeates the notion of the 
beginning of Western thought, where Plato, who is not stricto sensu a metaphysical 
thinker yet, paves the way for metaphysics itself. The practice of memory is the 
residual awareness of an origin as something that needs to be brought forth not 
through a form of contemplation or of strict argumentation but in virtue of a constant 
work of recollection which transits through the senses. In an earlier work of 1933, 
Heidegger had suggested a representation of the Platonic ambiguity through the myth 
of the cave: 
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The ideas give the appearance of beings, that is, their Being. Becoming free for the light 
means making the effort to authentically understand what things are, binding oneself to 
the essential law of things on the basis on which we first grasp things in their Being-
such-and-such. 
The freer we become and the more originally we bind ourselves to the essential laws of 
things, the nearer we come to beings and the more we come to be. In each case, the 
degree and the extent of human actuality depends on the degree and greatness of human 
freedom. This freedom is not lack of restraint; rather, it is all the greater the more 
originary and broad the binding of man is, the more that in his comportment, man sets 
his Being back into the roots of his Dasein, into the fundamental domains into which he 
is thrown as a historical being.37 
 
In Heidegger’s interpretation, the nearness to the origin translates into the 
coessentiality of knowledge and freedom, thus implicitly revealing the significance of 
the Platonic paradox: that metaphysics itself is a historical occurrence of Dasein and 
«belongs to the “nature of human being”»38. The error Heidegger denounces at the 
dawn of Philosophy is the forgetting of the essence of metaphysics as the obliteration 
of such nearness. That is the reason we are not truly convinced by criticisms such as 
Bernd Magnus’, who holds that Heidegger fails to capture the essence of Plato’s truth 
theory: «Clearly the philosopher-king’s discerning gaze is not made “right” merely 
by corresponding to its object, for this would be true also of opinion: doxa. The 
“rightness” of cognition is determined by something which is antecedently real; 
namely, the object in its truth»39. Magnus may well be right in saying that 
correspondence also applies to opinion but he misses the crucial point that what is 
«antecedently real», the object in its truth, is such only in virtue of the fact that it is 
an objectified standard of truth. The particular being in its actuality is lost in favour 
of such standard, unless the mnemonic tension, which is what keeps the belonging of 
the being to its Being, is maintained. The tension is progressively reduced and 
«binding oneself to the essential law of things» becomes impossible. The difference 
between a stick and another stick is abstracted as “stickness” in order to make sense 
                                                
37 M. Heidegger, Being as Truth, transl. by G. Fried and R. Polt, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington 2010, p. 125. 
38 M. Heidegger, “What is metaphysics?”, in M. Heidegger, Pathmarks, edited by W. McNeill, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 2007, p. 96. 
39 B. Magnus, Heidegger’s Metahistory of Philosophy. Amor Fati, Being and Truth, Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1970, p. 80.  
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of the fact that we recognize two different objects both as sticks: memory is thus 
replaced by the application of some inborn form of the Equal. It is this form of the 
Equal that gets in the way between beings and their Being, annihilating the mnemonic 
tension in the same way as Admetus escapes the condition of bearing two thoughts at 
once. Metaphysics, if we interpret Heidegger, is the breaking and the solution of this 
tension, where ideas are no longer characterized as the source of unconcealment but 
as a transcendent «object in its truth», as Magnus would have it. Magnus, who 
accuses Heidegger of building a metahistory of Philosophy vitiated by his own 
ontology, supposing to give a historical – and not metahistorical – account of Plato, 
objectifies the ground from a strong and fully developed a posteriori metaphysical 
point of view, which can hardly be present in the development of Platonic thinking. It 
would be as if we claimed that a classic such as Ben Hur were truer to the Roman 
world than Fellini’s Satyricon: in the case of Ben Hur the pretence of a supposedly 
historical and faithful reproduction does not constitute a practice of memory as it 
reproduces a present view in its presence, which tells us nothing about the Romans if 
not what we wish the Romans to be like; in the case of the Satyricon, Fellini’s 
mnemonic act captures the Roman world together with the irreducible distance from 
it through a creative act, which treats the Romans as if they were Martians, thus 
representing their truth in their difference. That is an instance of Mνημοσύνη as 
mother of the Muses. 
The crystallization of Platonic ideas as an objectified ground, just like Admetus’ 
effort to reduce difference to equality, is thus perfectly coherent with Husserl’s 
synthesis of the crisis of the West. The enacting of the reduction of such difference 
within thinking itself, and the consequent obliteration of difference in worldly affairs, 
is translated into technological violence and supremacy over the other 
“anthropological types”. Technology, which we shall discuss in Part II, buries 
questioning under its efficiency and practically translates the unitary thought that 
cannot be achieved in thinking. Technology has no memory, since it needs to 
obliterate what came before as old and useless; it is the utmost affirmation of 
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presence and it only possesses itself as a parameter. This is why the recognition of 
China and India as interlocutors only happens once they are technologically equal 
and their difference has also been culturally cancelled. The ground has become 
common, not in virtue of a successful theoretical effort, but of its technological 
projection. In metaphysics, then, what is irreducible is thus forgotten. Similarly, what 
remains of truth as unconcealment, which is, as a matter of fact, irreducible, is also 
forgotten in its vicissitudinal event. What is at stake here is that, whereas 
unconcealment can account for the belonging of beings in Being, as Heidegger would 
have it, ground can account, at most, for a transcendental categorial relation between 
Being and beings, a relation of utmost universality or of mere and empty self-
evidence.40 
  
Section 2 – The Renaissance Anomaly 
 
The obliteration of memory has taken us to the objectification of ground. 
Modernity, as we know it, has its source in a particular interpretation of such 
objectified ground. Despite the waves of postmodernism and even of post-
postmodernism we have experienced in the academic, intellectual and artistic world, I 
believe our time has not fully dealt with modernity as such and we are yet to 
appreciate its genesis and its omissions. Ground is the key factor in such an 
appreciation. It is through a radical transformation of ὑποκείμενον, operated by 
Descartes through his methodological doubt, that ground is turned into subjectivity in 
virtue of its being indubitable. Cassirer expressed a clear view of how he saw the 
Cartesian move: «And thus we date the beginning of modern philosophy from 
Descartes’ principle of the Cogito. This beginning appears not to have been 
historically mediated; it rests, as Descartes himself felt and said, upon a free act of the 
mind. With one blow, with an independent, unique decision, the mind rejects the 
                                                
40 See M. Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Blackwell, 
Oxford 2004, pp. 22-23. 
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whole of the past and must now go along the new path towards thoughtful reflection 
upon itself. This is not a question of gradual evolution but of a genuine ‘revolution’ 
in the mode of thought»41. What is interesting is that Cassirer argues that the bold 
Cartesian thinking act was, indeed, prepared by the antecedent Renaissance culture 
and philosophy which, due to its inorganic, disorganized and mystical nature, failed 
to reach the full maturity of the subject-object problem. Our reading of the 
Renaissance in relation to the issue of modernity and that of the subject is different 
and we shall show it starting from Heidegger’s history of metaphysics. This may 
appear as an odd move because Heidegger, from a philosophical point of view, has 
little more than contempt for the Renaissance: «We encounter the first humanism in 
Rome: it therefore remains in essence a specifically Roman phenomenon, which 
emerges from the encounter of Roman civilization with the culture of late Greek 
civilization. The so-called Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in 
Italy is a renascentia romanitatis»42. The Renaissance, according to Heidegger, is a 
phenomenon that promotes the revival of an era and a thinking that is already far 
from the origin and is endowed with a strongly established view on man and nature. 
This may be true to an extent but causes Heidegger to ignore almost two centuries of 
flourishing philosophical thinking between Scholasticism and Modernity. And it is 
precisely Heidegger’s criticism of Modernity that will take us back into the arms of 
the Renaissance. 
In order to evaluate the relevance of the Renaissance we shall move back to the 
problem of ground and point out that Heidegger and Cassirer have a very different 
reading of the Cartesian Cogito. Heidegger sees the subjective turn of Descartes as 
the beginning of a thinking that resolves the metaphysical project into subjectivity as 
ground, which is functional to the development of the modern sciences and their 
technological drift. Furthermore, his history of metaphysics sees a constant and 
                                                
41 E. Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, translated with an 
introduction by M. Domandi, Chicago University Press [1963], Chicago 2010, p. 123. 
42 M. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, from M.Heidegger, Basic Writings, pp. 224-225. 
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coherent development of subjectivity from Descartes, through Hegel and all the way 
to Husserl: 
 
With Descartes’ ego cogito, says Hegel, philosophy steps on firm ground for the first 
time, where it can be at home. If the fundamentum absolutum is attained with the ego 
cogito as the distinctive subiectum, this means that the subject is the hypokeimenon 
transferred to consciousness, is what truly presences; and this, vaguely enough, is called 
“substance”, in traditional terminology. 
When Hegel explains in the Preface (ed. Hoffmeister, p. 19) “The true (in philosophy) is 
to be understood and expressed, not as substance but, just as much, as subject”, then this 
means: the Being of beings, the presence of what is present, is manifest and thus 
complete presence only when it becomes present as such for itself in the absolute idea. 
But, since Descartes, idea means perceptio. Being’s coming to itself occurs in 
speculative dialectic. Only the movement of the idea, the method, is the matter itself. 
The call “to the thing itself” requires a philosophical method appropriate to its matter. 
[…] A hundred years later, the call “to the thing itself” again is heard in Husserl’s 
treatise Philosophy as Rigorous Science.43 
 
Whereas Descartes, for Cassirer, through an independent intellectual act, brings to 
fruition a process that developed progressively throughout the Renaissance, 
Heidegger explains the Cogito as a complete change of perspective. The subiectum, 
which in Scholasticism constituted the actual object, the res to which the intellectus 
had to achieve its adaequatio, comes now to coincide with the ego, thus generating 
the modern subject, which conflates with ground, thus becoming itself ὑποκείμενον. 
Furthermore, the newly constituted subject-object relation turns from an ontological 
to an epistemological standpoint as ideas become perceptions: bodies, matter or res 
extensa in general, are only insofar as they are known, i.e. insofar as they are an 
object of science. That is the reason why method is the key to modernity: it is central 
to the development of the modern sciences as we know them and to the progressive 
loss of the unity of knowledge.   
Despite the difference of their positions, both Cassirer and Heidegger fail to see 
something in their understanding of the Renaissance. Cassirer argues that the 
Renaissance could not be considered fully modern due to a number of shortcomings 
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and ambiguities that prevented it from becoming truly scientific, such as the constant 
presence of magic and mysticism44. Such a judgement appears rather hasty if we 
consider that a great amount of the Renaissance intellectual production is foreign to 
any magical or mystical practice and still close to Aristotelian positions, of which 
Bruni and Pomponazzi are important examples45. Furthermore, Cassirer seems to 
project, a posteriori, a modern point of view on the Renaissance as if its historical 
and philosophical task were to resolve the subject-object tension, describing different 
attempts to achieve an empirical and purely scientific practice: «[…] the Quattrocento 
and the Cinquecento had to steer a different course. Theirs was the task of making the 
concept of nature independent and of securing for it a strong, strictly ‘objective’ 
character. When this had been accomplished, one could – indeed, one had to – again 
raise the question of the relationship of this new realm of nature to the world of 
‘consciousness’ and ‘spirit’. Once again, the ‘correspondence’, the ‘harmony’ of 
these two worlds is sought; but now it presupposes the autonomy and the independent 
determination of each member of the relationship. It seems manifest that the 
Renaissance discovered and championed this independence of nature by means of 
immediate, sensible-empirical observation»46. If this amounts to the rejection of the 
old Aristotelian categories and the adoption of a direct relationship with nature – 
which was the case with authors such as Bruno – we agree with Cassirer, but 
affirming that this presupposes the autonomy of each member of the man-nature 
                                                
44 «The Renaissance philosophy of nature never succeeds in removing magic from its path. In the 
writings of Giordano Bruno, the problems of ‘natural magic’ take up so much room that they 
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relationship is hard to sustain for the Renaissance as a whole. Cassirer himself, in the 
previous chapter of his work, confirms such an attitude towards nature, thus 
contradicting himself: «There is a decidedly ethical stand even in the natural 
philosophy and cosmology of Bruno, a thinker whom we are accustomed to 
considering the typical representative of the ‘naturalistic’ tendencies of the 
Renaissance. Through the heroic passion that ignites within him, man becomes equal 
to nature and able to comprehend its infinity and its incommensurability»47. How 
Cassirer can claim that such premises pave the way for the achievement of a mature 
subject-object dichotomy is unclear, if the only justification for the alleged failure of 
the Renaissance in meeting such a goal is the presence of magic and mysticism. In 
Part III of this work we shall see how magic is not a mere esoteric leftover of times 
ruled by fear and superstition but an integrated part of philosophy aiming at building 
a close relationship between man and nature, which will be brusquely interrupted by 
the rise of the Cogito. That will also be Spinoza’s aim, yet through a completely 
different method. One last point we should underline in order to provide a fair sketch 
of Cassirer’s view is his praise of Leonardo da Vinci who, according to him, is a 
direct precursor of Galileo in his objective look upon nature – both in the artistic and 
in the scientific realms – and, most of all, in his use of mathematics as the main 
access to nature: «Leonardo’s true intellectual greatness lies in this formulation of the 
problem, of the ‘theme’ of exact science. Reason is the immanent, unbreakable law 
governing nature. Sense, sensation, or the immediate feeling for life can no longer 
serve as the means by which we assimilate nature and discover her secret. Only 
thought proves to be truly equal to nature; only ‘the principle of sufficient reason’, 
which Leonardo considers a principle of mathematical explanation. Now, we can 
begin to grasp and appreciate the significance of Leonardo’s influence upon 
Galileo»48. At first glance, it seems, then, that the Renaissance hosts two different 
attitudes, one of which will be particularly fruitful once it is elevated to system and 
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method, which is exactly what Descartes does. Nevertheless, we suspect that even in 
Leonardo da Vinci’s case Cassirer advances and provides a retrospective view that is 
distorted by an excessive faith in the inevitable destiny of modernity. If it is true, on 
the one hand, that both Leonardo and Galileo fight against what was a purely 
speculative view of science, typical of Scholasticism, ontologically it is still up to 
nature to provide the forms of the true and not to the rational subject. This is 
perfectly coherent with Leonardo’s attitude towards nature, which gives priority to 
the saper vedere [Italian for ‘being able to see’], an attitude that is diametrically 
opposed to the Cartesian objectification of nature. Mathematics is, indeed, another 
crucial point, as we shall see in the next chapter; in fact, depending on which 
ontological setting it is inscribed in, its hold upon nature greatly differs. This element 
makes a smooth succession of Galilean science to Renaissance maths not so obvious. 
Heidegger’s critique of Galilean mathematics, as a matter of fact, provides a 
rather striking point against Cassirer’s pacific continuity between the Renaissance 
and modernity, even though Heidegger does not even take the former into 
consideration. Heidegger speaks of an actual Galilean mathematical project, which 
deeply contradicts a view of nature belonging to Leonardo. Galileo’s observation of 
nature is not merely counterintuitive, it openly contradicts the observed facts. 
Heidegger reports the famous example of the fall of two bodies characterized by 
different mass, which should fall equally fast and touch the ground together, if 
dropped from the same height – the leaning tower of Pisa, for instance. During the 
famous experiment, the bodies did not fall with the same speed and apparently 
disproved Galileo’s theory. Heidegger illustrates the event as follows: 
 
Both Galileo and his opponents saw the same “fact”. But they interpreted the same fact 
differently and made the same happening visible to themselves in different ways. 
Indeed, what appeared for them as the essential fact and truth was something different. 
Both thought something along with the same appearance but they thought something 
different, not only about the single case, but fundamentally, regarding the essence of a 
body and its motion. What Galileo thought in advance about motion was the 
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determination that the motion of every body is uniform and rectilinear, when every 
obstacle is excluded, but that it also changes uniformly when an equal force affects it.49 
 
Galileo openly bends nature to the abstractions of the intellect, against those juxta 
propria principia that are in contrast with the Aristotelian categories, without needing 
to turn nature into an object. In Galileo’s system the truth does not lie in nature, it lies 
in the perceptio, perfectly in tune with the Cartesian Cogito: the man-nature 
relationship is a purely epistemological one but it is also a hierarchical one if the 
substratum where truth has to be found is no longer nature but the intellect: 
 
The mathematical is, as mente concipere, a project of thingness which, as it were, skips 
over things. The project first opens a domain where things – i.e. facts – show 
themselves. 
In this projection is posited that which things are taken as, what and how they are to be 
evaluated beforehand. Such evaluation is called in Greek axioō. The anticipating 
determinations and assertions in the project are axiōmata. […] Insofar as every science 
and cognition is expressed in propositions, the cognition that is taken and posited in the 
mathematical project is of such a kind as to set things upon their foundations in 
advance. The axioms are fundamental propositions.50 
 
 
Galileo’s method, then, cannot be defined as experimental in the sense of Francis 
Bacon: Galileo is the true founder of modern science in virtue of a method that 
projects subjectivity upon an objective nature, measured and predicted according to a 
number of axiomatic assumptions and the mathematical model. As Galileo himself 
affirms in the Saggiatore: «[…] philosophy is written in the great book of nature, 
which lies constantly before our eyes, but which no one can read unless he has first 
learned to understand the ciphers in which it is composed, i.e. the mathematical 
figures and their relationships»51. The axiom lies in the affirmation that nobody can 
read nature without the fundamental mathematical tool according to which the book 
of nature is written: it is obvious that every observation is necessarily filtered through 
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the previously projected mathematical interpretation of nature, which excludes any 
alternative reading. The ontological foundation of such truth can be nothing but the 
rational subject in which mathematics finds its origin, which drives the ground to 
shift from a nature in which man participates as a whole to one where man suffers an 
irreconcilable dualism as nature, together with man’s own body, become objects. 
Thus the nearness of Renaissance man to nature is, once and for all, broken.  
The ontological correspondent of the Galilean move, the Cartesian cogito, 
applies a similar technique in order to legitimize the methodological doubt. The 
standards for establishing the sum inferred from the cogitatio are just as axiomatic as 
Galileo’s assumptions about nature. Ricoeur’s comment on Heidegger’s critique of 
the cogito underlines this aspect particularly well: «First, the structure is the denial of 
the priority of the self-positing or of the self-asserting of the cogito. This is not to be 
taken in the sense that the question as question would imply a degree of uncertainty 
and of doubt lacking in the cogito. This opposition is still an epistemological one. An 
objection against the Cartesian cogito will be precisely that it starts with a previous 
model of certitude and places itself on the epistemological basis, which has been 
raised as a mirror of certitude. Thus the structure of the question is not defined by its 
epistemological degree, so to speak, or by the fact that if we raise a question it is 
because we are not certain. No. What is important in the question is that it is ruled by 
the questioned – by the thing about which the question is asked»52. Heidegger 
himself, Ricoeur argues, starts off his philosophical adventure in Sein und Zeit from 
the questioner itself, the one for whom Being is an issue – Dasein – and for whom 
the question of Being has been forgotten. Again, memory is the dividing line between 
Descartes’ and Heidegger’s approach: Descartes founds his thinking on the 
bracketing of all prior knowledge and the certainty of what remains indubitable, that 
is the questioner himself, who considers himself an absolute foundation of all 
knowledge – on the basis of which he can start building up the edifice of knowledge 
                                                
52 P. Ricoeur, ‘Heidegger and the Question of the Subject’, in P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of 
Interpretations, edited by Don Ihde, Continuum, London 2004, p. 221. 
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through reason and logic – and he therefore has no memory; in Heidegger, memory is 
a necessity for thinking whereas forgetfulness is the possibility of living through a 
mode of Being that does not question its own foundation: the questioner is a 
historical instance of man, that is Dasein, who has forgotten that very question that 
makes it what it is, the question of Being. In other words Heidegger starts Sein und 
Zeit by admitting the historical success of a certain mode of Being, that is the 
Cartesian “I”, which has provided the ontological substratum for modern science. 
Such an ontological substratum is based, nevertheless, on a purely epistemological 
act. 
Heidegger underlines the fact that Descartes shakes Philosophy from its 
medieval impasse, where all that was left was not only subordinated to theology but 
also lost in extremely abstract and fruitless analyses of concepts. Again, he omits two 
whole centuries of Renaissance philosophy, with their different outcomes and lively 
debates, which range from Aristotelian to Neoplatonic positions, from the new 
philological tools of approaching the texts to the reflection on the new scientific and 
geographical discoveries. Ernesto Grassi is probably the scholar who has most clearly 
underlined Heidegger’s shortcoming in this sense. In his work Heidegger and the 
Question of Renaissance Humanism he quotes a key Heideggerian passage that seems 
to shed some light on the paradox of Heidegger’s omission: 
 
Memory, the gathered thinking that recalls, is the source and the ground of poeticizing. 
Hence, the essence of poetry rests upon thinking….As long, of course, as we conceive 
of thinking according to what logic tells us about it, as long as we do not seriously take 
note that all logic is already fixed upon a particular kind of thinking, then we will not be 
able to recognize that, and to what extent, poeticizing rests upon thinking that recalls.53 
 
If Descartes provides a new foundation for philosophy, then faith in logical thinking, 
which also characterized medieval disputes, remains intact, indeed, it is provided 
with a more adequate ground upon which it can flourish, that is subjective thinking. 
                                                
53 From M. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfüllingen, 1978), p. 131, in E. Grassi, Heidegger 
and the Question of Renaissance Humanism: Four Studies, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and 
Studies, New York 1983, p. 75. Translation from German by E. Grassi. 
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Due to such indissoluble unity of subject and logical thinking, method actually 
becomes an end in itself to be pursued as it expresses the highest manifestation of the 
new identity of rational man as ground. The old adaequatio intellectus ad rem is 
resolved in an overwhelming victory for the human “I” at the expense not only of the 
human body but of nature itself, which becomes measurable and predictable 
according to the standards of the “I”: «As I doubt I must admit that “I am”. The “I”, 
accordingly, is indubitable. As the doubter, Descartes forced men into doubt in this 
way: he led them to think of themselves, of their “I”. Thus the “I”, human 
subjectivity, came to be declared the centre of thought»54. The poetic and the 
mnemonic are relegated to a gregarious role not simply because they are functional to 
the new course of science but because they cannot be reduced to unitary thought as 
they are an expression of a truth in transit, which reveals by concealing: memory and 
its images are not a collection of facts but a production of truth through the 
concealing of what is forgotten and what is not shown, they are witnesses to the 
irreducible, they are the very practice of ἀλήθεια. This aspect, despite the 
Aristotelian and theological apparatus of intellectual and ecclesiastical power centres, 
is more than latent in medieval popular culture. People’s encounter with the word 
does not happen through logical reasoning but through metaphors, stories, imagery, 
although burdened by the Christian – and thus metaphysical – ballast. This aspect is 
recovered and refined throughout the Renaissance with the aim of recovering the 
ancient harmony with nature and not as a mere revival of romanitas. Says Grassi: 
«For the Humanists, metaphor has primacy over all rational, deductive learning and 
knowledge. A further insight is that languages – and along with them the gods and 
customs of people – arise, flourish and decay. Time results from the experience and 
the historicity of metaphors by which reality emerges from concealment»55. As long 
as memory, i.e. thinking, guarantees the emergence of time, then life is not reducible 
to a measurable occurrence, and its truth lies in the event of unconcealment. Logical 
                                                
54 M. Heidegger, ‘Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics’, in M. Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, p. 297. 
55 E. Grassi, Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism, p. 76. 
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thinking does not think itself, as it does not have memory of its own occurrence, 
thereby establishing itself as the standard for truth as correspondence, which, through 
the Galilean and Cartesian revolution, comes to coincide with correctness.  
For the moment we are led not to share Cassirer’s view that sees the 
Renaissance as a natural precursor of modernity; if we cannot speak of a Renaissance 
thinking as a whole, we deem some of its expressions as radically alien to the modern 
one.  How Heidegger could not see this is still rather surprising. In the course of this 
work we shall attempt to show that the Renaissance is the lost opportunity of Western 
thinking and contains a radical alternative to that modernity that Heidegger so 
strongly thwarted. In Heidegger’s history of metaphysics the Renaissance does not 
even find a proper place, as if it were a mere accident. That is the reason why this 
work is inspired by such an anomaly and by its effects. What really is at stake here is 
not an obtuse condemnation of modernity and repudiation of science but a different 
appreciation of it. Giordano Bruno’s thought, one of the boldest products of the 
Renaissance, and Spinoza, who retains important Brunian elements beyond the 
Cartesian threshold, will be our Polar stars. Heidegger himself, inadvertently, 
suggests this experiment when, in his study of Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of 
Human Freedom, he addresses Spinoza in a rather blunt and dismissive fashion: 
 
But this system [Spinoza’s system: ed.] only became possible on the foundation of a 
peculiar one-sidedness which will be discussed56. In addition, it became possible 
because the metaphysical fundamental concepts of medieval scholasticism were simply 
built into the system with a rare lack of criticalness. The mathesis universalis, 
Descartes’ doctrine of method, was taken over for the development of the system itself, 
and the true metaphysical fundamental idea comes from Giordano Bruno in every detail. 
This system of Spinoza, however, must above all be mentioned here because it played a 
role once again in the eighteenth century in discussions which are linked to the names 
Lessing, Jacobi, Mendelssohn, Herder and Goethe, discussions which will cast their last 
shadows into Schelling’s treatise on freedom.57 
 
                                                
56 In the course of his treatise, Heidegger actually never takes up the matter again. 
57 M. Heidegger, Shelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, translated by J. 
Stambaugh, The Ohio University Press Series in Continental Thought, Athens 1985, pp. 33-34. 
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We shall not treat either Spinoza or Bruno as mere influences on subsequent authors, 
we shall explore them in order to recall what was left unnoticed by Heidegger and 
what provides us with those secondary paths that have been negated by the rise of 
modernity. Only by activating memory and capturing what was forgotten or reduced 
at the rise of modernity we shall be able to come to terms with it without retreating 
into the Black Forest. 
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Chapter II – More Copernican than Copernicus 
 
 
Section 1 – The Infinite and Mathematics 
 
 
Our encounter with Heidegger has revealed that the ontological substratum of 
modernity is Descartes’ subject, understood in its dichotomy with an object: from the 
body incarnating the subject to the earth around it and its individual beings, 
everything becomes subdued to the particular knowledge of modern science and is 
offered to the manipulation operated by technology. In other words: Being has 
delivered itself as technology through the development of modern science and that is 
what, historically, we call modernity. There seems to be, retrospectively, something 
yet unthought along the path traced by the Western metaphysical tradition that was 
captured by the Renaissance culture, which Heidegger seems to neglect. Before 
Descartes’ Discourse on Method, considered as the manifesto of modernity, 
philosophy had produced a valuable and fruitful encounter with the new scientific 
discoveries. The Copernican Revolution represents a turning point in Western history 
but it was not a simple step forward on the way to modern science: surely Descartes’ 
subject remains deeply Ptolemaic in its anthropocentrism, whether it accepts the new 
disposition of the universe or not, thus rendering the Copernican Revolution 
somehow incomplete.  
Bruno rejects the theological and Aristotelian notions associated with medieval 
philosophy, with which he was well acquainted through the direct study of Aristotle 
and of Thomas Aquinas. His contact with Renaissance Neoplatonism through 
Marsilio Ficino will only be the first step of a systematic rejection of 
Aristotelianism58. What really represented a turning point was the encounter with 
                                                
58 As Jill Kraye affirms: «Although Ficino received a traditional Aristotelian education at 
university, he was much at odds with the scholastic philosophers of his day as his humanist 
contemporaries: ‘they are not lovers of wisdom (philosophi) but lovers of ostentatious display 
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Copernicus.  Nevertheless, none of Bruno’s encounters was ever characterized by a 
blind and total acceptance, as we can primarily infer from The Ash Wednesday 
Supper, the first of his “English” dialogues written in Italian: 
 
He [Copernicus: ed.] was a man of deep, developed, diligent and mature genius: a man 
not second to any astronomer before him […]. This estate he attained by freeing himself 
from a number of false presuppositions of the common and vulgar philosophy, which I 
will not go so far as to term blindness. Yet, Copernicus did not go much further [away 
from the common and vulgar philosophy] because, being more a student of mathematics 
than of nature, he could not plumb and probe into matters to the extent that he could 
completely uproot unsuitable and empty principles […].59 
 
 
This passage is the point of departure for any serious account of Bruno’s twofold – 
yet not ambiguous – view of Copernicus60, which sheds light not only on Bruno’s 
admiration for the new emerging science but also his wise caution when faced with 
merely mathematical models of nature. All the way through Bruno’s philosophy, 
                                                                                                                                                            
(philopompi), who in their arrogance claim to have mastered Aristotle’s thought, although they have 
only rarely and briefly listened to him – not even in Greek but stammering in a foreign tongue’. His 
own philosophical inclination was towards Plato rather than Aristotle, primarily because, as a priest, 
he considered Platonism to be more compatible with Christianity. It was Ficino who put Platonism 
on the philosophical map of the Renaissance, first and foremost by providing Latin versions of all 
the dialogues (first published in 1484), most of which were unknown to western European scholars, 
as well as translating a large amount of Neoplatonic literature from late antiquity, which provided 
the intellectual framework for his Christianized interpretation of Plato». From J. Kraye, 
“Philologists and philosophers”, in J. Kraye (edited by), The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Humanism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011, pp. 149, 150. The Ficino quotation is 
from M. Ficino, Lettere, ed. S. Gentile (Florence 1990– ), I, p. 176.  
59 G. Bruno, The Ash Wednesday Supper, p. 86. For the original version see G. Bruno, “La Cena de 
le Ceneri” in Opere Italiane, vol. I, critical edition by G. Aquilecchia, general coordination by N. 
Ordine, UTET, Turin 2007, pp. 448-449: «Lui avea un grave, elaborato, sollecito e maturo ingegno: 
uomo che non è inferiore a nessuno astronomo che sii stato avanti lui […]: al che è dovenuto per 
essersi liberato da alcuni presuppositi falsi de la comone e volgar filosofia, non voglio dir cecità. 
Ma però non se n’è molto allontanato: per che lui più studioso della matematica che della natura, 
non ha possuto profondar e penetrar sin tanto che potesse a fatto toglier via le radici de 
inconvenienti e vani principii […]». 
60 About Bruno’s opinion of Copernicus, Hilary Gatti rightly highlights an important point: «Bruno 
did not make the mistake of identifying Copernicus himself with the famous anonymous preface of 
the De Revolutionibus, actually written by Andreas Osiander which advised use of the astronomical 
system proposed in the volume only in terms of a mathematical hypothesis. Indeed Bruno was the 
first to declare publicly that Copernicus himself could not have written that preface, although he 
seems not to have known who the author was». From H. Gatti, “Bruno’s Copernical Diagrams”, in 
H. Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2011, p. 40. 
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mathematics as a mere tool is treated with suspicion and is considered insufficient 
when providing a serious account of the universe. Bruno rejects from the very 
beginning what was to become an axiom of modern science, i.e. the mathematical 
reading of nature later propelled by Galileo and supported by the Cartesian rational 
subject. Heidegger’s reading of Galileo’s free fall experiment from the leaning tower 
of Pisa, which we examined in the previous chapter, exemplified how a modern view 
does not stop at the mere evidence: although the experiment shows that two falling 
bodies with different weights do not fall exactly at the same time, Galileo argues that 
the same falling bodies, in the absence of any obstacles, would actually fall together. 
This is a manifestation of a mathematical projection over the scientific observation: 
«The mathematical is, as mente concipere, a project of thingness which, as it were, 
skips over the things»61. Bruno places himself in a rift between the rejection of the 
old Aristotelian way of experiencing nature and the projection of mathematics over 
the same observation, which he condemns. Luciana De Bernart clearly underlines this 
aspect: «[…] Bruno’s [favourable: ed.] change of opinion regarding the “reasons” of 
the Copernican theory, is to be connected to his acquisition of the existence of 
“natural” mental structures of experience that are substantially different and 
disruptive if compared to the forms of Aristotelian attributive judgement. Within 
those Aristotelian forms the primitive mental processing of the sensible (common 
sense) was elaborated and on this, according to Bruno, was founded the 
misunderstanding of a natural science, conceived as an undue projection of the 
objective nature of things, i.e. the naively anthropomorphic dimension of common 
language»62. What we can infer from De Bernart’s passage is that both the 
                                                
61 M. Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics”, in M. Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, p. 291. 
62 L. De Bernart, Immaginazione e scienza in Giordano Bruno. L’infinito nelle forme 
dell’esperienza, ETS Editrice, Pisa 1986, p. 130. My translation from Italian: «[…] il ripensamento 
di Bruno circa le ‘ragioni’ della teoria copernicana, sia da connettersi principalmente alla sua 
acquisizione dell’esistenza di ‘naturali’ strutture mentali dell’esperienza sostanzialmente ‘diverse’ e 
dirompenti rispetto alle forme del giudizio attributivo, a quelle forme, vale a dire, entro cui si 
definiva per Aristotele la primitiva elaborazione mentale del sensibile (senso comune), e su cui si 
era venuto fondando, secondo Bruno, il malinteso di una scienza naturale concepita come indebita 
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Aristotelian common sense and a purely mathematical reading of nature are 
illegitimate projections, although seemingly antithetical. The presupposition that 
nature could somehow be explained by a superimposition of anthropomorphic models 
is perfectly coherent with the Western history of thought, whether understood as 
Aristotelian common sense or as mathematics. Bruno captured in advance the fact 
that both attitudes were inscribed in the same thinking and in this he could virtually 
agree with Heidegger when he describes the transition from ὑποκείμενον to subject. 
Thus, if Bruno rejects the Aristotelian attitude towards nature, he could never accept 
its disguise and systematization in the shape of mathematics, however fruitful from a 
scientific point of view. The primacy of philosophy lies in going beyond such 
thinking; what Bruno is looking for is a qualitatively different relationship to the 
world and nature. His positioning within this rift leaves him alone between two 
different historical attitudes, not as a thinker of transition but as a thinker of a kind of 
alternative modernity that never saw the light of day. This aspect, which we shall 
inquire into now, makes of Bruno a unique interlocutor for attempting to answer the 
challenge Heidegger presents in The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.  
The relationship between mathematics, science and philosophy, in the context of 
Bruno’s Copernicanism, is summed up in his notion of the infinite. If somehow 
Bruno is determined to go beyond Copernicus, it is precisely because Copernicus 
himself is not aware of the potential of his own discovery. In The Ash Wednesday 
Supper, while debating the Copernican theory, Bruno has his mouthpiece Theophilus 
respond to Nundinio’s criticisms with the following words: 
 
Nundinio then said that it cannot be possible that the earth moves, since it is the centre 
and mid-point of the universe, in which it is inherent to be the fixed and constant basis 
of all motion63. The Nolan [Bruno, ndr] answered that one who believes that the sun is 
in the middle of the universe can say the same thing and that for this reason the sun is 
immobile and fixed, as Copernicus and many others, who had imposed a circumferential 
limitation to the universe, maintained. Consequently [Nundinio’s] reason [for saying 
                                                                                                                                                            
proiezione nella natura oggettiva delle cose, della dimensione ingenuamente antropomorfica del 
linguaggio comune».  
63 See Aristotle, De coelo, II, 14, 296 B 21-26. 
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this] (if it is a reason) is useless against them and presupposes its own principles. It is 
also useless against the Nolan, who holds that the universe is infinite, whence it follows 
that nobody can simply be in the middle of the universe or at its periphery or anywhere 
between these two limits except through certain relations to other nearby bodies and 
artificially imposed limits.64 
 
In this dense passage we can see how Bruno, notwithstanding his admiration for 
Copernicus, still sees the Polish astronomer as excessively trapped within old 
Aristotelian conceptions of the universe, such as the need for celestial orbs and 
therefore a closed universe and the need for a centre. Bruno considers such notions as 
untenable, limiting and useless, as Gatti observes: «He centred his criticism on 
Copernicus’ mathematical methodology and his lack of physical reasoning, because 
he thought that Copernicus was confusing mathematical concepts and physical 
realities. In this respect, Bruno felt that there had been little improvement on 
Ptolemy. The sky in which people lived at the end of the sixteenth century was still 
cluttered with eccentrics, epicycles, celestial orbs and processional anomalies which 
were clearly conceptual tools interfering, in Bruno’s opinion, with a visualization of 
the real shape of the cosmos. Bruno wanted these concepts, which Copernicus had 
inherited from traditional cosmology, to be recognized as purely mental tools. They 
should be flexible where they had to be used, and where possible be eliminated 
altogether. It would, of course, be Kepler, with the discovery of the elliptical orbit of 
Mars, who would initiate the breakthrough in this context; but by that time Bruno was 
dead»65. Bruno confirms his hostility towards imposing mental schemes over the 
nature of the universe and, instead of enclosing the universe in a comfortably self-
                                                
64 G. Bruno, The Ash Wednesday Supper, pp. 151-152. For the original version see G. Bruno, “La 
Cena de le Ceneri” in G. Bruno, Opere Italiane, vol. I, p. 507: «Disse appresso Nundinio che non 
può essere verosimile che la terra si muove, essendo quella il mezzo e il centro de l’universo, al 
quale tocca essere fisso e costante fundamento d’ogni moto. Rispose il Nolano, che questo 
medesmo può dir colui che tiene il sole nel mezzo de l’universo, e per tanto inmobile e fisso, come 
intese il Copernico et altri molti che hanno donato termine circonferenziale a l’universo: di sorte 
che questa sua raggione (se pur è raggione) è nulla contra quelli, e suppone i propri principii. È 
nulla anco contra il Nolano il quale vuole il mondo essere infinito, e però non esser corpo alcuno in 
quello al quale semplicemente convegna essere nel mezzo, o nell’estremo, o tra que’ dua termini: 
ma per certe relazioni ad altri corpi e termini intenzionalmente appresi». 
65 H. Gatti, Giordano Bruno and Renaissance Science [1999], Cornell University Press, New York 
2002, p. 83. 
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contained and measurable perspective; he prefers to direct his attention to the infinite. 
It is the very idea of the infinite that gives strength to the omni-relational view of the 
bodies within the universe that, inspired by Nicholas of Cusa66, leads to Bruno’s own 
mathematics. As De Bernart affirms: «The very term “infinite”, after all, does not 
indicate in this context an attribute, nor is it thus conceived: its assimilation to the 
concept of sustanza [substance: ed.] tells us that we are now facing a concept of 
infinite that is emancipated from any link with a limit attributive dimension, such as it 
was the one signified by the classical concept of apeiron and […] by the theological-
medieval concept of infinite as absolute. The meaning of the Brunian concept of 
infinite consists in the relational ratio of a factuality that is intelligible only as the 
“ordered” momentum of a mentally inexhaustible geometry of the possible. Such a 
geometry is immanent with respect to the atomistic-combinatory structure of each 
aspect of experience and constantly moves the always apparent finiteness, so that the 
actual deciphering key of reality is reflected in the subject’s mind, especially 
prepared for the task by nature itself»67. Here De Bernart synthesizes well the 
                                                
66 There is not enough space here to provide a study of Nicholas of Cusa’s influence upon Bruno, 
yet from the summary Detlef Thiel provides of Cusa’s significance in the history of philosophy, we 
can find condensed many elements which have emerged or will emerge in our study of Bruno, for 
Cusa «is an instructive example of how one can hold out under tensions, whether societal, 
economic, spiritual, theological, philosophical, or scientific. His defence of a transparent order 
converges with an infinitism that remains optimistic despite all the sobering insight into human 
limitations and which inspires creativity – not as a trivial game, but as a reaction to the distress of 
the age. 
Second, he is a paradigm of a universal semiotics in the light of infinity and immortality. If all 
knowledge is necessarily transmitted via signs, mirrors, and parables, and can be gained only by 
“symbolic investigation”, this entails a disenchantment (with a nominalistic colouring) of false 
claims to power. Since the human person can never attain the vocabulum praecisum (the real term) 
– for that would be the object itself – all that remains is the reference (phonic, graphic, or of some 
other kind) of the signs to their origin, the human spirit. And this spirit should become an image of 
the absolute». From D. Thiel, “Nicholas of Cusa (1401 – 1464). Squaring the Circle: Politics, Piety, 
Rationality”, in P. R. Blum (edited by), Philosophers of the Renaissance, translated by B. McNeil, 
The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2010, p. 56. 
67 L. De Bernart, Immaginazione e scienza in Giordano Bruno, p. 135. My translation from Italian: 
«Lo stesso termine ‘infinito’, del resto, non designa più propriamente in questo contesto un 
attributo, né come tale è concepito: la sua equiparazione al concetto di sustanza ci dice che siamo di 
fronte a un concetto di infinito ormai emancipato da qualsiasi ancoraggio ad una dimensione 
attributiva limite, qual’era quella significata dal concetto classico di apeiron e […] dal concetto 
teologico-medievale di infinito come assoluto. Il significato del concetto bruniano di infinito si 
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Brunian approach both from an ontological and a gnosiological point of view and the 
way they reflect the cosmological one: if the appearance of finitude «deceives us on 
the surface of this globe [the Earth: ed.], then we should be much more suspicious 
about the limit that seems to comprise the starry concavity»68 says Bruno, who does 
away with Aristotelian spheres, deeming them illusory and useless. Here Bruno 
seems to transform his Platonism in order to use it against Aristotle: in our naïve 
realism we are indeed victims of illusions that stand between truth and us. 
Nevertheless, it is not because sensible reality is somehow untrue or illusory but 
simply because we are not able to dwell in it according to its infinite perspective. If 
we are entrapped in our geocentric and anthropocentric understanding, it is because 
we keep on projecting our finite standards upon the infinite. While chanting about 
stars and planets Bruno tells us something very important about ourselves; on a path 
that, in our opinion, recalls the way out of the Platonic cave, we envisage an even 
more ambitious road, which invites us to rise up to the infinite universe: 
 
So we are led to discover the infinite effect of the infinite cause, the true and living sign 
of infinite vigour; and we have the knowledge not to search for divinity removed from 
us as if we have it near; it is within us more than we ourselves are. In the same way, the 
inhabitants of other worlds must not search for divinity in our world, for they have it 
close to and within themselves, since the moon is no more heaven for us than we are for 
the moon.69 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
profila piuttosto consistere nella ragione relazionale di una fattualità leggibile solo come momento 
‘ordinato’ di una mentalmente inesauribile geometria del possibile la quale, immanente nella 
struttura atomico-combinatoria di ogni aspetto dell’esperienza, ne mobilita costantemente la 
finitezza solo apparente, sì che da questa traspaia e si riverberi nella mente del soggetto, a ciò 
opportunamente attrezzata dalla natura stessa, l’effettiva chiave di intellegibilità del reale». 
68 G. Bruno, “De l’infinito universo e mondi”, in G. Bruno, Opere Italiane, vol. II, p. 35. My 
translation from Italian: «Or come abbiamo per esperienza che ne inganna nella superficie di questo 
globo in cui ne ritroviamo, molto maggiormente doviamo averlo suspetto quanto a quel termine che 
nella stellifera concavità ne fa comprendere». 
69 G. Bruno, The Ash Wednesday Supper, p. 91. For the original version see G. Bruno, “La Cena de 
le Ceneri”, from G. Bruno, Opere Italiane, vol. I, pp. 455-456: «Cossì siamo promossi a scuoprire 
l’infinito effetto dell’infinita causa, il vero e vivo vestigio dell’infinito vigore. Et abbiamo dottrina 
di non cercar la divinità rimossa da noi: se l’abbiamo appresso, anzi di dentro più che noi medesmi 
siamo dentro a noi. Non meno che gli coltori degli altri mondi non la denno cercare appresso di noi, 
l’avendo appresso e dentro di sé. Atteso che non più la luna è cielo a noi, che noi alla luna». 
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In this beautiful passage from The Ash Wednesday Supper Bruno shows how absurd 
it is to consider ourselves other in relation to the rest of the universe or assuming that 
looking away from ourselves will tell us something more. Only understanding 
ourselves from the point of view of the infinite can we really feel a part of the 
universe, thus being one with divinity and not place it somewhere above artificial 
heavens of fixed stars. It is only by giving up on our finite projection upon the 
universe that we become one with it and not its centre – or its periphery – for there 
are no centres and no peripheries in the infinite universe. Bruno did not need the 
Apollo 11 to understand this. As a matter of fact, even here on the Earth itself, Bruno 
was uncomfortable with Columbus’ discovery and the subsequent subduing of 
American natives70. He not only found it morally deplorable but he identified it as a 
sign of the hybris and limited perspective of European culture. Its absolute religious 
fervour and intolerance were clear signs of the unawareness and ignorance of the 
                                                
70 As Bruno says in the Spaccio, referring to Columbus: «It is that one who crossed the seas in order 
to violate those laws of Nature by intermingling those peoples whom the benign mother set apart, 
and in order to propagate vice from one generation to another». G. Bruno, The Expulsion of the 
Triumphant Beast, p. 202. The defence of the American Indios does not spring from a humanitarian 
enthusiasm but from a solid ontological reason: man does not originate from the will of a Creator 
but is the result of the infinite vicissitude of the world, which is not limited to our planet but to the 
infinite universe. As Diego Pirillo puts it:  «Life is born out of spontaneous generation in every 
place and in every time, following the incessant movement of the atoms. It is nonsense, then, to 
think that in the infinite universe other civilizations and forms of life cannot be found. […] It was 
the Lucretian image of man, subject to the same natural conditions of any other living being, to 
influence in a decisive way the Brunian thought on civilization processes. […] Although the 
Spaccio, referring to the American savages, recognizes that “these ones of the new world […] in 
many circumstances show themselves to be wiser, and not even ignorant when dealing with them”, 
Bruno does not have any inclination towards the myth of the ‘good savage’ and he never represents 
the life conditions of the Indios as a primitive state of originary innocence and purity». D. Pirillo, 
Filosofia ed eresia nell’Inghilterra del tardo Cinquecento. Bruno, Sidney e i dissidenti religiosi 
italiani, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2010, pp. 152-153. My translation from Italian: «La 
vita nasce per generazione spontanea in ogni luogo e in ogni tempo seguendo il movimento 
incessante degli atomi. È dunque insensato pensare che nell’universo infinito non ci siano altre 
civiltà e altre forme di vita. […] Fu l’immagine lucreziana dell’uomo, soggette alle stesse 
condizioni naturali di ogni altro essere vivente, a influenzare in modo decisivo le riflessioni 
bruniane sui processi di civilizzazione. […]  Sebbene lo Spaccio, alludendo ai selvaggi americani, 
riconosca che “questi de la terra nova […] in molte circostanze si mostrano più savii, et in trattar gli 
lor dei manco ignoranti”, Bruno non ha però alcuna simpatia per il mito del ‘buon selvaggio’ e non 
presenta mai le condizioni di vita degli Indios come uno stato primitivo di originaria innocenza e 
purezza». 
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infinite and a subsequent inability to conceive any kind of difference. Bruno’s 
philosophy opens up to difference in a way that ideally precedes Husserl’s reflection 
as we read it in the Crisis. 
It is not only a morally relativistic attitude, it is also a clear ontological stance 
in favour of a newly found intimacy between humans and the universe, man and 
nature, based on a new understanding of both. An infinite conceived as a mere 
succession of finite objects is absurd as it cannot account for vicissitude, movement, 
life and death. It would be a sterile and fixed totality of objects that may make sense 
from an arithmetical point of view but definitely not from an ontological or even a 
physical one. In the De coelo, Aristotle tries to show that an infinite body cannot exist 
through a reductio ad absurdum71. If a body is infinite, says Aristotle, then it must be 
made of either finite or infinite parts; if they are infinite they can only be of a finite 
number of kinds, as the elements such as fire, earth, water and air are finite. 
Therefore, for the body to be infinite, kinds, which are finite in number, must be 
infinite in extent. Nevertheless kinds are also finite in themselves, as there can be no 
infinite type of motion or infinite weight or lightness. A body, thereby, cannot have 
infinite parts; therefore it cannot be infinite. Bruno completely dismisses Aristotle’s 
demonstration by claiming that Aristotle is arbitrarily applying finite notions to the 
infinite: the very notion of “part” cannot be applied to the infinite because it would 
have to be part of a totality but no totality can ever be reached by an infinite addition 
of parts. In De l’infinito, universo e mondi Bruno tries to imagine how two infinite 
bodies could come into contact: 
 
Let us pretend that two infinite bodies, A and B, are conjoined by the line or surface 
FG: of course, they will not be acting on each other according to their whole being 
because they are not in contact with all of their parts, for the part they have in common 
must be to some extent finite. Furthermore, even if we suppose surfaces or lines to be 
infinite, it will not follow that those two united bodies will provoke an infinite action or 
passion because they are not intensive but extended, just as all parts are extended. It 
                                                
71 See Aristotele, De coelo, i, 7. 
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follows that in no part does the infinite act according to its full being, but extensively 
from part to part, separately.72 
 
 
Aristotle would like to claim that the infinite is absurd by imagining it as composed 
of parts i.e. by attributing to the infinite something peculiar of finite things, which is 
acting or being affected, thus changing; this gives rise to the paradoxes that should 
supposedly rule out the infinite. But Aristotle’s premise is absurd in virtue of the fact 
that in nature change cannot be applied to a continuous infinite body, as Sydney 
Greenberg underlines: «For Bruno there is never any such action and passion as 
Aristotle indicates; whether we view the case of the finite action between bodies, or 
an action between finites and infinites or between two infinites, the agent never exerts 
its total vigour and power on the effect. Action and passion are effective according to 
dimension and distance, and the agent and patient are never so close that all their 
parts are continuous; consequently, the action will never be infinite, because the parts 
are not “intensive” but “extensive”»73. This attack affects the whole structure of the 
Aristotelian finite world and unmasks its assumptions that movement and change are 
teleological and that they all refer to the centre of the universe – the Earth – all of 
which stops making sense in an infinite universe. As we said earlier, in the De coelo 
i. 7, Aristotle denies the possibility for an infinite universe to exist on the basis that it 
should be composed of parts that must be either of infinite kinds, which is not 
possible as kinds are finite, or themselves infinite, which is not possible as there are 
no such things as infinite weights or movements – each natural thing should act 
                                                
72 G. Bruno, “De l’infinito, universo e mondi”, in G. Bruno, Opere italiane vol. 2, critical edition by 
G. Aquilecchia, general coordination by N. Ordine, UTET, Turin 2007, p. 81. My translation from 
Italian: «Perché poniamo il caso che sieno doi infiniti corpi A e B, gli quali son continuati o 
congionti insieme nella linea o superficie FG: certo non verranno ad oprar l’uno contra l’altro 
secondo tutta la virtù; perché non sono propinqui l’uno a l’altro secondo tutte le parti: essendo che 
la continuazione non possa essere se non in qualche termine finito. E dico di vantaggio che benché 
supponiamo quella superficie o linea essere infinita, non seguitarà per questo che gli corpi 
continuati in quella caggionino azzione e passione infinita; perché non sono intense, ma estense, 
come le parti sono estense: onde aviene che in nessuna parte l’infinito opra secondo tutta la sua 
virtù, ma estensivamente secondo parte e parte, discreta e separatamente». 
73 S. Greenberg, The Infinite in Giordano Bruno, King’s Crown Press, Columbia University, New 
York 1950, p. 55. 
 59 
towards an end and that would not be the case, were the thing infinite. What is clear 
now is that the infinite is not an arithmetical addition of finite bodies, even though 
reason itself tempts us to think so as reasonable common sense suggests that in order 
to get to a totality we should sum up al the innumerable finite things that populate the 
universe; such an attitude is, according to Bruno, nothing more than a mathematical 
abstraction and that is why, in order to deepen our understanding of Bruno’s infinite, 
we need to get a better idea of his mathematics.  
The infinity of the universe does not only show that, from a cosmological point 
of view, Bruno is truly more Copernican than Copernicus and that Copernicus 
actually lacks a philosophical perspective but it also forces Bruno to consider, as well 
as the infinitely large, the infinitely small. If mathematics is the ground on which 
Bruno operates, it will be a sort of mathematics that is very far from the Copernican 
or the yet-to-come Galilean one. As a matter of fact, even though the concept of 
infinity pervades the whole body of the Nolan’s philosophy, we shall try for now to 
understand its mathematical nature in order to further highlight the striking difference 
between Bruno and his modern successors. This will not only stress the ante litteram 
similarity with the Heideggerian view on the relationship between modernity and 
mathematics, it will also be a step forward towards the rejection of a science that is 
founded on abstraction and the need to question our anthropocentrism. Bruno’s 
dispute and controversial friendship with a man whom he considered as a clumsy and 
ignorant mathematician, Fabrizio Mordente74 from Salerno, inventor of a new 
                                                
74 Bruno met Mordente during the winter of 1586 in Paris, where the latter was presenting his most 
famous invention and the former was literally struck by the new proportional compass, so much that 
he elevated Mordente to the rank of «god of geometricians». It is rather odd to see a cultured and 
refined philosopher, famous throughout Europe, being so enthusiastic about a merely mechanical 
invention. As a matter of fact, Bruno was not so much interested in the mechanical aspects of the 
geometrical tool as in the implications of such an invention, so much so that he offered to translate 
Mordente ‘s exposition into Latin in order to give it international resonance. Bruno’s so-called 
translation ended up in the writing of two dialogues that went far beyond Mordente’s intentions, to 
the point that the latter believed, in his lack of philosophical and linguistic understanding, Bruno 
actually tried to steal his invention. See G. del Giudice, “Introduzione”, in G. Bruno, Il Dio dei 
geometri. Quattro Dialoghi, introduction and translation by G. Del Giudice, Di Renzo Editore, 
Roma 2009.  
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proportional compass, shows Bruno’s approach towards mathematics in relation to 
the infinite. Bruno does not appear interested in the mere mechanical potential of the 
new invention which, through a system of perpendicular arms, allows for the drawing 
of more precise circumferences; what Bruno focuses on is the method of partition of 
straight lines and curves. De Bernart, commenting one of the four dialogues devoted 
to Mordente’s invention – the Idiota Triumphans75 – underlines a particular passage76 
where Bruno addresses several minor criticisms to Mordente. Bruno contests the 
inappropriate use of the term “infinite” and he blames it on Mordente’s ignorance and 
inability to use language properly. Says De Bernart: «The first of these criticisms is 
the one concerning “the infinity of number”. Even though Bruno risks appearing 
pedantic, this criticism actually provides the philosopher with the occasion to express 
a primary aspect of the mathematical problem at stake: “When [Mordente] speaks of 
an ‘almost infinite number of mechanical effects’, we need to forgive him – says 
Philoteus – for the use of the unusual locution ‘in a kind of infinite way’. What he 
really means, speaking under the effect of an ecstatic impetus, is not different from 
what is commonly denoted by the saying ‘somehow infinite’ [quodammodo 
infinitus]: in his utter simplicity he ignores that a magnitude, whatever its extension 
may be, is equally distant from the infinite as much as any finite number, whatever 
and however many all the other finite numbers within the latter may be. Therefore it 
is inappropriate for a geometrician as well as for an arithmetician to affirm that 
something is ‘almost infinite’”»77. This passage sheds light on a few very important 
                                                
75 The “idiot” indicating Mordente and all those who believe knowledge to be confined to merely 
mechanical activity. 
76 See G. Bruno, “Idiota Triumphans”, in G. Bruno, Due dialoghi sconosciuti e due dialoghi noti, 
edited by G. Aquilecchia, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 1957, p. 12. 
77 L. De Bernart, Numerus quodammodo infinitus. Per un approccio storico-teorico al «dilemma 
matematico» nella filosofia di Giordano Bruno, Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, 
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2002, p. 201. My translation from Italian. «Il primo di questi 
rilievi è quello che riguarda ‘l’infinità del numero’: nello scrupolo quasi pedantesco che sembra 
informarlo, questo rilievo fornisce in realtà al filosofo l’occasione al filosofo di esprimersi su un 
aspetto tutt’altro che secondario della problematica matematica in gioco: “Quando [Mordente] parla 
di ‘un numero quasi infinito di effetti meccanici’, bisogna perdonargli – rileva Philoteus – la dizione 
inconsueta ‘in un certo modo infinito’, giacché quanto egli intende esprimere, parlando sotto 
l’azione dell’impeto estatico, non è diverso da ciò che comunemente si denota con la dizione ‘in 
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issues, one of which is akin to the problem of the partition of the infinite. Attacking 
Aristotle, Bruno argues in the De l’infinito78 that in order to divide the infinite into 
parts one should attribute a measurement or a number to it. Nonetheless this ends up 
making no sense because any sort of measurement, being it duration or distance, is 
not commensurable with the infinite. Any extensive notion cannot be attributed to the 
infinite as a whole, which is understood intensively: 
 
for in it [the infinite: ed.] the maximum time, meaning the greatest proportional part of 
duration, ends up being equal to the minimum [my italics: ed.], granted that infinite 
centuries are not more than the infinite hours […].79 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
certo modo infinito’: nella sua semplicità egli ignora che una grandezza, qualunque sia la sua 
estensione, è parimenti distante dall’infinito di quanto lo è un numero finito, quali e quanti che 
siano tutti gli altri numeri finiti compresi entro quest’ultimo, e pertanto è fuori luogo per un 
geometra come per un aritmetico affermare che qualcosa è ‘quasi infinito’». The passage quoted by 
De Bernart is taken from G. Bruno, Due dialoghi sconosciuti e due dialoghi noti, edited by G. 
Aquilecchia, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 1957, p. 12. 
78 «First, then, he [Aristotle: ed.] proceeds by unnatural foundations, wishing to take this or that part 
of the infinite; since the infinite cannot have parts, if we do not wish to say such parts must be 
infinite: since it implies a contradiction to say that in the infinite there is a greater and a smaller part 
and a part that is more or less proportional to it; since you do not come closer to the infinite by the 
hundred than by the ternary: as the infinite number is made of no less infinite ternaries than infinite 
hundreds. The infinite size is no less of infinite feet than of infinite miles: but when we wish to 
mention the parts of the infinite distance we do not say one hundred miles, a thousand parasangs; as 
these have to be called parts of the finite, and they truly are parts of the finite to which they have 
proportion […]. Thus a thousand years are not part of eternity as they are not proportionate to the 
whole: but they are part of some kind of time measurement, as of ten thousand years, a hundred 
thousand centuries». From G. Bruno, “De l’Infinito, Universo e Mondi”, in G. Bruno, Opere 
italiane vol. 2, p. 79. My translation from Italian: «Prima dumque nel suo supporre  procede per non 
naturali fondamenti, volendo prendere questa e quella parte de l’infinito; essendo che l’infinito non 
può aver parte, se non vogliamo dir pure che quella parte è infinita: essendo che implica 
contraddizzione che ne l’infinito sia parte maggiore e parte minore e parte che abbia maggiore e 
minore proporzione a quello; essendo che all’infinito non più ti avvicini per il centinaio che per il 
ternario: perché non meno de infiniti ternarii che de infiniti centenarii consta l’infinito. La 
dimensione infinita non è meno de infiniti piedi che de infinite miglia: però quando vogliamo dir le 
parti dell’infinita dimensione, non diciamo cento miglia, mille parasanghe; perché queste 
nientemanco possono esser dette parti del finito, e veramente son parti del finito solamente al cui 
tutto hanno proporzione […]. Cossì mille anni non son parte dell’eternità, perché non hanno 
proporzione al tutto: ma sì bene son parti di qualche misura di tempo, come di diece mille anni, di 
cento mila secoli». 
79 Ibid. p. 80. My translation from Italian: «[…] perché in quello il tempo massimo, cioè la 
grandissima parte proporzionale della durazione, viene ad essere equivalente alla minima, atteso che 
non son più gli infiniti secoli che le infinite ore […]». 
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From the perspective of the infinite, then, the opposites coincide – minimum and 
maximum, hot and cold, the instant and eternity – as any form of the absolute, 
including the centrality of the Earth, is missing. That is why Bruno’s need to be 
coherent with his theory of the infinite clashes with the Aristotelian theory that bodies 
can be infinitely divided and that the minimum is only conceivable in relation to 
form80. For instance, an apple remains such only down to a certain amount of 
splitting, a man remains such only to the point at which there is a sufficient quantity 
of matter in order to retain his form. Aristotle’s thought thus gives absolute 
preponderance to form in his ontology of beings and, at the same time, projects the 
same abstraction and confusion he held in relation to the infinite upon the infinitely 
small by forcing onto matter the possibility of being divided to infinity, thus denying 
the existence of an actual minimum. Mordente’s invention, which was supposed to 
measure all the way down to the infinite fractions of matter, provides Bruno with the 
idea of refuting Aristotle’s theory. Mordente’s method of mechanical partition of a 
line suggests, again, that it makes no sense to divide a quantity to infinity. The 
method suggested by Mordente’s compass mechanically superimposes over a 
segment B a certain arbitrary fraction of segment A (1/n A), thus determining how 
many times that fraction is contained in B. If the quantities are incommensurable, 
there must be a fraction of B < 1/n A that remains. Now, if we were to proceed 
according to what mathematicians do, thereby in agreement with Aristotle, we would 
first of all suppose that such a procedure is a division and, second, that it gives rise to 
an irrational number, which is infinite. Yet Mordente’s method proposes to keep on 
superimposing the remaining fraction on another fraction that corresponds to 1/n2 A, 
then subsequently 1/n3 A and so on. From here Bruno figures out that what is 
happening is not an actual division to infinity but a process that involves relating 
determinate and finite quantities (1/n A, 1/n2 A, etc. with B’s fractions) to one 
another, which are thereby not measured but numerated. The minimum, then, ends up 
being not an absolute smallest possible quantity – of which it would not make sense 
                                                
80 See Aristotle, Metaphysics V. 
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to speak as it would have to be the smallest relatively to some other quantity – but a 
relational principle that is the basis for the composition of any being in the infinite 
universe. Bruno operates a shift in meaning by intuiting that things cannot be 
explained by being mathematically calculated in an abstract fashion. Mathematical 
calculation is an abstraction of things because it does not provide an actual 
experience for things understood extensively. Only by being mathematically related 
do the minima give form81 to things. Thus the actor, or “numerating agent”, by 
numerating and ordering reality, experiences it in its extensive and finite dimension. 
As De Bernart puts it: «Number and quantity originate, for Bruno, as mental tools of 
ordering a reality that without order cannot even be perceived; as such, number and 
quantity, in their schematic and simple nature, are not inherent to natural objectivity, 
but to the perceptive intentionality, to the properly human way of experiencing the 
external world»82. We can conclude that Bruno practises a philosophical mathematics 
that proceeds in the opposite direction to the abstract rigour that will characterize the 
Galilean and Cartesian approach. What emerges from Bruno’s notion of infinity is 
that mathematics cannot be applied to reality a priori: the task of philosophy is to 
make sure that such a precious and sophisticated tool as mathematics is not merely 
projected upon reality but it is faithful to it, in order to give us a world that is neither 
an abstract projection of a rational subject nor understood by the categories of 
common sense. Bruno is a great example in the history of thought of a philosopher 
who was able to engage with science whilst never abandoning, indeed, affirming his 
philosophical standpoint. In this respect, Heidegger’s account of the history of 
metaphysics does not seem to hold, as in Bruno’s case it is the point of view of 
modernity which gets “skipped over” and not beings. Bruno envisages a role for the 
                                                
81 As a matter of fact, form is no longer the ontological basis of beings but it actually depends on 
composition. 
82 L. De Bernart, Numerus quodammodo infinitus. Per un approccio storico-teorico al «dilemma 
matematico» nella filosofia di Giordano Bruno, p. 225. My translation from Italian: «Il numero e la 
grandezza nascono, per Bruno, come strumenti mentali di ordinamento di una realtà che senza 
ordine non può neanche essere percepita; in quanto tali, il numero e la grandezza non sono inerenti, 
nella semplicità e schematicità che li caratterizza, all’oggettività naturale, bensì all’intenzione 
percettiva, alla modalità propriamente umana di fare esperienza del mondo». 
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philosopher, thus for thinking, that can relate to scientific practice not as a threat to 
himself but as a possibility for opening up new horizons. 
 
 
Section 2 – The Soul of Inanimate Things 
 
 Bruno’s rejection of infinity when dealing with the small side of things may 
seem surprising and may also give the impression of an excessive antagonism to 
Aristotle. There is, nonetheless, an intrinsic necessity for Bruno to hold this position, 
which is not the merely mathematical necessity that we saw in the last section; rather, 
it is the very possibility for man to dwell in an intelligible world. As Sandro Mancini 
puts it: «If, as a matter of fact, knowing is measuring, as Bruno assumes from 
Nicholas of Cusa, the infinite as such does not amount to a principle of intelligibility 
but of indifference, uniformity; so that, having welcomed the infinite from the side of 
composition, Bruno is forced to put a limit on the opposite side and to look for a 
criterion of measurement in a definite minimum»83. By measuring Bruno does not 
imply the correctness dictated by an objective standard but a condition for man to 
experience the world extensively; such an experience takes the form of ordering, 
measuring and composition, which allow for the infinite variety and the endless 
vicissitude of the world. Were a division to infinity possible, it would not make sense 
to speak of ordering and composition, as any attempt in that direction would be lost 
within the indifference of the infinite, as Bruno showed through the examples of 
distance and time. There is another reason for it, which is even more fundamental: 
Bruno’s intuition – unwittingly suggested by Mordente’s invention – that the 
minimum is not the result of a mechanical or arithmetic division, but the assumption 
needed to carry out a mathematical numeration and therefore a physical composition. 
                                                
83 S. Mancini, La sfera infinita. Identità e differenza nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno, Mimesis, 
Milano, 2000, p. 198. My translation from Italian: «Se, infatti, conoscere è misurare, come Bruno 
assume da Cusano, l’infinito di per sé non costituisce un principio di intellegibilità, ma di 
indifferenza, di uniformità; onde accolto operativamente l’infinito dal lato della composizione, 
Bruno è costretto a porre un limite nel lato opposto, e a cercare il criterio di misura in un minimo 
definito». 
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In this instance De Bernart clarifies why we speak of its omni-relational nature: 
«Thus the minimum is an assumption, it is always and in any way what is 
presupposed as the ultimate component of a “whole” that one intends to analyze in its 
internal relations and without which those very relations are not construable or 
determinable»84. The minimum, then, makes sense only in relation to a whole which is 
its way of relating to other minima, whether the whole is a word, whose minimum is 
constituted by its letters, a galaxy in relation to its planets, a stone in relation to its 
crystals or the World Wide Web in relation to its websites: Bruno ensures that, at 
every level, nature becomes intelligible through the notion of minimum. That is why 
he cannot identify the minimum with the Democritean/Lucretian atom, whose main 
feature was to be the smallest part characterized by the absence of void, i.e. 
impenetrability. He even makes one further distinction according to different spheres 
of reality where the metaphysical minimum is identified with the monad, the physical 
one with the atom and the geometrical one with the point:  
 
Number is an accident of the monad, the monad is the essence of number; composition 
requires the atom and the atom is the essence of the compound. The principle of number 
is the monad with the number, as the principle of magnitude is the atom with the 
magnitude itself: in a subordinate or primary manner they belong to the genus of 
quantity; in it all things are reduced to unity as, truly, all numerically diversified atoms 
are reduced to the foundation of the atom, according to the species. For those who look 
at bodies, the substance of all things is the minimum body, i.e. the atom. For those who 
look at the straight line or the plain, the minimum is the point.85 
                                                
84 L. De Bernart, Numerus quodammodo infinitus. Per un approccio storico-teorico al «dilemma 
matematico» nella filosofia di Giordano Bruno, p. 234. My translation from Italian: «Dunque il 
minimo è un’assunzione, è sempre e comunque ciò che si presuppone come componente ultima di 
un ‘intero’ che ci si prefigge di analizzare nelle sue relazioni interne e senza di cui le relazioni 
stesse non sono costruibili e determinabili». 
85 G. Bruno, “De triplici minimo et mensura”, in G. Bruno, Opera latine conscripta, edited by F. 
Tocco and H. Vitelli, vol. I.3, Florence 1889, p. 140. My translation from Latin and rendition in 
prose, also based on the Italian translation by Carlo Monti in G. Bruno, Opere latine, edited by C. 
Monti, Mondadori, Milano 2008, p. 98:  
«Numerus est accidens monadis, et monas est essentia  
numeri; sic compositio accidit atomo, et atomus est essentia com- 
positi. Principium numeri monas cum numero, sicut et principium  
magnitudinis atomus cum ipsa magnitudine, reductive vel princi- 
paliter sunt in genere quantitatis, et accidentia substantiae, quae  
est monas antecedens, vere et per se minimum principium magni- 
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The minimum, then, seems to become the essential substratum of reality: it has 
no size or duration but it is extensively expressed as relation; it is not an object then, 
therefore it retreats from a merely extensive perception. The minimum is what 
guarantees that, as letters compose a word, as bricks compose a building and atoms 
compose a molecule, beings are only understood in terms of their compositional 
relations and not as isolated objects. Not possessing determinations such as size and 
duration, the minimum coincides with the infinitely large and it is intensively present 
in each being, although it does not reveal itself. What is intensive hides and retreats 
from mere perception and yet, through its retreat, it offers beings as we know them in 
their extensive determinations. The twofold understanding of the minimum appears to 
reproduce the movement of Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια in its game of 
unconcealment through the safekeeping of Being. This similar dynamics shows that 
whenever the subject/object dichotomy is not present, the multiplicity of beings, of 
which we are part, can only be sustained by what is taken away from what is 
determinable through measurement and calculation. Man, although fully involved in 
the multiplicity of beings, is the place where the two thoughts of what is determined 
and what is concealed can be held at once. Furthermore, the notion of minimum does 
not project a mathematical model upon nature but lets nature operate in its infinite 
variety. It comes as no surprise, then, if in one of the Latin poems he wrote during his 
sojourn in Frankfurt, the De triplici minimo et mensura, Bruno even refers to the 
minimum as substance: 
 
The Minimum is the substance of things: you will see nevertheless that it is still greater 
than any other thing. The monad, the atom and all the spirit that pervades everything 
derive from the minimum, which has no dimensions and constitutes everything with its 
                                                                                                                                                            
tudinis, in quo non ex quo; et in hac omnia sunt unum, sicut in  
veritate atomi secundum speciem omnes atomi secundum nume- 
rum. Ad corpora ergo respicienti omnium substantia minimum  
corpus est seu atomus, ad lineam vero atque planum minimum  
quod est punctus». 
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mark, total essence and, if you look well, everything is made of it, even matter itself. 
[…]  
If the monad did not exist, there would not be any numbers either; as a matter of fact, it 
ordered the species, constituting every kind. […] It is said that it is the constant element 
in all things and the principle that determines the finite above them and pervades the 
infinite space constituting, tying, integrating, propagating, eternal, everything that is 
composite and whatever is created simple; because the maximum derives from the 
minimum, is in the minimum, tends to and through the minimum.86 
 
The minimum is here characterized as substance in a way that cannot prescind from 
the infinite. It will now be obvious that it cannot be considered as a part of the infinite 
but that it actually coincides with it: as there is no difference between an instant and 
eternity from the point of view of the infinite, then the minimum and the infinite are 
substantially coincident87. This apparent paradox makes sense only when it is 
                                                
86 G. Bruno, “De triplici minimo et mensura”, in G. Bruno, Opera latine conscripta, I.3, edited by 
F. Tocco and H. Vitelli, Florence 1889, pp. 138-139. My rendition in prose and translation from 
Latin, also based on the Italian translation by Carlo Monti, in G. Bruno, Opere latine, edited by C. 
Monti, Mondadori, Milano 2008, pp. 95-96:  
«[…] MINIMUM substantia rerum est;  
Atque id idem tandem opperies super omnia magnum.  
Hinc monas, hinc atomus, totusque hinc undique fusus  
Spiritus, in nulla consistens mole, suisque  
Omnia constituens signis, essentia tota,  
Si res inspicias, hoc tandem est, materiesque. 
[…] 
Esto nulla monas, numerorum non erit ullus;  
Namque ea constituit species, statuens genus omne. 
[…] 
Ergo cluit constans in cunctis, et super haec qui  
Claudit finitum, infinitum permeat amplum,  
Efficiens, nectens, integrans atque propagans  
Quidquid compostum, et simplex quodcumque creatur  
Immenso a seclo pendens; quia maxima quaeque  
Ex minimo, in minimo, ad minimum sunt, per minimumque.». 
87 In an interesting and short work, Guido del Giudice blends Eastern wisdom with Bruno’s 
philosophy of the contraries: «[…] for Bruno the minimum heat and the minimum cold were 
coincident, as in the maximum heat he singles out the principle for the movement towards the cold, 
in the same way as “in the last part of the decayed is the principle of the generated”, for one is the 
principle of decay and of generation. “The way up and the way down are one and the same”, 
continues Heraclitus, affirming, like the Taoists, the fundamental union of every couple of opposites 
and the consequent relativity of all concepts». From G. del Giudice, La coincidenza degli opposti. 
Giordano Bruno tra Oriente e Occidente, Di Renzo Editore, Roma 2005, p. 48. My translation from 
Italian: «[…] per Bruno il minimo caldo e il minimo freddo sono tutt’uno, in quanto nel massimo 
calore egli individua il principio del moto verso il freddo, così come “nell’ultimo del corrotto è il 
principio del generato”, perché uno è il principio della corruzione e generazione. “La via all’insù e 
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considered from an omni-relational point of view: Bruno needs to make sense of the 
experience of finite things in an infinite universe and he can only do it by indicating a 
discrete substratum that is the condition for things to exist, which exactly corresponds 
to saying for things to be composed, ordered and measured without reducing the 
minimum to a mere object that happens to be indefinitely small. The minimum «has 
no dimension» and, as such, it cannot be conceived as a small particle that adds up to 
an actual object. As Saverio Ansaldi puts it: «To each kind of being and to each form 
of life corresponds a minimum that defines the “nature” itself of the thing in question, 
starting from the incessant vicissitude and metamorphosis of the atoms. That is why 
the minimum allows us to explain the existence of the atom without thereby 
identifying itself necessarily with it. Without the combined action of the atoms, no 
“natures” would exist within the infinite matter, but each of these natures represents 
respectively a minimum if related to another greater nature (human nature is minimal 
if related to the nature of the sun)»88. What Ansaldi here underlines is one of the most 
important aspects of the Brunian ontology, which frontally attacks the Aristotelian 
prominence of form over matter: the nature of a being is not provided by a form 
towards which things should strive in order to fulfil their intimate nature, indeed, the 
form emerges only once the compound has been intended in its internal relations 
dictated by the vicissitude of the universe and understood by the actor; there is no 
teleology, no preconceived end in the Brunian infinite universe. Bruno endorses some 
kind of materialism but a sort of materialism that needs to fit into his infinite picture 
and that accounts for the metamorphoses and the vicissitude that characterize the 
universe. The adoption of a simple materialism could not account for such a degree of 
                                                                                                                                                            
all’ingiù è una sola e medesima”, continua Eraclito, affermando, come i taoisti, la fondamentale 
unità di ogni coppia di opposti e la conseguente relatività di tutti i concetti». 
88 S. Ansaldi, Giordano Bruno. Une philosophie de la métamorphose, Éditions Classiques Garnier, 
Paris 2010, p. 238. My translation from French: «À chaque genre d’être et à chaque forme de vie 
correspond un minimum définissant la ‘nature’ même de la chose en question, à partir de la 
vicissitude et de la métamorphoses incessante des atomes. C’est pourquoi le minimum permet 
d’expliquer l’existence de l’atome sans pourtant s’identifier nécessairement avec lui. Sans l’action 
combinée des atomes, il n’existerait pas de ‘natures’ au sein de la matière infinie, mais chacune de 
ses natures représente à son tour un minimum par rapport à une autre nature plus grande (la nature 
humaine est minime par rapport à la nature du soleil)». 
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life, as it would leave the universe as a sum of inert bodies, which is exactly what 
Bruno dismantles from the very beginning. Michele Ciliberto stresses, while 
commenting on Bruno’s Latin works written in Frankfurt, how the ontology 
developed in the Italian dialogue De la Causa Principio et Uno has finally reached 
maturity: «These are symptomatic texts on the conceptual and on the linguistic level. 
It is not by chance that Bruno’s passage to a monism oriented in a clearly physical-
immanent sense has been found here. This is true, but only in part. The Brunian 
monism is and remains structurally inscribed in the organic connection of absolute 
being and communicated being, of “shadow” and “light”. It is here that that the bond 
between God and Infinite Life is tightened. Obscuring one of these two sides means 
depriving this position of one of its specific traits. In Bruno “material” and 
“corporeal” are not identified. This means that the valorisation of the bodily (of 
bodily matter) does not, as such, deprive the incorporeal (incorporeal matter) of 
foundation. They are both aspects of the same substance»89. Ciliberto confirms our 
earlier claim that Bruno’s ontology can only conceive the multiplicity of beings, what 
Ciliberto calls «communicated being», through a unity that is concealed, for it is not 
grasped through the determinations of duration and size, what Ciliberto calls 
«absolute being». It is the “light” of truth that is kept safe and it is only revealed 
through a “shadow”, the image of its being hidden: the Heideggerian movement of 
truth as unconcealment encountered in Heidegger, finds here a further confirmation.  
Bruno’s philosophy is striking in that it functions as a mirror of the reality it is 
trying to account for: it does not provide a description of a static ontology, it does not 
announce a truth to be correctly met, it actually puts this truth into practice by 
                                                
89 M. Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2005, pp. 240-1. My translation from Italian: 
«Sono, questi, testi sintomatici sia sul piano concettuale che su quello linguistico. Non per caso, 
proprio qui si è individuato il passaggio di Bruno a un monismo orientato in senso nettamente 
fisico-immanentistico. Questo è vero, ma solo in parte. In effetti quello bruniano è, e resta, un 
monismo strutturalmente imperniato nella connessione organica di essere assoluto e di essere 
comunicato, di ‘ombra’ e di ‘luce’. È qui che si stringe il nesso organico tra Dio e Vita infinita. 
Offuscare uno di questi lati, in un senso o nell’altro, vuol dire togliere a questa posizione il suo 
carattere specifico. In Bruno ‘materiale’ e ‘corporeo’ non si identificano. Il che vuol dire che la 
valorizzazione del corporeo (della materia corporea) non toglie, di per sé, fondamento 
all’incorporeo (alla materia incorporea). Sono l’uno e l’altro aspetti di una stessa sostanza». 
 70 
progressively inhabiting all the faces truth presents itself with. That is why 
commentators such as Ciliberto often recall the importance of light and shadow when 
dealing with Bruno, which applies to his writings, where all affirmations are never 
absolute but work as shadows, understood extensively, created by a light that can 
never be captured as it is always understood intensively, concealed. We, philosophers, 
are part of this shadowy game and have to move within it; our effort is to manage 
where Admetus failed, bearing two thoughts at once. In the case of matter, then, 
Bruno is not inverting the ontological role of matter and form in order to object to 
Aristotle. Rather, he shifts from a point of view of difference to a point of view of 
identity and vice versa in order to make sense of the universe. Before going deeper 
into the notion of shadow, which will be explored in Chapter V, we should take a 
look at the foundations of the Brunian ontology as expressed in De la Causa, 
Principio et Uno. Here the dialectic of identity and difference is clarified by the 
distinction between Cause and Principle, as Dicsono exposes them to a complacent 
Teofilo, who is Bruno’s mouthpiece: 
 
I think you take ‘principle’ to be that which intrinsically contributes to the constitution 
of things and remains in the effect, as they say of matter and form, which remain in the 
composite, or else the elements from which a thing is composed and into which a thing 
is resolved. You call ‘cause’ that which contributes to the production of things from 
outside, and which exists outside the composition, as is the case of the efficient cause, 
and of the end to which the thing produced is directed.90 
 
It is customary for Bruno to make use of well-established concepts. In this passage he 
refers to the Aristotelian four causes in order to twist them to his own advantage. 
Here the difference between Cause and Principle is very neat: the former is 
characterized as transcendent and it embraces efficient and final causality, the latter is 
characterized as immanent and embraces matter and form. While setting the stage, 
Bruno seems to proceed in a rather ordinary metaphysical manner, clarifying the 
main concepts he will adopt throughout his dialogue and on which his ontological 
                                                
90 G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, and Essays on Magic, p. 37.  
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system is going to be built. Indeed, he will introduce some rather widespread 
Neoplatonic terminology and inscribe it within the aforementioned Aristotelian 
notions. Nevertheless, that is a mere appearance, which is necessary for Bruno’s 
ontology to function and for establishing the light/shadow game that we shall explore 
deeply in the second Part of this work. As we shall often make note of, Bruno adopts 
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic terms in order to disembowel them, flatten them and 
render them suitable for the vicissitudinal and transient nature of truth, often even 
adopting neologisms, in open contrast with «grammarians» and «pedants». His 
lexicon, thus, is highly experimental, as Saiber rightly summarizes: «In sum, Bruno’s 
motivation for such linguistic labour was to convey his notion that the “realest” 
language is the one most able to express the multiplicity of human thoughts, feelings 
and inventions and most able to express the infinite variety of nature. Agrimi91, 
building on Ciliberto’s study, notes Bruno’s continual use of polisemy, homography, 
graphic oscillation and semantic mobility to help further his effort to name and 
describe the innumerable things and thoughts – as well as their ineffable essences – 
                                                
91 Saiber is here referring to the work by Mario Agrimi, “Giordano Bruno, filosofo del linguaggio”, 
in Studi filosofici 2 (1979), Olschki, Firenze 1981, p. 113, 131: «For Bruno, then, the linguistic 
“front” is the essential strategic line of his philosophical battle, fought exactly through the 
subversion of artificial linguistic and literary modes, thus against a superficial and empty use of 
language, devoid of sematic mobility and incapable of innovating itself» and – quoting M. 
Ciliberto, Lessico di Giordano Bruno, Edizioni dell' Ateneo & Vizzarri, Prima edizione (First 
Edition) edizione (1 gennaio 1979), p. XL – p. 131: «“the voice soul refers to spirit and body; that 
of body to world and universe; that of universe to infinite and one; we are speaking of intertwined 
correspondences: body refers to spirit; world to soul; universe to body; infinite to world; one to 
universe. And again: soul refers to form, form to intellect, both refer to universe. On a different 
level, wisdom refers to ignorance; madness to asinità [donkey-hood: ed.]; water to earth, air and 
fire, which refers to sun and earth, and again, through this path, to world and universe”». My 
translation from Italian:  «Per Bruno, quindi, il “fronte” linguistico è linea strategica essenziale della 
sua battaglia filosofica, combattuta appunto attraverso l’eversione di modi linguistici e letterari 
artefatti, contro cioè un uso della lingua superficiale e vuoto, privo di mobilità semantica e incapace 
di innovarsi» and «“la voce anima rimanda a spirito e corpo; quella di corpo a mondo e universo; 
quella di universo a infinito e uno. Si tratta di corrispondenze intrecciate: corpo rimanda a spirito; 
mondo ad anima; universo a corpo; infinito a mondo; uno a universo. E ancora: anima rimanda a 
forma, forma a intelletto, entrambe rinviano a universo. Su un altro piano, sapienza rimanda a 
ignoranza; pazzia ad asinità; acqua rimanda a terra, aria e fuoco, il quale rinvia a sole e terra, e, di 
nuovo, per questa via, a mondo e universo”». 
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of a universe of innumerable possible forms»92. Bruno refuses to reduce language to a 
mere scientific tool; he wishes to capture what is minor, what is irrelevant, the bits 
and pieces of reality, what he calls minuzzarie. The innumerable forms of his 
changing reality, indeed, are called forth by matter itself in virtue of the Neoplatonic 
notion of Universal Intellect, which does not act univocally but as both Cause and 
Principle. As a Cause: 
 
DICSONO. The aim, the final cause which is sought by the efficient [cause], is the 
perfection of the universe, which consists of all forms having actual material existence; 
the intellect delights and takes such pleasure in pursuing this goal, that it never tires of 
calling forth from matter all sorts of forms, as Empedocles himself seems to maintain. 
TEOFILO. Quite right, and I add that, just as this efficient [cause] is universal in the 
universe, but specific and particular in the universe’s parts and members, so are also its 
form and its purpose.93 
 
 
Here, in perfect Neoplatonic fashion, the Universal Intellect seems to be extrinsic and 
act as efficient Cause, shaping matter according to pre-existing forms. But that is not 
the end of the story: 
 
TEOFILO. […] we said, in fact, that the intellect, which is a potency of the world soul, 
is the proximate efficient cause of all natural things. 
DICSONO. But how can the same subject be principle and cause of natural things? 
How can it have the character of an intrinsic part and not that of an extrinsic part? 
TEOFILO. That is no contradiction, if we consider that the soul is in the body as the 
pilot is in the ship: since the pilot is part of the ship94, he moves with it; yet, considering 
that he governs and moves it, he must not be included as a part but as a distinct efficient 
cause. Likewise, the soul of the universe, in so far as it animates and informs it, is found 
to be an intrinsic and formal part of the universe, but in so far as it directs and governs 
                                                
92 A. Saiber, Giordano Bruno and the Geometry of Language, p. 54.  
93 G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, And Essays on Magic, p. 40. 
94 This image is borrowed from Averroes who, already appreciated in the Middle Ages, seemed to 
enjoy a particular success in Renaissance Italy, as Hasse holds: «In Renaissance Italy, Averroism 
for several reasons acquired an intensity and dynamism unparalleled in the Middle Ages. First of 
all, the number of Renaissance Averroists was simply larger than that of their medieval 
predecessors […]. Then, too, the Averroist current is more frequently the object of attack in the 
Renaissance than in the medieval period. And, most importantly, it is only in the Renaissance that 
the doctrinal direction of the Averroist school is challenged and debated openly within the school». 
From D. N. Hasse, “Arabic philosophy and Averroism”, in J. Hankins (edited by), The Cambridge 
Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, p. 117. 
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the universe, it is not a part, and does not have the character of principle, but of a 
cause.95 
 
Both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic notions are merged and reinvented, as Bruno’s 
fundamental intuition is that metaphysical concepts cannot be exhausted in a univocal 
manner as, for instance, «the efficient cause works from within, remaining distinct 
only because it is not exhausted by the particular thing it produces; and the final 
cause is that which assures the “perfection of the universe”»96. Whereas in Plotinus 
the Universal Intellect and the World Soul are separate notions, in Bruno they 
become one, yet under different points of view: the Universal Intellect is the World 
Soul understood operatively. Through these premises we can finally see that the 
transcendence carried by the notion of form is such only while matter in-forms it, as 
the very fact of being material implies having a form and thus being animate. And if 
matter, as we saw while examining the evolution of Bruno’s thought in the later De 
minimo, is subject to the vicissitude of aggregation and disintegration, then the forms 
are not eternal and pre-established prototypes of things and the soul is not part of an 
immaterial and transcendent world and yet matter itself has all the possible forms in 
its womb. The World Soul, as a matter of fact, permeates the one substance according 
the principle of contraction – concept of Cusanian descent97 – and is in every thing 
according to the principle of explication mirroring the intensive and extensive 
                                                
95 G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, And Essays on Magic, p. 40. 
96 S. Greenberg, The Infinite in Giordano Bruno, p. 25. 
97 Although the concept is indeed of Cusanian descent, it is dubitable whether Bruno actually 
derives it primarily from Cusanus. According to Leo Catana the Cusanian doctrine is actually 
absent in Bruno’s earlier works, from De umbris (1582) to Sigillus sigillorum (1583) and De la 
causa (1584): «The affinities between contraction in the relevant passage in De umbris and 
contraction in Cusanus’ De docta ignorantia ii 6 could then be read an an indication of Bruno’s 
admiration for Cusanus’ polemics against Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy – though without 
implying that Bruno shared Cusanus’ interpretation of contraction. […] Bruno revised the idea of 
matter through his reading of Plotinus’ Enneads II iv, conflating intelligible and corporeal matter 
and emphasizing the active potentiality of matter. Bruno incorporated Cusanus’ principle of 
coincidence of opposites into this idea of matter. On the basis of an interpretation of contraction as 
the one found in Giles and Bruno’s own interpretations of Plotinus’ notion of matter, Bruno could 
give a pantheistic account of the relationship between unity and multiplicity, which was distinct 
from the Christian version Cusanus had presented in his De docta ignorantia». From L. Catana, The 
Concept of Contraction in Giordano Bruno’s Philosophy, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005, p. 152. 
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perspectives of the infinite. There is no qualitative difference between an onion, a cat 
and a human: they all are animated in this sense; it is the vicissitudinal destiny of 
matter that gives them a particular form and degree of animation. Bruno even 
provides a biblical grounding for his theory in the fourth dialogue of the De la Causa, 
which sounds vaguely Heideggerian in tone: 
 
But nature produces everything out of its own matter by means of separation, parturition 
and effluxion, as the Pythagoreans thought, as Anaxagoras and Democritus understood 
and the sages of Babylon confirmed. Moses, himself, also subscribes to their opinion 
when, describing the generation of the things ordered by the universal efficient cause, 
he speaks thus: “Let the earth bring forth its animals, let the waters bring forth living 
creatures”98. It is as if he had said: Let matter bring them forth.99 
 
It is not by accident that in De minimo Bruno ties the notion of minimum to the 
faculties of man as a measurer and an organizer: man does not dwell outside of the 
World Soul, he is qualitatively coincident with other beings. Man’s alleged “mastery 
of nature”, which characterizes the modern subject, in Bruno becomes meaningless 
for man is also brought forth by matter, although with a particular configuration that 
allows him to impose his dominion upon other beings, yet not on nature.  
We shall probably find what is left of man in Bruno’s concept of individual, 
which we would call weak or, simply, not substantial, in the sense that the individual 
in Bruno is not conceived as ὑποκείμενον, which makes a theory of the subject 
impossible to begin with. Yet, Bruno does account for individuality, as Filippo 
Mignini rightly argues: «A sort of general definition of individual as an indivisible 
unity of a multiplicity recurs in the fourth dialogue of the De la Causa100, precisely 
relatively to the need of considering “individual” any being that should be thought as 
                                                
98 Paraphrase of Genesis I, 20 and 24. 
99 G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, and Essays on Magic, p. 83. 
100 The passage Mignini refers to is the following: «DICSONO. Then, everything which comprises 
all the genuses is indivisible? TEOFILO. Exactly, because the form which comprises all figures 
does not itself possess any; that which possesses all sensible  being is not, for that reason, accessible 
to the senses. That which possesses all natural being is highly indivisible; that which possesses all 
intellectual being is still more highly indivisible; that which possesses all that can be is the most 
highly indivisible of all» from ibid., p. 79. 
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implying or comprising a multiplicity in its own nature. Such indivisibility coincides 
exactly with the indifference of that being towards everything of which it is an actual 
unity. The indivisibility of such a being is not opposed to its being participated as, on 
the contrary, its simultaneous essential being participated and indivisibility are 
rendered possible by its indifference and indeterminacy»101. The individual is, 
therefore, the indifferent unity of a multiplicity, as it does not make sense to speak of 
an individual by referring to its parts, even though the individual is the unity of many 
parts, extensively; that is why, even though the one and infinite substance is the 
highest type of individual, its individuality is not qualitatively different – and thus not 
substantial – from the individuality of an animal or a stone; it simply is an infinitely 
greater individuality of which minor individualities are contractions. Again, the 
theory of the minimum in this light makes even more sense not as a principle of 
divisibility but as a principle of composition, as we saw earlier in this chapter. There 
is, therefore, no ontological hierarchy amongst individuals, which enjoy the same 
dignity as participating in the World Soul, and that includes man and human nature, 
which becomes the result of an ever developing anthropogenesis: «In the De 
Immenso102, Bruno also develops a theory of anthropogenesis that gives an account of 
                                                
101 F. Mignini, La dottrina dell’individuo in Cusano e in Bruno, in Bruniana & Campanelliana. A. 
6, n. 2 (2000), Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, Pisa 2000, p. 340. My translation from 
Italian: «Una sorta di definizione generale dell’individuo come unità indivisibile di un molteplice 
ricorre nel quarto dialogo del De la causa, precisamente in riferimento all’esigenza di considerare 
‘individuo’ qualsiasi ente che debba essere pensato come implicante o comprendente nella sua 
natura un molteplice. Tale indivisibilità coincide esattamente con l’indifferenza di quell’ente 
rispetto a tutto ciò di cui è unità attuale. L’indivisibilità di un tale ente non si oppone alla sua 
partecipabilità, perché, al contrario, la simultanea partecipabilità essenziale e indivisibilità sono rese 
possibili dalla sua indifferenza o indeterminatezza». 
102 «As in the individual the power of all is found; as in the simple homogeneity of the seed the 
power of composition and of the heterogeneity of animal and vegetal organisms is found, so in the 
simplicity of the soul is found the active power of life that we accordingly name motion not 
according to a unique and simple difference but in a universal sense, according to all the differences 
[…]» from G. Bruno, De immenso in Opera latine conscripta, p. 291. My translation from Latin 
and rendition in prose, also based on the Italian translation of Carlo Monti, in G. Bruno, Opere 
latine, Mondadori, Milano 2008, p. 640: 
«Sicut autem in individuo est potentia totius dimensi, ut in simpli- 
citate seminis et homogeneitate est potentia compositionis et ethe- 
rogeneitatis animalis vel plantae, sic in simplicitate animae est po- 
tentia activa omnis actus vitae, quem nunc pro more motum dicere vo- 
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the power of human nature as a whole. Human nature is the product, always in 
metamorphosis, of the incessant action of the living infinite matter. Human nature has 
been engendered by the natural metamorphosis of atoms and minima and it continues 
to be permanently subject to the laws of transformation»103. There is no fixed human 
nature because there is no fixed configuration of man, who becomes a manipulator of 
nature because of his bodily configuration and he possesses a hand as the 
configuration of the world offers him things to be grabbed and manipulated; man is 
for the same reason a measurer and a thinking being and all these features and their 
malleable meaning are deeply historical, as they are founded in the vicissitude. Bruno 
would, then, consider it a mistake to try and determine human nature by dissecting 
and analysing the individual because once it is dissected, the individual is lost; he 
would also deem it absurd to formulate a fixed notion of human nature based on a 
transcendent soul, as that very soul cannot be fixed nor transcendent, for it is brought 
forth by the incessant vicissitude of the living, infinite, matter104. 
                                                                                                                                                            
lumus, non secundum unam et singularem, sed secundum omnes uni- 
versaliter differentias». 
103 S. Ansaldi, Giordano Bruno. Une philosophie de la métamorphose, p. 247. My translation from 
French: «Dans le De immenso, Bruno développe ainsi une théorie de l’anthropogenèse qui rend 
raison de la puissance de la nature humaine dans son ensemble. La nature humaine est le produit, 
toujours en métamorphose, de l’action incessante de la matière vivante infinie. La nature humaine a 
été engendrée par la métamorphose naturelle des atomes et des minima et continue à en subir en 
permanence le lois de transformation». 
104 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, another central figure of the Renaissance, had also argued for an 
indeterminate nature of mankind, although arguing on completely different grounds – the freedom 
granted by God – with respect to Bruno. As Pico himself affirms in his 1486 Oratio de hominis 
dignitate [Oration on the Dignity of Man] while, as God’s mouthpiece, addressing man: «‘[…] We 
created you neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal so that you, almost voluntary 
and honorary sculptor and shaper of yourself, could shape yourself the way you wish. You could 
degenerate in inferior beings, which are brute; you could be regenerated, according to your soul, in 
superior beings, which are divine’. Oh greatest liberality of Father God, greatest and admirable 
happiness of man, to whom is given to have whatever he pleases, to be whatever he wishes to be!». 
From G. Pico della Mirandola, Discorso sulla dignità dell’uomo, edited and with a translation in 
Italian by F. Bausi, Fondazione Pietro Bembo / Ugo Guanda Editore, pp. 10-12. My translation 
from Latin: «‘[…] Nec te celestem neque terrenu, neque mortalem, neque immortalem fecimus, ut, 
tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque plastes et fictor, in quam malueris tute formam effingas. 
Poteris in inferiora, quae sunt bruta, degenerare; poteris in superiora, quae sunt divina, ex tui animi 
sententia degenerari’. O summam Dei patris liberalitatem, summam et admirandam hominis 
foelicitatem, cui datum id habere quod optat, id esse quod velit!». 
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Our path through Bruno’s ontology has provided us with a perspective on 
science and modernity that is alternative to Heidegger’s history of metaphysics. 
Furthermore, operating without reference to a subject, we saw that Bruno anticipates, 
although using a language that remains profoundly metaphysical, those traits that will 
be characteristic of Heidegger’s notion of truth as unconcealment. What is striking is 
that such thinking is inspired by the very scientific revolution that Heidegger saw as a 
threat to his notion of truth. Had Heidegger considered the history of metaphysics in a 
less deterministic manner, he could have spotted similar results. That also seems to be 
the case with Spinoza, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III – Difference 
 
Section 1 – Mos geometricus 
 
Our encounter with Bruno has shown a philosophical practice that rejects a role 
as “scientist’s appendix”: the philosopher understands himself as centre of intensity in 
order to account for the infinite variety of experience. The most mature exponent of 
Renaissance culture seems to be pushing metaphysics away from the destiny 
Heidegger envisages. The notion of “end of philosophy” was presented in Chapter I 
as not reducible to a moment in time: if it is not understood through duration, it is 
therefore an intensive notion, which indicates the end coinciding with the whole 
history of metaphysics as a constitutive feature. Yet Bruno and the Renaissance 
culture behind him express a different drive running through the history of 
philosophy, which, however historically – thus extensively – defeated, is structurally 
part of metaphysical thinking. Spinoza’s alleged «peculiar one-sidedness»105 is 
presented by Heidegger as a sufficient reason for a quick dismissal from his history 
of metaphysics, thereby narrowing his relevance to be merely functional to an 
understanding of German Idealism within the perspective of a Greco-Germanic 
destiny of philosophy. As Krell rightly affirms: «The epochality of Heidegger’s 
history of being preserves traces of a certain teleological thinking, especially in what 
it “forecloses” for thinking. Derrida sees such foreclosure at work in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Platonic χῶρα as a preparation of the Cartesian interpretation of 
beings in space as extensio, and also in Heidegger’s tendency to exclude recalcitrant 
figures from the history of being, figures such as Spinoza, who cannot be readily 
subordinated to the epoch of subjectivity»106. Spinoza twists and de-structures the 
Cartesian premises of modernity. Just as Bruno produced a whole new possibility for 
                                                
105 See n. 54. 
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thinking by opening up the old and sclerotic metaphysical structures to the infinity of 
the universe, so Spinoza bends the rigid laws of reason and logic to the infinite 
possibilities of production for man by moving back from the epistemological ground 
to the ontological one. Through Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics and through our 
first approach to Bruno we have realized that granting man the status of subject – and 
therefore ontological foundation of the real – forces any thinking within the 
epistemological cage of method as it restricts any further access to Being. Through 
his encounter with Copernicus, Bruno has shown science to be an opportunity for 
man to establish a state of proximity with nature without losing himself and without 
recurring to Cartesian isolation and dualism. Such an understanding of man and of his 
place can only occur by thinking him already within the operational truth of Being, 
i.e. immersed in the disclosing life of the world, and not by bracketing life through 
methodological doubt. Cartesian doubt, as we saw, presupposes its outcome as it 
empowers the doubter to distance and negate everything that can be an object of 
doubt, thereby identifying what is left, the subject, as a foundation on which, through 
the work of reason, an absolutely certain knowledge can be built. Yet, certainty is a 
prerogative of doubt. Spinoza, on the other hand, one-sidedly – as Heidegger would 
have it – engages with foundation or ground in all its actuality and full complexity 
and not with its reduction. Spinoza, as a philosopher and as a man, inhabits the world, 
just like Bruno, and seeks to understand nature from within. We shall see how the 
mos geometricus, which characterizes Spinoza’s Ethics, is not a foundational method 
at all: we shall also see how substance is already displayed in its full existence and 
complexity and how Spinoza’s rigorous logic is not superimposed on reality but on 
the understanding.  
Heidegger’s criticism of Descartes suggests that the foundation of Descartes’ 
philosophy, the cogitans, is reached precisely through an arbitrarily pre-determined 
method; the proximity to Being is obliterated because the ontological problem is 
closed up and reduced to a merely epistemological one before even being addressed. 
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Spinoza, on the other hand, sets a different pace from the very beginning, starting 
from his very first definitions in Ethics I: 
 
1. By that which is self-caused I mean that whose essence involves existence or that 
whose nature can be conceived only as existing. 
2. A thing is said to be finite in its own kind [in suo genere finita] when it can be limited 
by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is said to be finite because we 
can always conceive of another body greater than it. So, too, a thought is limited by 
another thought. But body is not limited by thought, nor thought by body. 
3. By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that 
the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it 
has to be formed.107 
 
We should not give in to the temptation of imagining the thinker who is trying to 
capture an alien reality: from the very beginning it is made clear, as in Bruno, that the 
infinite cannot be understood through finite notions. Spinoza is manifesting the power 
of what he can or cannot conceive when dealing with existence as a whole, absolutely 
aware of his position and of his starting point. The first and most difficult effort, 
perhaps, when dealing with Spinoza, is to try not to assume we are talking of some 
thing that constitutes the ground of our reality and that is more general or more 
universal than all particular things we experience, which is one of the erroneous 
notions of Being Heidegger denounces in Sein und Zeit. There is no rift between 
Spinoza’s enunciation of it and its display in existence. It is crucial that, while talking 
about Spinoza, we make the effort of thinking each time that we are dealing with a 
substance that is «self-caused […] whose essence involves existence». It makes no 
sense to doubt it, for we can only doubt what is not necessarily existent and that is not 
the case of substance. That is exactly why Descartes misses the point, that is why all 
he has left is method, because he thinks that by bracketing reality on the basis of his 
own criterion of certainty, he could somehow grasp something that is, on the other 
hand, alien to the notion of doubt. This does not mean that Spinoza does not apply 
any method at all, indeed, his Ethics is demonstrated more geometrico, through the 
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geometrical method, but the method is not established as the standard of essence or 
existence. Deleuze underlines this point particularly well in his Spinozist vocabulary: 
«METHOD. – 1. The aim is not to make something known to us, but to make us 
understand our power of knowing. It is a matter of becoming conscious of this power: 
a reflexive knowledge or an idea of the idea. But since the idea of the idea is worth 
what the first idea is worth, this prise de conscience assumes that we first have a true 
idea of some kind. It matters little which idea; it can be an idea that involves a fiction, 
such as that of a geometric being. It will enable us to understand our power of 
knowing all the better, without reference to a real object»108. Spinoza’s starting point 
is ostensive: it is not dubitative or cogitative, it is a practical move; method arranges 
and demonstrates the power and the operational range of existence.  
It is not our purpose here to give a full account of Spinoza’s oeuvre but to arrive 
at that level of engagement that is necessary for us to think alternatively with respect 
to the Cartesian model of modernity. In the case of Spinoza the relationship between 
existence and method is crucial for capturing such opportunity: at first glance we 
might consider that Spinoza is operating a mathematisation of nature, which seems to 
make him a perfectly modern thinker, just like Galileo and Descartes. On the other 
hand, Spinoza’s affinity to Bruno will progressively emerge – something that, after 
all, was also obvious to Heidegger109. We saw that Bruno’s mathematics does not 
function according to abstraction, i.e. by expecting nature to follow models based on 
isolated objects whose relations are strictly calculated in virtue of the fact that they 
are treated as ideal objects, e.g. the bodies falling from the leaning tower of Pisa. 
Bruno’s mathematics of numeration works by understanding beings relationally, 
where the relation is not mere contact between separate bodies but the dynamic 
ontological determination of the minimum. Now, the particular kind of relation 
examined in the Ethics is the causal one. Spinoza’s thinking, as we affirmed, is not 
looking for a ground that is guaranteed by certainty simply because he does not need 
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it: he is not dissecting, analysing or, worse, doubting reality, he is indeed figuring and 
synthesizing it. Such an approach forces him to begin from undemonstrated 
definitions, which are a cause of perplexity amongst his commentators: how can 
Spinoza base his whole philosophical construction on arbitrary and undemonstrated 
definitions? The eyes of the logician are rather short-sighted, in this instance; if we 
wish to have an answer, the eyes of the philosopher are surely more rewarding. Let us 
listen to Spinoza himself, in his reply to his friend Simon de Vries: 
 
There is the definition that serves to explicate a thing whose essence alone is in question 
and the object of doubt, and there is the definition which is put forward simply for 
examination. The former, since it has a determinate object, must be a true definition, 
while this need not be so in the latter case. For example, if one were to ask me for a 
description of Solomon’s temple, I ought to give him a true description, unless I 
propose to talk nonsense with him. But if I have in my own mind formed the design of a 
temple that I want to build, and from its description I conclude that I will have to 
purchase such-and-such a site and so many thousands of stones and other materials, will 
any sane person tell me that I have reached a wrong conclusion because my definition 
may be incorrect? […] Therefore a definition either explicates a thing as it exists outside 
the intellect […] or it explicates a thing as it is conceived by us or can be conceived. 
And in that case it also differs from an axiom and proposition in requiring merely that it 
be conceived, not conceived as true, as in the case of an axiom.110 
 
The definitions offered in the Ethics are of the former kind, where a determinate 
object is under examination. Their truth is given by their actual existence and not by 
assigning them a logical truth-value: we are presented with no abstract standard of 
certitude to measure them against; their existence is not dependent upon a 
propositional truth. This pushes Spinoza very far from Descartes, who doubts the 
very existence of the outer world – including his own body – in order to rationally 
establish that very standard against which the whole reality should be tested. As 
Nadler puts it: «He [Spinoza: ed.] does not take himself only to be showing what are 
the extended implications of a number of stipulated but not necessarily true 
definitions. On the contrary, he sees the Ethics as laying out the truth. The book is 
about reality: its nature, its structure, its operations and the implications of these for 
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human happiness. In Part One, he is not just saying: “If you will assume for the sake 
of argument that this is what ‘substance’, ‘God’ and ‘attribute’ are, then it will follow 
that God is the only substance and is identical with Nature.” Rather, he is saying: 
“This is how ‘substance’, ‘God’ and ‘attribute’ should be understood, if defined truly; 
and therefore it is the case that God is the only substance and is identical with 
Nature.” Naturally, one will want to know how Spinoza can be so sure […] that these 
definitions are true. […] It seems that Spinoza thinks that the definitions are self-
evidently true»111. The expression «self-evidently true» might be slightly misleading 
for those who think we are talking of a logical or propositional truth: definitions in 
the Ethics are the very image of our power of conceiving reality within our originary 
nearness to it, they are not a logical abstraction. The easiest error we can commit is to 
interpret Spinoza through the scientific eyes of our modernity, where living reality is 
only true starting from its correspondence to a scientific model. Modern science, as 
the analytic representation of reality based on mathematical models, is never 
originary, as what is most originary is the creation and production of reality, 
according to which Spinoza provides his highest thinking effort. Definitions, then, are 
an engaging access to the Ethics, which shows no need to be transcendentally 
grounded because it is already rooted in reality. 
In the famous Appendix to Part I of the Ethics, Spinoza provides a recapitulation 
and a clarification of how he is trying to rid philosophy and thinking of all those 
anthropomorphic, teleological and finalistic notions we are imbued with. Within this 
important passage we would like to focus, once more, on the role of method and its 
relation to Being. Protesting against those who find it easier to relegate everything 
they do not understand to the divine sphere, Spinoza suggests: 
 
Hence they made it axiomatic that the judgement of the god is far beyond man’s 
understanding. Indeed, it is for this reason, and this reason only, that truth might have 
evaded mankind forever had not Mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but 
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only with the essences and properties of figures, revealed to men a different standard of 
truth.112 
 
Spinoza’s notion of mathematics is not based on calculation; it is concerned with 
properties, with what figures and things can do. Spinoza’s look is oriented 
synthetically and not analytically, antithetically to Descartes and Galileo. Francesco 
Valerio underlines how the method revolving around a subjectivity is abstracted from 
the thing, the being itself: «What matters the most in the thinking exercise of the 
doubting subjectivity is not the “thing” but the method through which the thing has 
been found. In this sense Heidegger’s analysis of the foundations of the modern 
epoch surely hits the right spot, when it underlines the ‘primacy of method’ as the 
essential constitutive trait of subjectivity. This, as a matter of fact, handles the being 
of things positing itself as its fundamentum inconcussum. Analysis methodically 
guarantees the theoretical prominence of the subject, of the cogito, and with it the 
very possibility of making the describing thread that is extended between finite being 
and infinite being around subjectivity»113. As was seen in Bruno, the importance of 
mathematics is fundamental to the author’s thinking and, nevertheless, it is not the 
kind of mathematics practised in modern thinking: it is a philosophical mathematics 
ontologically based on the things themselves and not around subjectivity. Just like in 
geometry, Spinoza works on the operational properties of reality in their infinite 
actuality of relating and being affected. It is in virtue of such relations and affections 
that the geometrical method displays its full potential as offering the tools of 
synthesis that can account for the multiple properties and the omni-relational 
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character of the world. The debate between Spinoza and Tschirnhaus is illuminating 
in this sense, as Tschirnhaus asks Spinoza to explain how he can derive a priori the 
variety of the world from his definition of Extension, considering that Descartes finds 
no better way than taking God as a first mover: 
 
[Tschirnhaus] In mathematics I have always observed that from any thing considered in 
itself – that is, from the definition of any thing – we are able to deduce at least one 
property; but if we wish to deduce more properties, we have to relate the thing defined 
to other things. It is only then, from the combination of the definitions of these things, 
that new properties emerge. […] This seems to be at variance, to some extent with 
Proposition 16 of the Ethics114, almost the most important proposition of your Treatise. 
In this proposition it is taken for granted that several properties can be deduced from the 
given definition of any thing, which seems to me impossible if we do not relate the 
thing defined to other things. In consequence, I fail to see how from an Attribute 
considered by itself, Extension, for example, an infinite variety of things can arise.115 
 
[Spinoza] As to what you add, from the definition of any thing, considered in itself, we 
can deduce only one property, this may hold good in the case of the most simple things, 
or in the case of mental constructs (entia rationis), in which I include figures, but not in 
the case of real things. Simply from the fact that I define God as an Entity to whose 
essence existence belongs, I infer several properties of him, such as that he necessarily 
exists, that he is one alone, immutable, infinite, etc.116 
 
Tschirnhaus is thinking abstractly by treating real things as geometrical figures and 
thus missing the point of Prop. 16 of Part I. Geometrical figures are within the realm 
of the mathematician; Spinoza, on the other hand, deals with real things immersed in 
                                                
114 «Proposition 16 
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite ways [modis] 
(that is, everything that can come within the scope of infinite intellect). 
Proof  This proposition should be obvious to everyone who will but consider this point, that from 
the given definition of any one thing the intellect infers a number of properties which necessarily 
follow, in fact, from the definition (that is, from the very essence of the thing), and the more reality 
the definition of the thing expresses (that is, the more reality the essence of the thing defined 
involves), the greater the number of its properties. Now, since divine nature possesses absolutely 
infinite attributes (Def. 6), of which each one also expresses infinite essence in its own kind, then 
there must necessarily follow from the necessity of the divine nature an infinity of things in infinite 
ways (that is, everything that can come within the scope of the infinite intellect)» from B. Spinoza, 
“Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 227. 
115 E.W. von Tschirnhaus, “Letter 82. To the acute and learned philosopher B.d.S.”, in B. Spinoza, 
Complete Works, p. 957. 
116 B. Spinoza, “Letter 83. To the most noble and learned Mr. Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, 
from B.d.S.”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 958. 
 86 
the omni-relational activity of existence. In the case of Prop. 16, divine nature is the 
very source of all possible relations among things or, to use a Neoplatonic term, their 
being understood in contraction. Furthermore, geometrical figures, such as circles, 
are the effect of fictitious causes inferred by the mathematician – the movement of a 
line’s endpoint around a centre – whereas causal relations in reality are not fictions, 
they are our real understanding of the operational activity of the world: we relate the 
vase falling to the hand pushing it. And even in the case Tschirnhaus observes, which 
is the case of the Attribute – substance seen under one kind of infinity – we are not 
dealing with an external and fictional cause that somehow aids us in our 
understanding of it, as we understand it from being involved in it and not through the 
external eye of the mathematician, who can fictitiously cause the generation of a 
circle. The things belonging to the variety of the world – the modes – are the 
substance understood through one of its attributes. Within that variety, in which they 
are understood, they are not isolated and fictional entia rationis. That is the reason 
why existence cannot be attributed necessarily to the essence of single modes but 
only to the substance that expresses them, which is the only entity whose essence 
necessarily implies existence and can be the only cause of itself in its infinite variety. 
Deleuze provides a further clarification of this point: «In taking Absolute Infinity as a 
cause, we are not postulating, as for a rotating semicircle, something that lies outside 
its concept. It involves no fiction to consider modes in their infinite variety as 
properties jointly deduced from the definition of substance, and attributes as points of 
view internal to the substance on which they are substance on which they are so many 
views. So that, if philosophy is amenable to mathematical treatment, this is because 
mathematics finds its usual limitations overcome in philosophy»117. We find that 
Spinoza, just like Bruno, is well aware of the difference between a mathematician and 
a philosopher and that philosophy is not exhausted in mathematics or in what is 
strictly delimited by method and reduced to an epistemological problem. 
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Section 2 – Infinity of the attributes, dignity of the modes 
 
We have encountered substance only incidentally so far. The reason is that it 
was necessary to pave the way for the encounter with substance, to establish a 
practice that would do away with the temptations of approaching it as ὑποκείμενον, 
as another version of abstract ground on which the whole of reality is founded. We 
shall attempt to show how substance does not need to found or to be founded, in 
virtue of its own articulation as reality itself that requires nothing outside of itself. 
Bearing such a thought in mind, let us follow three further definitions Spinoza 
provides us with: 
 
4. By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its 
essence.  
5. By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else 
and is conceived through something else.  
6. By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of infinite 
attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. 
Explication I say “absolutely infinite”, not “infinite in its kind”. For if a thing is 
only infinite in its kind, one may deny that it has infinite attributes. But if a thing is 
absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and does not involve any negation 
belongs to its essence.118 
 
We witness the appearance of substance, attributes and modes intimately intertwined 
with the notion of the infinite. We are compelled to engage in a thorough 
understanding of the notion of the infinite, in order to make easier our nearness to 
substance and its articulation. On the notion of the infinite, just as we observed in 
Bruno, the ontological problem unfolds and marks a deep distinction between 
Cartesian modernity and Spinozism. The difficulty of approaching Spinoza for the 
modern reader lies not so much in the nitpicking analysis of the validity of his logical 
arguments but in the effort of thinking the two thoughts of substance and modes at 
once. Spinoza does not employ Admetus’  stratagem of separating what he cannot 
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seem to think at once; he shows no need for a dialectics and no need to have a 
counterparty in the ontological or in the knowing activity. The distinction between 
absolutely infinite and infinite in its kind provides the first access to our 
understanding of this new scenario.  
The problem of infinity is actively explicated in the relationship between 
substance and its attributes, which is one of the great issues that distinguishes 
Spinoza from Descartes. From Def. 4 Spinoza directly derives Prop. 9, which states 
that «the more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has»119 and from Def. 3 and 
Def. 4 he deduces Prop. 10, according to which «Each attribute of one substance 
must be conceived through itself»120. Within these two propositions and the 
definitions on which they stand, we find synthesized the problem of difference 
concerning infinity. It is clear from Def. 4 that the attribute is how a substance is 
conceived in its existence and how the attribute is only found in association with a 
substance – not as a quality attached to a thing but as «constituting its essence». 
Making substance conceivable in its existence and constituting its essence means that 
attributes are not optional properties of a substance; they ontologically belong to it, 
i.e. they are the operational actualization of a substance. There cannot be any 
expression of a substance if not through one of its attributes. Extension and thought 
are the attributes that are known to us; they constitute the way we experience 
substance. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think substance itself, which is 
characterized as absolutely infinite being, as, for instance, an infinitely extended 
entity, for that would amount to a determination, thus to a limitation, which blatantly 
contradicts its absolutely infinite being. As a matter of fact, attempting to think 
substance under some sort of determination implies treating it as a finite object. In 
Spinoza’s case we are not trying to determine substance, we are attempting to think it 
from within the determinations of reality, which are its very own finite 
determinations expressed through its attributes. As Deleuze points out: «Attributes 
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are like points of view on substance; but in the absolute limit these points of view are 
no longer external, and substance contains within itself the infinity of its points of 
view upon itself»121. If these «points of view», which are nothing like predicates or 
qualities, are to be conceived as constituting the essence of substance, there is no real 
distinction between substance and attributes as in each attribute we find the whole of 
substance understood either as thought or extension, for instance. Nadler is correct 
only to an extent when he affirms the following: «The attributes are indeed elements 
making up the absolutely infinite substance but none can be removed or separated 
from the totality that is substance itself, not even in principle. Each attribute is in 
itself and conceived through itself»122. Even though Nadler captures the indissoluble 
link between attributes and substance, he still sees them as elements of a whole and 
thus fails to see that each attribute expresses substance as a whole in its own way: 
whenever we conceive of substance as extension we conceive the totality of 
substance as extended and the same goes for thought: the relationship is not one of 
whole vs. parts but between types of infinity. It is compelling, then, that attributes 
themselves should be infinite, as they are identical with substance and express it in 
their own way, without being constrained by any other attribute. The only way we 
can conceive or represent substance, then, is through an attribute. Nevertheless, we 
cannot represent it or conceive it as an infinitely extended entity or as an omni-
comprehensive intellect when we think of it in its absolute infinity. In that case it will 
not be absolute but determined in one way, although in both cases we are trying to 
conceive the same “thing”. If we are not to fall into error or confusion, then, we have 
to make the effort to think such infinites in a different manner. The absolute infinite 
that characterizes substance is one that is not extended either in matter or thought. It 
is indifferent to measurement, analysis and division and can therefore be nothing but 
an intensive infinite. This is a notion we encountered previously in Bruno and one 
that will be gradually clarified in the course of our study of Spinoza. 
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The distinction mentioned above allows us to move to the notion of infinite 
attributes. Spinoza, in a manner that resembles Bruno’s approach, bends traditional 
concepts. In this case, as Carlo Sini rightly points out123, seeing the attributes as 
infinite just because they belong to an infinite substance is a rather traditional 
Neoplatonic claim. Such a claim would imagine the infinite substance on one side 
and its attributes as some kind of hypostases – a fault that we encountered in Nadler 
too. Says Sini: «I have said two things: the first is more banal, the second is more 
profound. To substance it is indifferent how many attributes there are; as a matter of 
fact, the problem does not lie there; attributes cannot be quantified, they are un-
limitable, they are not 1+1+1+1+n. But then I said another thing within this: to 
substance attribute is in-different. There is no difference between attributes for 
substance. It is the attributes that make the difference, whereas to substance it does 
not matter to be thought or extended, it is indifferent. From the point of view of 
substance, three attributes are not more than two, three hundred more than two 
hundred, three thousand more than two thousand»124. Sini is claiming that, from the 
standpoint of substance, it makes no sense to investigate whether there are attributes 
in addition to extension and thought125 and, if so, what they are. Even Nadler 
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imagines attributes as distinct elements, as if they were somehow “numerable things”, 
however inseparable from substance. The difference is more subtle: when I 
understand the colour red by looking at something red and when I understand the 
same experience of the colour red by defining it as some particular refraction of light, 
I am understanding the same thing in both cases, once under the attribute of 
extension, once under the attribute of thought. This happens because I am 
understanding a mode of substance through two of its attributes, but I am 
understanding the same thing. Such a thing does not reside anywhere else than 
exactly where and how I am experiencing it, the substance of which the colour red is 
a modification is not somewhere else where we can find a colour red-in-itself, some 
sort of noumenon, yet ante litteram. That is how a certain kind of metaphysics – that 
which Heidegger identifies with Metaphysics – reifies and makes substance 
transcendent. For Spinoza nothing but attributes can constitute the essence of 
substance, whose only difference from substance is the very event of their difference 
amongst one another. If we keep on reasoning extensive [Latin for extensively], we 
shall surely keep on seeing such difference as numerical but then we would be 
compelled to see attributes as numerically distinct, which they are not, not even in 
principle – as Nadler rightly admits. By seeing attributes as numerical we would fall 
back right into the hands of Descartes and have to admit that each corresponds to a 
different substance and get trapped into an irredeemable dualism. If we think 
                                                                                                                                                            
impossible problem for Spinoza’s epistemology. Those are four reasons for reading the Ethics as 
consistent with attribute dualism. Should we read it as entailing dualism? The reasons do not work 
as well in support of that, though the fourth is still powerful: the difficulty of explaining our 
ignorance of further attributes is a positive reason for denying that there are any. Spinoza could 
have argued for dualism like this: “The universe must exist in every possible basic way, of which 
the only two we know about are thought and extension. My views about what we are, and about 
what knowledge is, make it seem impossible that there should be attributes which we do not know. 
So, probably, thought and extension are the only possible basic ways of being , though I cannot see 
why this should be so and cannot make it look self-evident”. The modesty and caution of that were 
foreign to Spinoza’s temperament, however. He said nothing like it and probably thought nothing 
like it. I have no idea what Spinoza really thought about how many attributes there are. My central 
claim is not about his mind but about the text. It is that if he took “infinite attributes” to imply 
“more than two attributes”, then that extra implication is negligible because in the Ethics it is idle». 
From J. Bennet, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Hackett, Indianapolis 1984, pp. 78-79. 
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intensive [Latin for intensively] as we already did in the case of Bruno, the problem 
vanishes because, from the perspective of the absolute infinite, there is no standard 
against which we can numerate attributes, so one is not less than three, which is no 
more than two and vice-versa. And that is how Jonathan Bennet’s effort becomes 
rather meaningless126. 
We are starting to understand that the issue of difference is intimately 
intertwined with that of infinity and with the fact that mathematics is intended, as 
Bruno wished and practised, not as the pure and abstract language of nature but as 
subordinate to the philosophical practice: Bruno and Spinoza, respectively before and 
after the official rise of modernity, had already captured its major shortcoming. Let us 
then explore this aspect further and jump for a moment to Part II of the Ethics, to the 
Scholium of Prop. 45 – «every idea of any body or particular thing existing in 
actuality necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God»127:  
 
Here by existence I do not mean duration, that is, existence insofar as it is considered in 
the abstract as a kind of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is 
attributed to particular things because they follow in infinite numbers in infinite ways 
from the necessity of God’s nature (Pr. 16, I). I am speaking, I repeat, of the very 
existence of particular things insofar as they are in God. For although each particular 
thing is determined by another particular thing to exist in a certain manner, the force by 
which each perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. 
See Cor. Pr. 24, I.128 
  
The proof of this proposition is based on the fact that an idea is necessarily 
understood through an attribute, which constitutes the eternal and infinite essence of 
God, according to Def. 6. What is really interesting here, though, is the confirmation 
of our distinction between an infinite understood intensive as opposed to extensive. 
Spinoza’s causal chains are not to be reduced to mechanical links between 
determined objects; that is only a numerical, thus modal and not real, understanding 
of them. As Heidegger would have it, we would simply skip over the thing by 
                                                
126 See note above. 
127 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 270. 
128 Ibid., pp. 270-271. 
 93 
projecting mathematics onto it. Just as in Bruno, duration here does not make any 
sense if matched with infinity, as one minute or one century are indifferent to eternity: 
one minute or one century are the abstractions we use in order to represent inter-
modal time, but modes, although they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God 
– and in there lies their necessity – are constituted by an essence that does not entail 
existence. Thus duration cannot tell us anything about existence as such; duration, as 
we said, is only a numerical abstraction. As Deleuze would have it: «numerical 
distinction can never distinguish substances, but only modes that involve the same 
attribute. For number expresses in its own way the character of existing modes: the 
composite nature of their parts, their limitation by other things of the same nature, 
their determination from outside themselves. Number thus goes on ad infinitum. But 
the question is, can it ever reach infinity itself? Or, as Spinoza puts it: even in the 
case of modes, is it from the multitude of parts that we infer their infinity?»129. Here 
Deleuze re-proposes the same argument we encountered in Bruno: it does not make 
any sense to imagine an infinite extension as divided up into an infinite number of 
finite extensions as that would lead to the absurdity that an infinity of inches is 
somehow larger than an infinity of feet130. Again, this distorted perspective is that of 
the of the mathematician, who claims to be able to measure infinity by dividing it up, 
a perspective that Bruno had fought since he was inspired by Mordente’s compass. 
The perspective of the philosopher looks farther than mathematics and does not stop 
at the mere projection of his calculations onto nature: the infinite is not divisible 
                                                
129 G. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 33. 
130 Rather explicit in Spinoza in Prop. 13, I «Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible. Proof  If it 
were divisible, the parts in which it would be divided will either retain the nature of absolutely 
infinite substance, or not. In the first case, there would therefore be several substances of the same 
nature, which is absurd (Pr. 5). In the second case, absolutely infinite substance can cease to be, 
which is also absurd (Pr. 11).  
Corollary  From this follows that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as 
it is substance, is divisible. 
Scholium  The indivisibility of substance can be more easily understood merely from the fact that 
the nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite, and that a part of substance can mean only 
finite substance, which involves an obvious contradiction (Pr. 8)» From B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. 
Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 224. 
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because, however you divide it, its finite parts cannot be related or counted, they lose 
consistency; the so-called parts of the infinite extension, for instance, cannot be 
considered as modes of extension because modes, as we saw above, cannot find their 
origin in the division of the attribute and the same reasoning goes for eternity and 
duration. Whenever we speak from the perspective of infinity intensive [to be read in 
Latin], then, and not extensive [to be read in Latin] – which is merely numerical and 
therefore abstract – we are speaking from the point of view of substance, that is what 
is most real, i.e. what is real, thus numerical distinction cannot be a real distinction. 
Thus, Deleuze is right in concluding: «Numerical distinction is never real; then 
conversely, real distinction is never numerical. Spinoza’s argument now becomes: 
attributes are really distinct; but real distinction is never numerical; so there is only 
one substance for all attributes»131.  
We have mentioned several times the word reality and we have seen it defined 
in several manners that lead us towards substance but we have not yet thought it 
thoroughly. Therefore, we shall now perform a new jump back to Ethics, Part I, to 
the very first proposition of Spinoza’s masterpiece: 
 
Substance is by nature prior to its affections. 
Proof  This is evident from Defs. 3 and 5.132 
 
Having briefly explored Spinoza’s attitude towards duration, we should be able to do 
away with any gross misinterpretation of Proposition 1. It is obvious that Spinoza 
does not mean to give a temporal priority to substance when referring to its 
affections, i.e. the modes, because that would require the application of inter-modal 
measurement criteria – duration – that do not belong to substance, intensively 
understood. We are talking about an ontological priority here, which makes the 
existence of substance coincide with its essence, which amounts exactly to saying 
that substance is causa sui. If we do away with our reifying, modern and dualistic 
                                                
131 G. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 34. 
132 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 218. 
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attitude, we shall be able to see that such priority is not given because substance 
comes first by causing itself and then somehow generates its modes through the 
attributes. From our perspective as humans, the perspective of modes of substance, it 
could appear that modes are somehow temporally and physically transient: modes 
live, die, decompose, they are forgotten and remembered. That is correct, but it would 
be mistaken to say that modes are secondary with respect to substance simply 
because they pass away: we would be, once more, talking of substance in modal 
terms, in terms of duration, for instance. What makes modes ontologically secondary 
is simply the fact that their essence does not entail existence, which constitutes the 
priority of substance: modes are limited because they are always the effect of a cause 
and the cause of an effect; they do not subsist on their own. In our modal world we 
feel such a situation to be explicated as a characteristic contingency of the modes and 
their historical life, which allows us to order facts, objects and people historically, 
which means measuring and ordering them according to numerical distinctions that, 
we saw, are not real. Now we understand even better what Bruno’s perspective on 
mathematics and the minimum was: his mathematics based on numeration and not on 
calculation played exactly on the awareness that division is not real and he combined 
it with an intuitive and synthetic mathematical procedure that does not provide a 
physical or objective reality to atoms or monads but an ordering of reality that is 
constantly confronted with the necessity of infinity intensive. That is why Bruno’s 
minimum is not understood through dimension. In the following passage Deleuze 
could easily be talking of Bruno when he describes the dynamics of that “plane of 
immanence” that is Spinoza’s substance: «a plane of immanence has no 
supplementary dimension: the process of composition must be apprehended for itself, 
through that which it gives, in that which it gives. It is a plan of composition, not a 
plan of organization or development […]. There is no longer a form, but only 
relations of velocity between infinitesimal particles of an unformed material. There is 
no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force»133. 
                                                
133 G. Deleuze, Spinoza. Practical Philosophy, p. 128. 
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From the perspective of substance, these relations of composition, whatever attribute 
they are conceived through, are affections understood under a point of view of 
necessity – they have always been there – but contingent from a modal point of view, 
thus their reality is not substantial. Valerio draws his conclusion all the way to 
Heidegger and shows, by quoting him, the nearness of Spinoza’s substance to 
Heidegger’s Being through the notion of ontological priority: «This “even more 
initial sense” of Being, which we have called ‘ontological priority’, expresses the an-
archy of Being itself with regards to the being [ens]; as a matter of fact, as much as it 
is in its power, it does not refer to a different ‘principle’ that is not its own truth. 
Resting in itself, without the need of a further reference “Being as Being is the event 
[Ereignis] – comments Heidegger in a note to the Nachwort – that precedes 
difference and is therefore without the being [ens]”»134. Being that is without being 
corresponds to that retention that we encountered in Heidegger’s mnemonic 
understanding of thinking with relation to Being. Nevertheless, as memory retains and 
keeps in safety, it is only in virtue of the fact that it gives. Being without beings is the 
expression of an intensive point of view that excludes an understanding based on 
determination, which is how beings can be understood in their ontic dimension. On 
the other hand, in reality such retention never stops giving, it never stops existing in 
its determinate dimension. One thought does not hold without the other. 
Finally, I believe we should qualify our affirmation that the reality of modes, 
understood in themselves, is not substantial; it is an implication that, at Spinoza’s 
time, could have cost a life even in the Netherlands, the most liberal country of 
Europe at the time. The facts that the mild Spinoza is one of the most widely cursed 
and feared philosophers of all times and that the Ethics was published posthumously 
                                                
134 F. Valerio, “Heidegger, Spinoza e il «problema della soggettività»”, in G. Semerari, Confronti 
con Heidegger, pp. 234-235. My translation from the Italian: «Questo “senso ancor più iniziale” 
dell’Essere, che noi abbiamo chiamato ‘priorità ontologica’, dice l’an-archia dell’Essere stesso 
rispetto all’ente; esso, infatti, per quanto è in suo potere, non rinvia ad un ‘principio’ altro che non 
sia la propria verità. Riposando in se stesso, senza il bisogno dell’ulteriorità del riferimento, 
l’”Essere in quanto Essere è l’evento – commenta una nota manoscritta di Heidegger al Nachwort – 
che precede la differenza, e perciò è senza ente”». 
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definitely give some weight to our statement. There is more to it, nevertheless, so we 
should make one last effort to think this affirmation in all of its implications. Such an 
effort consists in thinking difference, while we are obliged to remain within our 
modal standpoint, without losing the other perspective, which is the one of substance. 
Once more, we are faced with the dual thought. In everyday life we are used to deal 
with pens, trees, chairs, my sister and the President of the Republic and nobody, with 
the exception of Descartes haunted by the evil demon, would doubt that they are 
actual and real. Nevertheless, following Spinoza, we have just affirmed that modes do 
not possess a substantial reality in themselves. The fact that the essence of a mode 
does not entail existence, which is thereby not necessary, should be made more 
intelligible in its practical consequences. The fact that I cannot really distinguish the 
modes from one another but I can only numerically distinguish them implies the 
conclusion that a pen is not really distinguished from a book or a chair if not 
quantitatively i.e. extensively. The very feature of being closed up into a modal 
standpoint – without the effort of thinking the perspective of substance – amounts, on 
the other hand, to treating numerical distinctions as real: under this univocal 
perspective the reality of a pen, of a book, of a chair, of a person even, is uniquely 
derived from quantitative, thus abstract, features: weight, shape, colour, use and so 
forth. Yet, such extensive and quantitative features are only generated relationally, 
thus they cannot be held responsible for the reality of a mode, which can only be 
accounted for if we consider the point of view of substance, which does not depend 
on anything different from it in order to acquire reality. The everyday attitude of 
dealing with objects with a sort of common sense realism, as if they were prototypes 
of reality (e.g. “a book is just a book and a chair is just a chair”) is strongly 
undermined by the Spinozist view. When we dealt with Bruno’s living infinite Matter 
we saw something very similar: difference, understood merely extensively and from a 
bodily point of view, was nothing but the configuration of the ens that, if understood 
intensively, captures the variety and vicissitude of the living infinite matter by 
denying the existence of fixed and particular natures. Finally, then, what does it mean 
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to think that the keyboard I am using in this moment cannot count on itself in order to 
be real? It means that it cannot be really distinguished, and that is why it is 
necessarily existent in the in-difference of substance. It means that the keyboard is 
only the tip of the iceberg, figuratively. The keyboard is inscribed in the practice of 
writing, in the industrial scheme within which it was conceived and produced and in 
the materials used to build it, in the IT culture and in the alphabetical Western 
tradition, in its fancy design and in its weight. All such relations are themselves tips 
of icebergs: the keyboard, just like the pen, is not really distinguished because it 
originates from the ἀλήθεια, the play of unconcealment through which Being 
conceals while revealing itself. In Spinozist terms we would merely define them as 
affections of the substance. Humans are no exception. On the other hand, the modern 
subject is the outcome of modernity arbitrarily granting this kind of reality to what 
should be understood as a mode, while making it the standard of the reality of nature, 
which is turned into a determinate agglomerate of objects. What we have so far 
addressed is the unsaid of the history of metaphysics, which in Heidegger remains 
constantly implicit for it does not find an actual expression as, on the other hand, 
occurs in Bruno and Spinoza. Mignini provides a particularly effective image of the 
two authors’ role within the history of philosophy: «Under the ontological profile, the 
Ethics can be considered as the most rigorous philosophical document in the modern 
age of the historical doctrine of the indeterminate principle. Such a doctrine can be 
compared to a Carsic river, which, after having irrigated and seeded periods and 
regions of the ancient culture, has sunk for a long time under the surface only to 
appear now and then and sink again until its emergence in the modern age with the 
indifferent One of Bruno and in Spinoza’s Substance. The totality of the attributes 
constituting the essence of substance can be considered as simultaneous and identical 
to its unitary absolute existence only if substance, considered in itself as absolute 
principle, necessary and immanent to its own determinations, is considered as an 
active and neutral infinite power, indifferent to any essential determination»135. Bruno 
                                                
135 F. Mignini, L’Etica di Spinoza. Introduzione alla lettura, Carocci, Roma 2009, p. 193. My 
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and Spinoza are the witnesses of an origin that is intensive, i.e. beyond determination 
and a matter for philosophy. The censorship of the subject obstructs any access 
because it can only grasp difference as mere determination and not in relation to in-
difference. As a matter of fact, it is only in virtue of this that modes can be understood 
as affections of the substance, whether they are a man, a rat or a stone. 
                                                                                                                                                            
translation from the Italian: «Sotto il profilo ontologico, l’Etica può essere considerata come il più 
rigoroso documento filosofico, nell’età moderna, della dottrina storica del principio indeterminato. 
Tale dottrina può essere paragonata a un fiume carsico, il quale, dopo aver bagnato e fecondato 
periodi e regioni della cultura antica, si è a lungo inabissato sotto la superficie per apparire solo a 
tratti e di nuovo inabissare, fino al suo emergere sicuro in età moderna nell’Uno indifferente di 
Bruno e nella Sostanza di Spinoza. La totalità degli attributi costituenti l’essenza della sostanza può 
essere considerata come simultanea e identica alla sua unitaria esistenza assoluta solo in quanto la 
sostanza, considerata in sé come principio assoluto, , necessario e immanente delle proprie 
determinazioni, venga assunta come una potenza attiva infinita e neutra, indifferente a ogni 
determinazione essenziale». 
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Chapter IV – Subjectless/Objectless Knowing 
 
 
Section 1 – Truth as Openness 
 
The modern subject obliterates the problem of Being by turning philosophical 
practice into epistemology. We saw that in Bruno and Spinoza it was not method 
which dictated the development of their ontology: by focusing on mathematics, it was 
possible to see how reality is known, although not by being subordinated to method. 
Heidegger does not develop a theory of knowledge in its own right, as his primary 
concern is to develop a radical ontology. This fact does not make the problem of 
knowledge irrelevant or marginal in his work; rather, it brings it to another level. 
Knowledge itself, then, will need to acquire a new and broader meaning outside the 
subject/object dualism and the analysis of some of Heidegger’s texts will show how it 
is possible to talk of a gnosiology in Heidegger, even though he does not use this term 
himself. As a starting point I shall consider Heidegger’s speech as a rector 
(Rektoratsrede), known as The Self-Assertion of the German University. The 
philosophical relevance of this text has been highly disputed. The reason why this 
1933 speech gave rise to many controversies and opposing interpretations has to be 
found in the context in which it took place, the rise of National Socialism in Germany 
and Heidegger’s brief adhesion to it. Nevertheless I am not going to focus on the 
immediate political aspect of the speech, as what I am really interested in is 
Heidegger’s concern for the university as an institution, an inescapable element of his 
philosophical research and the place where knowledge as such is transmitted, 
apprehended or called into question. It is not a coincidence that in many of his 
lectures Heidegger used to start by interrogating himself and the student body on 
what they were actually doing when they started their activity united in the 
Gefolgschaft, the «following» of those who have the privilege of gathering around a 
leader who is himself guided by a spiritual mission. The Gefolgschaft finds its origin 
in the history of the ancient barbarian populations of Germany, as narrated by 
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Tacitus, and it constitutes part of the essence of Germany and of its university, an 
essence that is historical and needs to be asserted.  Whilst it is not surprising that 
some of the Nazi auditors easily misread Heidegger’s words in favour of much 
coarser ideals, it is interesting to note Heidegger’s commitment to the university as 
the home of science. As a matter of fact, it should not be forgotten that for Heidegger 
science «is philosophy, whether it knows and wills it – or not»136.  
In order to analyse the sense in which Heidegger intends science, it is useful to 
start from a different, and somehow broader, concept, that of knowing: 
 
Among the Greeks an old story went around that Prometheus had been the first 
philosopher. Aeschylus has this Prometheus utter a saying that expresses the essence of 
knowing. 
 
   τέχνη δάνάγκης ασθενεστερα µακρῶ  
 
“Knowing, however, is far weaker than necessity”. This is to say: all knowing about 
things has always been delivered up to overpowering fate and fails before it.137 
 
 
What Heidegger is trying to show by appealing to the Greeks is that we have 
forgotten the essence of knowing and therefore the essence of science; he translates 
τέχνη as knowing in order to stress the fundamental difference between the ancient 
Greek conception of knowledge, which was not of a theoretical type and therefore it 
was not worthy of contemplation and admiration as such, but as «the power that 
hones and embraces Dasein in its entirety»138. It seems, then, that there is a totality in 
the essence of knowing that does not appear in the modern way of approaching 
knowledge, which seems to conceive science as a progressive form of praxis that tries 
to add up more and more material; for the Greeks knowledge expresses the link 
between the inside and the outside, i.e. the being-there that is neither the 
contemplating subject nor the inanimate object and that is subordinated to the power 
                                                
136 M. Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University”, in Philosophical and Political 
Writings, edited by M. Stassen, Continuum, New York 2003, p. 4.  
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
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of fate, in a perfectly tragic fashion, in other words, Dasein. Nevertheless, we are 
faced with a dilemma: if it is true that the Greeks could initiate Philosophy as we 
know it because of the fundamental relationship between knowledge and fate, it is 
also true that Philosophy as such has led to the disappearance of this totality in favour 
of a science that has turned into something else. Tέχνη is no longer a global way of 
knowing but has turned into the practical branch of theoretical knowing (ἐπιστήµη), 
namely, technology. Already in Plato and Aristotle, respectively in the Republic and 
in De Anima, the ἐπιστήµη appears to be characterized as an intellectual and 
universal form of knowledge, deriving from the first principle, respectively the ἱδέα 
and the οὐσία. In Chapter I we gave an account of the Platonic transition from a 
mnemonic tension of Being to an understanding of Being as presence. The 
metaphysics of presence, i.e. the metaphysics of the ens, following Heidegger, lays 
the basis for the systematic reduction of Philosophy (as Metaphysics) to the 
calculation, prediction and control of beings, namely modern science, which resolves 
itself into τέχνη, in a fashion that renders the question of Being, so dear to Heidegger, 
unnecessary139. One of Heidegger’s great merits, I think, has been to let us see that 
the problems of philosophy are not of an intellectual nature, i.e. the question of Being 
is not an intellectual question but the means philosophy uses in order to address them 
                                                
139 In the Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger contextualizes this cognitive situation through the 
word “machination”, i.e. “a manner of the essential sway of being”, which “is the early and still 
long hidden showing of what is precisely not ownmost to the beingness of beings”. Machination is 
“early” precisely because it finds its roots in ancient Metaphysics and Heidegger provides a rather 
explicit schema that exemplifies such a derivation: 
 
“οὐσία (τέχνη – ποίησις – ἱδέα) 
 constant presence 
 ens creatum 
nature 
history 
causality and objectness 
re-presentedness 
      
lived-experience”. 
See M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) [1989], Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington 1999, pp. 88-90.  
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are intellectual; it is not surprising, then, that metaphysics has been the core of 
philosophy for centuries and that it has led to the supremacy of modern science, 
which has obliterated thinking. As Heidegger himself makes clear in What is called 
Thinking?: 
 
Thinking – more precisely, the attempt and the duty to think – is now approaching an 
era when the high demands which traditional thinking believed it was meeting, and 
pretended it had to meet, become untenable. The way of the question “What is called 
Thinking?” lies even now in the shadow of this weakness. The weakness can be 
described in four statements: 1. Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences. 
2. Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom. 3. Thinking solves no cosmic 
riddles. 4. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.140 
 
If we are to extract a theory of knowledge from Heidegger, we cannot look to a sort 
of epistemology, a term which is now unequivocally used to indicate the philosophy 
of science, mainly within the analytic philosophical tradition. We have to understand 
knowledge through the practice of thinking, which means abandoning the scientific 
temptation of seeing nature as objective. 
Following Heidegger, then, the problem of knowledge cannot even be 
considered as properly philosophical unless it regains the characteristics of totality 
found in the Greek tragic tradition; yet Heidegger is perfectly aware that it is 
impossible to ignore what has happened between us moderns and the Greeks and he 
is always very careful to avoid giving any judgement of value, even if it is about 
technology. The fact that Being has delivered itself as technology is itself part of the 
necessity, the fate to which knowing is subordinated. Being itself has delivered itself 
as technology, thus hiding behind its concealment and hiding the very fact of its own 
concealment, therefore making the question of Being useless and forgotten. I would 
like to be faithful to Heidegger and, at the same time, to pull myself out of his paths 
of thought, in order to get him to speak to a different tradition, and that is why, 
despite everything that has been said, I would still like to give a name to the problem 
of knowledge in Heidegger: gnosiology. Gnosiology, if compared to epistemology, 
                                                
140 M. Heidegger, What is called Thinking?, p. 159. 
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has a stronger ontological connotation, as it generally indicates a theory of knowledge 
that derives from the actual being of beings and not from the manner in which beings 
are grasped; the Greek word γνώσις, as a matter of fact, differs from ἐπιστήµη as it 
indicates a non-theoretical knowledge but an intuitive, and sometimes mystical, 
experience, thus implying an ethical level, i.e. an actual involvement of the knower 
with the known as opposed to a subject/object dichotomy. In the case of Bruno and 
Spinoza, who understand man as qualitatively in-different towards the rest of nature, 
the notion of gnosiology does not incur any difficulty. In the case of Heidegger, on 
the other hand, it is not enough to rule out epistemology in order to speak of a 
gnosiology, although I think that there is indeed a concept that brings Heidegger 
closer to Bruno and Spinoza and that is the one of Lichtung, as it is found in the 
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). We wish to show how close his 
notion of Lichtung [clearing] is to a tradition that, I think, has a lot more in common 
with Heidegger than it is generally believed. It is important to stress that we are not 
advocating a mystical interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, although that is the risk 
run  by any interpretation claiming to be alternative to modernity. The Philosophy of 
the Renaissance, in particular that of Bruno, has been in many ways considered not 
properly modern, due to its colourful, sometimes obscure, and strongly allegorical 
language or because it has been seen as a strong political stance against the religious 
oppression of the time but it is my opinion that neither of these analyses properly 
exhausts its value. After all, Heidegger is not immune from allegations of mysticism 
and it would not be hard to compare the two philosophers on that ground; Spinoza’s 
third kind of knowledge is itself a very slippery ground between Philosophy and 
mysticism but I shall refrain from adopting such interpretations in order to keep the 
discourse on a solid philosophical track. 
The notion of Lichtung is inserted in the Heideggerian quest for originary truth, 
as expounded in the Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), a work published 
posthumously, composed not long after the suspension of Sein und Zeit. Such  notion 
carries the task of making explicit, and thus overcoming, some of those aspects that 
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made it impossible for Heidegger, not to pursue his ontological project, but to pursue 
it from such an anthropocentric point of view as that of Da-sein and through a 
language too highly compromised with metaphysics and therefore with the 
«Abandonment of the Question of Being». Heidegger’s vocabulary enforces upon 
thinking a powerful twist aimed at rescuing thinking from the now sterile theoretical 
path of metaphysics; the terms, and sometimes images, he uses have got a sensuous 
and ethical dimension, in the sense that they should not only be thought but practised 
and experienced: as was noted while talking about the Rektoratsrede, Philosophy as 
ontology is not a merely intellectual issue. Thus we shall address the notion of 
Lichtung, which is generally translated into English as «clearing» but which, as 
happens with many Heideggerian terms, needs to be qualified in depth. Lichtung has 
a very specific meaning as clearing but not related to Licht, i.e. light, which 
theoretically excludes possible analogies with any “philosophy of light”. Heidegger 
gives an account of the etymology of Lichtung revealing that, historically and 
linguistically, its meaning is borrowed from the French word clairière, which is the 
open and free space left in the midst of a wood or a forest when the trees thin out. 
The actual word Lichtung, in fact, is composed of the archaic German words 
Waldung (wood) and Feldung (field), and the Waldlichtung is precisely the open 
space in the wood; furthermore Lichten, as a verb, means to “thin out”. Nevertheless, 
even though the etymology does not involve the concept of “light” as such, it would 
be too easy to dismiss the relation of clearing to “light” because, if we move onto 
another level, we can observe that the Lichtung, the clearing in the wood, allows light 
to get through and enlighten the clearing itself. If we wish to make a 
phenomenological observation, we cannot ignore that a clearing clears the way to 
something else; so we cannot exclude tout court the possibility of light, which would 
need to be qualified as well on its own. For now it will be enough to notice that the 
clearing provides the possibility of a double movement of retirement and 
advancement, a step back and a step forwards practised at once, which is the same 
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movement Heidegger attributes to memory. The Lichtung is not and cannot be a 
univocal notion, as we can tell from Heidegger’s own words: 
 
If truth here means clearing [Lichtung] of be-ing as openness of the midst of beings, 
then one cannot even enquire into the truth of this truth unless one means the 
correctness of the projecting-open – but that misses in manifold ways what is essential. 
For, on the one hand, one cannot inquire into the “correctness” of  projecting-open at all 
– and certainly not into the correctness of that projecting-open through which on the 
whole the clearing is grounded. On the other hand, however, “correctness” is a “type” of 
truth that as its consequence lags behind the originary essential sway and therefore 
already does not suffice for grasping originary truth.141  
 
Here «correctness» is intended as referring to that «manner of the essential sway of 
be-ing» Heidegger calls «Machination», which is incompatible and almost 
antithetical to the Lichtung: «correctness» refers to what is objectively measurable 
and predictable, which provides an immediately usable kind of truth that erases any 
need for the undetermined and the concealed and thus any need for a clearing. We are 
talking of a type of measuring that radically differs from that theorized by Bruno. 
Whereas Heidegger’s critique of correctness attacks the modern scientific attitude, 
which seems to assume the measurability of an objectified nature, we saw that Bruno 
introduces a concept of measuring that is not based on calculation but on relation. 
Both ways imply a sort of understanding of nature but the former covers up any 
access to Being. As a matter of fact, Heidegger is deliberately ambiguous here, as 
«correctness» is nevertheless a kind of truth, a way in which Being is delivered to us, 
but one that, at the same time, contributes to seal its concealment to the point of its 
abandonment. Whenever τέχνη, daughter and active instrument of the ἐπιστήµη, is 
identified with the truth, then not only does the openness, which nonetheless opens up 
such truth, remain concealed but also the problem of its unconcealment is forgotten.  
The clearing as openness of the originary truth of Being is therefore not an 
object that needs to be uncovered, which is a prerogative of the realm of Machination, 
the realm where knowledge measures, predicts and subsequently produces. It is hard 
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not to notice that the need for unconcealment, expressed by Heidegger, springs from 
the realm of Machination itself, which has supposedly forgotten and abandoned Being 
as such; «correctness» is indeed related to Lichtung, to the extent that through it the 
clearing is shut. Such forgetting re-affirms what Heidegger claims in What is called 
thinking? – which we saw in Chapter I – that thinking is in need of memory. The 
Lichtung, as a matter of fact, is an openness that keeps in safety, that shelters what is 
to be given or revealed and that is the reason why it acquires the feature of hesitation, 
which Heidegger describes in the Contributions. The clearing is the theatre, the stage 
of the openness where truth is not revealed in the form of ground as presence but 
through a hesitating self-refusing. Heidegger calls this ab-ground, which replicates 
the mnemonic dynamic of retention and delivery: 
 
Ab-ground is the hesitating refusal of ground. In refusal, originary emptiness opens, 
originary clearing occurs; but the clearing is at the same time such that the hesitating 
manifests in it. Ab-ground is the primarily essential [erstwesentliche] sheltering that 
lights up, is the essential sway of truth.142 
 
What Machination does is forgetting and obliterating the sheltering of this openness, 
thus occupying the entire stage as if ground showed itself as presence. Being does not 
stop delivering itself through its own concealment – even when it delivers itself as 
metaphysics – but the game of Being finds no more shelter for it is forgotten. Memory 
itself is obliterated because what is to be kept safe and sheltered gets covered up. 
Krell, reporting an encounter with Heidegger himself, clarifies this point: «Sheltering 
has to do with hüten and schonen, safeguarding and protecting the mystery of Being’s 
self-concealment. For Heidegger such sheltering is the very essence of mortal 
dwelling. He was therefore careful to warn me not to allow the distinction between 
concealment (of Being) and shelter (of the mystery) to be conflated»143. Man’s task is 
one of sheltering and protecting, which amounts to going back to a notion of knowing 
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143 D. Farrell Krell, Intimations of Mortality. Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of 
Being [1986], Penn State University Press, University Park 1991, p. 92. 
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as remembering. The movement is opposite if we compare it to what happened with 
Plato, as we described it in Chapter I, which saw truth being progressively shifted 
from memory to correspondence: the tension in Plato is finally resolved in favour of 
the latter. Memory is that thinking which uncovers what is covered up and shelters it, 
meaning that it guarantees the unconcealment game through retention. If sheltering is 
the essence of mortal dwelling, then man stands in the openness whether he wants to 
or not, as Krell notes: «Man alone enjoys the open, oblivious of at least one of his 
feet, the one planted firmly on the far side of the gap»144. There is no particular 
course of action man is supposed to take – we saw that thinking is not prescriptive – 
but a recalling of man’s position within the openness: 
 
Man only inhabits the keeping of what gives him food for thought – he does not create 
the keeping. Only that which keeps safely can preserve – preserve what is to be thought. 
The keeping preserves by giving harbour, and also protection from danger. And from 
what does the keeping preserve what is to be thought? From oblivion.145 
 
The reason I earlier emphasized the Aeschylean dictum from the Rektoratsrede 
is that it can help us understand how the global point of view of the Greeks, as origin, 
is still present and yet closed up: as was said earlier, it is not possible, or useful, to 
repeat the experience of the Greeks as such but, on the other hand, it is possible to 
overcome the ambiguity by accepting «correctness» and Machination as subordinated 
to the realm of necessity, which does not amount to rejecting modern science or the 
whole metaphysical tradition but, on the contrary, to seeing them as subordinated to 
the necessity of Being. Bruno and Spinoza, in their philosophical approach to science, 
showed that it is a viable path. I advance this interpretation because this could be a 
fatal blow against anthropocentrism, as, whenever necessity and fate come into play, 
everything that springs from the human being, such as science and technology, is 
revealed to be nothing but Being delivering itself through man. The sclerosis of this 
movement only occurs when man conceives of himself as a substratum. This is why 
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the Lichtung is not an instrument of knowledge but an openness where the knower 
and the known are not separable or identifiable; from the point of view of the 
Lichtung the human being is caught up in the game of clearing and letting light come 
through. As was said before, though, Philosophy uses naturally inadequate 
intellectual tools and that is why it dwells with gnosiology and not with γνώσις itself, 
which means that the state of γνώσις is mediated by the λόγος and therefore it 
becomes thought, word and discourse. Only once discourse can reproduce the tension 
of this mediation, can philosophical practice occur. As Heidegger himself says in the 
Postscript to “What is Metaphysics?”: 
 
Thinking, obedient to the voice of being, seeks from being the word through which the 
truth of being comes to language. Only when the language of historical human beings 
springs from the word does it ring true. Yet if it does ring true, then it is beckoned by 
the testimony granted it from the silent voice of hidden sources. The thinking of being 
protects the word, and in such protectiveness fulfils its vocation.146 
 
Here again, thinking is subordinated to the hidden sources; it is not a thinking for its 
own sake, not a theoretical contemplation, which means that knowledge as expressed 
by thinking and by words is, to use a Nietzschean expression, human-all-too-human. 
Humans, through knowledge, believe they are talking about Being but really they are 
being themselves talked by Being. How do they give voice to this being talked by 
Being? Not through the model of modern science, where the light of Reason 
observes, analyzes and states the truth, ignoring the truth of be-ing that speaks 
through it and therefore concealing the necessity which which it is indissolubly 
associated. It is not the light that clears and reveals; it is the clearing itself that lets 
the light through in the place where Da-sein finds its unity with Being. That is why a 
gnosiology in Heidegger is necessary: it renders explicit what it means to know 
without covering up the openness of the Lichtung. 
 
 
                                                
146 M. Heidegger, “Postscript to What is Metaphysics?”, Pathmarks, edited by W. McNeill, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 2007, p. 237. 
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Section 2 - Gnosis , Clearing, Humanism  
 
 
Even though the Lichtung has been framed within the horizon of gnosiology, it 
is not yet clear what kind of knowledge it is able to provide. Certainly not a scientific 
or theoretical kind based on the observation of beings or on a conceptual 
categorization of them. We said that gnosiology is not after the ἐπιστήµη but it is 
after a kind of experience that does not require the apprehension of particular notions 
by a subject. Nevertheless, the idea of experience evokes at first sight the necessity of 
determining who is undertaking a certain experience or is, at least, conscious of it. If 
in Sein und Zeit Heidegger attacks the Cartesian subject and reveals Dasein as In-
Der-Welt-Sein [being-in-the-world], in his later writings he partially brackets the 
existential framework of Dasein’s everydayness and its possibility for Resoluteness 
in order to focus on an ontological perspective that would allow Being to be the true 
actor of its own disclosedness. Yet it would not be correct to interpret this move as a 
project for the dissolution of the subject by means of an ecstatic or Dionysian 
experience; instead, it has to do with the ethical project of reformulating the task of 
thinking. For now it will be enough to say that, if any non-epistemic knowledge can 
arise at all, it will not spring from any mental faculties belonging to a particular 
subject, but will stem from Being itself. In order to show this, I shall explore the 
gnosiological possibilities of such a perspective. 
It may seem paradoxical to look for a non-theoretical and non-conceptual type 
of knowledge within the Western tradition, which is strongly rooted in the concept; 
yet it is at the very beginning of this tradition that Heidegger finds the elements to 
explore such a possibility. In the Heraclitus Seminar, conducted by Heidegger and 
Eugen Fink at the University of Freiburg in 1966-67, Heidegger claims: 
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Quintessence, inclosing, grasping and comprehending is already by itself un-Greek. 
With Heraclitus, there is no concept. And also, with Aristotle, there are still no concepts 
in the proper sense147.  
 
It is true, nevertheless, that the gestation of the concept does indeed begin with Plato 
and Aristotle; but what Heidegger means here is that the concept as we intend it 
(conceptus) is un-Greek because it has a peculiarly Latin nature that derives from the 
transposition of λόγος into Roman culture through the Stoics. A difference still 
stands, though, between the Presocratic thinkers, on the one hand, and Plato and 
Aristotle, on the other. Says Heidegger in the Parmenides:  
 
Plato and Aristotle and subsequent thinkers have thought far “more”, have traversed 
more regions and strata of thinking, and have questioned out of a richer knowledge of 
things and man. And yet all these thinkers think “less” than the primordial thinkers148.  
 
It is not a matter of a temporal proximity to the beginning of thought, which is not 
characterized by a scientifically determined moment in history. Rather, it is a matter 
of the beginning itself that happens when Being is not theorized or developed around 
the idea of presence, but is exposed so as to reveal its immediacy and simplicity. This 
happens not through the formulation of a theory but through the exposition of a 
doctrine. We are not in the presence of the philosopher but of the σοφός, the one who 
possesses wisdom and sets out a didactic poem aimed at the ones who are ignorant; 
the gap between these σοφοί and Socratic ignorance is therefore substantial. What 
separates us from the Presocratics, then, is not a time-frame of 2500 years but the 
inability to think Being and the «capacity to hear the few simple things said in the 
words of the primordial thinkers»149. We can start seeing, then, the knowing 
experience gained through gnosiology as a capacity of hearing, a tuning of our 
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thinking to a frequency we are not able to reach with the tools of theoretical 
knowledge. 
Γνώσις is the type of grasping that is attributed to humans by Heraclitus in 
Fragment 7: «If all things were to become smoke, then we would discriminate them 
with the nose». «Would discriminate» is Diels’ translation for διαγνοῖεν, which 
refers to the capacity of discriminating within the τὰ πάντα [all things], i.e. the role 
of human cognizance in the distinction of beings within all things (τὰ πάντα) whose 
significance is a matter of debate between Heidegger and Fink from the very 
beginning of the Seminar: is τὰ πάντα to be understood as the totality of all 
individual things or as a cosmological whole or, again, as the Being of beings?  The 
possible meaning of τὰ πάντα is examined in all the Heraclitean fragments where the 
expression appears; and what emerges, more than the actual meaning of τὰ πάντα, is 
its relations to lightning, sun, fire, to the one, to strife and to λόγος. All these 
relations, more than clarifying the meaning of τὰ πάντα, open up the problem of 
how a totality could actually relate to something external to it, thus ruling out the 
metaphysical interpretation of it, yet bringing to the fore the experience of a 
primordial outbreak of all things and the emergence of something unthought in Greek 
thinking. What is immediately interesting here, nevertheless, is not the nature of τὰ 
πάντα but the role of γνώσις, which is the human capacity for the knowledge of 
beings intended as distinction. It is, indeed, only a perspective, as it cannot be taken 
as what is ontologically responsible for the being of τὰ πάντα: even though humans 
have access to the knowledge of beings through γνώσις, which grants them the 
ability of distinguishing within the τὰ πάντα, it is not on such discriminating that the 
being of beings is based. Again, we are not in the presence of an active subject whose 
knowledge defines the Being of beings by distinguishing them: «διαγνοῖεν is an 
indication that πάντα are characterized as what is distinguishable, but not what is 
already distinguished»150. What makes τὰ πάντα distinguishable, then? If we looked 
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for a counterpart, an opposite polarity that would simply provide a complement to 
γνώσις, then human cognizance would be stigmatized as ontologically necessary and 
fall back into a subject-object dualism. Heidegger individuates what makes τὰ πάντα 
distinguishable in the λόγος, by referring to Heraclitus’ Fragment 1: here Heraclitus, 
rather vehemently, accuses men of lacking any experience of how λόγος applies to 
each thing (τὰ πάντα). Again, we are faced not with a conceptual understanding but 
with an experience of the λόγος and cannot therefore blame Heidegger for rejecting 
its translation as conceptus. Its meaning is, instead, closely related to its occurring in 
τὰ πάντα as a gathering or, when thought as ἓν, as a unifying or, when thought as 
Lightning, as a steering. The plural form of τὰ πάντα allows for an understanding of 
this movement as the unifying of a plurality, which is at the same time an outbreak of 
the possibility of being distinguished. As the λόγος permeates τὰ πάντα, so the 
Lightning steers all things (Fragment 64) as a «sudden burst in the dark of night»151 
and yet, Heidegger wonders, «isn’t lightning eternal and not merely momentary?»152. 
Within this horizon, then, the experience of γνώσις is entirely dependent on what 
allows τὰ πάντα to be distinguishable, i.e. a primordial outbreak of a unifying 
plurality. The outbreak is the origin understood intensive [Latin]: Heidegger’s 
question is a provocation, for he is aware that the outbreak cannot be determined in 
time; it is not a Big Bang. It is also not a unification of previously individual elements 
but the event (Ereignis) of a plurality that emerges as one through strife (πόλεµος). 
Λόγος, ἓν, πόλεµος, Lightning or fire, all express this primordial outbreak of τὰ 
πάντα and are the conditions of possibility for the human experience of τὰ πάντα, 
namely γνώσις. They are the extensive expression of the outbreak. 
By extracting a notion of γνώσις from Heidegger’s philosophical exegesis of 
Heraclitus, I could assert that the possibility of a gnosiology is viable in Heidegger’s 
reading of Heraclitus and yet, one question must still be answered: is it also viable in 
Heidegger’s thought? It will not be enough to restate the philosophical importance 
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that Heidegger attributes to the Presocratics as those who think the most, but an 
answer is indeed found in the Heraclitus Seminar itself. Throughout the whole 
seminar Heidegger tries to leave aside his own terminology153; and any reference to 
Being is consciously avoided. Nonetheless, the move of holding off the words that 
identify Heidegger’s thought is not driven by any scientific or objective methodology 
in the study of Heraclitus’ fragments; it is rather a conscious stance within the 
hermeneutical circle, which introduces the Heideggerian vocabulary only once the 
Heraclitean ground is firm enough not to get illegitimately altered. A ground that is, 
nonetheless, never firm enough for a number of reasons: the fragmentary nature of 
the Heraclitean wisdom, which compels us to look at other sources in order to 
understand his writings (Greek poets, later philosophers) but mainly because he is a 
thinker who does not think metaphysically yet. For us, contemporary thinkers who no 
longer think metaphysically, the gap cannot be completely bridged. The answer is 
provided by Heidegger himself at the end of the Seminar:  
 
HEIDEGGER: Is our concern only to repeat Heraclitus?  
FINK: Our concern is a conscious confrontation with Heraclitus154.  
 
The conscious confrontation sees the philosophers’ thinking as an active part of the 
inquiry and not as an analytical tool, thereby excluding the possibility of a merely 
philological enterprise. It is the gap itself that allows for a step further in thinking, as 
Heidegger sees, at the end, the greatest possibility of this confrontation with 
Heraclitus in what seems still to be unthought in Greek thinking and that is ἀλήθεια. 
I would like to report Heidegger’s closing up in its entirety, as it is a crucial passage 
for seeing how he, after conducting the Seminar independently of “Heideggerian” 
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philosophy, finally takes off the mask and dives back into his own thinking and his 
own vocabulary: 
 
ἀλήθεια thought as ἀλήθεια has nothing to do with “truth”; rather, it means 
unconcealment. What I then said in Being and Time about ἀλήθεια already goes in this 
direction. ἀλήθεια as unconcealment had already occupied me, but in the meantime 
“truth” came in between. ἀλήθεια as unconcealment heads in the direction of that 
which is the clearing. How about the clearing? You said last time that the clearing does 
not presuppose the light, but vice versa. Do clearing and light have anything at all to do 
with each other? Clearly not. “Clear” implies: to clear, to weigh anchor, to clear out. 
That does not mean that where the clearing clears, there is brightness. What is cleared is 
the free, the open. At the same time, what is cleared is what conceals itself. We may not 
understand the clearing from out of light; rather, we must understand it from the Greeks. 
Light and fire can first only find their place in the clearing. In the essay “On the Essence 
of Truth”, where I speak of “freedom”, I have the clearing in view, except that here truth 
always walked behind. The dark is, to be sure, without light, but cleared. Our concern is 
to experience unconcealment as clearing. That is what is unthought in what is thought in 
the entire history of thought. In Hegel, the need consisted in the satisfaction of thought. 
For us, on the contrary, the plight of what is unthought in what is thought reigns.155 
 
This powerful ending sums up in a few lines the development of Heidegger’s 
thinking from the perspective of unconcealment and also provides a deeper 
understanding of the Lichtung (clearing) in connection with the primordial outbreak 
of τὰ πάντα that allows for the possibility of γνώσις. As was stated earlier on, this 
event corresponds to the strife that characterizes such possibility and, furthermore, 
coincides with the Lightning that opens up the possibility instantaneously, yet for 
eternity. The Lightning itself is not to be seen as “light”, as it is the event itself that 
allows τὰ πάντα to be distinguishable; it is the Lichtung itself, the openness where 
beings come to the fore through the concealment of Being. On the one hand, then, the 
ontological weight is carried by the Lichtung but it is through γνώσις that knowledge 
as experience actually occurs, i.e. through the human access to the open region. Yet 
the meaning of the Lichtung still needs to be fully related to the primordial outbreak 
of Lightning. As was said above, the Lightning is instantaneous but eternal, i.e. the 
outbreak of τὰ πάντα as distinguishable is the opening of a region that stays open, no 
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matter whether, from the perspective of knowing, it is illuminated by light or it sinks 
into the dark. The Lichtung is, then, from the perspective of γνώσις, yet to be 
explored; yet we do know that such an open region is already there and it is the 
precondition for ἀλήθεια to be experienced. When Heidegger says that ἀλήθεια “has 
nothing to do with truth”, he means that it has nothing to do with a propositional 
concept of truth based of the idea of correspondence. Yet, in On the Essence of Truth 
Heidegger had indeed stated that the essence of truth (as ἀλήθεια) is indeed untruth 
and such a statement cannot be understood without recurring to the notion of 
Lichtung. This means that in the open region [Lichtung] truth as ἀλήθεια, i.e. as 
unconcealment, can be experienced in virtue of the very possibility of being 
concealed: «Concealment deprives ἀλήθεια of disclosure yet does not render it 
στέρησις (privation); rather, concealment preserves what is most proper to ἀλήθεια 
as its own»156. The possibility for ἀλήθεια to be experienced as unconcealment 
resides in the very fact that it is sheltered within the clearing, the open region that 
allows light to shine on the truth but also darkness to cover it up. It is thanks to this 
open region allowing the strife between concealment and unconcealment that beings 
can be distinguished and known. The notion of sheltering the truth is nothing but the 
gnosiological understanding of memory, which we encountered in the first chapter: 
Being that is kept in safety in order to be given. 
To provide a concrete example on the ontic level, we could say that my 
experience of a chair as a chair happens through its unconcealment as a chair but also 
through its concealment as wood and straw or, even, as fuel for my fireplace but also 
as the concealment of the fact that it happens through concealment. What we defined 
as the “tip of the iceberg” in Spinoza here re-emerges as the play of truth. During 
such experience, though, truth is happening as it allows me to distinguish a chair as a 
chair in the distinguishable whole of τὰ πάντα. But I am not experiencing truth as 
the strife between concealment and unconcealment. In the modern world we 
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experience beings as something objective, i.e. a chair is a chair, such an experience, 
though, does not require the acquaintance of the happening of truth that allows that 
chair to be a chair. That is why it is possible to live and be absolutely content with an 
idea of truth as correspondence, where the word «chair» is associated with the object 
«chair» and it functions perfectly within the equipment that allows me to live in the 
world. Such is the technological interpretation of the world, what Heidegger calls 
Gestell [Enframing], which enforces on the world the truth undisclosed by its own 
horizon, thus covering up that open region where that particular horizon arose 
through the strife between concealment and unconcealment. We could conclude that, 
in order to experience the world, we do not need any experience of truth as such, and 
it is thanks to the crystallization of the world into a specific horizon (the one of 
technology, in this instance) that truth acquires its narrow significance as 
correspondence or correctness. In The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger gives one 
possibility for not receding into this limited conception of truth, again, by recurring to 
the notion of Lichtung:  
 
The openness of this open region, that is, truth, can be what it is, namely this openness, 
only if and as long as it establishes itself within its open region. Hence there must be 
always some being in this open region, in which the openness takes its stand and attains 
its constancy. In thus taking possession of the open region, openness holds it open and 
sustains it. […] Clearing of openness and establishment in the open region belong 
together157.  
 
The openness of the open region, then, appears as the experience of a strife that tries 
to maintain the access to the open region, where the truth (as unconcealment through 
concealment) actually happens. Heidegger talks exactly about strife in the same 
lecture, a strife between earth, which is identified with the open region itself and 
world, which is the level of experience of beings as equipment or mere objects. It is 
almost impossible not to recognize the Heraclitean πόλεµος, another of the forms in 
which the outbreak of τὰ πάντα as distinguishable happens. Truth, then, appears as 
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an extremely complex and dynamic experience; Julian Young summarizes it in a very 
effective way: «It is a complex of four elements: the undisclosed (earth), the 
disclosed (world in the ontic sense), the horizon of disclosure (world in the 
ontological sense) and man (the discloser)»158.  
Setting up this experience of truth in terms of gnosiology had as an objective the 
clarification of the knower (in the gnosiological sense we have been investigating) or, 
in Young’s words, of the “discloser”. We operated an extraction of γνώσις from 
Heidegger’s thought through his study of Heraclitus and what this extraction 
achieves, then, is a renewed interest in the human role, albeit free from any 
philosophy of the subject. In the world that has covered up the possibility of the 
openness of the open region, the only way to experience knowledge is ἐπιστήµη, 
which is the prerogative of a subject, intended metaphysically. My question is, then: 
what kind of knower (or discloser) emerges from γνώσις? The answer appears simple: 
obviously the knower is the one who stands in the openness of the open region, thus 
experiencing the happening of truth as unconcealment of the concealed. Nevertheless, 
when considering the reflections carried out so far, the answer sounds merely 
tautological and does not exhaust the potentiality of the question. In order to give a 
more substantial answer, the only way is to complicate it through the investigation of 
such a knower, i.e. man conceived as human, bearing in mind that we cannot afford 
to fall back into subjectivism and not even into anthropocentrism. The possibility of a 
human being a subject is strongly dismissed by Heidegger in the Letter on 
Humanism:  
 
Of course the essential worth of the human being does not consist in his being the 
substance of beings, as the Subject among them, so that as the tyrant of being he may 
deign to release the beingness of beings into an all too loudly glorified “objectivity”159.  
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From the point of view of knowledge, then, which is the one that has concerned this 
section all along, we can confirm the exclusion of a strong ontological role in the 
constitution of beings by the human being that is the view held and perpetrated by 
metaphysics, which  
 
recognizes the clearing of being either solely as the view of what is present in “outward 
appearance” or critically as what is seen in the perspective of categorial representation 
on the part of subjectivity. This means that the truth of being as the clearing itself 
remains concealed for metaphysics160.  
 
The knowing experience (γνώσις) has to shift from a constitutive perspective to what 
we could improperly define as a positional one. I say “improperly” as it does not 
have to be conceived in terms of position in the physical space but in terms of an 
ontological engagement, i.e. standing in the clearing while keeping the constancy of 
the openness and therefore the experience of truth as unconcealment. Heidegger lays 
the foundations for this possibility in Sein und Zeit itself, by choosing to carry out an 
“existential analytic of Da-sein”: «the human being occurs essentially in such a way 
that he is the “there” [das “Da”], that is, the clearing of being. The being of the Da, 
and only it, has the fundamental character of ek-sistence, that is, of an ecstatic 
inherence in the truth of being»161. «Ek-sistence» here means the being-out-there of 
human life, being exposed to projection and possibility within the open region. The 
different spelling for existence (ek-sistence) adopted by Heidegger also indicates that 
he is not interested in the metaphysical opposition essence/existence, according to 
which Sartre makes his case for Humanism by stating that «existence precedes 
essence». Heidegger dismisses the possibility of Humanism, which he sees as a naïve 
anthropocentrism precisely for not ascribing enough dignity to the human. He insists 
on this point through a genealogy of the very term humanitas, which emerges from 
the encounter of the Greek world with the Roman one and ends up being an 
exquisitely Roman term that would serve to oppose the civilized Roman man to the 
                                                
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., p.248. 
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Barbarian. The translation of the Greek term παιδεία, which constitutes the 
educational foundation of Greek civilization, as humanitas completely changes its 
significance. What is lost in translation is not only the mere meaning of the word but 
the originary understanding of the human that belonged to the Greek. We should not 
forget, as was mentioned at the beginning of this section, that Parmenides’ poem is 
also a didactic and educational enterprise that springs from an originary proximity 
with Being.  
From this understanding of the origin of the word humanitas, Heidegger also 
dismisses Italian Humanism and the Renaissance as a renascentia romanitatis and not 
as a rediscovery of the Greek origin. In the first part of my work I tried to show how 
this judgement on Renaissance Humanism is at least questionable and overlooks the 
importance of the philosophy that emerged from this complex and flourishing 
civilization, which is not merely to be identified with a philological and historical 
enterprise. In this section I would like to make a similar statement, yet from the point 
of view of knowledge as I have been treating it so far, that is from the point of view 
of standing in the Lichtung, i.e. from the point of view of what was recognized as 
γνώσις. Obviously the notion of γνώσις in what was the humanist turn from 
Aristotle to Neoplatonism, still retains, as in Ficino, a strong metaphysical 
connotation. Such a connotation is linked to the experience of contemplation and 
therefore cannot be cited as an example of that human knowledge, albeit deprived of 
subjectivity, that we have been seeking so far. Nevertheless the aim here is not to 
recuperate a previously formulated notion of γνώσις but to grant it a renewed 
meaning deriving from the confrontation that has started with Heidegger’s encounter 
with Heraclitus and that will proceed with Renaissance Humanism. Ernesto Grassi, in 
his lectures on Heidegger and Renaissance Humanism, is profoundly convinced that 
an experience of the Lichtung already happens in the philosophy of the Renaissance. 
Such an experience radically rejects the metaphysical and logical tradition of the 
Middle Ages but it does not lead to the Cartesian turn either: «Historically, we should 
note that Heidegger’s definition of Western thought – as rational deductive 
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metaphysics which arises and unfolds exclusively from the problem of the 
relationships between beings and thought, i.e. in the framework of the question of 
logical truth, does not hold. In the Humanist tradition, there was always a central 
concern for the problem of the primacy of unhiddenness, openness, that in which 
historical “being-there” can first appear»162. The Humanist struggle against language 
as a logical tool that produces a truth that is mere correspondence results in the 
opening up of a Lichtung in which new possibilities can appear. If knowledge no 
longer happens through logical investigation, we can see the emergence of a new 
experience of knowing that brings us back to the type of original wisdom that 
belonged to the Presocratics, the coming back together of thing and word, such as in 
Giovanni Pontano: «Pontano, however, argues that in the “original” word we cannot 
distinguish between form and matter, for the simple reason that the word is 
original»163. A premise of this type opens up a possibility for giving new vigour to the 
Heideggerian conception of language as the «house of being» and to its exploration in 
terms of its knowing potentialities as γνώσις. Grassi carefully examines many 
Renaissance authors, thus building a conceptual path that would sustain a renovated 
dialogue between Heidegger and Renaissance Humanism. But this is only a hint we 
have provided. Bearing this in mind, I would like to take Grassi’s arguments even 
further and explore the notion of γνώσις so far extracted from Heidegger within the 
gnosiology of Giordano Bruno. 
 
 
 
                                                
162 E. Grassi, “Humanism and the End of Philosophy”, in E. Grassi, Heidegger & the Question of 
Renaissance Humanism: Four Studies, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, New York 
1983,  p.29. 
163 E. Grassi, “The Humanist Tradition”, in E. Grassi, Heidegger & the Question of Renaissance 
Humanism: Four Studies, p. 53. 
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Chapter V – Shadows 
 
 
Section 1 – The Hand 
 
  
 Modernity is the history of a success based on a quest for knowledge identified 
with epistemology. The Italian historian of science Paolo Rossi offers a very clear 
account of the Cartesian success: «One of the reasons of the success of Descartes’ 
grand construction was that it was introduced to European culture as a system. A 
system founded on reason, with no mention of the occult and vitalism and seemingly 
capable of linking (differently from medieval Scholasticism) the science of nature, 
natural philosophy and religion. Last but not least, it offered men a coherent, 
harmonious and complete picture of the world in a doubt-ridden era of intellectual 
revolution»164. It is a comforting image Descartes is offering, together with an 
objectified nature, which can be investigated without the danger of getting involved 
with spiritual matters, which belong to the sphere of the Subject, i.e. to another 
substance. In Bruno, as we saw in Chapter II of our work, matter is animated, i.e. the 
World Soul is present – not in virtue of an interaction with a non-material substance 
but in virtue of composition. The Cartesian dualism severs mind and body into two 
substantial realities, which is common to that kind of mathematical attitude Bruno 
was trying to contrast, that of division: Descartes sets the standards of Being by 
dividing that which can be doubted from that which cannot be doubted. Bruno’s 
attitude follows a radically different attitude by numerating parts from the point of 
view of composition in relation to the one who is numerating. Thus, atoms or parts 
only make sense in virtue of the fact that they are composed in a compound and can 
only be numerated as parts of the compound – and not by abstract division – in virtue 
of a relational minimum. What we described as the activity of γνώσις within τὰ 
πάντα is figured in Bruno as a distinguishing activity that happens through a 
                                                
164 P. Rossi, The Birth of Modern Science, translated by C. De Nardi Ipsen, Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford 2001, p. 99. 
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relational determination of the knower and the known: it is the minimum which steers 
the τὰ πάντα in its being distinguished. 
One question is still pending. If it is up to man – the knower – as intelligent 
being, to numerate and if Bruno postulates no “I”, then how does the relation between 
the being who numerates and the compound of numerated minima – atoms – take 
place? Coherently with what was explored at the end of Chapter II, we can affirm that 
Bruno proceeds differently from Descartes, i.e. he does not postulate any unnecessary 
metaphysical structure similar to a Subject, which would need to be separated from 
an object and then somehow recomposed with it. Ontologically, there appears to be 
no difference: as such, man is as much of a compound as any other being, he 
participates in the World Soul, thus in the living, infinite matter. He is himself 
distinguished within τὰ πάντα. It was mentioned how Bruno’s philosophy employs 
different registers, that of identity and that of difference, as happened in the case of 
the intensive and extensive infinite, in order to account for the coincidence of the ἕν 
καὶ Πάν with the infinite variety and vicissitude of nature. Within the undistinguished 
One-and-All, there is no ontological gap, each thing expresses the World Soul in 
virtue of its particular composition and also of its relation to other compounds. 
Indeed, as the ἕν καὶ Πάν is extensively infinite and intensively infinite in each of its 
particular beings, the World Soul participates with different intensity in the existing 
compounds in virtue of their omni-relational mode of existence. What makes the 
human compound different and enables it to participate in the World Soul with a 
particularly strong intensity is its particular composition. Such a unique composition 
is exemplified by the hand. Heraclitus is right in saying that if all things were smoke, 
we would distinguish them with the nose but all things offer themselves to 
manipulation and therefore they are distinguished by man through the hand. Bruno 
stresses the importance of the hand in more than one place. In the Spaccio, although 
in a highly allegorical manner, Sophia declares: 
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And [Jove] added that the gods had given intellect and hands to man and made him 
similar to them, giving him power over the other animals. This consists not only in his 
being able to operate according to his nature and to what is usual, but also to operate 
outside the laws of nature, in order that by forming or being able to form other natures, 
other paths, other categories, with his intelligence, by means of that liberty without 
which he would not have the above-mentioned similarity, he would succeed in 
preserving himself as god of the earth. That nature certainly when it becomes idle will 
be frustrating and vain, just as are useless the eye that does not see and the hand that 
does not grasp. And for this reason Providence has determined that he be occupied in 
action by means of his hands, and in contemplation by means of his intellect, so that he 
will not contemplate without action and will not act without contemplation.165 
 
Bruno did not believe in Creation anymore than he believed in Providence. What is 
really of interest here is that intellect and hands are intimately tied together: man 
«will not contemplate without action and will not act without contemplation». 
Translating our discourse in Cartesian terms, this clearly suggests that, if there has to 
be a res cogitans166 at all, it is coessential to the res extensa, in the shape of an organ 
named the hand. It is even possible to hear virtual echoes of the “existential analytic 
of Dasein”: the world presents itself in its «manipulability» as equipment that is 
grasp-able, in its readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit] and «intelligence», man’s ability 
to contemplate, reveals its inadequacy to capture such readiness-to-hand. In 
Heidegger’s words: «No matter how sharply we just look at the “outward 
appearance” of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything 
ready-to-hand. If we look at Things just “theoretically”, we can get along without 
understanding readiness-to-hand»167. In the same way, Bruno does not take for 
granted the theoretical look, which makes sense only in the light of the hand 
«grasping», as man «will not contemplate without action». Furthermore, he adds an 
                                                
165 G. Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, translated and with an introduction by A. D. 
Imerti, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln NE 2004, p. 205. 
166 We are immediately drawn to Heidegger’s severe judgement: «Everyone who is acquainted with 
the Middle Ages sees that Descartes is “dependent” upon medieval scholasticism and employs its 
terminology. But with this “discovery” nothing is achieved philosophically as long as it remains 
obscure to what a profound extent the medieval ontology has influenced the way in which posterity 
has determined or failed to determine the ontological character of the res cogitans. The full extent 
of this cannot be estimated until both the meaning and the limitations of the ancient ontology have 
been exhibited in terms of an orientation directed towards the question of Being» from M. 
Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 46-47. 
167 Ibid., p. 98. 
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important function to the role of the hand, the one of «creating natures» while always 
being part of nature itself, thus indicating man’s difference in virtue of his identity 
with nature. As we saw during his exchange with Mordente, for Bruno artificiality is 
as natural as things of nature. His notion of creativity, which we shall examine in 
Chapter VIII, will coincide with nature’s creativity and will be at the centre of the 
Nolan’s Art of Memory. For now we shall only note how man is emerging as a 
knower – or measurer, numerator168 – in virtue of his particular composition and not 
in virtue or in spite of an ontological gap. Again, in the Cabala of Pegasus, the 
coessentiality between the hand and the soul is more explicitly stated in the context of 
a discussion regarding metempsychosis: 
 
ONORIO: That [the soul: ed.] of the human is the same in specific and generic essence 
as that of flies, sea oysters and plants, and of anything whatsoever that one finds 
animated or having a soul, as no body lacks a more or less lively communication of 
spirit within itself. Now such a spirit, according to fate or providence, decree or fortune, 
links up now with one species of body, now with another; and by reason of the diversity 
of constitutions and limbs, it comes to have diverse degrees and capabilities of mind and 
functions. […] And that such be the truth, consider its subtlety a bit and examine within 
yourself what would be, if, supposing that man had twice the brains he has, and the 
active intellect would shine so much more clearly, and with all that his hands would 
become transformed into the shape of two feet, all the rest remaining in its ordinary 
whole; tell me, how might the conduct of mankind be unaltered? How could the families 
and leagues of such people, any more than of horses, deer, pigs, be established and 
continue without being devoured by innumerable species of beasts, being thus subject to 
greater and more certain ruin? And consequently where would the institutions of 
knowledge, the invention of disciplines, the congregations of citizens, the structures of 
the buildings and other things in great quantity that signify human grandeur and 
excellence, and make man truly the victor over the other species? All this, if you look 
cautiously, refers primarily not so much to the style of mind, as to that of the hand, 
organ of the organs.169 
                                                
168 At the time of the Spaccio (1584) Bruno has not yet developed a proper atomistic theory, which 
will be theorized in the Frankfurt poems (1591); in this instance we are engrafting man as the 
knower and manipulator on his mathematical role of numerator, thus making parallel moves along 
the different points of access to Bruno’s gnosiology. It is a characteristic feature of the Nolan’s 
philosophy to have more than one access to truth and we are proceeding coherently with such 
notion. 
169 G. Bruno, The Cabala of Pegasus, translated and annotated by S. L. Sondergard & M. U. 
Sowell, Yale University Press, London 2002, pp. 56-58. For the original version see G. Bruno, 
“Cabala del Cavallo Pegaseo”, in G. Bruno, Opere Italiane, vol. II, commented by G. Aquilecchia, 
edited by N. Ordine, UTET, Torino 2007, pp. 452-454: «Quella dell’uomo è medesima in essenza 
specifica e generica con quella della mosche, ostreche marine e piante, e di qualsivoglia cosa che si 
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The «organ of the organs»170, then, allows for the most brilliant spirit, intellect and 
wits that can be found in nature and gives man the keys not only to his own survival 
but to his supremacy over the other beasts and yet, we cannot exclude a priori the 
possibility of a greater intellect dictated by a more complex configuration – just as 
human nature, as was said in Chapter II, cannot be fixed or constant. Again, this is 
stated with the proviso that beasts or plants do not qualitatively differ from man as far 
as their soul is concerned: man’s soul is as complex as his configuration – which we 
have called composition in the light of Bruno’s later works – allows. It is, therefore, a 
reductio ad absurdum to suppose that man could possibly be endowed with an 
intellect which was twice as powerful and be deprived of his hands, as everything that 
is owed to his intellect would be missing with the privation of hands – unless his 
hands themselves were replaced by a more powerful configuration. As Ansaldi 
observes: «Human nature thus attains to the possession of its power [puissance] – 
cognitive and practical – starting from the use of the organ that designs his specific 
                                                                                                                                                            
trove animata o abbia anima: come non è corpo che non abbia o più o meno vivace e perfettamente 
communicazion si spirito in se stesso. Or cotal spirito secondo il fato o providenza, ordine o 
fortuna, viene a giongersi or ad una specie di corpo, or ad un’altra: e secondo la raggione della 
diversità di complessioni e membri, viene ad avere diversi gradi e perfezzioni d’ingegno et 
operazioni. […] E che ciò sia la verità, considera un poco al sottile, et essamina entro a te stesso 
quel che sarrebe se posto che l’uomo avesse al doppio d’ingegno che non have, e l’intelletto agente 
gli splendesse tanto più chiaro che non gli splende, e con tutto ciò le mani gli venisser transformate 
in forma de doi piedi, rimanendogli tutto l’altro nel suo ordinario intiero: dimmi dove potrebbe 
impune esser la conversazion de gli uomini, come potrebbero instituirsi e durar le fameglie et unioni 
di costoro parimente o più che de cavalli, cervii, porci, senza esserno divorati da innumerabili 
specie de bestie per essere in tal maniera suggetti a maggiore e più certa ruina? e per conseguenza 
dove sarrebono le instituzioni de dottrine, le invenzioni de discipline, le congregazioni de cittadini, 
le strutture de gli edificii, et altre cose assai che significano la grandezza et eccellenza umana, e 
fanno l’uomo trionfator veramente invitto sopra l’altre specie? Tutto questo, se oculatamente 
guardi, si riferisce non tanto principalmente al dettato de l’ingegno, quanto a quello della mano, 
organo de gli organi». 
170 Here Bruno, as Aquilecchia underlines in his note to the text, quotes Aristotle, De Anima, III, 8, 
432 a i. As Saverio Ansaldi affirms: «Bruno reinterprets here the famous Aristotelian definition of 
the hand as organ of organs in the light of a question that leads him to the definition of what one 
may call ‘organic anthropology’». From S. Ansaldi, Nature et puissance. Giordano Bruno et 
Spinoza, Kimé, Paris 2006, p. 42. My translation from the French: «Bruno réinterprète ici la célèbre 
définition aristotélicienne de la main comme organe des organes à la lumière d’une problématique 
qui le conduit à la définition de ce qu’on pourrait appeler une ‘anthropologie organique’». 
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belonging to the natural order of beings. This means that the perfection of this nature 
is founded on the process of perpetual interaction between human activity and its 
environment – in a word, what results from its practice. Bruno does not grant man 
any natural dignity, but, at the same time, it is precisely in virtue of such a 
desubstantialisation of human nature that he legitimates his moral dignity starting 
from the effort of cognizance and activity»171. Bruno’s position simply cannot 
correspond to the object of Heidegger’s attack we explored in the previous chapter. 
Bruno manages to conciliate, through his skilled handling of the registers of identity 
and difference, man’s humanity and its distinctness within the One-and-All without 
recurring to any ontological gap between humanity and nature. Bruno’s γνώσις is 
nothing but the relational constitution of man that, within τὰ πάντα, is determined 
and determines as a “hand-equipped” being. Man’s dignity as a human is preserved in 
virtue of his ontological belonging to τὰ πάντα, into which he does not dissolve but 
he is distinguished through his act of distinction. Heidegger, who does little to 
provide a more thorough appreciation of Renaissance humanism and dismisses it as 
renascentia romanitatis, considers humanitas a term that mistranslates παιδεία. It is 
Heidegger who mistranslates Renaissance humanism, somehow conferring a 
generalized and Cartesian meaning to it: Heidegger already projects onto humanitas 
the characteristics of a rational subject by isolating it from nature. In Bruno this is 
definitely not the case. 
 Bruno’s Philosophy, in the sense we have so far explored it, is 
uncompromising. We have seen Bruno ferociously attacking Aristotle but also 
Neoplatonism. In the Italian writings we have partially explored a phenomenology of 
the hand, which led us to conclude that its cognitive power is intimately dependent on 
                                                
171 Ibid., p. 43. My translation from the French: «La nature humaine parvient ainsi à la possession 
de sa puissance – cognitive et pratique – à partir de l’usage de l’organe qui désigne son 
appartenance spécifique à l’ordre naturel des êtres. Cela signifie que la perfection de cette nature se 
fonde sur les processus d’interaction perpétuels entre l’activité humaine et son milieu – c’est-à-dire 
ce qu’il résulte de sa pratique. Bruno ne reconnaît à l’homme aucune dignité naturelle, mais, en 
même temps, c’est précisément en vertu de cette désubstantialisation de la nature humaine qu’il 
légitime sa dignité morale à partir de l’effort cognitif et de l’activité». 
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the hand’s ontological identity and intimacy with the world. Such intimacy is 
expressed through its participation in the World Soul but also through its figurative, 
thus extensive, composition. It is the particular figuration that corresponds to a major 
intensity of the participation in the World Soul and its cognitive and practical power. 
In other words, man’s intellectual superiority cannot be severed from his handling of 
the world. In Bruno’s earlier Latin writings, where the the relationship with 
Neoplatonism grows more and more complex172, we can nevertheless find the same 
play of identity and difference from a purely metaphysical point of view, where the 
Neoplatonic hypostases are bent to the necessity of making sense of man’s cognitive 
powers. The rigid and transcendent hierarchy of Plotinus’ system makes Bruno 
uncomfortable, as it posits sense and intellect on two different levels, as he declares 
in the Sigillus Sigillorum: 
 
And as in every moment we experience sensations, surely we consider sense completely 
in our power, whilst about the intellect the Platonists are in doubt, because we do not 
always operate with our intellect and because it [the intellect: ed.] is separated; and it is 
separated – they say – because it is not the intellect that bends towards us, it is we who 
look upwards in order to look for it. Nevertheless, they fool us and themselves; it is 
more appropriate to figure the intellect as bending towards us and we towards it, in a 
way that it is ours as we are its. We belong to the intellect, as a matter of fact, because 
its light makes us perennially present to it, even though it is not perpetually present to 
us. As a consequence it is not always ours, as we do not always understand it, we are not 
always enlightened.173 
                                                
172 In Eugenio Canone’s words: «In his Parisian writings, Bruno arrived at a number of theoretical 
insights that were decisively important for the further development of his thought. Although he had 
written explicitly of the relationship between nature and ars in the Ars Memoriae and the 
Candelaio, and had given a precise account of the unity between the physical world and the human 
spirit, it was necessary to develop such reflections in the context of one specific epistemology. 
Besides this, he still lacked some fundamental building bricks for his real aim, namely, a new and 
complete natural philosophy on the basis of the Platonic and Plotinian metaphysics, which in turn 
was oriented to a “cosmology” derived from the Pythagoreans, from Heraclitus, Democritus, and 
other Pre-Socratics. Bruno took an important, strongly monistic step, above all on the gnoseological 
level, in the Sigillus sigillorum, where we find a conception of the faculties of the soul (mind, 
imagination, reason and understanding) as degrees of one and the same reality. He parts company 
with Plotinus against a completely immanentist background». From E. Canone, “Giordano Bruno 
(1548-1600). Clarifying the Shadows of Ideas”, in P. R. Blum, Philosophers of the Renaissance, p. 
226. 
173 G. Bruno, “Sigillus Sigillorum”, in G. Bruno, Opere Mnemotecniche II, directed by M. Ciliberto, 
edited by M. Matteoli, R. Sturlese, N. Tirinnanzi, Adelphi, Milano 2009, p. 210. My translation 
from the Latin, also based on the facing-page Italian translation in the same volume: «Sensum 
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Once more, the knowing movement is twofold and it is not a mere ascending process. 
There is, nevertheless, an element of difference: sense is not only permanently present 
to us but also in our control; intellect, on the other hand, is present yet not always in 
our possession. Now, this rift between sense and intellect is somehow generated by 
the intermediate faculties of imagination and reason. Bruno seems here to follow a 
very traditional scheme of which we can give a rough sketch: sense – on the 
vegetative level – generates accidental and rather obscure forms in the imagination – 
on the animal level – which, in the case of humans, provides reason with less obscure 
forms that reason will elaborate in such a way as to reach the essential forms of the 
intellect174. Each faculty corresponds to an increasingly complex form of life and 
cognitive power in a seemingly typical Neoplatonic ascending fashion, integrated 
with the Aristotelian notion of a tripartite soul – vegetative, animal and rational. Yet, 
only a few pages later, Bruno does not miss the occasion to distinguish himself from 
both the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian schemes: 
 
And surely by means of a connection, which is not weak, a union and maybe even a 
certain unity and identity, it happens that from the elemental faculty the vegetative one 
is produced, from this concupiscence and sense, from those reason and imagination, 
from which at last descend will and intellect; and on the basis of this it can be shown in 
a conclusive manner that if in sense is given participation in the intellect, then sense will 
be the intellect itself.175 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
quidem – quia sentimus semper – iudicamus esse nostrum, de intellectu vero ambigunt Platonici, et 
quia eo non semper utimur et quia est separatus : separatus, inquiunt, quia non ipse annuit ad nos, 
sed potius nos ad ipsum superne aspicientes. At fallunt et falluntur ita dicentes ; magis enim 
convenit, ut intelligamus et ipsum nos et ipsum ad nos et nos ad ipsum adpellere, unde et illenoster 
et nos illius. Nos quidem semper illius, quia nos semper illuminans perpetuo praesentes habet, 
quantumvis non ille nobis perpetuo praesens, et consequenter non semper ille noster, quia non 
semper intendimus, nec semper illuminamur». 
174 See ibid. p. 212: «The forms of things in the mind are always essential […]».  My translation 
from the Latin: «Formae rerum in mente sunt omnino essentiales […]». 
175 Ibid., pp. 216-218. My translation from the Latin: «Et certe a non imbecilli connexione, unione 
et forte unitate et identitate quadam provenit, quod a facultate elementativa vegetativa perficitur, ab 
ac concupiscentia et sensus, ab iis ratio et imaginatio, a quibus tandem voluntas atque intellectus; ex 
quibus demonstrative concludi potest, quod si in sensu sit participatio[ne] intellectus, sensus erit 
intellectus ipse». 
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What Bruno affirms here, which is the identity of sense and intellect, denies one of 
the pillars of Neoplatonic ontology, which is the opposition between the scarce reality 
and untruth provided by the senses and the truth and reality provided by the intellect. 
In Bruno the difference is not ontological, it is gnosiological. On the one hand, the 
so-called form or idea – the direct expression of reality and truth – delivers itself 
through different faculties in an increasingly essential manner; on the other hand, the 
intellectual distinction is not a real one. For instance, whether I conceive of sunlight 
as nourishment searched for by a plant or I feel it warming my hand up or I formulate 
a photonic theory of light, the distinction between those different acquaintances with 
the same thing remains formal. Really, the intellect is nothing transcendent or 
hierarchical: man, as such, always knows within the light of the intellect, he is not 
enlightened by it. In Heideggerian terms, man always stands in the Lichtung. 
Faculties are fictions of reason, occasions for man to inhabit truth through the 
experience of forms and for forms to be a simple essence that, nonetheless, 
«necessarily divides, distinguishes and multiplies itself within the substratum»176. 
Man and forms both inhabit the substratum in a situation of coessentiality that is also 
codetermining and that recalls the notion of γνώσις that we extracted from 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Heraclitus: a knowing experience that distinguishes 
within unity. In De Bernart’s observations on the gnosiology found in the Sigillus we 
can infer we might be on the right track:  
 
The Brunian critique of the theory of “impressions” seems, as a matter of fact, to recall 
a gnosiology that focuses on the influence exerted on the knowing subject as a 
determining factor, putting it on the same level as the known object, i.e. the features of 
sensation. Although, differently from Sextus Empiricus, who had characterized his 
“anti-dogmatic” polemic on the impossibility of getting out of the subjective sphere, 
[…] in order to know the “truth” of the things themselves, belonging to the objective 
sphere, Bruno aims, through the concept of “nature”, at the re-absorption of the subject 
itself, similarly to the “object”, within the thread of relations according to which the 
universal reality is structured. From this it follows that, if the content of the senses is 
never for Bruno an inert and faithful “copy” of the object, it is neither something 
irreducibly other than the object itself and pertaining solely to the subjective sphere: it is 
                                                
176 Ibid., p. 218. My translation from the Latin: «[…] in subiecto dividi, distingui et multiplicari 
necessum est». 
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a natural fact, the product of a contact, of the reciprocal tension between subject and 
object […].177 
 
Even though, in my opinion, the terminology of subject and object covers up the 
undivided point of departure of Bruno’s thinking, De Bernart rightly depicts the 
knowing act as an event that happens within nature, as an internal movement and 
discrimination that, while discriminating and distinguishing, restates its unity. On the 
other hand – if observed in Heideggerian terms – when the knowing act turns into a 
mere distinguishing, not within but outside the unity, then we witness the triumph of 
Enframing [Gestell], the end of the practice of truth and its codification into the 
incontrovertible metaphysical closure and isolation, which is the feature of τέχνη or, 
rather, of its modern translation as cybernetics.  
Bruno’s vision of the hand, as we have seen, is antithetical to the technical 
power of man as a conquering and severing event. Bruno has provided us with a 
precious access to the cognitive power of a de-substantialised man and has developed 
a notion of the human that combines composition, from the material point of view of 
the atoms, and intensity, from the spiritual-material perspective of the World Soul. In 
other words, man has encountered his coincidence with what is known, yet becoming 
a knower, practising that knowledge we envisaged while staring at the Heraclitean 
origin, γνώσις. What strikes us is that the practice of such a gnosiology becomes 
possible only once man recognizes his belonging to the world of beasts, plants, 
stones, yet remaining the only one amongst those who can grant such a recognition. 
                                                
177 L. De Bernart, Immaginazione e scienza in Giordano Bruno, pp. 26, 27. My translation from the 
Italian: «La critica bruniana alla teoria della ‘impressione’ sembra infatti rinviare a una gnoseologia 
che pone in primo piano la condizionatezza naturale del soggetto conoscente come fattore 
determinante, alla stessa stregua di quella dell’oggetto conosciuto, i caratteri della sensazione. Solo 
che, a differenza di Sesto Empirico, che aveva imperniato la sua polemica ‘antidommatica’ sulla 
impossibilità di uscire dalla sfera del soggettivo (in cui si collocava per Sesto qualsiasi contenuto 
mentalecome qualsiasi criterio di giudizio umano) per conoscere la ‘ verità’ delle cose in sé, 
appartenente alla sfera dell’oggettivo, Bruno mira, attraverso il concetto di ‘natura’, a proporre il 
riassorbimento del ‘soggetto’ stesso, alla stessa stregua dell’’oggetto’, entro la trama dei rapporti 
‘invisibili’ secondo cui si struttura la realtà universale. Da ciò deriva che, se il portato dei sensi non 
è mai per Bruno una ‘copia’ inerte e fedele dell’oggetto, non è neanche qualcosa di radicalmente e 
irriducibilmente ‘altro’ rispetto all’oggetto stesso e di pertinente solo alla sfera soggettiva: esso è un 
fatto naturale, il prodotto di un contatto, di una tensione reciproca tra soggetto e oggetto […]». 
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Within such animality lies human freedom, which opens up a great horizon for the 
hand-endowed beast, that is, man. Eugenio Canone, quoting and paraphrasing the 
Spaccio, explains this really well: «“The pig – observes Bruno – does not wish to die 
for he wouldn’t be pig, the horse greatly fears being de-horsed. Jove…maximally 
fears not being Jove”. The fear of death concerns, then, at once, the loss of 
individuality both as an individual and as species, together with the nightmare of 
living the experience of separation of body from soul, of badly incarnated souls, so 
effectively described in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. All this implies for man – an 
indistinct nature between beast and heavenly animal, thus free to turn into whatever 
he wishes – that it is not so much necessary to remain tied to what one is, i.e. 
“maintaining and preserving oneself in the present being”, exactly in virtue of the 
power of modifying oneself and, through, one’s ars, the surrounding world»178. Here 
Canone extrapolates conclusions that are, at once, ontological, gnosiological and 
ethical. The composition of man as hand-endowed does indeed give him the chance 
to transform the surrounding world and to know it. Nonetheless, it does not 
necessarily imply his ontological subsistence as a categorized – and therefore 
metaphysical – species because its very endowment provides him with the faculty of 
transforming nature and therefore man himself as nature. It is only when man 
inscribes his own species as humanity, only once he conclusively determines his 
difference, that he loses the very chance of being human, i.e. transforming nature, 
thus himself. In Heideggerian terms, we could say that Dasein loses itself once it 
                                                
178 E. Canone, “Una profonda notte animale”, in E. Canone, Il dorso e il grembo dell’eterno, 
Bruniana e Campanelliana, Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, Pisa-Roma 2003, pp. 192-
193. My translation from the Italian: «“Il porco – osserva Bruno – “non vuol morire per non esser 
porco, il cavallo massime paventa di scavallare. Giove… sommamente teme di non esser Giove”. Il 
timore della morte riguarderebbe quindi, nel contempo, la perdita dell’identità sia come individuo 
che come specie, con l’incubo di vivere nell’esperienza di estraniamento dell’anima dal corpo, di 
anime cioè male incarnate, così efficacemente descritta nelle Metamorfosi di Ovidio. Tutto questo 
comporta per l’uomo – natura incerta e sospesa tra la bestia e l’animale celeste, libero pertanto di 
trasformarsi in quello che vuole – che è necessario non tanto rimanere legati a quello che si è, ossia 
“mantenersi e conservarsi nell’esser presente” quanto aprirsi a quello che si può essere, “sempre 
oltre quel che possiede”, proprio in virtù del potere di modificare se stesso e, con la sua ars, il 
mondo che lo circonda». 
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interprets Being as presence, furthermore rejecting the projection of its Being-
towards-Death. Bruno, in the Spaccio, identified the existential fear of death with the 
interpretation of being as presence, which is fear of losing one’s own individuality, 
whether that of a pig or of a human that leads to the rejection of the very idea of 
death. According to Bruno, death is simply part of the vicissitude of nature, a change 
in our composition and therefore not separable from our vicissitudinal nature as 
transformers and transformed. In Division II of Sein und Zeit Heidegger affirms that 
«Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. “As soon as man 
comes to life, he is at once old enough to die”»179, which means that Dasein’s totality 
is as open as Bruno describes it when he rejects death as a loss of individuality. 
Furthermore, individuality, as such, loses any substantial feature as it crystallizes 
presence; and therefore the fear of death, as loss of individuality, makes even less 
sense, which means that there is no special mission to fulfil for man, no existential 
task that death can interrupt or complete. We imagine Heidegger would agree with 
this as «In death, Dasein has not been fulfilled nor has it simply disappeared; it has 
not become finished nor is it wholly at one’s disposal as something ready-to-hand»180. 
We can conclude, then, that the hand, as such, is not the place of technology, not the 
tool of man’s dominion over nature; it is the place of intensity where man and nature 
are identical as knower and known, the place of distinction within unity, the event of 
γνώσις. We can affirm this in virtue of the transforming power of the hand that makes 
the act of knowledge a transformation of both knower and known, an act of distinction 
and identification within the ἕν καὶ Πάν. Transformation encompasses death in each 
instant of man’s life and, at once, it deprives it of its ontological and existential 
pregnancy, as man ceases to be measured in the instant between his birth and his 
death. 
 
 
                                                
179 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 289. 
180 Ibid. 
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Section 2 – The Naked Diana 
 
 
Human knowledge passes, then, through animality and mortality. In this Bruno 
appears as far as possible from modernity, for his ideas travel beyond any 
anthropocentric temptation. Bruno’s peculiar materialism combined with a spiritual – 
thus material in Bruno’s sense – intensity, and not bearing the weight of the modern 
subject, anticipates some of Deleuze’s thought. Not to mention the rhizomatic 
structure of his infinite universe that is an infinite periphery with no centre and the 
encounter of man with nature and animality, free from any categorial organization181. 
Just as human nature is defined only within the infinite vicissitude, so human 
knowledge, understood as γνώσις i.e. as distinguishing multiplicity within unity, is 
not a result of contemplation but of action, as we said earlier. Deleuze himself spots 
in Heraclitus the same play of identity and difference we have found in Bruno, driven 
by vicissitude – becoming, in Heraclitus’ case: «Heraclitus denied the duality of 
worlds, “he denied being itself”. Moreover, he made an affirmation of becoming. In 
the first place it is doubtless to say that there is only becoming. No doubt it is also to 
affirm becoming. Heraclitus has two thoughts which are like ciphers: according to 
one there is no being, everything is becoming; according to the other, being is the 
being of becoming as such182. A working thought which affirms becoming and a 
contemplative thought which affirms the being of becoming. These two ways of 
                                                
181As Bruno de-substantialises man by making him qualitatively similar to animals within a 
polycentric universe, so Deleuze and Guattari express the understanding of man in his animality by 
getting rid of any transcendent understanding of man: «Memories of a sorcerer, I. A becoming-
animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity. We 
sorcerers have always known that. It may very well be that other agencies, moreover very different 
from one another, have a different appraisal of the animal. One may retain or extract from the 
animal certain characteristics: species and genera, forms and functions, etc. […] But we are not 
interested in characteristics; what interests us are modes of expansion, population, propagation, 
occupation, contagion, peopling. […] What we are saying is that every animal is fundamentally a 
band, a pack. That it has pack modes, rather than characteristics, even if further distinctions within 
these modes are called for. It is at this point that the human being encounters the animal». From G. 
Deleuze, F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by B. 
Massumi, Continuum, London, pp. 239-240. 
182 The same thoughts banned by Admetus as inventor of dialogue. See Chapter I.  
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thinking are inseparable, they are the thought of a single element, as Fire and Dike, as 
Physis and Logos. For there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond 
multiplicity; neither multiplicity nor becoming are appearances or illusions. But 
neither are multiple or eternal realities which would be, in turn, like essences beyond 
appearances. Multiplicity is the affirmation of unity; becoming is the affirmation of 
being. The affirmation of becoming is itself being, the affirmation of multiplicity is 
itself one.  Multiple affirmation is the way in which the one affirms itself. “The one is 
the many, unity is multiplicity”»183. Deleuze is definitely not a philosopher of the 
Origin; thus he operates on a completely different plane with respect to Heidegger 
and yet, from the perspective of his philosophy of difference, he walks on the same 
path as Heidegger when interpreting Heraclitus, trying to capture the apparent 
paradox of τὰ πάντα, which Bruno revives through the materialist notion of a World 
Soul. It seems, then, that Bruno has a point when he holds that truth can be accessed 
from many different paths and he is not just advocating a sterile eclecticism. Bruno’s 
praise of the hand as «organ of organs», then, is perfectly inscribed in his ontology; 
the hand is not a tool of dominion of man over nature, it is the place of intensity – in 
virtue of its figuration or composition – that, at once, distinguishes man within the 
unity, makes the unity distinguishable to him and lets him distinguish things within 
the unity. The hand is the place of action that allows for contemplation and it could 
not be otherwise in a reality characterized by vicissitude – or becoming. Bruno 
understands, just like Heraclitus in the Heideggerian and Deleuzian interpretations, 
the danger of building a pure philosophical system of identity, which would have, 
otherwise, to disqualify change and experience to mere appearance and falsity. Bruno 
prefers to stand in the region of truth without creating dualisms and without recurring 
to any sort of dialectical movements, teleological or historical temptations that, for 
instance, will characterize the great Hegelian project. The λόγος is not reduced to a 
merely contemplative conceptus, as Heidegger fears when describing the Renaissance 
                                                
183 G. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by H. Tomlinson, Continuum, London 2006, p. 
22. 
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as a renascentia romanitatis; it is the relational co-determination that steers τὰ 
πάντα, the vicissitudinal truth that, at once, shapes the knower himself on the acting 
stage of γνώσις. Identity and difference, just like being and becoming, are coessential. 
We have explored the knower so far, focusing on his identity with the known but 
then, we need to practise a parallel and contrary movement, that would take us from 
the known back to the knower, as knowledge from the point of view of truth still lays 
unexplored. Almost reflecting the vicissitudinal character of nature, Bruno’s thought 
is itself a dynamic experience more than a monolithic system; thus we do find that 
some notions which appeared in his early writings and were apprehended from older 
traditions, successively permeate and are permeated by the development of his 
philosophy184. That is the case of shadows [umbrae], which make their appearance in 
the very title of the early Latin mnemotechnic work, the De umbris idearum. In the 
Intentio Prima of this fundamental text, which gave Bruno international resonance 
and got him hired at the court of the French king, Henri III, the Nolan begins by 
evoking a biblical scene that appears in the Song of Songs, narrating the episode of 
the Sulamite who sits in the shadow of the great Jewish sage, thus escaping from the 
imperfect and vain shadows man is generally immersed in, in order to enjoy the direct 
shadow which emanates from truth. The Platonic root is evident but it does not 
exhaust the significance of the image, which acquires a new complexity: 
 
Nevertheless, how is it possible that what is not properly true and whose essence is not 
properly the truth has nonetheless the effectiveness and action of truth? It is enough, 
then – and it is a lot – to sit in the shadow of the good and the true. In the shadow, I 
mean, not of the natural and rational – under this aspect one should, as a matter of fact, 
define as false and evil – but of the metaphysical, ideal and supra-substantial. Thus, 
thanks to its faculty, the soul participates in the good and in the true, and even if it does 
not have enough strength to be the image of that, it is nonetheless in its likeness, 
                                                
184 «We do not ban the mysteries of the Pythagoreans, we do not depreciate the Platonists’ faith nor 
do we deprecate the Peripatetics’ arguments, as long as they rest on a real foundation». From G. 
Bruno, “De umbris idearum” in G. Bruno, Opere Mnemotecniche I, directed by M. Ciliberto, edited 
by M. Matteoli, R. Sturlese, N. Tirinnanzi, Adelphi, Milano 2009, p. 36. My translation from the 
Latin: «Non abolemus Pythagoricum mysteria. Non parvifacimus Platonicorum fides, et quatenus 
reale sunt nacta fundamentum, Peripateticorum ratiocinia non despicimus». 
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whereas the diaphanous crystal that is proper to the soul, limited by the opacity that is 
the essence of the body, experiences a vague trace of the image in man’s mind, as much 
as the impulse can drive him to it; but in the internal senses and in reason – by which we 
are circumscribed, living the life of animate beings – he experiences the shadow 
itself.185 
 
The Platonic content and appearance of this passage should not lead us astray and the 
reason is not only due to what we know of Bruno’s later Philosophy, which is the 
endorsement of a spiritualized matter and the total abandonment of any form of 
transcendence. The great theme of the shadow is not here introduced as a 
fundamental lack of truth; it is a positive characterization of humanity itself, a basic 
structure for the experience of truth, as the shadow is no less true than truth itself, 
otherwise that will result in the paradox envisaged in the question that opens the 
passage. Bruno proceeds to a more positive definition of shadow: 
 
After having considered this, I would like you to take into account what follows, in 
order to distinguish the shadow from the nature of darkness. 
The shadow is not darkness but the trace of darkness in light or trace of light in darkness 
or a participant in light and darkness or a compound of light and darkness or a mixture 
of light and darkness or an element that is distinct from light and darkness and separated 
from both. And all this not because either the truth is full of light or because it is false 
light or, again, because it is neither true nor false, but because it is trace of what truly or 
falsely is, and so on. In our treatise, let us consider it, however, a trace of light, 
partaking of light, not the full light.186 
 
                                                
185 Ibid., pp. 42-44. My translation from the Latin: «Qui autem fieri potest, ut ipsum, cuius esse non 
est proprie verum et cuius essentia non est proprie veritas, efficaciam et actum habeat veritatis? 
Sufficiens ergo est illi atque multum, ut sub umbra boni verique sedeat. Non inquam sub umbra veri 
bonique naturalis atque rationalis – hinc enim falsum diceretur atque malum –, sed metaphysici, 
idealis et superstantialibus. Unde boni et veri pro sua facultate particeps efficitur animus, qui est si 
tantum non habeat ut eius imago sit, ad eius tamen est imaginem, dum ipsius / animae diaphanum, 
corporis ipsius opacitate terminatum, experitur in himinis mente imaginisaliquid, quatenus ad eam 
appulsum habet; in sensibus autem internis et ratione, in quibus animaliter vivendo versamur, 
umbram ipsam». 
186 Ibid., pp. 44-46. My translation from the Latin: «Hoc ipsum consideraveris, illud quoque tibi 
occurrat velim, ut a tenebrarum ratione seiungas umbram. 
Non est umbra tenebrae, sed vel tenebrarum a luce et tenebris et ab utrisque seiunctum. Et haec vel 
inde, quia non sit plena lucis veritas, vel quia sit falsa lux, vel quia nec vera nec falsa, sed eius, 
quod vere est aut flase, vestigium, etc. 
Habeatur autem in proposito, ut lucis vestigium, lucis particeps, lux non plena». 
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In the co-penetration of light and darkness, the shadow finds its reality, in its identity 
and difference from truth. If the Heideggerian clearing [Lichtung] is truth as 
openness; the parallel between the Heideggerian Lichtung and the Brunian umbra 
means much more than just a similarity of images, a parallel that Sandro Mancini 
catches better than other critics: «Bruno distinguishes between shadow as error, 
which keeps away from truth, and shadow as latency of truth, both as the inerasable 
modality of the manifestation of light in the intellect of human experience, uncertain 
space of communication between these two polarities, and as the inexhaustible lap of 
the possibilities of knowledge: when, 350 years later, Heidegger will elaborate his 
notion of truth starting from the re-memoration of the Greeks’ a-letheia, he will walk 
along the unnoticed trail of this reflection on the complementary nature of light and 
darkness»187. Mancini’s analysis is coherent with the rejection of knowledge as 
contemplation, which is another point of encounter between Heidegger and Bruno: 
contemplation is the total abstraction from an actual experience of truth, from the 
practice of truth as standing in the clearing, thereby witnessing that same play of 
concealment and unconcealment that makes truth itself come to the fore; standing in 
the shadow of truth means exactly taking part in the game of truth in virtue of its 
concealment. The shadow is the gift delivered through retention. The human 
gnosiological experience of the shadow lets us distinguish and discriminate the 
multiplicity within the Unity: the figurations are nothing but the World Soul casting a 
shadow upon itself. Γνώσις, then, is witnessing the movement of knowledge from 
within, which is the philosophical knowing. Each of us, as humans, distinguishes 
shadows as objects, people, planets, a tree or a car but not in their shadowy nature of 
emergence from Unity, from light through darkness. The adoption of an elementary 
                                                
187 S. Mancini, La sfera infinita. Identità e differenza nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno, Mimesis, 
Milano 2000, p. 31. My translation from the Italian: «Bruno distingue tra l’ombra come errore, che 
quindi allontana dalla verità, e l’ombra quale latenza della verità, sia in quanto ineliminabile 
modalità manifestativa della luce dell’intelletto nell’esperienza umana, spazio incerto di 
comunicazione tra questi due poli, sia in quanto grembo inesauribile delle possibilità della 
conoscenza: quando, 350 anni dopo, Heidegger elaborerà la sua concezione della verità a partire 
dalla rimemorazione dell’a-letheia dei Greci, riprenderà la scia inavvertita di questa riflessione sulla 
complementarità di luce e tenebre». 
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realism could definitely get us by throughout our lives and yet, at once Bruno and 
Heidegger seem to expose its absurdity as the very act of distinguishing presupposes 
a unity. A tree does not emerge on its own, as the object “tree”. It does not emerge in 
virtue of its tree-ness either. The tree emerges in virtue of a reciprocal determination 
of knower and known that conceals what is undistinguished in order for the tree to 
stand out. The tree does not stand out “in itself” but in relation to my handling the 
world that is, vice-versa, determined by the tree. Not being a pre-determined form but 
a co-determining figuration, the tree is a shadow of the totality that hides behind it. 
As such, we distinguish the tree only because the tree offers itself as distinguishable 
to the one who distinguishes it and it offers itself as a shadow, i.e. not as a 
metaphysically constituted object but as a vicissitudinal movement within τὰ πάντα. 
The tree and the tree-knower, through their reciprocal ontological belonging, 
participate in γνώσις. The tree is a shadow and, were it not a shadow, it would not be 
anything at all. The unity cannot reveal itself as unity, which amounts to saying that 
Being cannot reveal itself as Being for it is not a being. Beings remain shadows 
because their being distinguished depends on the retention of Being. 
If the notion of shadow is central in Bruno, as it is the key that gives access to 
the possibility of memory – which we shall explore in the next part of this work – it 
also permeates his whole gnosiological approach, which is, again, suggested by 
Bruno already in the De umbris, where the shadows are depicted as progressing to an 
«ever growing multiplicity, to the point of  – as the Pythagoreans would have it – an 
infinite multiplicity»188. Here the attitude is almost purely Neoplatonic, as the notion 
of multiplicity is interpreted as a distancing from the unity, as a lower hypostasis, the 
most corrupted and the farthest from truth, represented by a divine metaphysical 
substratum. We should not be fooled by Bruno’s habit of endorsing different 
philosophical traditions, as we have seen that, coherently with his notion of 
vicissitude, he is indeed ready to let them collapse from within. The whole of the 
                                                
188 G. Bruno, “De umbris idearum” in G. Bruno, Opere Mnemotecniche I., p. 48. My translation 
from the Latin: «[…] in infinitam multitudinem – ut Pythagoreorum more loquar - progrediuntur». 
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Nolan philosophy is a fatal blow to all the concepts he endorses, whether Platonic, 
Peripatetic or scientific, in an uncompromising practice of thinking.  The opening of 
the De umbris already showed that shadows are not to be dismissed as faded images 
of ideas but are to be seen as what the human can experience of truth. Mancini shows 
Bruno’s twists – which earned him the scorn of many “systematic” philosophers and 
critics – by underlining how Bruno easily gets rid of his ancient masters’ and 
inspirers’ notions by testing them against his own thinking experience. What really 
suffers from his shadowy theory of knowledge is not the reality of nature: «Bruno 
opts for the shadowy nature of knowledge, as he wishes to make experience lighter 
and less real in order to dismantle the old image of the world and favour the 
construction of a new one, based on infinity and uniformity. If the conceptual edifices 
built by men are all shadows, then also the thick ones of the Aristotelian image of the 
world can, although sustained by heavy theocratic apparatuses, be swept away by the 
wind of the infinite»189. Bruno makes use of the Neoplatonic foundations not in order 
to degrade material nature but to be able to level nature and divinity: what is 
considered as the upper and transcendent level of knowledge is not discarded 
altogether, but is conflated with the material. Nature is not a lower hypostasis of the 
divine; divinity participates in nature as the World Soul and the World Soul finds its 
expression in Nature.  He affirms it rather explicitly in the De Immenso: «the species 
of the true, affirmed in every part, is rendered strong by the support of nature»190. 
Further proof of the absence of a true contradiction between Bruno’s Platonism and 
his monism, Mancini notes, is that in his very last publication, the De imaginum 
                                                
189 S. Mancini, La sfera infinita. Identità e differenza nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno, p. 35. My 
translation from the Italian: «Bruno opta per la tesi dell’umbratilità della conoscenza appunto 
perché vuole alleggerire l’esperienza, derealizzarla, onde rendere praticabile l’opera di 
smantellamento della vecchia immagine del mondo e di costruzione della nuova, imperniata 
sull’infinità e sull’uniformità. Se gli edifici concettuali costruiti dagli uomini sono tutti ombre, 
allora anche quelle spesse dell’immagine aristotelica del mondo, benché puntellate da pesanti 
apparati teocratici, possono essere spazzate via dal vento dell’infinito». 
190 G. Bruno, “De innumerabilis, immenso et infigurabili, seu de Universo et mundis”, in G. Bruno, 
Opp. lat., I, II, p. 68. My translation from the Latin:  
«Sic ubi naturae certo fulcimine, veri  
Consistit species, parteis sancita per omneis». 
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compositione – thus after having published his Italian works in England and his Latin 
poems in Frankfurt, where his turn towards monism was clear and complete – Bruno 
reverts, on the steps of the old De umbris idearum, to his former Platonic language: 
 
Let us put the focus of the present inquiry on the concept of universe understood by the 
third meaning, i.e. as a living mirror in which the image of natural things and the 
shadow of the divine ones are found. 
A mirror of this sort surely conceives the idea as the cause of things, in the same fashion 
as the image of the thing to be done in the mind of the agent assumes the trait of 
efficient cause.191 
 
  
The classical definition Bruno provides of the idea later on in the text, as supra-
substantial species of the world, in spite of the monist, pantheistic and naturalist 
positions adopted in the years between the De umbris and the De imaginum 
compositione, should not lead us astray. The apparent incoherence of this return to 
the Neoplatonic origins is easily overcome once we take into account the 
gnosiological path we have followed so far, as the meaning of image and shadow 
have been radically dismantled of all their transcendent referents and, from their 
dependence on some other-worldly truth, they have taken an active part in the very 
game of truth. When we examined the knowing process of a tree, we came to see it as 
a shadow that comes to be known as an image reflected by nature through the 
knower. The image, as a form of knowledge that is ordered and arranged within 
man’s knowing faculties192, can only be achieved through the access provided by the 
shadow. The access to the supra-substantial species of the world – the world of ideas 
– is not outside nature193; it is the grasping of unity, which is nature discovered in its 
                                                
191 G. Bruno, “De imaginum compositione”, in G. Bruno, Opere Mnemotecniche II, p. 496. My 
translation from the Latin: «Actum praesentis considerationis proponimus in universe iuxta tertiam 
<si>gnificationem, quod est veluti speculum quoddam vivens, in quod est imago rerum naturalium 
et umbra divinarum. 
Hoc sane speculum concipit ideam tamquam causam rerum, sicut imago rei faciendae in mente 
efficientis imbuit efficientis rationem». 
192 And we shall see its relevance in Bruno’s art of memory, in Part III. 
193 As Ciliberto clearly states while commenting the De umbris: «In the second section, entitled 
Triginta conceptus umbrarum […] Bruno mainly underlines the organic nexus between ideas and 
their shadows. It is for this very reason that man’s interior world can be figured as an image of the 
 143 
divine sphere and which, through the shadows, is made distinguishable in its 
multiplicity. There is no transcendent realm to refer to and there is no coming back to 
Neoplatonic hierarchies for Bruno; we can hear echoes, instead, of the Heraclitean 
motif we quoted from Deleuze: «multiplicity is the affirmation of unity; becoming is 
the affirmation of being». The quest for such unity, which, as humans, we can access 
only through multiplicity, will be the quest for the comprehension of the divine, as 
Ciliberto notes already in the Spaccio: «[…] Bruno posits the problem of the search 
for the “forms” of communication between God, man, nature; between superior 
Sophia and inferior Sophia; between Providence and Prudence. This is, actually, the 
Archimedean point of the “nova filosofia”. From unity, from light, springs, 
explicating itself in innumerable ways, the shadow; from the shadow springs the 
tension towards unity, towards light. Error – “crisis” on the historical level – lays in 
separating and juxtaposing the two plains. On the contrary, they reciprocally hold 
each other»194. 
                                                                                                                                                            
universal dynamism, on every level. And, since there are ideas of all things – as the Nolan notes, 
thus questioning Plato – for man it is possible to ascend, progressively, from any interior umbra up 
to the idea from which it emanates. The art of memory Bruno aims at, then, is something very 
different from a mere practical tool: it is inscribed in the profound dynamism explicated by the 
universe, and from there it derives its foundation and legitimacy. It can be well understood, in such 
light, why the second part of the De umbris – which contains the actual art of memory – is 
introduced by an affirmation that confirms and restates the organic rapport that binds the world of 
ideas, world of shadows and mnemotechnic». From M. Ciliberto, Umbra profunda. Studi su 
Giordano Bruno, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 1990, pp. 111-112. My translation from the 
Italian: «Nella seconda sezione, intitolata Triginta conceptus umbrarum – sullo sfondo di una 
problematica di carattere nettamente gnoseologico, in cui echeggiano I grandi testi neoplatonici, a 
cominciare dalle Enneadi plotiniane – Bruno sottolinea anzitutto il nesso organico fra le idee e le 
loro ombre. È per questo, infatti, che il mondo interiore dell’uomo si può configurare come un 
riflesso del dinamismo universale, a tutti i livelli. E dal momento che vi sono idee di tutte le cose – 
come il Nolano sottolinea polemizzando con Platone – per l’uomo è possibile ascendere, in modo 
progressivo, da qualsiasi umbra interiore fino a raggiungere l’idea da cui promana… L’arte della 
memoria cui mira Bruno, dunque, è ben altro che un semplice strumento pratico: si situa nel 
dinamismo profondo che si esplica nell’universo, e di qui trae il suo fondamento e la sua legittimità. 
S’intende bene, a questa luce, perché la seconda parte del De umbris – la quale racchiude l’ars 
memoriae vera e propria – si apra con un’affermazione che conferma, e ribadisce, il rapporto 
organico che lega mondo delle idee, mondo dell’ombra e tecnica mnemonica». 
194 M. Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno, Laterza, Bari 2007, pp. 146-147. My translation from the Italian: 
«[…] Bruno pone il problema della ricerca delle “forme” della comunicazione tra Dio, uomo, 
natura; tra Sofia superiore e Sofia inferiore; tra Provvidenza e Prudenza. Questo, in effetti, è il 
punto archimedeo della “nova filosofia”. Dall’unità, dalla luce scaturisce, esplicandosi in modi 
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The supra-sensible world envisaged in De imaginum compositione, the divine 
sphere, is not, then, a separate world where ideas dwell and provide shadows for the 
lower, human level. The idea of tree is not an ideal tree-ness that is somehow perfect 
if compared to all its shadows, it is the intensive belonging of the tree to the unity of 
being, the necessary condition for its existence in all of its shapes and vicissitudinal 
or temporal changes precisely because of its being one with the infinite unity, 
distinguishable but not distinguished. All of its shadows spring exactly from the 
infinite possibilities given by an undistinguished idea; it is supra-sensible in the sense 
that only shadows, being determinate, are accessible to the senses. We find in Bruno 
an irreducible tension between what is retained, the divine, and what is given, 
shadows: man is thrown in a world of shadows and yet, in his most philosophical 
afflatus, wants to grasp divinity. Such tension reflects man’s being-out-there in the 
world, being exposed to the open region through the vicissitude of life, it is a re-
edition of Heidegger’s ek-sistence that calls the philosopher himself into question. 
The philosopher is not content of being exposed to the gnosiological game of 
distinction, he wants to capture the unity: we could say that this is Bruno’s personal 
Seinsfrage. Bruno translates this tension in the most violent bond man ever gets to 
experience and that is love. It is of the Heroic Frenzies [De gli eroici furori] I speak, 
a unique text in the history of Philosophy, which addresses the primordial wish 
enacting the desire for knowledge, freeing it from the contemplative ropes that 
restrain the love and desire that originated it: 
 
CICADA: Why is love signified through fire? 
TANSILLO: I lay aside plenty of other reasons, for now let the following suffice: 
because in this way love turns the loved thing into the lover, as fire amongst all 
elements is the most active and powerful in converting all the other ones into itself. 
CICADA: Go on, then. 
TANSILLO: «He knows a paradise»: meaning a principal end, as paradise commonly 
means the end, which is distinguished in what is absolute, in truth and essence, and the 
                                                                                                                                                            
innumerabili, l’ombra; dall’ombra scaturisce la tensione all’unità, alla luce. L’errore – sul piano 
storico, la “crisi” – sta nel separare i due piani, nel contrapporli. Al contrario: essi si tengono 
reciprocamente». 
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other which is in similitude, shadow and participation. Of the first mode, it cannot be 
more than one, as the first and the ultimate good. Of the second mode, they are 
infinite.195 
 
In this passage from the first dialogue of the Furori we not only encounter the wish to 
access «paradise», which is the object of love, the divine sphere, but we are also 
informed that the fire of love deeply transforms the relationship between the lover 
and the object of love. The premise is the following: philosophy, understood as Love, 
has the power of changing the understanding we have of ourselves. As such, this lust 
for knowledge has none of the traits that characterize modern, objective pursuit of 
knowledge. Bruno appeals to a form of benign fury or madness, similar to the one of 
the lover, in order to render viable the quest for that knowledge that aims at unity as 
its object. On the other hand, unity is no object to be captured intellectually and that is 
why the quest for «paradise», characterized by madness and folly, overturns the terms 
of the loving relationship, which the shadows can no longer satisfy. The shadows, as 
such, represent the limit of human intellect but they do not exhaust the philosopher’s 
effort to capture what retreats while giving, namely Being. Were it not for such 
madness, the hide-and-seek play of truth would never come to the fore. What we are 
claiming here is that we do not need to think like Heidegger or Bruno to live a decent 
life but we need to be “mad” to think like Heidegger and Bruno or like the Socrates 
depicted in the Phaedrus, for that matter. Philosophers force the regular proceeding 
of common sense in order to be able to think, as Ciliberto observes:  
 
                                                
195 G. Bruno, “De gli eroici furori”, in G. Bruno, Opere Italiane, vol. 2, pp. 534-535. My translation 
from the Italian:  
«CICADA. – Perché l’amore è significato per il fuoco? 
TANSILLO. – Lascio molte altre caggioni, bastiti per ora questa: perché cossì la cosa amata 
l’amore converte ne l’amante, come il fuoco tra tutti gli elementi attivissimo è potente a convertere 
tutti quell’altri semplici e composti in se stesso. 
CICADA. – Or séguita. 
TANSILLO. – “Conosce un paradiso”: cioè un fine principale, perché paradiso comunemente 
significa il fine, il qual si distingue in quello ch’è absoluto, in verità et essenza, e l’altro che è in 
similitudine, ombra e participazione. Del primo modo non può essere più che uno, come non è più 
che uno l’ultimo et il primo bene. Del secondo modo sono infiniti». 
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vicissitude, for Bruno, is the foundation of universal “life”, of which the restless 
movement of the contrary is the root and foundation. If it is so, in order to disrupt the 
“vicissitudinal mutation” it becomes essential to operate directly on the “contraries”, 
forcefully stressing the original nexus that joins intrinsically the one and the other, 
giving birth to “motion” and to the life of everything. […] [Bruno: ed.] is perfectly 
conscious that, in order to obtain such extraordinary results, it is necessary to break the 
equilibrium, the harmony, pushing the opposition to the limit – disequilibrium, 
disharmony, contrariety – thus operating a true “suspension” of “motion”, of “time”, of 
“life”. In this sense the furious’ experience is structurally – and technically, one could 
say – an “apocalyptic” experience; and it is, in a full sense – and consequently – a direct 
and explicit confrontation with death, if death is suspension of “motion”, “time” and 
“life”.196  
 
In other words, the philosopher, in order to think, has to suspend the world 
understood as extensive, with its duration and size; but that is an enterprise for 
madmen. The experience of love as madness amounts to experiencing the in-
difference of the world by reaching an unprecedented level of intensity, it amounts to 
merging with the origin. Such an experience has the traits of primordial innocence 
and animality and it recalls the Orphic myths of Dionysus devoured by the Titans, 
incinerated by Zeus, from whose smoke – i.e. from the union of the divinity and the 
savage beasts – man is born. Facing death is nothing but a return to the origin and 
returning to the origin amounts to experiencing unity. Bruno is well aware that this is 
impossible but his uncompromising philosophical quest obliges him to embrace this 
extreme tension because that is what being a philosopher is about.  
In the fourth dialogue of the Furori Bruno revisits the myth of the hunter 
Actaeon who, searching for Diana, finds her naked and, overcome by that prohibited 
and divine sight, is devoured by his own dogs: 
                                                
196 M. Ciliberto, L’occhio di Atteone, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2002, p. 48. My 
translation from the Italian: «[…] la vicissitudine, per Bruno, è il fondamento della ‘vita’ 
universale, di cui il movimento continuo dei contrari è, a sua volta, radice e fondamento. Se così è, 
per incrinare la ‘mutazione vicissitudinale’ diventa indispensabile operare, direttamente, sui 
“contrari”, tenendo al massimo il nesso originario che congiunge, intrinsecamente, l’uno all’altro, 
dando origine al ‘moto’ – e alla vita di ogni cosa. […] [Bruno: ed.] è pienamente consapevole che, 
per ottenere questo risultato straordinario, è necessario rompere l’equilibrio, l’armonia, forzando al 
massimo l’opposizione – lo squilibrio, la disarmonia, la contrarietà –, operando una vera e propria 
‘sospensione’ del ‘moto’, del ‘tempo’, della ‘vita’. In questo senso, quella del furioso è 
strutturalmente – e tecnicamente verrebbe da dire – una esperienza di tipo ‘apocalittico’; ed è, in 
modo compiuto – e conseguentemente –, un confronto diretto, esplicito, con la morte, se morte è 
sospensione del ‘moto’, del ‘tempo’, della ‘vita’». 
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TANSILLO: You know well that the intellect apprehends things intelligibly, i.e. 
according to its own way; whereas the will pursues things naturally, thus according to 
the way they are in themselves. Therefore, Actaeon with such thoughts, those dogs that 
were looking for goodness, wisdom, beauty, the prey of the woods, outside of 
themselves and in such way got to their presence, captured by such beauty, outside of 
himself, became the prey, saw himself turned into what he was looking for; and he 
realized that he had himself become the desired prey of his own dogs, of his own 
thoughts, as having contracted it in himself, there was no need to look for divinity 
outside of himself.197 
 
The will, which is desire, lust or love, is supposed to discover the unbearable sight, 
the naked Diana, the unsustainable object of love, which corresponds to the 
transformation of the hunter into the longed for prey: Actaeon, finding the naked 
Diana, finds nature unconcealed, which amounts to saying that he himself is the 
divinity omnipresent within nature and in its animality – as he gets devoured by his 
own dogs, just like the Titans devour young Dionysus in the Orphic myth. Actaeon 
finds nature only as nature, thereby exasperating the tension between the animal and 
the divine through the fury of desire. Bruno is conscious that the ultimate knowing 
moment that goes beyond the shadow or the game of a-letheia is, indeed, apocalyptic 
and implies the total loss of the individual. Bruno chooses to push the quest for 
knowledge to the limit not because he is looking to destroy the human, as such, but to 
make the human protagonist of his own anthropogenesis by acquiring the 
consciousness of his intimate belonging not only to the animal world but also to the 
divine one, precisely his intimacy with the naked Diana, nature198. Nature, 
                                                
197 G. Bruno, “De gli eroici furori”, in G. Bruno, Opere Italiane, vol. 2, p. 578. My translation from 
the Italian: «TANSILLO. – Sai bene che l’intelletto apprende le cose intellegibilmente, idest 
secondo il suo modo; e la voluntà perseguita le cose naturalmente, cioè secondo la raggione con la 
quale sono in sé. Cossì Atteone con que’ pensieri, que’ cani che cercavano estra di sé il bene, la 
sapienza, la beltade, la fiera boscareccia, et in quel modo che giunse alla presenza di quella, rapito 
fuor di sé da tanta bellezza, dovenne preda, veddesi convertito in quel che cercava; e s’accorse che 
de gli suoi cani, de gli suoi pensieri egli medesimo venea ad essere la bramata preda, perché già 
avendola contratta in sé, non era necessario di cercare fuor di sé la divinità». 
198 «The “vicious” character of the heroic fury resides precisely within the permanent possibility of 
the extreme, i.e. in the possibility of making the limits inherent to the constitution of human nature, 
burst. Fury designates thus the “excess” of human power – the possibility that is to open itself up to 
the infinite. This openness of human power to the infinite is characterized by a double register: on 
one hand, human nature fully belongs to the order of infinite nature, to the incessant rhythm of 
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understood outside of all its determinations, is the ultimate experience of γνώσις; it is 
standing face to face with Being. Nevertheless, as we said in the previous chapter, the 
philosopher can only practise gnosiology; he cannot experience γνώσις as a moment 
of pure intensity unless he is annihilated just like Actaeon. Bruno’s move is twofold: 
on the one hand, he is inviting us to take the risk and pursue nature in its unity; on the 
other hand, he is telling us this is madness, for he knows that the thought of 
multiplicity has to be kept in order not to lose oneself. It is the tension between the 
wise and the furious that interests him; he does not wish to replicate Actaeon and be 
devoured by his own dogs, so he needs to hold onto the thought of extension and the 
thought of intensity at once, which is the failed enterprise of Admetus we encountered 
in Chapter I. David Farrell Krell spots a similar attitude in Heidegger, who mistrusts 
the lust for vision, typical of metaphysics: «Yet Heidegger’s reference to vision is 
now compelled to become part of the destructuring of the ontological tradition, 
insofar as the tradition is enslaved by the “desire to see”. Heidegger cites the opening 
words of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Pantes anthropoi tou eidenaioregontai physei, 
which he paraphrases as follows: the human being is shaped by the “care” of sight – 
the orexis, the prevailing will (in Nietzsche’s sense) or passion, to see. Heidegger also 
identifies it with noein, the purely intuitive apprehending that constitutes “the 
fundament of Occidental philosophy from Parmenides through Hegel”»199. 
                                                                                                                                                            
metamorphoses; on the other hand, such nature is “free” to invent and to create “new orders” in the 
infinite. Such freedom precisely explains the power of the heroic fury: the excess and the vice of the 
furious represent the proof that human nature can open up to the infinite and act upon it». From S. 
Ansaldi, Giordano Bruno. Une philosophie de la métamorphose, p.165. My translation from 
French: «Le caractère ‘vicieux’ de la fureur héroïque réside précisément dans cette possibilité 
permanente de l’extrême, c’est-à-dire dans la possibilité de faire éclater les limites inhérentes à la 
constitution de la nature humaine. La fureur désigne ainsi la ‘démesure’ de la puissance humaine – 
la possibilité qui est la sienne de s’ouvrir aux variations de l’infini. Cette ouverture de de la 
puissance humaine à l’infini relève d’un double registre : d’une part, la nature humaine appartient 
pleinement à l’ordre de la nature infinie, au rythme incessant de ses métamorphoses ; de l’autre, 
cette nature est ‘libre’ d’inventer et de créer des ‘ordres nouveaux’ dans l’infini. Cette liberté 
explique précisément la puissance de la fureur héroïque : l’excès et le vice du furieux représentent 
la preuve que la nature humaine peut s’ouvrir à l’infini et agir en lui».. 
199 D. Farrell Krell, Intimations of Mortality. Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of 
Being [1986], Penn State Press, University Park 1991, p. 86. Also, Krell adds just below: «As 
further testimony sharing the passion to see, which binds the most exalted theoria in the meanest 
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Metaphysical thinking wishes to hold the truth of nature in one gaze; therefore it 
refuses to accept the latency of the truth. Bruno, on the other hand, understands that 
there is nothing “pure”; he is fully immersed in the vicissitudinal and extensive 
dimension of nature, yet he strives not to abstract such vicissitude but to give it the 
life that can only spring from unity. That is the greatest aspiration of Renaissance 
man: as Giovanni Gentile affirms, in Renaissance culture «the human point of view 
becomes the point of view of nature or of the cosmos […]»200. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
oggling of curiosity mongers, and which Sartre so enticingly analyses as the Actaeon Complex 
(Being and Nothingness, IV, 2, ii), Heidegger introduces Augustine’s account of concupiscentia 
oculorum (Confessiones X, 35; SZ, 171)». From Ibid. 
200 G. Gentile, Il carattere del Rinascimento, in G. Gentile, Il pensiero italiano del Rinascimento, 
Sansoni, Firenze 1968, p. 18. My translation from the Italian: «Il punto di vista umano diventa 
punto di vista naturale o cosmico […]». 
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Chapter VI – Another kind of knowledge 
 
 
Section 1 – Particular things and the essence of knowing 
 
 
Unity and multiplicity have been guiding our analysis throughout Heidegger’s 
and Bruno’s gnosiology, which, although characterized by different geneses, have led 
us to a common path. The former, in his encounter with Heraclitus, ties the 
ontological character of truth as unconcealment to the distinguishing of the un-
distinguished totality, whereas the latter extrapolates the necessary latency of truth 
from the spiritual materialism which, within the perspective of infinity, makes our 
knowledge of things an experience of shadows captured within a totality. In both 
cases knowledge is liberated from any sort of objectivity that forces things into a 
scientifically determined essence, severed from the rest of reality. We would like to 
show that Spinoza, again, through different routes, comes to very similar conclusions. 
The different methods that characterize the three authors are not an obstacle, first of 
all because they do not posit method itself as the arbitrary parameter for the 
determination of Being; in other words, they are profoundly distinct from 
Cartesianism and from the general premises of modernity as we know it. Descartes, 
as we said earlier, sets the ontological problem on epistemological bases and 
proceeds on this latter track, as he feels secured by the presence of the subject. 
Heidegger harshly criticises this setting, while Bruno and Spinoza actively proceed 
on alternative routes that make gnosiology not a separated philosophical practice but 
a discourse that runs in parallel and with equal dignity in respect to their ontology.  
We left Spinoza in Chapter III by affirming that the modes, which characterize 
our everyday experience, are the «tip of the iceberg», which is another way to say 
that they are inscribed in a number of relations and practices, through which they are 
identified as such. This, in turn, implies that they are not really distinguished 
inasmuch as real distinctions only pertain to attributes. In order to address the 
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problem of knowledge in Spinoza, then, we should look more closely at the relation 
between the essence of particular things and how we come to know them. The 
importance of starting from particular things lies in the fact that knowledge in 
Spinoza – just as in Bruno – is not oriented towards universals. These latter are, at 
best, considered as entia rationis and abstractions. Particular things and our 
understanding of them give us an understanding of God itself, as Spinoza affirms 
explicitly towards the end of the Ethics (Prop. 24, Part V): 
 
The more we understand particular things, the more we understand God. 
Proof  This is evident from Cor. Pr. 25, I.201 
 
It is evident that such an affirmation runs against any traditional view of God, who is 
understood as transcendent and therefore cannot be in any way known through the 
encounter with particular things (with the poetical exception, maybe, of Saint 
Francis’ mystical experience of God’s creatures). The reason, of course, lies in 
Spinoza’s ontology and, in particular, in the Corollary he is referring to (Prop. 25, 
Part I): 
 
Corollary  Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, that is, 
modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determinate way. 
The proof is obvious from Pr. 15 and Def. 5.202 
 
In other words, particular things are God himself, understood as determinate. God – 
who, by Def. 6, Part I is Substance – nevertheless, is infinite and, as every 
determination is a limitation, he cannot be understood as determinate. Thus we are 
facing, once more, the issue of unity and multiplicity that need to be thought together. 
If God is to be understood through particular things, then we are facing once more 
the challenge of γνώσις: distinguishing what is, by definition, absolute and 
undistinguished. As we partially examined in Chapter III, the difference between 
substance and modes lies in the necessity of their existence, which is entailed in the 
                                                
201 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 374. 
202 Ibid., p. 232. 
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case of substance and is not in the case of modes. What we should investigate, then, 
is how we, from a modal perspective in which we are fully immersed, come to an 
understanding of God. That will give us an account of our knowing faculties within 
the dual thought of unity and multiplicity. As we saw in our encounter with Bruno, 
such dual thought is difficult to hold together unless we bend our common sense 
perspective. Any thinking that is generated from a modal and thus extensive point of 
view needs to be understood by its intensive counterpart. It should not be mistaken 
for a dialectic, as holding these two thoughts together means that we are talking of 
the same thing understood differently and not of a subject and an object. 
Understanding God through particular things means nothing more than understanding 
the Being of beings: Spinoza thinks that, in order to get to an understanding of 
substance, we should change our understanding of modes. 
When Spinoza affirms that the essence of the modes does not entail existence, he 
is not making a merely logical point. He is saying, rather, that they are real only 
insofar as they inhere in substance, which is the only reality that there can be. 
Whether we are talking of an idea – mode of thought – or of a body – mode of 
extension – their existence is unnecessary and does not cause the essence to be or not 
to be. The apparent Platonic structure of such an affirmation is easily dismissed: by 
“existing mode” we do not mean some sort of lower kind of existence, diminished by 
the corruptibility and volubility of the mode. Indeed, the mode is corruptible, unstable 
and changeable, but that is the only kind of existence there can possibly be. This 
entails that the essence is not a higher form of existence, some sort of ἱδέα or οὐσία; 
although it does not get corrupted nor suffer instability, essence is nothing like an 
ideal or perfect version of the mode. It cannot get corrupted or be unstable simply 
because it is not subject to the determinations of change. The essence is the mode 
understood as intensive. Again, just like in Heidegger and Bruno, essence is what is 
“kept in safety”. Proposition 22, V, in this sense, is crucial: 
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Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or 
that human body under a form of eternity [sub specie aeternitatis] 
Proof  God is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body but also of 
its essence (Pr. 25, I) which must therefore necessarily be received through God’s 
essence (Ax. 4, I) by a certain eternal necessity (Pr. 16, I), and this conception must 
necessarily be in God.203  
 
We must not forget that, whenever we are talking of eternity, we are not thinking of 
an infinite series of seconds, hours, days or centuries. We learned this from Bruno. 
Therefore, if we are conceiving a body sub specie aeternitatis, we are not talking of 
an ever existing body. Nadler, although less hasty than his colleagues Bennet204 and 
Curley205, cannot fully capture the sense of this and he does not go far enough: «Now, 
the essence of a body as an extended mode is in God (or Substance) under the 
attribute of Extension. It is “eminently” contained within Extension as one of its 
infinite potentialities or possible generations. It is, in other words, just one out of 
infinitely many ways of being extended, and thus belongs as an eternal finite mode 
within Extension’s immediate infinite mode»206. The reduction of essences to mere 
logical possibility is simply not contemplated in Spinoza, for whom substance is the 
only possible world. It is simply absurd to think of essences as possibilities for 
generations from a perspective of eternity, where numerical distinctions are not 
contemplated, something that Nadler himself recognizes: «True eternity, which 
Spinoza explicitly contrasts with sempiternity (in ID8) stands outside of all temporal 
categories whatsoever. ‘Before’, ‘after’, ‘now’, ‘later’ and all such ascriptions are 
                                                
203 Ibid., p. 374. 
204 «I don’t think that the final three doctrines [of Part Five] can be rescued. The only attempts at 
complete salvage I have encountered have been unintelligible to me and poorly related to what 
Spinoza actually wrote…After three centuries of failure to profit from it, the time has come to admit 
that this part of the Ethics has nothing to teach us and is pretty certainly worthless…this material is 
valueless». From J. Bennet, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, pp. 357, 372. Quoted in S. Nadler, 
Spinoza’s Ethics. An Introduction, p. 260. 
205 «Another, more equanimous scholar insists that “in spite of many years of study, I still do not 
feel that I understand this part of the Ethics at all”. He adds, «I feel the freedom to confess that, of 
course, because I also believe that no one else understands it adequately either”». From S. Nadler, 
Spinoza’s Ethics. An Introduction, p. 260.  
206 Ibid., p. 261. 
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completely inapplicable to what is eternal»207. Possibilities, however infinite, are a 
countable and numerical perspective and are ontologically out of place when dealing 
with modal essence. Nadler does not fully endorse the perspective of the infinite and 
keeps reasoning from a purely extensive point of view. Genevieve Lloyd confirms 
this view by definitely excluding the notion of possibility from the sphere of 
essences: «‘Contingency’, in the use Spinoza gives it here, relates to essence; and 
‘possibility’ relates to causes – to the position of the thing in the interconnected 
system of modes. The contingent is that for which – attending to its essence – we find 
nothing which either necessarily ‘posits’ its existence or necessarily ‘excludes’ it. 
The ‘possible’ is that for which – attending to the causes from which it must be 
produced – we are given no knowledge of whether or not the causes are determined 
to produce it (IVD3 and IVD4)»208. 
Having excluded some potential ambiguities from the field of essence, we can 
finally address the problem of knowledge. We should try first to set a firm 
gnosiological ground starting from essences. Coherently with the Heraclitean ground 
extracted from Heidegger, we are dealing, as a matter of fact, with a gnosiological 
problem, which is concerned with the distinction of particulars within τὰ πάντα with 
respect to essences. Thus, unless we abandon the perspective of numerical and logical 
distinction, a paradox will keep on haunting our thoughts. We can see why in Bruno 
particular things are only known as shadows, not because they are somehow 
imperfect in comparison to a Platonic form but because that is the only possible 
account of an extensively constituted, and thus numerically interpretable, world. As 
things assume different configurations, whose reality is thereby not that of a fixed 
and transcendent nature, they are subject to an omni-relational existence. 
Nevertheless, their belonging to the unity of the One, a belonging that was defined as 
World Soul and characterized as intensive, is devoid of extension and calculability, so 
much so that the only access to the «naked Diana» – nature as One – happens 
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through a furious and insane passion of love. In Spinoza the issue, although 
approached differently, leads to similar conclusions: essences are not only caused by 
God but must «necessarily be received through God’s essence (Ax. 4, I) by a certain 
eternal necessity (Pr. 16, I), and this conception must necessarily be in God» as 
Spinoza said above about the essence of that human body. That is the reason why the 
understanding of particular things and of their essences, contained in the idea of God, 
provides us with an understanding of God. We are to comprehend how this can 
happen, essences as such not being distinguishable from one another, not even as 
possibilities of existence, from our modal point of view. Deleuze affirms, as a matter 
of fact, «Distinction, then, is taken in the sense of extrinsic distinction. The argument 
is as follows. Modal essences are contained in their attribute; as long as a mode does 
not exist, no extrinsic distinction between its essence, and other essences, is possible. 
Thus no idea can represent or apprehend modal essences as extrinsic parts of the 
attribute, or as parts external to one another»209. Deleuze, drawing on Duns Scotus, 
claims that essences are to be distinguished in quantitative terms of intensity or 
power: «It is in this sense, as we have already seen, that modes of a divine attribute 
necessarily participate in God’s power: their essence is itself part of God’s power, is 
an intensive part, or a degree of that power»210. Deleuze’s interpretation is not only 
more acceptable than Nadler’s but it makes perfect sense, as it provides a kind of 
distinction which is not numerical and is thus coherent with Spinoza’s equation 
between essence and power in Part I, Prop. 34, of the Ethics: 
 
God’s power is his very essence. 
Proof  From the sole necessity of God’s essence it follows that God is self-caused (Pr. 11) 
and the cause of all things (Pr. 16 and Cor.). Therefore, God’s power, whereby he and all 
things are and act, is his very essence.211 
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If particular essences are degrees of God’s power, thus of God’s essence, 
understanding particular essences implies understanding God’s power, and thus his 
essence. God is infinitely powerful because he is causa sui [cause of himself] and 
thus cause of all things (τὰ πάντα). Therefore particular things are powerful to the 
extent that they can causally affect other things. The fact that such power is only 
expressed in existence does not prevent essences from being sub specie aeternitatis 
but not as Platonic forms. As a matter of fact, when someone dies or when a house is 
burnt down, their essences are eternal not because their idea is fixed somewhere else 
but because, from the point of view of aeternitas, they do not exist in a particular 
duration or dimension. We could not even properly speak in terms of present, future 
and past, as such categories are meaningless from the point of view of eternity: the 
Punic Wars and the French Revolution, from the point of view of substance, are 
simply its own affections and are not historically or temporally ordered. The power of 
such events, their essence, is not limited to their happening; it causes us to study and 
somehow remember them as much as it causally influences our actual geographical 
and cultural boundaries, political institutions and thinking. This implies something 
really important: when we refer to the Punic Wars or the French Revolution, we 
could not possibly refer to them in their existence, as we could not possibly have 
experienced them. Furthermore, not even Scipio Africanus or Robespierre, who have 
lived those events from two particular perspectives, could possibly refer to them in 
their existence. The conclusion is that we cannot talk of the Punic Wars or the French 
Revolution, which do not exist as such. We are being affected by their power, which 
is being expressed and is not inscribed in time as duration. This does not amount to 
denying that those events ever happened; they did happen, but in their actual modal 
existence they are something really different from whatever I, a historian, Scipio or 
Robespierre could have said or experienced. What we said in chapter I about Fellini 
and the Romans fits exactly in this perspective. Fellini is a great artist, for he is 
affected by the power of the Romans – their essence – but he is also aware of such 
power. In virtue of this he renounces any temptation of describing the Romans as 
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they allegedly were. His artistic power affects and is the constitutive cause of the 
Romans represented in his Satyricon. Not only has the essence of the Romans caused 
Fellini to recreate a world through Petronius Arbiter’s text, it is Fellini’s essence as 
an artist that empowered him to affect the very idea we have of the Romans. Were it 
not so powerful, the movie would have fallen into oblivion. What is powerful holds 
sway and is remembered but it is also kept in safety. Fellini is affected by a people, 
the Romans, that he has not encountered and whose essence is expressed through his 
recollection of them. The essence of the Romans belongs to an undistinguished unity, 
therefore it is preserved and concealed. Yet, it is concealed behind the power it has on 
us, as we are being affected by the many expressions of what we consider “the 
Romans”. Spinoza’s γνώσις is characterized by a kind of distinguishing that is 
distinction of essences, which are degrees of God’s power. From the modal 
perspective, essence as intensity of power finds its only expression in the world of 
extension, which is the only one that exists, just as in Bruno intensity is expressed in 
the extensive configuration of things, which allows, for instance, man to master other 
beings through the use of his hand. Once more it is necessary to hold Admetus’ two 
thoughts at once: we are not presented with two parallel worlds, essence and 
existence, as the reality we live in is all that exists.  
If we were to extend our discourse on science, then, we would have to 
interrogate Heidegger’s notion of the essence of knowing, which we addressed in 
Chapter IV. In the Rektoratsrede, Heidegger draws his critique of the modern 
interpretation of τέχνη back to this fundamental issue: the Aeschylean saying that 
knowing is far weaker than necessity. The saying expresses the original sense of 
knowing, which does not contemplate the subject as the active substratum from which 
knowledge acquires its legitimacy but the centre of intensity on which knowledge 
comes to be practised as «the power that hones and embraces Dasein in its 
entirety»212. As we saw, Heidegger frames the Aeschylean saying in terms of power: 
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«This is to say: all knowing about things has always been delivered up to 
overpowering fate and fails before it»213. Fate is overpowering, so much so as to 
embrace Dasein in its entirety and not in its historical and metaphysical form as 
subject. Dasein comes to exist through the necessity of the world it is thrown in and 
knowledge is subordinated to such necessity. The implications of such a view are 
vital in order to build a theory of knowledge that is not founded upon «calculation» 
and «machination», thereby reducing things to mere, isolated objects. If Heidegger 
exposes the essence of knowing in terms of power, then, that is a viable alternative to 
a mathematically, thus numerically and analytically based, theory of knowledge. As 
was illustrated above, though, Spinoza offers a valid anticipation of Heidegger’s path. 
As a matter of fact, it should not surprise us if in an early text such as the Short 
Treatise Spinoza already affirms: 
 
[…] it is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing, but it is the thing itself that 
affirms or denies, in us, something of itself.214 
 
This is the precise negation of any subjectivist stance on knowledge: there is no 
subject functioning as an ontological substratum but as particular things affecting us 
through their essence, that is, their power. In the case of Heidegger, then, two aspects 
become clearer: the essence of science as technology reveals itself as a great centre of 
intensity, so powerful as to drive the whole Western tradition and its pervasive 
influence upon the rest of the world; such an essence has to be looked for at its 
origin, not in virtue of the ancients’ authority but in virtue of the understanding of 
such a power that has given rise to the great metaphysical tradition and therefore to 
modern science. The claim that the essence of science is technology, then, is perfectly 
coherent with this framework: more precisely, and more correctly, technology is the 
expression of that power that has guaranteed the Western tradition a cultural and 
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material dominion upon the rest of the world. Therefore we experience the essence of 
knowing expressed as technology: we could not possibly experience such an essence 
if not by the expression of its power. The retrospective look to the Greeks for an 
understanding of the essence of technology reveals, then, the power of the origin but 
it also opens up a new perspective on the origin itself. The mnemonic exercise of 
going back to the origin stops, once and for all, being characterized as a temporal and 
historical one – we said power cannot be characterized by duration but only by 
intensity – and thus it is not the recovery of a particular event in history or a revival 
of Greek culture. Our extensive practices, such as the philological and historical ones, 
are mere tools and cannot define the origin as such. Heidegger’s quest is oriented, 
instead, towards the understanding of the end of philosophy as metaphysics by 
thinking the crisis of a power that is present under some form of eternity. Now, even 
Heidegger’s notion of memory makes much better sense: «Memory, in the sense of 
human thinking that recalls, dwells where everything that gives food for thought is 
kept in safety»215. It is, then, essence that gives food for thought, «harbours» and  
«conceals» it but «“Keeping” alone gives freely what is to-be-thought, what is most 
thought-provoking, it frees it as a gift»216. It is the game of ἀλήθεια, truth that gives 
through unconcealment but that is in need of keeping concealed, which is another 
way of saying that Being is the place of essences and has to remain hidden because it 
could not be otherwise; it is only to be expressed in the realm of beings, because that 
is all there is. 
Spinoza, just like Bruno, shows himself to be more confident with the dual thought 
that is required by thinking than Heidegger imagined and very far from the «peculiar 
one-sidedness» that was ascribed to him. 
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Section 2 – Adequacy  
 
We have explored particular essences and addressed their being sub specie 
aeternitatis, thus their Being understood through God. Such discourse, nevertheless, 
would not acquire any value at all if we did not also address the realm of existence, 
which is what we actually experience and within which we are undertaking our 
thinking effort, that of holding two thoughts at once. Most people are perfectly 
content with everyday extensive and abstract categories such as duration and 
measurement; those are the categories that allow us to thrive in the modern world, 
those are the tools through which metaphysics has made the world easier to think, 
manageable and predictable. That is Admetus’ realm of dialogue, where the dialectic 
of conflicting opinions ascribes the same value to all. Such is the reduction operated 
by metaphysics, with its extraordinary results achieved by modern science and 
technology. We saw that Heidegger has forced this reading upon the whole history of 
metaphysics but we found in pre-Cartesian Bruno and in post-Cartesian Spinoza a 
different approach that is uncompromisingly philosophical and not subject to the 
needs of modern science and actually appreciative of it. In Bruno, the point of 
encounter between what he called ideas – yet devoid of any Platonic remnant – and 
man was the realm of shadows. Such an organization of knowledge allows Bruno to 
hold onto the everyday experiences of the world, yet saving them from the 
objectification operated by the human mind, de-realizing them as much as it is 
necessary to save experience and, at the same time, rooting them in the ever-changing 
vicissitude of the One. In Spinoza we saw how essences of particular things are 
degrees of God’s power, meaning they are contained in God’s own essence, a power 
that allows it to be causa sui, a prerogative that is not granted to its modes. Essence is 
obviously the power to affect and to be affected. In Chapter III we affirmed that 
modes are the «tip of an iceberg»: this means that if a mode such as a chair is not to 
be considered as an object but as an affection of substance, it is not its “chairness” 
that makes it such nor any particular and unique features. The “iceberg” that 
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underlies the chair is not only the wood and straw or the iron that it is made of, but 
also the space and role it occupies in a kitchen or in an office; it is the use made of it, 
the culture that, instead of sitting on the floor, prescribes sitting on chairs and the 
innumerable causes and practices that it is inscribed in. Its essence is its affirmation 
as a chair within substance, its power to establish itself amongst other affections. 
Therefore, an adequate knowledge of the chair has very little to do with a chart of its 
design features such as its size, colour and shape, although they too are affections of 
the chair itself.  
 Keeping in mind our example of the chair, then, we should approach the 
problem of knowledge in Spinoza by casting aside any temptation of adopting an 
objectified view of what is to be known. We should not forget that, as knowers, we 
are ourselves affections, and thus modes of substance, as much as our chair, where 
our mind is simply the idea of our body (Pr. 13, Part II of the Ethics): 
 
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, i.e. a definite mode of 
extension actually existing, and nothing else. 
[…]  
Corollary  Hence it follows that man consists of mind and body, and the human body 
exists as we sense it.217 
 
As no causal interaction is possible between mind and body, it is obvious that the 
mind cannot affect the body or somehow order it to do anything or vice versa. As we 
said when we talked of attributes in Chapter III, mind and body are substance seen 
under different perspectives. That is the reason that makes it absurd for them to 
interact causally with each other because they are not different things, as any 
affection of the body corresponds to an affection of the mind. As Deleuze puts it: 
«What we call an “object” is only the effect an object has on our body; what we call 
“me” is only the idea we have of our own body and our soul insofar as they suffer an 
effect. The given here appears as the most intimate and vital as well as the most 
confused relation between our knowledge of bodies, our knowledge of our own body 
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and our knowledge of ourselves»218. As any other mode, just like the chair, man is 
inscribed in a great number of relations but the issue gets increasingly complicated by 
the fact that a mind is the idea of the body not as a detailed description of bodily parts 
and organs but in virtue of what affects it. Furthermore, those bodily affections are 
the way to the formulation of ideas about the world. If a man sits on a chair, he is thus 
affected by it and formulates an idea of a “chair” roughly as “something to sit on”. 
That could be sufficient to get by but surely for Spinoza that is not an adequate idea. 
In a world characterized by affects – which affect affections – we find ourselves 
involved and affected in different ways, so that our mind, just as our body, does not 
function as an input-output machine or black box; it affects and it is reciprocally 
affected by the world. If the mind were something along the line of Hilary Putnam’s 
brain in a vat, the very necessity of a world for it would disappear but so would the 
brain and the mind themselves. Let us hear what Spinoza has to say about it (Pr. 1, 
Part III of the Ethics): 
 
Our mind is in some instances active and in other instances passive. Insofar as it has 
adequate ideas, it is necessarily active; insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is 
necessarily passive. 
Proof  In every human mind, some of its ideas are adequate, others are fragmentary and 
confused (Sch. Pr. 40, II). Now ideas that are adequate in someone’s mind are adequate 
in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of that mind (Cor. Pr. 11, II); and 
furthermore those ideas that are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God (same 
Cor.), not insofar as he contains in himself the essence of that mind only, but insofar as 
he contains the minds of other things as well. […]219 
 
Inadequate ideas are our primary understanding of the world, the fundamental 
images, as ideas in our mind – corresponding to our bodies being causally affected by 
other bodies they are involved with. Says Lloyd: «As long as the human body is 
affected, the mind will have an idea of an actually existing external body. Our bodies 
retain the traces of the changes brought about on their surfaces by the impinging of 
other bodies. So the mind will again regard external bodies as present, even when 
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they no longer exist (IIP17D & C). […] These affections of the body whose ideas 
present external bodies as present to us are Spinoza’s version of “images”; and the 
mind’s regarding bodies in this way is his version of imagining. These imaginings are 
not themselves a source of error. Error arises from the fact they can occur 
unaccompanied by other ideas which ‘exclude from existence’ the non-existent things 
imagined as present»220. Inadequacy is akin to the Heideggerian presence-at-hand, 
which is a basic structure of existence from an ontic point of view; in gnosiological 
terms they are a condition of the knower with respect to the known, that represents 
things as present. As Lloyd affirms, this is not, in itself, a source of error, although 
she does not explain the reason: they are not a source of error because in Spinoza no 
notion of truth as correctness can be found, thus there is no standard to correspond to. 
Such a notion is absolutely foreign to the concept of adequacy.   
Knowing things as merely present, as «fragmentary and confused» images 
corresponds to the first kind of knowledge221. Their being «fragmentary and 
confused» does not amount to their being wrong. Their being somehow false is not 
due to a lack of correspondence but to a condition of scarcity and privation of 
knowledge222. If we think of Heidegger’s Lichtung and Bruno’s shadows, we shall 
see that the first kind of knowledge is also characterized by the latency of truth. 
Human knowing, in its everyday immediacy, relies on what is offered to the 
imagination. Images, conceived as «those affections of the human body the ideas of 
which set forth external bodies as if they were present to us»223, do provide us with an 
understanding of the world that is not negative as such. What we distinguish as 
                                                
220 G. Lloyd, Spinoza and the Ethics, p. 56. 
221 «1. From individual objects presented to us through the senses in a fragmentary [mutilate] and 
confused manner without any intellectual order (See Cor. Pr. 29, II); and therefore I call such 
perceptions “knowledge from causal experience”.  
2. From symbols. For example, from having heard or read certain words we call a thing to mind and 
we form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine things (Sch. Pr. 18, II). 
Both these ways of regarding things I shall in future refer to as “knowledge of the first kind”, 
“opinion” or “imagination”». From B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 267. 
222 «Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas, that is, fragmentary and 
confused ideas, involve». From B. Spinoza, “Ethics” (Pr. 35, Part II), in ibid., p. 323. 
223 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, Scholium, Pr. 17, Part II in ibid., p.279. 
 164 
images is given as a defined and determined object. Nevertheless, we know that 
modes are not isolated objects but are affections constituted by their own affecting 
other things and their being affected, i.e. their power or essence. Such essence is 
exactly what is denied and hidden in the imagination. The ignorance of such 
concealment is what constitutes the condition called the first kind of knowledge. As a 
matter of fact, Spinoza notes: 
 
[…] to begin my analysis of error, I should like you to note that the imaginations of the 
mind, looked at in themselves, contain no error; i.e. the mind does not err from the fact 
that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack the idea which excludes the 
existence of those things which it imagines to be present to itself. For if the mind, in 
imagining nonexisting things to be present to it, knew at the same time that those things 
did not exist in fact, it would surely impute this power of imagining not to the defect but 
to the strength of its own nature, especially if this faculty were to depend solely on its 
own nature; that is (Def. 7, I), if this faculty of imagining were free.224 
 
At first sight there is nothing particularly interesting in Spinoza’s statement: if I 
imagine my grandmother dining with me, my grandmother being dead, the adequacy 
of such an image, and thus my being crazy or perfectly rational, will depend entirely 
on the idea of her death. If I understand what causes my mind to imagine my granny 
– nostalgia or sadness, for instance – dining with me and if I understand what makes 
it impossible for her to dine with me at present – her death – then my mind is 
powerful enough to bear such a thought. Nevertheless, that is a very abstract reading 
of Spinoza, a purely commonsensical mitigation, thereby a reading that has little to 
do with Spinoza. If we imagine modes, whether of thought or extension, as isolated 
billiard balls bumping into each other, thus being the causes of one another’s 
movements, we shall get nowhere with our understanding. An image, as such, cannot 
exhaust the cognizance of a thing or of its essence, as Deleuze rightly points out: «An 
image is, in the strictest sense, an imprint, a trace or physical impression, an affection 
of the body itself, the effect of some body on the soft and fluid parts of our own body; 
in the figurative idea, an image is the idea of an affection which makes an object 
                                                
224 Ibid. 
 165 
known to us only by its effect. But such knowledge is not knowledge at all, it is at 
best recognition. And from this there follow the characteristics of indication in 
general: the primary “thing indicated” is never our essence, but always a momentary 
state of our changing constitution; the secondary (or indirect) thing indicated is never 
the nature or essence of some external thing, but is rather an appearance that only 
allows us to recognize a thing by its effect, to rightly or wrongly assert its mere 
presence»225. Asserting mere presence amounts to reducing truth to correspondence, 
as re-cognition “skips over the thing”, to use a Heideggerian expression, for it does 
not capture the thing but projects an abstraction upon it. We said that a thing is the 
«tip of an iceberg» and the image only depicts the tip. We learned already with Bruno 
never to lose a perspective of unity, which corresponds to intensity, and we know that 
in Spinoza what is affected really is substance, not simply my mind or my body, 
which are affections of substance themselves and, thus, they are in substance. The 
iceberg corresponding to the tip, at the end of the day, is nothing but substance itself, 
which is extensively composed of the concurrence of infinite causal series that 
determine a particular affection and intensively expressing a certain degree of power 
for the emergence of the “tip” over its competing modes. Bruno sees the contents of 
our knowledge as shadows: as the ἕν καὶ Πάν needs to cast shadow upon itself in 
order for particulars to be distinguished. In the same way Heidegger needs Being to 
be concealed in order to reveal itself in the open region [Lichtung], which is the 
theatre and the stage of such concealment and, therefore, unconcealment. 
We said, in many different instances, that gnosiology wants to address 
knowledge through an act of distinction or discrimination within something that is 
undifferentiated. That is what we made of Heraclitus’ saying that «if all things were 
smoke we would discriminate them with our nose»; but all things are smoke, in the 
sense that they are all substance, including our nose. We could say that, somehow, 
Malevitch’s painting representing a white square on another white square, exposed in 
a white room, under a white light, symbolically describes our condition. 
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Nevertheless, this seems rather counterintuitive as all things generally appear to us 
already distinguished. That is a mere illusion, though, as recognizing objects as 
tables, carrots, cats and men and conferring on them a downright reality means 
severing them from each other, thus losing the perspective of unity, which causes the 
absurdity of generating many different substances as objects. Furthermore, we would 
have to imagine tables and cats existing without the context of a world of people who 
sit and dine or tenderly stroke them. In the first Scholium of Pr. 40, part II of the 
Ethics, Spinoza does have an answer for our behaviour and proposes a different 
approach that somehow accounts for our tendency to treat “things” as we have just 
described. He starts precisely from the situation of inadequacy that was earlier set 
out, attributing it to the limits a human body and a human mind have in their ability 
to represent many images at once, thus resulting in a situation of confusion and 
fragmentation: 
 
This conclusion can also be reached from the fact that images are not always equally 
vivid, and also from other causes analogous to these, which I need not here explicate. 
For it all comes down to this, that these terms signify ideas confused in the highest 
degree. Again, from similar causes have arisen those notions called “universal”, such as 
“man”, “horse”, “dog”, etc.; that is to say, so many images are formed in the human 
body simultaneously (e.g. of man) that our capacity to imagine them is surpassed, not 
indeed completely, but to the extent that the mind is unable to imagine the unimportant 
differences of individuals (such as the complexion or stature of each, and their exact 
number) and imagines distinctly only their common characteristics insofar as the body 
is affected by them. For it was by this that the body was affected most repeatedly, by 
each single individual. The mind expresses by the word “man” and predicates this word 
of an infinite number of individuals. For, as we said, it is unable to imagine the 
determinate number of individuals.226 
 
Spinoza is not particularly keen on “universals”, traditionally understood, for they are 
determined by those features that appeal more frequently to one’s senses and those 
are not necessarily the same in all individuals. Our inability to deal with the infinite 
variety of the world causes inadequate ideas; it is obvious that, although Spinoza 
does think that knowing causal relations amongst things does provide us with a 
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knowledge that is less confused and thus makes us less vulnerable to external 
affections, he surely does not expect us to account individually for infinite causal 
chains to explain the world around us. Nevertheless, in Ethics II, Spinoza introduces 
the concept of common notions, which allow us to put some order in the confusion of 
our ideas, derived from the overwhelming sense experience: 
 
Lemma 2  All bodies agree in certain respects. 
Proof  All bodies agree in this, that they involve the conception of one and the same 
attribute (Def. 1, II), and also in that they may move at varying speeds, and may be 
absolutely in motion or absolutely at rest.227 
 
He subsequently affirms in prop. 38: 
 
Those things that are common to all things and are equally in the part as in the whole 
can be conceived only adequately. 
[…] 
Corollary  Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men. 
For (by Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain respects, which must be (preceding Pr.) 
conceived by all adequately, or clearly and distinctly.228 
 
The proof, which we have omitted, is based on the fact that what is common to all 
bodies, in the part as in the whole, is necessarily perceived adequately by the mind, 
insofar as God constitutes the human mind, i.e. he has the ideas that are in the human 
mind. Spinoza is here talking of agreements between bodies, which make the bodies 
themselves conceivable, such as being understood under the same attribute, for 
instance. As Deleuze points out: «Spinoza carefully distinguishes common notions, 
on the one hand, and transcendental terms (being, thing, something) or universal 
notions (genera and species, man, horse, dog) on the other. And yet common notions 
are themselves universal, “more or less” universal according to their degree of 
generality; one must then suppose that Spinoza is not attacking what is universal, but 
only a certain conception of abstract universality»229. The problems with abstract 
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ideas are, in Deleuze’s interpretation, essentially two: the fact that the quality that is 
universalized is subject to chance, as in the case of a dog, that for some is identified 
with barking, for others with being a faithful pet; the fact that our incapacity to think 
adequately the immense variety of ideas makes us project upon all of them those 
features that we think to be universal, even if they do not possess them. This situation 
produces a confused understanding. For Deleuze, what Spinoza really refers to with 
common notions is the community of “structures”, i.e. the system of relations. «By 
inquiring how these relations», says Deleuze «vary from one body to another, we 
have a way of directly determining the resemblances between two bodies, however 
disparate they may be. The form and function of an organ in a given animal depend 
solely on the relations between its organic parts, that is, between fixed anatomical 
components. In the limit Nature as a whole is a single Animal in which only the 
relations between the parts vary»230. Deleuze here hits a very important point, which 
is the fact that an adequate intelligibility of particular things can only occur through 
an omni-relational understanding of them, which is knowledge of the relations of 
living parts within a unity. Also the notion of being in motion or at rest is to be 
understood within an omni-relational unity231. A universal feature becomes abstract 
once it is taken out of the system of relations, thus having little to do with the reality 
of things, as was explored in Chapter III by recurring to the metaphor “tip of the 
iceberg”. This capacity that common notions provide us with is what Spinoza calls 
knowledge of the second kind:  
 
From the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of 
things (see Cor. Pr. 38 and 39 with its Cor. and Pr. 40, II). I shall refer to this as 
“reason” and “knowledge of the second kind”.232 
 
                                                
230 Ibid., p. 278. 
231 The relational structure of reality will be an important feature of Bruno’s art of memory in 
Chapter VIII.  
232 G. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 267. 
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The ideas are adequate because they allow us to handle the things and the world 
around us. They empower us to an extent: although we are not yet able to understand 
and capture substance as such, we are given the chance to manage the overwhelming 
burden of sense experience. Spinoza grants common notions adequacy because they 
are clear and distinct to the extent that we do not suffer the affections of things 
around us but somehow master them through their agreement with us. Such 
knowledge is sufficient to develop a sound scientific understanding and an advanced 
technological level. Nevertheless, Spinoza could not possibly stop here, as common 
notions are, indeed, in God in virtue of their adequacy but they can only account for 
an extensive understanding of the world. What makes this kind of knowledge only the 
second out of three is that it does not know particular things which, as we said in the 
previous section, is the only way to get to an understanding of God.  
So far we have discovered that neither our being at the mercy of affections, thus 
of inadequate ideas, nor our taking rational control through their generality by 
deriving common notions actually gives us a proper understanding of particular 
things. If we are to achieve knowledge as distinguishing within unity, approaching the 
matter on a merely extensive level will not lead us much farther. As a matter of fact, 
we saw that extension only allows for numerical distinctions, such as duration or 
length, which are not real distinctions. Lloyd is puzzled by a similar problem: «But 
what are we to make of Spinoza’s claim that singular bodies cannot be adequately 
perceived? And, more importantly, what are we to make of the claim that the human 
mind cannot even know itself adequately? It may seem obvious that Spinoza is urging 
us to transcend the illusions of the imagination in order to see the world adequately 
through reason. But we need to remember here the implications of Spinoza’s 
treatment of the individual mind as idea of a body inserted in the totality of 
determinate modes of extension. If duration and singularity are illusions, the illusion 
extends to the existence of the finite singular minds which we ourselves are. If it is all 
illusion, that applies to us, whose defective knowledge supposedly produces the 
illusions. Not only is this high-minded goal of adequate knowledge inevitably too 
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difficult for us to attain. Reaching it would, it seems, have to be at the cost of 
forfeiting our own existence»233. Through this last hypothesis Lloyd immediately 
takes us to the point where we left Bruno, the myth of Actaeon and the achievement 
of unity with Nature – the Naked Diana – through the loss of individuality, devoured 
by our own insane lust for knowing – Actaeon’s dogs. Bruno definitely excluded that 
this could be achieved through a mere exercise of reason. Unlike Lloyd, I believe 
Spinoza does not urge us to achieve a unity with the world through mere reason. As 
far as we have seen, Spinoza identifies reason exactly with knowledge of the second 
kind, which does not give us access to the essence of particular things, therefore to 
God. The Ethics as a philosophical and literary work can definitely be seen as a rather 
complex application of the knowledge of the second kind, as it applies reason by 
formulating a sophisticated system that is supposed to give us a better understanding 
of the world but also, being an ethics, a more adequate way of inhabiting it. What we 
have observed about the different kinds of knowledge is valid just as much for 
Spinoza’s Ethics itself. If we consider it as an important book written by some 
famous modern philosopher and present in most bookstores and libraries, the Ethics 
is understood through knowledge of the first kind. On the other hand, as a 
philosophical work, academically studied and analyzed by students and scholars who 
put to the test the validity of its propositions, the Ethics is understood rationally 
through knowledge of the second kind; through its study we come to have adequate 
ideas about its arguments. We could also say that it is also written according to 
knowledge of the second kind. In neither of these two cases is the Ethics captured in 
its essence, though; in the first case its power is limited and reduced by the 
fragmentary and stereotypical knowledge of the general public, in the second case by 
the criteria and the methods of academia. If Bruno was an academic of no academy, 
Spinoza was no academic at all. The Ethics is a work that, as long as it is understood 
as an academic text – and thus through a common notion that classifies it as such – is 
not understood as a particular thing, a work that nevertheless is meant to make us 
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understand how to understand particular things. As a matter of fact, in virtue of this 
peculiarity, it is no exception. Nonetheless its study is not unfruitful, as it provides us 
with those adequate ideas that make us realize the need for a knowledge of the third 
kind or understanding of particular essences: 
 
Apart from these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I shall later show, a third kind of 
knowledge, which I shall refer to as “intuition”. This kind of knowledge proceeds from 
an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate 
knowledge of the essence of things. I shall illustrate all these kinds of knowledge by one 
single example. Three numbers are given; it is required to find a fourth which is related 
to the third as the second to the first. Tradesmen have no hesitation in multiplying the 
second by the third and dividing the product by the first, either because they have not 
yet forgotten the rule they learned without proof from their teachers, or because they 
have in fact found this correct in the case of very simple numbers, or else from the force 
of the proof of Proposition 19 of the Seventh Book of Euclid, to wit, the common 
property of proportionals. But in the case of very simple numbers, none of this is 
necessary. For example, in the case of the given numbers 1,2,3, everybody can see the 
fourth proportional is 6, and all the more clearly because we infer in one single intuition 
the fourth number from the ratio we see the first number bears to the second.234 
 
If knowledge of the third kind is referred to as “intuition”, then we have the 
confirmation that a faculty of that kind needs to be acquired through a certain kind of 
practice and cannot be found in a text. If essences are to be understood sub specie 
aeternitatis, thereby not extensively, we shall find a description of a particular 
essence neither in the Ethics nor in any other text. Even in the numerical example 
provided by Spinoza, the intuition of the number 6 is not achieved numerically, i.e. 
extensively, and thus it cannot be described. So we find ourselves in a situation where 
the text that would like us to reach an understanding of a certain kind of knowledge is 
unable to make it explicit, not out of incapacity but out of the very constitution of 
what is to be known. What we have achieved is an understanding of the ontological 
and gnosiological conditions we rest on and which, on their own, cannot take us any 
farther. The Ethics is concealing the access to such knowledge because it is the only 
way of revealing it; it is inviting us to practise this truth, although it does not just say 
or utter the truth, it is steering our desire towards it (Pr. 28, Ethics, Part V): 
                                                
234 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, pp. 267-68. 
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The conatus, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from 
the first kind of knowledge, but from the second.235 
 
In other words, the Ethics is itself the open region where ἀλήθεια can happen but 
only if we stand in it. In order to do this we need to step into the actual field of ethics 
and start considering our position. 
                                                
235 Ibid., p. 375. 
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Chapter VII - Thinking 
 
 
Section 1 – The practice of thinking and the polit ical 
 
 
Gnosiology took us to a point where understanding particular things, thus 
distinguishing τὰ πάντα from the perspective of unity, left man in a position of being 
himself part of the game of truth as unconcealment. Man has to place himself within 
the open region, in a position that leaves him exposed and questions his role as 
master of nature. Spinoza’s Ethics was seen as the book that reveals the truth by 
concealing it behind the practice of reason. Essences are not knowable because they 
are undistinguished. Nevertheless, we would like to show that the Ethics is the place 
of intensity where the third kind of knowledge occurs, where essences of particular 
things are intuited and where essences, which are not determined, are seen as 
expressing determination. This is nothing but the game of truth, where 
unconcealment reveals through concealing. In Bruno we saw how shadows are 
recognized as the latency of truth. Yet Bruno also provides us with the myth of 
Actaeon, which sees the philosopher as the seeker of a truth – precisely the one we 
outlined – that he cannot reach without annihilation. Nevertheless, it is this very 
tension that brings the philosopher to understand the game of truth in the course of 
his seeking: it takes madness, mindless and passionate love to pursue knowledge and 
truth. Gnosiology described what happens in the open region where the truth of Being 
comes to the fore. We are yet to understand, though, what this participation in the 
game of truth amounts to ethically, in man’s active inhabiting of the world, a relation 
of dwelling. Etymologically, ethics derives from ἦθος, which indicates custom, habit 
or practice and from which stems the adjective ἠθικός, which indicates what is 
related to custom and habit. Now, if custom, habit and practice were to be 
anthropologically understood, they would be limited to a description of a particular 
culture or civilization but, on the philosophical level, we are dealing with an 
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inhabiting that is a «being-in» within a pre-given horizon of understanding. In the 
early Heidegger this notion starts coming to the fore through Sein und Zeit: «[…] and 
so ich bin means in its turn “I reside” or “dwell alongside” the world as that which is 
familiar to me in such and such a way»236. Our dwelling does not, then, correspond to 
inhabiting a house or a city, it is the way in which Being delivers itself historically 
through us and what we recognize as familiar. Furthermore, we should by no means 
consider the ich as a return to subjectivity, which in the previous chapters has lost its 
ontological role as constitutive of the world and has been assimilated to the Brunian 
and Spinozist perspectives. It has thereby been suggested that such knowledge can 
only happen in the absence of the Cartesian separation between subject and object. In 
order to explore the possibility of replacing a technological mastery of nature with a 
proper relation of dwelling, we would like to devote this section to Heidegger’s 
political experiment and its theoretical setting. We wish to account for Heidegger’s 
own stepping onto the public arena, which is a quest for knowledge, for it is 
concerned with reforming the university, the house of knowledge. It is a preliminary 
sketch that will provide us with an understanding of the urge that drives Heidegger 
towards the necessity of dwelling. It will be Heidegger’s political failure which 
makes him realize that no real transformation can arise from a politically driven 
change, which ends up being, once more, a technocratic and technological form of 
dominion. This is even truer in the case of Nazi politics. We shall see that the essence 
of politics is something quite different. 
«Most thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking – not even yet, 
although the state of the world is becoming constantly more thought-provoking»237. 
In Chapter I we have encountered a similar statement in relation to memory, then to 
technology which, analogously to this one, was pronounced during the last lectures at 
the University of Freiburg between 1951 and 1952. We are going to explore this 
                                                
236 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Blackwell, Oxford 
2004, p. 80. 
237 M. Heidegger, What is called thinking?, translated by J. Glenn Gray, Harper Perennial, New 
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affirmation under a different perspective. If «the state of the world is becoming 
increasingly thought-provoking», then we should inquire into the world of the 
philosopher in its political dimension, that is not simply understood in relation to 
nature but is revealed as being-with-others. This may seem counter-intuitive, at least 
from a historical point of view: in 1951 Heidegger had given up any sort of 
participation in the political life. We do not wish to provide a critical account of 
Heidegger’s political opinions, even less of his involvement with Nazism; we wish to 
reflect upon the way Heidegger thought whether and how politics could contribute to 
defining the task of thinking, at least at some point in his life. By addressing the issue 
of the political within this discourse we intend to account for the active role of 
thinking while man interacts with his world. Heidegger says: «ontologically, ‘world’ 
is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is 
rather a characteristic of Dasein itself»238. Similarly, in relation to others he claims: 
«by Others we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the ‘I’ 
stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not 
distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too»239. Also in the case of collective 
experience, the point of departure is an undistinguished unity. Such a unity is 
expressed in our experience of the world as the political. 
If the political has to be brought into the discourse on ethics, it cannot be 
considered as the attempt to define a certain kind of government or institution to be 
forced on a number of subjects with similar intentions or objectives, with certain 
rights and duties, in the manner of traditional political philosophy. The political 
problem in its essence needs to capture the necessity of belonging to a pre-given 
horizon of co-determination between us, the world and others and, at the same time, 
evaluate our margin of action within that horizon. Heidegger does not produce an 
«Ethics» in its own right, for the whole of Heidegger’s philosophical production is 
inherently ethical, i.e. inseparable from habit, custom and practice. As David Webb 
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puts it: «For Heidegger, there is an unbreakable link between philosophy and the 
existence of Dasein, insofar as the temporal horizon for the disclosure of Being is to 
be elicited from the existence of Dasein itself, in and through which the ontological 
difference occurs. Fundamental ontology rests on an ‘ontic foundation’»240. What is 
not viable is the extraction of a deontological or moral type of ethics from any of 
Heidegger’s texts, for his philosophy does not contemplate a substantial subject, able 
to catalyze moral praise or blame. Miguel de Beistegui confirms the claim that 
Heidegger does not take further steps in the direction of a “proper ethics”: «So, once 
again, Heidegger maintains his analysis at the fundamental ontological level, without 
introducing anthropological considerations that would illustrate the basic structure 
laid out. If an ethics or a politics could indeed unfold from this fundamental 
existential constitution, Heidegger refuses to consider it»241.  Heidegger’s reticence 
is, nevertheless, understandable if the level of fundamental ontology is to be 
maintained. Heidegger is not after a mere cultural operation, not after a re-
organization of morals or political institutions. The activity of organizing beings, 
including humans beings, according to moral and political structures reproduces the 
technological scheme of attempting to rearrange a world conceived as an object of 
consumption: «[...] since the emptiness of Being can never be filled up by the fullness 
of beings, especially when this emptiness can never be experienced as such, the only 
way to escape it is incessantly to arrange beings in the constant possibility of being 
ordered as the form of guaranteeing aimless activity. Viewed in this way, technology 
is the organization of a lack, since it is related to the emptiness of Being contrary to 
its knowledge»242. As the understanding of the world is reduced to «standing 
reserve», so would human beings.  Heidegger’s criticism of the current state of affairs 
could be assimilated to many environmentalist or no-global stances of our time but 
such stances are not equipped to intervene politically because they only advocate a 
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different use of resources and technology, thereby questioning neither the essence of 
technology nor the essence of politics. If politics has to be understood essentially, it 
has to be understood in the ethical terms of dwelling. Again, this means walking on 
the thin line between what is retained and what is revealed, between the ontological 
and the ontic, the intensive and the extensive. Heidegger defines the domain within 
which thinking should operate as «a domain of metontological-existentiell 
questioning»243, meaning that it should move across the ontological difference 
without covering it up. As Webb puts it: «[…] thinking has to follow or repeat the 
movement essential to the existence of Dasein itself. This is what Heidegger means 
when he says that thinking must return into the originary dimension in which world-
formation occurs»244. 
Heidegger claims that when Aristotle defines man as a ζῷον πολιτικόν in his 
Politics, he does not mean that man is a political animal, which may make sense to a 
modern ear but does not capture what is being said. The art of politics in Ancient 
Greece and particularly in Athens refers to a proper place, which is the πόλις, at once 
a city and a system of relations amongst men. As Heidegger says: «In the being of 
human beings themselves, lies the basic possibility of being-in-the-πόλις. In being-in-
the-πόλις, Aristotle sees the genuine life of human beings. To show this he refers to 
the fact that the being of human beings is λόγον ἔχειν. Implicit in this determination 
is an entirely peculiar, fundamental mode of the being of human beings characterized 
as “being-with-one-another”, κοινωνία. These beings who speak with the world are, 
as such, being-with-others»245. The political sphere, then, is not only depicted as 
essential for man but it makes explicit his co-determination with the world and others 
that was mentioned earlier in this chapter. Even more crucial is the description of the 
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relation between man and the world as a speaking246 one that is a consequence of 
having λόγον and which does not amount to defining man as an animal rationale. 
Here λόγος is conceived only as the potentiality for being rational, the capacity of 
speaking which gives birth to politics, i.e. the constitution and life of a πόλις as a 
network of relations amongst citizens. Thus, if the possibility of constituting a πόλις 
amounts to being-with-others, then speaking with the world, being familiar with it, 
i.e. relating to it in a co-determining manner, is also included in the political sphere. 
The act of speaking through λόγος takes place with the medium of voice – φωνή – 
thus providing an immediate encounter with the world, for it allows man to grasp the 
world as a «general topic of investigation»247, whereas for animals such encounter 
happens from a different perspective, the one of a voice which is a mere φωνή. We 
do not have the space to address the theme of φωνή, but what is interesting is its 
original bond with λόγος. In Heraclitus we saw that λόγος was the force that steered 
beings, the outbreak of τὰ πάντα that is intensively expressed in the distinction of 
beings. In the essential realm of the political, the φωνή is the instrument of λόγος, 
the power that keeps a multiplicity of “others” together as a unity in a co-
determination that is analogous to that of man and world. 
The essences of being-in-the-πόλις and being-in-the-world necessarily overlap: 
distinction only occurs on the determinate level of human relations. The relation of 
man and the world discloses itself as a relation of dwelling. Young puts it as follows 
«‘essential dwelling’, is the human ‘essence’. Even if we are oblivious to the fact, we 
all live in a holy world, a world, that is to say, which is to be cared-for. Whether we 
know it or not, this is the truth of the matter. It follows that we are the guardians of 
B/being – in fact its sole guardians – whether we practise this or not so our 
guardianship is our proper, our ‘fitting’ way of being-in-the-world, whether or not we 
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are conscious of that task and whether or not we live up to it»248. In the instance of 
the political such guardianship of Being is expressed by letting the being-with-others 
come forth, which can happen through the use of voice but also through the encounter 
with space. In Building, Dwelling, Thinking, Heidegger affirms that building is our 
way of attaining dwelling, for building allows spaces to come forward through 
letting-dwell, by letting what he calls the «fourfold» – sky, earth, mortals and 
divinities, i.e. the world – come together thanks to the creation of space, which is not 
a metaphysical space, i.e. calculated and measured. Building a Royal Palace or a 
Parliament, depending on what ideas I have of politics, is not necessarily going to 
finally realize κοινωνία; indeed, they are most likely to cover up what they are 
suppose to let dwell. Being-with-one-another is the understanding of my co-
essentiality with others, in virtue of the fact that we are co-essential with the world: 
whatever is built should not be rhetorically constructed on the model of an idea, it 
should spring from this coming-together of man and nature and therefore of man with 
others. That is why Heidegger admired Ancient Greek religious and civic buildings, 
which followed the lines and the shapes of the hills they were built on, as an 
encounter, a continuation of nature, for they were expression of the political essence 
of man.  That is also what Heidegger means by dwelling and this is how he relates it 
to thinking: 
 
Building and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling. The two, 
however, are also insufficient for dwelling so long as each busies itself with its own 
affairs in separation instead of listening to one another. They are able to listen if both – 
building and thinking – belong to dwelling, if they remain within their limits and realize 
that the one as much as the other comes from the workshop of long experience and 
incessant practice.249  
 
Separation amounts to an inability to listen to the φωνή, which is the instrument of 
the λόγος, which keeps the multiplicity as unity, thus failing to achieve the being-
                                                
248 J. Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 91, 
92. 
249 M. Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, in M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language and 
Thought, translated by A. Hofstadter, Perennial Classics, New York 2001, pp. 158, 159. 
 181 
with-one-another, which is the expression of politics in its essence. More generally, 
fragmentation and specialization demolish any possibility for dwelling because they 
are unable to capture man’s belonging and unity with nature. 
In the sense we have explored, then, politics and knowledge conflate in their 
essence and thus it should not surprise us that Heidegger’s stepping into politics 
happened through the university, which is the house of knowledge. Very late in his 
career, in 1969, long after his political adventure and defeat, Heidegger still affirms: 
«We all still need an education in thinking, and first of all, before that, knowledge of 
what being educated and uneducated in thinking means»250. Heidegger is still 
lecturing, he is still somehow within the educational institution that is known as the 
“university” and still convinced that thinking has been covered up by the very 
practice of science and its technological turn. What is urgent, for Heidegger, has not 
changed if compared to the time when he tried to enact his reform of the German 
university through the means of politics. The Rector’s Address, partially explored in 
Part II of the present work, introduced us to the notion of clearing. I wish, now, to 
look at the text from a different angle, as it constitutes a unicum within Heidegger’s 
production and it can be read at different levels. We are walking on a «domain of 
metontological-existentiell questioning»251 a thin line between Heidegger’s actual 
political enterprise and thinking on the essential level. The political context of the 
Rector’s Address shows Heidegger’s skill in condensing different layers of 
significance in such a brief exposition: here philosophy is heavily interpolated with 
Heidegger’s wish to reform the German university in a determinate political moment, 
i.e. his appointment as Rector of the University of Freiburg by the newly formed 
National Socialist government. This element is rather functional to the present 
treatment of ethics as it lends us the opportunity to observe what happens when a 
radical philosophy based on fundamental ontology crosses over the line to the ontic 
political level. I am by no means trying to assess Heidegger’s degree of involvement 
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with Nazism or trying to provide a moral evaluation of Heidegger as a person. This is 
an interesting and yet unresolved matter and it has been carried out, with different 
outcomes, by a substantial number of authors; nonetheless, it does not have any direct 
implications for what I am trying to study, which is the role of ethics at the level of 
fundamentally ontological philosophical practice. What will be observed regarding 
the context of the Rektoratsrede, then, has only the scope of shedding light on the text 
and evaluating its relevance to the ethical discourse outlined so far. One should be 
aware, nevertheless, that at the time of the Rektoratsrede Heidegger had not yet 
developed a critique of modern technology or articulated the theme regarding the task 
of thinking; but the failure of his project of reform will have a strong impact on the 
philosophy of the so-called later Heidegger. 
The Rector’s Address appears as encoded into a very precise political 
framework that is not immediately related to philosophy. Victor Farìas, in his 
thoroughly documented book, Heidegger and Nazism, portrays effectively how 
Heidegger, in 1933, ideally fit into Hitler’s radical reform of German society in a 
National Socialist direction: «This extreme reform model advocated a complete 
renewal of the conception of the sciences (in teaching and research) for the 
universities and meant a substantial shift in procedures and work at the universities, 
especially as it affected the relationship between students and professors. The most 
important leader and spokesman for this kind of university reform was Martin 
Heidegger»252. Farìas’ disputed account sketches, drawing on witnesses of the time, 
an image of Martin Heidegger as a strong supporter of the new regime, an account 
that does to some extent seem likely, considering that the regime itself chose him as 
the first Nazi rector of the University of Freiburg. Nonetheless, Farìas, though well 
informed, tends to forget that Heidegger is a philosopher and not a politician; as a 
matter of fact the Chilean author rarely considers the implications of this aspect. As 
Beistegui clearly outlines in Heidegger and the Political, Heidegger’s wish to reform 
                                                
252 V. Farìas, Heidegger and Nazism, translated by P. Burrell, Temple University Press, 
Philadelphia 1989, p. 98. 
 183 
the German university is nothing new and is rooted in a tradition of thinkers that span 
the 19th century, since Napoleon’s victory over Prussia in 1812. In that particular 
instance Prussia lost control of Magdeburg and of the University of Halle, the most 
prestigious amongst the German universities. This event changed the perspective on 
the institution of the university as such, which had lost the cosmopolitan traits it used 
to have in Kant’s time, and culminated in the dispute between Fichte and 
Schleiermacher. Says Beistegui: «Fichte himself actually thinks the university in the 
context of its inscription in a larger totality, that of the nation and of the State. 
Schleiermacher’s conception is quite different: he insists on the limited role of the 
State – limited to financial support – in order to guarantee the independence of the 
institution […] Whereas Schleiermacher and Humboldt’s system insists on the 
autonomy of the various sciences, Fichte wishes to see those sciences unified under a 
common, philosophical concept of science»253. Heidegger is indeed determined to 
change a university that is still modelled on Schleiermacher’s ideas and he does 
pursue a unifying project of Fichtean flavour but he does not share Fichte’s 
nationalistic urges (at least not at the philosophical level) or his rational and 
systematic conception. Heidegger is concerned about the fact that the university has 
become an institution of highly specialized and fragmented disciplines, where 
philosophy itself has been reduced to a discipline amongst the others and has lost its 
role as mother of all sciences; the essence of Science, the very unifying principle of 
all sciences, has itself been forgotten254, turning the sciences into a number of highly 
technical forms of knowing. Again, fragmentation is the centre of a situation of loss 
of memory because it forgets the essence of science, «the power that hones and 
embraces Dasein in its entirety»255. It is most likely true that Heidegger saw the rise 
to power of the National Socialist Party as an opportunity to reform the university but 
that does not imply that he and the Nazis shared common objectives, also because it 
is hard to see how the party officers and bureaucrats could grasp the profundity of 
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Heidegger’s thinking. Nevertheless, nationalism is one of the most ambiguous 
elements in the text: 
 
We understand the German university as the “high” school that, grounded in science, by 
means of science, educates and disciplines the leaders and the guardians of the fate of 
the German people. The will to the essence of the German university is the will to 
science as the will to the historical mission of the German people as a people that knows 
itself in its state.256 
 
One should not fall into the trap of reading into Heidegger’s words any thirst for 
German domination over the rest of the world or even the Western world. What 
Heidegger has in mind is something epochal, over which he does not have control or 
which he does not even hope to fulfil within his lifetime and philosophical work but 
that, at the same time, he could prepare within the opportunity offered by the new 
government. Reading Heidegger’s proposals for the reform of the German university 
as politically driven guidelines on which to model university life does not do justice 
to the profundity of his thought, whilst putting his words into perspective restores the 
breadth and the splendour his project deserves. In this particular instance the «Letter 
on Humanism» sheds light on the alleged issue of nationalism: 
 
“German” is not spoken to the world so that the world might be reformed through the 
German essence; rather, it is spoken to the Germans so that from a destinal 
belongingness to other peoples they might become world-historical along with them. 
[…] The homeland to this historical dwelling is nearness to Being.257 
 
In these lines, which are a comment on Hölderlin’s poem “Homecoming”, it is 
German culture that needs to rethink itself from the roots in order to capture the 
essence, not only of Western/European culture but also but also of those long 
                                                
256 M. Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University”, in Philosophical and Political 
Writings, edited by M. Stassen, Continuum, New York 2003, p. 3. 
257 M. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, in Pathmarks, edited by W. McNeill, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 2007, pp. 257-258. 
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neglected cultures coming from the East258 with which a tradition that has claimed 
universality up to now finally needs come to terms. The German element is not the 
glorification of a nation, it is the multiplicity distinguished within the unity of being-
with-one-another. As Beistegui affirms: 
 
The being-with-Others that is destinal is a community, a people. The community or the 
people is itself defined in terms of its destinality. Yet destiny is not the sum of 
individual fates. It is itself something that we inherit, something that befalls us. Since 
Dasein is from the start with other Daseins, its individual fate is given to it as a common 
fate, which is tantamount to saying that there is no (purely) individual fate. The destiny 
of a community is freed through communication and struggle, through efforts and 
decisions, through a common resoluteness.259 
 
Heidegger’s failure to reform the German university and his retirement from political 
life should not suggest that the project of redefining the task of thinking is not deeply 
intertwined with the political sphere, which since the Greeks remains a co-
determining factor of our being. The problem of thinking should instead be reiterated 
starting from the track left by Heidegger and those philosophers who expressed this 
pivotal urge within Philosophy. Although reappropriated and reformulated by 
Heidegger in terms of a re-capturing of the essence of Science, the echo of Husserl’s 
Crisis and his project of grounding the European sciences is still current for 
Heidegger and for us. Husserl, who definitely cannot be suspected of National 
Socialist sympathies, had grasped what was at stake even though, according to his 
brightest pupil, he did not go past the metaphysics of the subject that, since Descartes, 
had carried the Western world towards nihilism. Here is what Husserl says in the 
Crisis and it is hard to ignore the parallel with the «Letter on Humanism»: 
 
So the upheaval of a national culture can proliferate, first of all when the advancing 
universal science becomes the common property of nations that were formerly alien to 
                                                
258 Just above the last quotation Heidegger had affirmed: “But even the West is not thought 
regionally as the Occident in contrast to the Orient, not merely as Europe but rather, world-
historically out of nearness to the source. We have still scarcely begun to think the mysterious 
relations to the East that have come to word in Hölderlin’s poetry”. Ibid., p. 257.  
259 M. de Beistegui, Heidegger and the political, p. 36. 
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one another and the unity of a scientific community and the community of the educated 
spreads throughout the multiplicity of nations.260 
 
 
Section 2 – Taking care of the Gods 
 
 
In the previous section of this chapter the political was related to thinking in 
what was considered as a metontological-existentiell domain by focusing on those co-
determining ways of being that make political life and engagement possible within a 
community, such as the πόλις. Heidegger’s active participation in politics was 
presented as a strong and motivated, yet ultimately failed, attempt to posit the 
problem of thinking through a reform of the German university.  
In 1943 and 1944 Heidegger delivers two lecture courses on Heraclitus, which 
are a meticulous attempt to think the origin of Western thought. Rather unusually he 
starts by telling two anecdotes about Heraclitus which are not intended to transmit 
any biographical curiosity about the Ephesian thinker. The first anecdote tells of a 
multitude of foreigners who, looking for the great thinker, find him warming up 
beside a stove. The crowd, expecting to encounter an extraordinary man and hear 
words of wisdom, is disappointed at the sight of such a humble and ordinary 
situation. Nevertheless Heraclitus, noticing their shock, invites them in and says: 
“Here, too, the gods are present”. The second anecdote offers an analogous situation: 
here Heraclitus leaves the temple of Artemis in order to play dice with some young 
boys; to the astonished crowd he exclaims: “Why are you scoundrels surprised? Isn’t 
it perhaps better to do this, rather than taking care of the πόλις with you?”. What 
strikes us here is the apparently opposite attitude towards politics, if compared to the 
κοινωνία, the being-with-one-another, which was encountered in the previous 
section. Here the co-determination with the others is broken by an abrupt disinterest 
                                                
260 E. Husserl, The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. An introduction 
to phenomenological philosophy, translated by D. Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 
1970, p. 288. 
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in the public sphere and its implications, such as current affairs, success, career and, 
most of all, the expectations of the general public as to what a thinker should be, 
which are shown to be as far from reality as possible. What is expected of a thinker 
by the general public is something extraordinary, uncommon, something exciting that 
would divert the public from ordinary life. Nevertheless, not only does Heraclitus 
present the foreigners and the Ephesians with something even more ordinary and less 
interesting than their own everyday life, such as sitting beside a stove and playing 
children’s games, but he relates such activities with the deities and puts them above 
the citizens’ political activity, which is the apex of the Greek man’s life. Heidegger 
argues that Heraclitus does not mean to refute the political but to claim that he 
actually practices it in its most essential, archaic form, which does not correspond to 
the everyday activities of his fellow citizens: 
 
And what if – thinking in a Greek way – the preoccupation with the gods’ presence 
coincided instead with the highest preoccupation for the πόλις? That is actually the way 
it is: as a matter of fact the πόλις, always thought in a Greek way, is the centre and the 
place around which revolves the manifestation of everything that is essentially being 
and therefore also the non-essence of everything that is. If it is so, then, […] the thinker 
who takes care of the essential proximity of the gods is the man who is authentically 
«political».261  
 
Far from advocating a reactionary blend of politics and religion, Heidegger here is 
looking for an essential way of being-in-the-world and being-with-one-another, in 
other words, the essence of politics, which cannot be found in the everyday 
management of the affairs of the πόλις. When Heidegger talks of «thinking in a 
Greek way», he does not refer to any ordinary Greek person’s thoughts but to the 
Greek thinker, incarnated by Heraclitus in this instance, who is not simply different 
                                                
261 M. Heidegger, “Heraklit. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens”, in M. Heidegger, 
Gesamtausgabe. II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923-1944 [1979], V. Klostermann, Frankfurt 1994, 
pp. 11-12. My translation from the German: «Wie, wenn, griechisch gedacht, die Sorge um die 
πόλις wäre? So steht es in Wahrheit; denn die πόλις ist, immer griechisch gedacht, der Pol und die 
Stätte, um die sich alles Erscheinen des wesenhaft Seienden und damit auch das Unwesen alles 
Seienden dreht. Steht es so, dann ist, [...] der Denker bei seiner Sorge um die Wesensnähe der 
Götter der eigentlich  “politische Mensch”».  
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from the οἱ πολλοί of his time as he does not engage in the Gerede of Das Man: he is 
indeed a thinker whose thinking is not mediated by 2,400 years of metaphysics, and 
in whom, nevertheless, metaphysics finds its roots. The great challenge lies in the 
attempt of experiencing essential thinking from our modern and technological 
perspective. This is exactly why it would be wrong to understand the gods as a 
transcendent correlate of our physical world or, worse, as the ultimate objects of a 
religion. Religio, Heidegger argues, is an essentially Roman word; thus we can talk 
neither of a Greek religion nor of a Greek theology. In order to see why this is the 
case, we should explore the nature of the gods Heraclitus is referring to and see what 
significance they have for contemporary man.  
Heraclitus, as a citizen of Ephesus, lives under the wardship of Artemis, goddess 
of hunting, represented as carrying torches in both her hands (φωσφόρος). Both the 
images of hunting and of light indicate that Artemis is related to Φύσις. In its 
essence, we should not see hunting as a mere sport but as that event that brings 
together humans, animals and nymphs, Artemis’ companions representing the game 
of nature. Light (φῶς), on the other hand, should be interpreted as the manifestation 
of nature, which, always understood in its essence, is that clearness that allows for the 
experience of Φύσις. Through the exercise, to which Bruno made a fundamental 
contribution in Chapter II, we understood that essential thinking does not occur 
through division and fragmentation but through bringing together, composing. From 
the perspective of the mortal, that means standing within the clearing [Lichtung] 
because that is the place where beings are revealed as particulars, yet through the 
concealment of their unity. Essential thinking tries to capture this unity that is not 
determined or measurable. Therefore, Heraclitus is not linked to Artemis according 
particular determinations, i.e. because he is a citizen of Ephesus, but because he is a 
thinker of Φύσις: it is this immediate relation to nature, incarnated by the goddess 
Artemis, that makes of Heraclitus an essential thinker, as Φύσις is the Lichtung 
where ἀλήθεια happens. Heraclitus’ being-in-the-world is thus divine and not 
religious, as Artemis is the divinity who springs from the bringing forth of the open 
 189 
region of Φύσις and the subsequent experience of ἀλήθεια, and that bringing forth is 
identified with thinking. The god herself has no supernatural power or an all-powerful 
will; it is simply the ontological intimacy with nature. In addition, the god is also 
what is dearest to the πόλις and the thinker, who is the one that takes care of the god 
in its essence and is the most essentially political citizen. 
The presence of the gods, therefore, is revealed as a necessity on the way to 
thinking and poses a crucial issue for thinkers in the era of technology, who live in the 
absence of the gods. Heidegger precisely describes what this absence amounts to: 
 
The default of God and the divinities is absence. But absence is not nothing. [The non-
existent cannot be ‘absent’]. Rather it is precisely the presence, which must first be 
appropriated, of the hidden fullness and wealth of what has been and what, thus 
gathered, is presencing, of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, 
in the preaching of Jesus. This no-longer is in itself a not-yet of the veiled arrival of its 
inexhaustible nature.262        
 
Heidegger here traces a significant parallel between the gods and the question of 
Being, which has been concealed together with the memory of its concealment: 
pointing out the absence of the gods amounts to developing the awareness of the 
concealment of the Seinsfrage and it is exactly for us, men of the technological 
epoch, that this becomes truly relevant. As Young puts it: «The gods, therefore, must 
be present in modernity even though, as with the bridge, ‘their presence is 
obstructed…even pushed wholly aside’»263. Heidegger sees the poet as the only one 
capable not only of pointing out this absence but also of being able to experience the 
lost intimacy with the gods, which appears to be of an essentially linguistic nature; 
«holy names are lacking» says Hölderlin in his poem Homecoming, thus revealing 
exactly the absence of the divine and relating it to language at the same time. 
Heidegger is very explicit in drawing such a connection: «Since we have been a 
conversation – man has experienced much and named many of the gods. Since 
language has authentically come to pass as conversation, the gods have come to 
                                                
262 M. Heidegger, “The Thing”, in M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 182. 
263 J. Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, p. 97. 
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expression and a world has appeared. But again it is important to see that the 
presence of the gods and the appearance of the world are not merely a consequence of 
the occurrence of language; rather, they are simultaneous with it. And this to the 
extent that it is precisely in the naming of the gods and in the world becoming word 
that authentic conversation, which we ourselves are, consists»264. This is exactly the 
reason why thinkers like Heraclitus are essential and enjoy intimacy with Φύσις 
through the gods. The gods also pronounce the words that give rise to Western 
thought but we are deaf to them as our intimacy with Φύσις has been jeopardized by 
the development of a language that is not coessential with nature – the language of 
reason and logic – which is treated as «as something he [man: ed.] has in hand, like a 
personal belonging, and thus as a handle for his representation and conduct»265, 
which amounts to saying that language is a mere tool by means of which nature is 
objectified and dominated.  
Objectification of nature occurs within the subject/object dualism, which is at 
the root of modern science266. We have addressed the shortcomings of the 
subject/object dualism; what is more difficult to grasp is how we could think of a 
thing without representing it as an object. Therefore, we should explain what, 
according to Heidegger, a thing is. Shortly after the end of World War II, Heidegger 
delivered a lecture at the Bayerische Akademie der Schönen Künste, entitled The 
Thing [Das Ding], which starts off by asking why, in spite of our technological 
development and the subsequent suppression of distances between places and people, 
we do not seem to enjoy any nearness with things. Heidegger denies the possibility of 
knowing what a thing is only by relying on its outward appearance, i.e. all those 
features that are necessary to the maker in order to make the thing. The maker of a 
jug only needs a few general notions, i.e. its being a vessel for liquids, in order to 
                                                
264 M. Heidegger, Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, translated by K. Hoeller, Humanity Books, 
New York 2000, pp. 57-58. 
265 M. Heidegger, “What are poets for?”, in M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 130.  
266 “Science always encounters only what its kind of representation has admitted beforehand  as an 
object possible for science”, in M. Heidegger, “The Thing”, in M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language 
and Thought, p. 168. 
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produce it but such notions do not say anything of the jug; they only express an idea 
of it, which annihilates the thing as something near to us and turns it into something 
that stands opposite us, thus increasing the distance: 
 
That is why Plato, who conceives presence in terms of the outward appearance, had no 
more understanding of the nature of the thing than did Aristotle and all subsequent 
thinkers. Rather, Plato experienced (decisively, indeed, for the sequel) everything 
present as an object of making. Instead of “object” – as that which stands before, over 
against, opposite us – we use the more precise expression “what stands forth”.267 
 
In Chapter I we saw how Plato incarnates the transition between truth as 
unconcealment and truth as correctness. By tracing this situation of distance between 
man and things back to Plato, Heidegger implicitly underlines the radical change that 
has taken place in thinking between Plato and the previous thinkers (Heraclitus, 
Parmenides, Anaximander), who could still enjoy that nearness and intimacy with 
Φύσις, which belonged to essential thinking. According to Heidegger, Plato 
establishes the premises for what will be properly scientific knowledge of nature, 
which will turn it into something not simply opposite but also measurable and 
predictable: 
 
It is said that scientific knowledge is compelling. Certainly. But what does its 
compulsion consist in? In our instance it consists in the compulsion to relinquish the 
wine-filled jug and to put in its place a hollow within which liquid spreads. Science 
makes the jug-thing into a nonentity in not permitting things to be the standard for what 
is real.268 
 
What we consider to be most real, then, which is science, that knowledge that we 
deem to be the standard for reality, truly renders reality empty and abstract and 
covers up things by turning them into meaningless objects that count only in virtue of 
their measures and their general utility; it is a distance that resembles isolation, the 
isolation of the subjects that can relate to Φύσις only in terms of opposition. 
                                                
267 Ibid., p. 166. 
268 Ibid., p. 168. 
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Overcoming this state of opposition and separation is one of the most genuinely 
phenomenological moments in Heidegger’s work, as he provides a content for the 
much celebrated motto «back to the things themselves!» by thinking a thing not as an 
object but as a thing that “things”. In the case of the jug we should not look for its 
essence – the jugness of the jug – in its apparent features of being a vessel for liquids 
of a certain weight and size but focus on the bringing-forth of the nature of gift that 
characterizes the outpouring of water and wine, a gift that remains even when the jug 
is empty, as it is the trace of that giving where earth and sky are let-to-dwell. That is 
the only way of making sense of Heraclitus’ presence in the oven: he is letting earth 
and sky as warmth (or bread) dwell beside the oven as a gift, which amounts to taking 
care of the gods. Why does Heidegger use the word “gift”? When we talked of 
thinking as memory, we understood it as what gives through retention: recalling the 
origin of such a gift means bringing together, composing, going back to the original 
retention that unconcealed the gift. According to Heidegger, we can only recognize 
such a gift within a fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and divinities. The fourfold 
amounts to the cancellation of any opposition or isolation, the ἁρμονία, the bringing 
together that allows Φύσις to appear as a holy activity. Man, the mortal, is not a mere 
maker, Φύσις is not qualified as standing-resource and the gods are not supernatural 
powers but that sacred intimacy between man and Φύσις, the divine «destinings»269, 
the messengers of such unity, the point of intensity where the gift is delivered. This is 
the most advanced version of world Heidegger provides, as opposed to the one 
encountered in Sein und Zeit: 
 
The tolling of the evening bell brings them, as mortals, before the divine. House and 
table join mortals to the earth. The things that were named, thus called, gather to 
themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities. The four are united primally in being 
toward one another, a fourfold. The things let the fourfold of the fold stay with them. 
This gathering, assembling, letting-stay is the thinging of things. The unitary fourfold of 
                                                
269 M. Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, in M. Heidegger, The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by W. Lovitt, Harper Perennial, New York 
1977, p. 34. 
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sky and earth, mortals and divinities, which is stayed in the thinging of things, we call – 
the world.270 
 
It is now possible to deepen the notion of ethics that opened this chapter as a 
form of «residing» or «dwelling alongside» but which lacked a clear account of the 
world, without which the dwelling would hardly be thinkable. It is the practice of 
thinking that is essentially ethical, as it concerns man directly not as a Cartesian res 
cogitans but as the coessential side of the fourfold – the mortal – that lets beings 
dwell. Such dwelling amongst beings does happen through a knowing experience, 
which is not the one proper to modern science but the one that looks back to the 
essence of Science, which was identified as γνῶσις in Part II of this work. What 
γνῶσις stood for was the distinguishing of τὰ πάντα that happens by standing in the 
openness of the open region, which «then comes into a connection with what we call 
world»271. In Bruno we saw how this notion amounts to the composition of relational 
minima that, from the perspective of the infinite, coincide with the One, as unity is 
contained in particulars. In Spinoza the knowledge of God, substance or nature, is 
achieved through the understanding of particular essences. The coincidence of the 
whole with the particular is a characteristic of the infinite and both Bruno and 
Spinoza operate through the infinite in which, Bruno held, there was no centre and no 
periphery, which is coherent with the following Heideggerian affirmation: «Man is, 
he dwells in the midst of the ens in its totality, without being its centre in the sense of 
a foundation that orders and supports the whole ens. Man is the centre of the ens but, 
at the same time, he is not himself the centre»272.  
Thinking as dwelling is indeed the essence of man: only man can access 
knowledge but that does not provoke a rift between him and the world or, even worse, 
                                                
270 M. Heidegger, “What are poets for?”, in M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought, p. 197. 
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New York 2000, p. 86. 
272 M. Heidegger, “Heraklits Lehre vom Logos”, M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe. II. Abteilung: 
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give him a privileged position within it. As soon as man adopts the Ptolemaic 
cosmology and assumes such a privileged position, the world, the things and the gods 
are concealed from him. As long as the encounter between knowledge and dwelling is 
preserved, then we can have an ethics of thinking, which directly concerns him but 
only within the fourfold. As Heidegger puts it in his lectures on Heraclitus, ethics is a 
form of knowledge that directly concerns man: 
 
[…] ἐπιστήμη ἠθική indicates having a kind of knowing in what belongs to ἦθος. The 
term ἦθος means originally home, dwelling. Here, in the expression ἐπιστήμη ἠθική we 
intend τὸ ἦθος par excellence. This means the home of man, the sojourn, i.e. the 
«inhabiting» of man in the midst of the ens in its totality. The essence in the ἦθος, in the 
sojourn, is the way in which man is amidst the ens, stays by it, maintains himself and 
lets being. To have a knowing of the ἦθος, that knowing that is relative to it, is 
«ethics».273 
 
This knowing that concerns man is not at man’s disposal; it is not culture or 
information aiming at increasing the «armoury of useful facts» about the world or 
himself, as much as the world is not something to be objectively captured through 
knowing – as Otto Pöggeler puts it: «The world as the fourfold of earth and sky, gods 
and mortals is not an in-itself which would stand over against man, but is rather the 
occurrence of the unconcealment of beings in man»274. Man is indeed central in the 
bringing forth of this unconcealment in the form of dwelling and guarding, which 
corresponds to his essence. Beings are unconcealed in man within the open region; 
they are not divided up into objects by a rational subject. As Ernesto Grassi puts it: 
«Being is not knowable through a rational and logical discussion and identification of 
beings – which, as ‘participles’ of Being, presuppose the knowledge of it – but only 
                                                
273 Ibid., pp. 205-206. My translation from the German: «Der an dritter Stelle genannte Titel 
ἐπιστήμη ἠθική bezeichnet das Sichverstehen auf das, was zum ἦθος gehört. ἦθος bedeutet 
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274 O. Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinging, translated by D. Magurshak and S. Barber, 
Humanities Press International, Atlantic Highlands 1987, p. 217.  
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functionally to the lived experience of that urgency of Being which urges and presses 
in each of our affirmations or negations. Such experience obliges us to posit not only 
the problem of the function and structure of Being – radically distinct from the one of 
beings – but also to recognize from the very beginning the originary non-rational 
character of language»275. Not only is the character of language non-rational, it is 
actually silent: if we look at the origin of the word λόγος, which originally appears to 
be a bringing-together, a gathering not of objects but of the distinguished τὰ πάντα 
into the unity of the ἕν276. In this sense Heraclitus, as reported by Heidegger in his 
1944 lectures, invites us not to listen to him speaking but to listen to the λόγος277 in 
order to understand that «all is one»: this listening is obviously not intended as a form 
of perceiving an assertion but as that originary listening that allows us to hear and 
which can only be expressed in terms of belonging:  
 
We do not listen only because we have ears but we have ears and we can be endowed 
with ears only in virtue of the fact that we listen. But we humans listen, for instance, to 
the thunder in the sky, the rustling of the wood, the flowing of the water in the fountain, 
the chords of the harp, the roaring of the engines, the noises of the city; we hear all these 
things in virtue of the fact that somehow we belong to them and we do not belong to 
them. […] The fact of being able to hear the singing of the earth presupposes that our 
hearing is a sensory hearing that needs an organ of sense, the ear. Being able to hear and 
hearing are not, then, the same thing. 278 
                                                
275 E. Grassi, La preminenza della parola metaforica. Heidegger, Meister Eckhart, Novalis, Mucchi 
editore, Modena 1986, p. 16. My translation from Italian: «L’Essere non è conoscibile mediante una 
discussione e codificazione razionale, logica degli “enti” – che in quanto “particìpi” dell’Essere ne 
presuppongono la conoscenza – bensì soloin funzione dell’esperienza vissuta di una impellenza 
dell’Essere che urge e preme in ogni nostra affermazione o negazione. Tale esperienza ci obbliga a 
porre non solo il problema della funzione e struttura dell’Essere – radicalmente distinto da quello 
degli enti – ma fin da principio a riconoscere anche l’originario carattere non razionale del 
linguaggio». 
276 For an in-depth discussion of the gnosiological aspects of the logos, please see Part II, chapter 
IV of this work. 
277 See M. Heidegger, “Heraklits Lehre vom Logos”, M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe. II. Abteilung: 
Vorlesungen 1923-1944 [1979], V. Klostermann, Frankfurt 1994, p. 244. «Have you not just 
listened to me, ἀλλά, have you, rather, heard the Logos?». My translation from German: «“Habt ihr 
nicht bloß mich angehört, ἀλλά, sondern habt ihr auf den Logos gehört?». 
278 Ibid., p. 247. My translation from German: «Wir hören nicht, weil wir Ohren haben, sondern wir 
haben und können haben die Ohren, weil wir hören. Wir Menschen hören aber auch nur z. B. den 
Donner des Himmels, das Rauschen des Waldes, das Fließen des Brunnens, das Klingen des 
Saitenspiels, das Rattern der Motoren, das Lärm der Stadt, wir hören das nur insofern wir dem 
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Our distinguishing and bringing-together into the ἕν, what we have called γνῶσις in 
our gnosiological account, is nothing but the listening to the singing of the earth – the 
gods letting the earth resound by calling the earth – that, as mortals, shapes us within 
the fourfold – in this sense we both belong and do not belong to it. As guardians of 
the earth, the essence of mortals is the very resonation of the divinities’ call, that 
originary λόγος that, by being heard, gives the ability to hear and by being spoken, 
gives the ability to speak, thus giving access to the openness of the open region where 
the unconcealment takes place, in one word, Φύσις: «But perhaps Φύσις can appear 
– if the insight into that which is becomes the lightning flash of truth – in the nature 
of ‘natural language’ and language can enter the discussion as the gathering of the 
going out, which goes back in itself as λόγος. The most ancient, soon forgotten 
coining of language – as λόγος – would again be spoken»279. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
allem in irgendeiner Weise gehören und nicht gehören. Wir haben Oren, weil Wir horchsam hören 
können und bei dieser Horchsamkeit auf das Lied der Erde hören dürfen, auf ihr Erzittern und 
Beben, das doch unberührbar bleibt von dem riesenhaften Lärm, den der Mensch auf ihrer 
vernutzten Oberfläche bisweilen veranstaltet. Das Hörendürfen auf das Lied der Erde bedingt es, 
daß unser Hören ein sinnliches ist, das der Sinneswerkzeuge, der Ohres, bedarf. Hören und Hörenist 
somit nicht das Selbe». 
279 O. Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, p. 226. 
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Chapter VIII – The Art of Memory  
 
 
Section 1 – Ars Combinatoria 
 
 
Within the Heideggerian world as fourfold of sky, earth, gods and mortals, the 
thing loses its objectivity and is received as a gift, thus opening up the ethical 
dimension of dwelling which, we saw, was thinking as letting things come forth. It 
was also seen how such dwelling is the essence of ethics and how, therefore, thinking 
is an essentially ethical matter. In ontological terms, receiving the gift is the delivery 
of Being to beings as the unconcealment of its own concealing and unconcealing. It 
is not, then, a Christian granting of a grace but an openness to the gift, a standing in 
the Lichtung, which is the knowing position of the mortal who enjoys intimacy with 
the gods, the earth and the sky. As such, receiving the gift becomes a way of being-
in-the-world that gives us access to Being through the distinguishing of the things 
within the ἕν – which, in Part II we have defined as γνῶσις. We have said in Chapter 
I that memory gives by retaining: the gift is what is given by memory, and 
recollection is the bringing together of the fourfold in the gift. Thinking, thus 
understood, is then ready to be taken to a further stage that will explore its 
potentialities as a receiving and therefore a being grateful: 
 
What is it that is named with the words «think», «thinking», «thought»? Toward what 
sphere of the spoken word do they direct us? A thought – where is it, where does it go? 
Thought is in need of memory, the gathering of thought. The Old English thencan, to 
think, and thancian, to thank, are closely related; the Old English noun for thought is 
thanc or thonc. The «thanc», that which is thought, the thought, implies the thanks.280 
 
Naturally Heidegger does not stop at the commonly shared significance of the word  
«thanks»: gratefulness arises from receiving the gift as the thing; however we should 
always bear in mind that the thing is not an object but our very nearness to the world 
                                                
280 M. Heidegger, What is called thinking?, transl. by J. Glenn Gray, Harper Perennial, New York 
2004, pp. 138-139. 
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which is only possible through thinking. Thus receiving the gift amounts to receiving 
exactly what allows us to be what we essentially are, i.e. «our essential nature, with 
which we are gifted in such a way that we are what we are only through it. That is 
why we owe thanks to this endowment, first and unceasingly»281. When Heidegger 
says «thought is in need of memory», he is making both an etymological and an 
ontological point: memory in its essence is not a mere recollection of things which 
happened in the past because it belongs to the sphere of piety as devotion explicated 
as contiguity to the world within which the thanc unfolds. In Heidegger’s words: 
«This thinking that recalls in memory is the original thanks»282. The role of memory 
becomes increasingly crucial if we note that Heidegger claims that Western thinking 
begins by letting the question of Being remain forgotten283, thus initiating the history 
of metaphysics, characterized by the transition from the ὐποκέιμηνον to the modern 
subject which has increasingly impaired us from experiencing things as things and 
obliterated our contiguity with the world, i.e. has prevented us from thinking. The 
recollection of this forgottenness demands that we think what is most thought 
provoking and «most thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking»284. The 
modern subject has no memory because he does not experience things as gifts but as 
objects, which are not given; they are merely present. As Stephen Mulhall puts it: 
«according to Heidegger ‘memory’ initially means a constant concentrated abiding 
with something (whether past, present or yet to come), a steadfast intimate 
concentration upon the things that essentially speak to us. And this in turn returns us 
to the idea of thinking with which the lectures series began, where Heidegger claimed 
that to think is to be inclined towards that which in turn inclines towards us, and 
thereby gives us not only particular things to think about but the very capacity for 
                                                
281 Ibid., p. 142. 
282 Ibid., p. 145. 
283 As Robert Bernasconi says: «Remembrance takes place only on the basis of the experience of 
the oblivion of Being». In R. Bernasconi, The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of 
Being, Humanities Press International, Atlantic Highlands 1985, p. 84. 
284 Ibid., p. 4. 
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thinking that constitutes our essence»285. Once more our understanding of particular 
things affects our very access to Being, as it was in Bruno and in Spinoza. 
Understanding things as objects, though, makes them abstract, unreachable, as all we 
can do, just like in the case of the jug, is specify their quantitative determination. 
Objects are not given to us; they do not incline towards us, they are not gifts because 
there is nothing that delivers them. Let us recall what Heidegger said in the first 
Chapter of our work about memory:   «“Keeping” alone gives freely what is to-be-
thought, what is most thought-provoking, it frees it as a gift. But the keeping is not 
something that is apart from and outside of what is most thought-provoking»286. 
Things are thought-provoking because they are the unconcealment of what is being 
kept in safety, retained. Memory recalls their belonging together in a safe place, that 
is the place of Being, the place of intensity where determinations disappear.  
If we are to encounter Bruno on our Heideggerian path for the third and last 
time, then, it will be on account of memory. Bruno’s art of memory is solidly rooted 
in an old tradition, which dates back to the Greeks, the Romans and even, in the 
Middle Ages, to Thomas Aquinas and his highly rational and Aristotelian approach. 
In the Renaissance the interest in the art of memory reaches its peak, as we can 
observe from the sudden abundance of material which, in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, invades the intellectual scene in the shape of memory treatises from several 
European countries. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of my research to inquire 
into the complex Renaissance debate on the art of memory287, one that goes back to 
the Ancient Greeks and to Stoicism in particular. What is crucial here is to understand 
not only the way Bruno takes the art of memory to an extremely advanced and 
complex technical stage but also, and more importantly, the ontological foundations 
and consequences of Bruno’s art, which break with any previous tradition, though 
                                                
285 S. Mulhall, Inheritance & Originality. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Oxford University 
Press, New York 2001, p. 309. 
286 See n. 32. 
287 To explore the matter in depth, please refer to Frances Yates, The Art of Memory [1966], 
Pimlico, London 2008.  
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eclectically synthesizing and reformulating in an original way what his predecessors 
had done. What strikes us at first, above all after having explored Heidegger’s 
account, is that for Bruno memory is not a mere instrumental recollection of facts 
through specific techniques but, actually, a bringing together. As Yates points out: 
«The aim of the memory system is to achieve this unifying vision where alone it can 
be done, for the inner images of things are nearer to reality, less opaque to the light, 
than are the things themselves in the outer world»288. In Chapter V we saw that 
Bruno’s gnosiology limited human knowledge to shadows and could not reach the 
actual light of truth, which is divine territory, as he confirms in the De la causa 
principio et uno:  
 
Of the divine substance, therefore, because it is both infinite and extremely remote from 
those effects which constitute the outer limit of the path of our discursive faculty, we 
can know nothing except by means of vestiges, as the Platonists say, or of remote 
effects, as the Peripatetics have it, or by means of garments, as the Cabalists say, or of 
dorsal and back parts, as the Talmudists say, or of a mirror, shadow and enigma, as the 
Apocalyptics claim.289 
 
Nonetheless, we know from the Furori that Bruno is animated by a loving madness 
that pushes him to steer this tension to it limit. The old Neoplatonic structures, which 
maintain a role only by losing their hierarchical and transcendent nature, are 
progressively flattened, emptied and re-employed. In order to construct his art of 
memory in perfect harmony with nature Bruno takes advantage of the Neoplatonic 
concept of universal intellect, yet getting rid of its original ontological feature, 
thereby excluding any hierarchical separation between it and the world: 
 
The universal intellect is the innermost, most real and most proper faculty or potential 
part of the world soul290. It is that one and the same thing that fills everything, 
illuminates the universe and directs nature to produce her various species suitably. It is 
                                                
288 F. Yates, The Art of Memory [1966], Pimlico, London 2008, p. 225. 
289 G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity. And Essays on Magic, transl. and edited by R. de Lucca 
and R. J. Blackwell, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, p. 35. 
290 For a full account of the World Soul, please see Part I, Charter 2 of this work. 
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to the production of natural things what our intellect is to the production of the 
representation of things.291 
 
In Chapter II we defined the Universal Intellect as the operational point of view of 
the World Soul: Bruno wishes to replicate the action of the Universal Intellect in his 
own intellect. Rita Sturlese individuates such a connection by tracing a parallel 
between the art of memory and what she calls art of nature on the basis of their 
productive virtue: «In the art of memory free invention of images is not pure fantasy, 
an incoherent combinatory play of fantasy […]; it is indeed productive invention, as 
images are constantly organized and united in a system, in an efficient organism 
[…]»292. Such inner images, which belong to the realm of imagination, are nothing 
but the shadows we encountered in our gnosiological enquiry. If shadows are images 
of the latency of the truth, they are what is given in unconcealment, then memory can 
bring them together to experience what is retained and kept in safety. 
How is Bruno going to achieve that? Since his early work entitled De umbris 
idearum, Bruno brings forth his original position by introducing the theme of 
shadows, which is man’s experience of the latency of truth, the images he has of 
nature. If, on the one hand, Bruno’s  «Copernican revolution» takes man out of the 
centre of the Universe and throws him into infinity, thus providing him with the same 
ontological status as all the other beings, on the other hand, shadows are his 
privileged access to nature. Shadows are nature that is given through the human 
imagination. The knowing relation to the shadows of ideas does not indicate man’s 
position of ignorance but instead underlines his ability to reconcile the gap between 
unity and multiplicity. Matteo Matteoli, in this respect, affirms: «if, as a matter of 
fact, the individual resides in the latter [nature: ed.], nonetheless he brings within 
                                                
291 G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity. And Essays on Magic, edited and translated by R. J. 
Blackwell and R. de Lucca, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, p.38. 
292 R. Sturlese, “Arte della natura e arte della memoria in Giordano Bruno”, in Rinascimento, n. 39, 
year 51, Vol. 40 (2000), p. 130. My translation from Italian: «Nell’arte della memoria la libera 
invenzione di immagini non è però pura fantasticheria, gioco combinatorio affatto incoerente della 
fantasia […];è invece invenzione produttiva, perché in essa le immagini son sempre organizzate e 
unite in un sistema, in un organismo efficace […]». 
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himself the intellectual potential to mend, starting from the experience of the senses, 
the fracture of unity with respect to multiplicity»293. If the bringing together of this 
fracture does not happen through the means of logic, then, we should remember what 
he says in the De la causa, when he talks of «production» and «representation»: 
Bruno already explores such potentialities of man in the De umbris idearum, where 
he affirms that «reason, on the other hand, forms new species and in a new 
fashion»294. Indeed, then, even though man is not the ontological centre of the 
universe, he does retain this productive role of closing up the fracture and it will not 
be his discursive and logical abilities that enable him to do it but the analogical and 
productive way of images, organized in the art of memory: «Bruno’s interest in the 
logic of images, as a matter of fact, is associated with a search for instruments that 
would enable him to guarantee forms of knowledge that could prescind from 
abstraction. As a knowing tool, the art of memory also has the following value: 
through the use of images, it allows us to fix the physical reality of single things 
according to their specific individuality, which in nature are dissolved in the infinite 
metamorphosis that ensures the life of the universe»295. In the previous chapter we 
saw that, for Heidegger, what prevented us from actually experiencing a thing was 
the misunderstanding of its essence, i.e. the jugness of the jug conceived as the 
abstraction of its properties and its transformation into something unreal and distant 
from us. Bruno grants man some productive abilities that not even nature possesses, 
as Sturlese notes: «[…] not only does [Bruno] confer full autonomy on the intellect 
                                                
293 M. Matteoli, ‘L’arte della memoria nei primi scritti mnemotecnici di Giordano Bruno’, in 
Rinascimento, n. 39, year 51, Vol. 40 (2000), p. 79. My translation from Italian: «se, infatti, 
l’individuo risiede in quest’ultima, tuttavia egli porta in sé il potenziale intellettuale per risanare, a 
partire dall’esperienza sensibile, la frattura dell’unità nel molteplice». 
294 G. Bruno, De umbris idearum, edited by Rita Sturlese, Firenze 1991, p. 52. My translation from 
Latin: «Ratio novas atque noviter in infi<ni>tum species format». 
295 M. P. Ellero, Lo Specchio della fantasia. Retorica, magia e scrittura in Giordano Bruno, Maria 
Pazzi Facini Editore, Lucca 2005, p. 95. My translation from Italian: «L’interesse di Bruno per la 
logica delle immagini infatti è associato alla ricerca di strumenti in grado di garantire forme di 
conoscenza che prescindano dall’astrazione. Come strumento conoscitivo, l’arte della memoria ha 
anche questo valore: attraverso le immagini essa consente di fissare, nella sua specifica 
individualità, la realtà fisica dei singoli, che in natura si dissolvono nell’incessante metamorfosi che 
assicura la vita dell’universo». 
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with respect to the rules of the physical world but it also provides it with the 
prerogative of always inventing and finding something new, as opposed to the infinite 
repetitiveness of nature»296. This does not place man outside of nature; it makes him 
the creative and productive centre of nature. Again, we should be wary of such 
Neoplatonic terminology, for the emanation is not to be intended as a hypostasis, as a 
decay of a superior being endowed with a higher degree of reality, but as an 
immanent production within nature: 
 
But nature produces everything out of its own matter by means of separation, parturition 
and effluxion, as the Pythagoreans thought, as Anaxagoras and Democritus understood 
and the sages of Babylon confirmed.297   
 
Within human experience we observe nature operating by “separation”, 
“parturition” and “effluxion”, meaning by determinate physical divisions, giving birth 
and emanation. What happens through the art of memory, on the other hand, is the 
overcoming of such physical determinations in a creative effort that could provide us 
with an intensive experience of the world, an experience of unity, as Yates agrees: 
«The aim of the memory system is to establish within, in the psyche, the return of the 
intellect to unity through the organization of significant images»298. Significant 
images can only be provided by the shadows, which are the “vestiges” of the unity 
that is being pursued. The ethical value of this approach is enormous, as Bruno is not 
simply interested in providing us with an explanatory model of the universe and with 
a technical process to be able to know it; he is doing much more. What makes him 
believe that he is the turning point of an epoch is his diagnosis of the crisis of politics, 
religion and, above all, philosophy, dominated by pedants and grammarians. Bruno, 
just like Heidegger, is dissatisfied with the practice of philosophy, which has been 
                                                
296 R. Sturlese, ‘Arte della natura e arte della memoria in Giordano Bruno’, p. 139. My translation 
from Italian: «[…] non solo [Bruno: ed.] conferisce all’ingegno piena autonomia rispetto alle regole 
del mondo fisico, ma gli riconosce la prerogativa del sempre inventare e trovare il nuovo, di contro 
alla ripetitività infinita della natura». 
297 G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity. And Essays on Magic, p. 83. 
298 F. Yates, The Art of Memory, p. 224. 
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reduced to a linguistic exercise. He therefore sees no alternative but putting forward 
an extreme challenge, which is the very reform of the self in order to start doing 
philosophy again. As Matteoli observes, «the double value of the theory of shadows, 
personal and universal, makes then this theme the most suitable mediation between 
philosophical knowing and the reform of the self; in this sense the art of memory is a 
coherent part of the process of construction of a new identity»299. The ethical aspect 
of Bruno’s art of memory is further highlighted by the way he transforms a 
traditionally technical and methodological art into an emendation of man’s intellect, 
which amounts to another way of inhabiting the world.  
As far as the technical aspects of his art of memory are concerned, Bruno owes a 
great deal to the medieval figure of Raymond Lull, who had developed a logico-
rational system called the ars combinatoria. Such a system is composed of terms 
connected by syllogistic chains that are inductively demonstrated according to the 
truth value of those very terms, which are dependent on the terms that immediately 
precede them. Lull’s aim is to build a perfectly matching logical system that would 
exactly match the metaphysical structure of the world, thus enabling us to elaborate 
any sort of predicate about the world, a sort of ante litteram logical positivist. Bruno 
assimilates Lull’s methodology but radically changes both the premises and the 
objectives of the ars combinatoria. Bruno’s main interest is not maintaining logical 
coherence but navigating within beings in terms of their relationship with the One, 
what we called τὰ πάντα while discussing Heraclitus: 
 
You will undoubtedly discover that you are really progressing, and you will be able to 
experience it, when you are allowed access from a confused multiplicity to a distinct 
unity: that does not mean increasing logical universals out of all proportion, which, 
moving from the low species, confusedly grasp the intermediate species and, moving 
from these, grasp even more confusedly the highest species. It means, instead to order, 
                                                
299 M. Matteoli, ‘L’arte della memoria nei primi scritti mnemotecnici di Giordano Bruno’, in 
Rinascimento, p. 80. My translation from Italian: «Il duplice valore della teoria dell’ombra, 
personale e universale, rende dunque questo tema il più adatto a mediare tra il sapere filosofico e la 
riforma e potenziamento del sé; in questo senso l’arte della memoria è parte coerente e consapevole 
del processo di costruzione di una nuova identità». 
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as it were, before oneself a formed and unique whole moving from multiple and 
amorphous parts.300 
 
Not only does Bruno eliminate any ontological hierarchy but also any logical 
necessity in nature, as Matteoli confirms: «there is no need for logical rigour in order 
to guarantee that a thing is: it is, as a matter of fact, being, and the produced being, 
the truth value that bears the most sense within Bruno’s world»301. The kind of 
Lullian ars combinatoria that Bruno has employed within his own art of memory 
does not claim to be a faithful and exact reproduction of nature; it is not an objective 
correspondence of predicates to reality. Bruno is not a logical positivist who replaces 
paradigms with images. This is due to the fact that Bruno does not identify the 
number as a real entity – exactly as in the case of Spinoza – but as something abstract 
and therefore not suitable to provide any understanding of unity, which is not 
understood through numerical determinations. The mathematical and logical 
structures of the art of memory, then, are mere organizational associations. Bruno’s 
art of memory does not aim at remembering as many brute facts as possible; what 
really characterizes it is the ability to create this productive process of organizing and 
ordering of significant images sculpted and allocated in our memory within a 
complex combinatory system that corresponds to the world’s vicissitude in our 
psyche and therefore allows us to follow the dynamics of nature. That, however, does 
not amount to reproducing the world or its functioning structure within one’s own 
mind, but rather the steadfast search for the different combinations in which the 
                                                
300 G. Bruno, De umbris idearum, edited by Rita Sturlese, Firenze 1991, p. 54. My translation from 
Latin, also based on the facing-page Italian translation:  
«Talem quidem progressum tunc te vere facere comperies, et expe- 
rieris cum a confusa pluralitate, ad distinctam unitatem per te fiat  
accessio. Id enim non est universalia logica conflare, quae ex distinctis  
infimis speciebus, confusas medias, exque iis confusiores supraemas  
captant, sed quasi ex informibus partibus et pluribus, formatum totum  
et unum aptare sibi». 
301 M. Matteoli,‘L’arte della memoria nei primi scritti mnemotecnici di Bruno’, in Rinascimento, p. 
85. My translation from Italian: «Non occorre nessun rigore logico per garantire che una cosa ci sia: 
è infatti l’essere, e l’essere prodotto, il valore di verità che ha maggior senso all’interno del mondo 
di Bruno». 
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world manifests itself to us. Bruno does not believe in abstract Aristotelian species or 
categories. He is anchored in the reality of things and in the innumerable ways they 
manifest themselves to us, not as objects, but as the multiplicity of nature that needs 
to be thought as the unity of the ἕν.  
The organization of the images happens within a finite structure of organized 
spaces called subiecta, ready to receive the actual memory in the shape of an image, 
the adiectum. The subiectum – or substratum – does not act as a mere container 
where significant images are stored but is instead the place where the phantasia, the 
creative activity, moulds and shapes the significant images, thus producing the actual 
memory. The new memory is not a brute fact but something new if compared to the 
mere sense data: when the adiectum «apple» enters the subiectum, it is neither the 
particular perception of the apple (its particular sweetness, its particular colour, etc.) 
nor the universal concept of an apple. The apple is relationally composed through a 
potentially infinite number of relations: the action of plucking, the myth of Discord, 
the bite of the peel, etc. And each of these relations reveals another potentially 
infinite number of relations. An apple stops behaving as an object and starts being 
inscribed in everything that makes it an apple all the way to infinity. In Spinoza, 
while talking of modes, we said they are “tips of an iceberg”, in the sense that what 
we call objects are nothing but the tip of an infinite series of practices, affections, 
reciprocal causes and effects. Bruno’s art of memory gives a figuration to this 
“iceberg”, it represents it through the power of imagination. Understanding things as 
determined by potentially infinite series of relations brings together multiplicity and 
understands it as a unity that keeps and reveals. The apple, through its being defined 
by the subsequent relations – and the relations of these relations – in its tension 
towards infinity, comes to coincide with the whole of reality. Bruno literally invents a 
tool to experience the intensity of Being in its unity through pushing multiplicity to 
the compositional limits bearable for the human mind. Whereas Heidegger 
understands things as the gathering up of the fourfold, Bruno, driven by his heroic 
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passion – as well as by his hypermnesia – wants to reproduce this gathering, this 
bringing together, through images. 
This move, then, demonstrates Bruno’s originality if compared to his 
predecessors but also if compared to his successors. I think that to conclude our 
understanding of this process and to appreciate its significance it is worth listening to 
Bruno himself in two passages from two of his mnemotechnic works, the Cantus 
Circaeus and the De umbris idearum: 
 
As far as the relationship between substrata and images is concerned, the substrata must 
be intended as entities that let themselves be shaped, moved and altered by the 
forthcoming images, so that you can easily represent them. They have to be intended, I 
mean, as places destined to suffer some sort of mutation, just as the blank page is 
actually mutated by the letters traced on it […].302 
 
And as it is said that the imaginative faculty grasps what it is that the painter has 
described on the wall and the memorizing retains the intention of that painting, so this 
organ has the function of referring and connecting or, better, has that function through 
which one thing is referred or connected to another: as if they were reciprocally 
connected through chain rings or similar things.[…] so the cogitative faculty, without 
hesitation, having set aside every other aspect, chooses what has been determined in 
order of succession by the same virtue of the distinguishing […] the distinguishing 
being a sort of number through which the cogitative faculty approaches in its own way 
the retained images, dividing them, disaggregating them, gathering them, connecting 
them, modifying them, forming them, ordering them,  relating them from within to the 
unitary form, everything in proportion to its capacity.303 
                                                
302 G. Bruno, ‘Cantus Circaeus’, in G. Bruno, Opere Mnemotecniche I, edited by M. Matteoli, R. 
Sturlese, N. Tirinnanzi, directed by M. Ciliberto, Adelphi, Milano 2004, p. 678. My translation 
from Latin, also based on the facing-page Italian translation: «Quo ad Relationem. Subiecta debent 
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pictore est in pariete descriptum, rememorativaque illius picturae reti- 
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In addition, insofar as they are subjected to a constant change and, therefore, are not 
simply retained, they require a more interpretative and hermeneutical attitude. Bruno 
is also influenced by the Jewish tradition of the Cabala, much of which is based on 
interpretation and exegesis. As a matter of fact, every image is re-interpreted 
according to the subsequent relation, and so forth. In the second extract such a re-
interpretation is represented as a kind of distinguishing, that same Heraclitean virtue 
from which we derived our notion of γνῶσις. If distinguishing is a form of re-
interpreting an image through its following relation, ideally the exercise will lead, at 
the end, to the greatest relation of all, that is, the unity of nature or its intensive 
participation in each of its particulars. It is not surprising if Heraclitus was no 
stranger to Bruno. In the De umbris idearum, Bruno cites the famous Heraclitean 
dictum: «if all things were smoke, we would not distinguish anything»304.  
Bruno’s art of memory goes beyond the Heideggerian claim that «thought is in 
need of memory, the gathering of thought». In Bruno memory is not only a thinking 
that shelters what needs to be thought, what gives by being concealed. Bruno enacts 
memory as a gathering, a bringing together of shadows in their infinite relationality 
that, intensively understood, grasp unity. What is concealed is not merely sheltered, it 
is sought-after and creates the “heroic” tension that characterises his way of dwelling. 
It is obvious that Bruno does not intend to build a system that reflects all the possible 
relations. His art of memory is potentially infinite because it reflects the vicissitude of 
the world in the constant change of its relations. But the more relations this system 
can represent, the more it tends to the experience of the unity of nature, pushed by 
the love for knowledge.  
One last observation regarding the role of imagination. In his work Echoes: 
After Heidegger, John Sallis posits a very interesting question, asking whether 
imagination could be thought of as the meaning of Being. Sallis builds his argument 
                                                
304 Ibid., pp. 107-108. My translation from Latin: «Dixit Heraclitus: "si omnia entia fumus fierent, 
nares omnia discernerent"». 
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referring to imagination mainly in its Kantian significance. Yet, if imagination in 
Kant could be seen as a bridge between dualisms – what is thought and what is 
sensed, what is free and what is not free – in Bruno, as we have seen, it even prevents 
such dualisms from arising. Says Sallis: «How, then, could imagination be supposed 
the meaning of Being? Only insofar as imagination proves to be essentially linked to 
the horizon of ontological understanding. Only insofar as it can be shown to bear on 
the very constitution, the opening, of that horizon. In short, only insofar as 
imagination turns out to be in some respect identical with time»305. By recalling the 
understanding of time as anticipation and projection in Sein und Zeit but also as the 
grasping of the ecstasies of past, present and future in a unity as the primordial and 
original time that is finite, we could go as far as to affirm that the existential structure 
of time that Heidegger provides is mirrored in the Brunian imagination, where 
significant images are gathered in a finite space, moulded by their relations to 
subsequent images and therefore anticipating, mirroring and containing the infinite 
universe in a glance. Therefore a unity is captured starting from a finite point of 
departure but it is also able to project through the infinite potential of the ars 
combinatoria, the mathematical tool applied by the cogitative faculty. Sallis, quoting 
Heidegger, stresses the productive aspect of imagination: «In production one has 
always already looked ahead to such an image so as then to be able to form the 
product according to the look thus anticipated. Such an anticipated look, Heidegger 
says, is precisely what the Greeks mean by εἶδος and ιδέα. Thus, most remarkably, 
Heidegger can correlate εἶδος, as image, with imagination: “The anticipated look, the 
pre image [Vor-bild] shows the thing as what it is before the production and as it is 
supposed to look as a product. The external look has not yet been externalized as 
something formed, as actual, but rather is the image of imagination [das Bild der Ein-
Bildung], of φαντασία” (GA 24: 150). Heidegger stresses that such an imaginal 
sighting is not ancillary to production but rather belongs positively to its structure, 
indeed, constitutes the very centre of that structure. Imagination thoroughly governs 
                                                
305 J. Sallis, Echoes: After Heidegger, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1990, pp. 99-100. 
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production»306. In the case of Bruno, this is even more evident for not only does man 
explicate his productive faculties through imagination in individual and finite cases 
but he also understands the infinite potentialities of the process offered by the ars 
combinatoria, thus grasping, in a single gaze, the unity of τὰ πάντα.  
 
 
 
Section 2 – Hieroglyphics  
 
 
Heidegger is a philosopher of the origin. His works on the Presocratics do not 
aim at determining what Heraclitus or Parmenides “really said”; they are an attempt 
to experience their proximity to the origin. A privileged and yet undisclosed path on 
this potential experience of the origin lies in those words that we are no longer able to 
listen to. Here I would not claim that we cannot understand them, as we do have an 
understanding of them in terms of their meaning and communicative power. 
Nevertheless, it is their very semantic intelligibility that makes them distant from us 
while we persist in a stubborn attempt to discover the meaning of λόγος as the 
natural language of Φύσις. It is not a problem of meaning or reference – we are not 
looking for the object those words refer to – it is the impossibility for those words to 
resound in our ears in their originality, which follows our incapacity even to 
experience what it is for those words to resound; again, we are faced with a sclerosis 
of the fourfold, where the mortals do not hear the voice of the earth, nor do they take 
care of the gods. Bruno feels that his age also makes it impossible to hear the gods, 
for it has forgotten ancient wisdom. Inspired by the Hermetic texts, Bruno provides 
his own take on the origin, going back all the way to Ancient Egypt. 
                                                
306 Ibid., p. 101. 
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If the view advanced by Frances Yates in her Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic 
Tradition has depicted Bruno as a Hermetic magician307 more than a philosopher, 
thus providing a mainly mystical interpretation of his magical theories, we stand with 
those philosophers and critics, such as Ciliberto, Gatti and Bassi, who have provided 
a more fruitful reading of what Bruno calls magic. Bruno affirms in the De magia 
naturalis: 
 
Such were the figures, so well designed by the Egyptians, which are called 
hieroglyphics or sacred symbols. These were specific images selected from natural 
objects and their parts to designate individual things. The Egyptians used these symbols 
and sounds to converse with the gods to accomplish extraordinary results. Later, when 
Theuth308, or someone else, invented the letters of the type we use today for other 
purposes, this resulted in a tremendous loss, first of memory, and then of divine science 
and magic.309 
 
In this dense passage extrapolated from one of Bruno’s essays on magic we can find a 
number of issues that are immediately relevant to our ethical purposes, i.e. to a 
practice of thinking as inhabiting the world, as we saw in Heidegger: hieroglyphics as 
a manifestation of an original inhabiting of the world by the Egyptians, their 
implications as images for the role of memory and for our relationship with the gods 
and, finally, the attack on language as alphabetical writing. Again, the Nolan 
philosopher is addressing unity but the point of departure is always the attention 
granted to the minuzzarie310, all the seemingly irrelevant and unimportant things. 
Even the smallest creature, understood in its infinite relational bonds, expresses unity; 
thus everything has the same dignity in the infinite universe, a man just like a donkey 
                                                
307 «Bruno appears as a Renaissance Magus, proceeding from the Ficino-Pico synthesis (via the De 
occulta philosophia of Agrippa) but shifting the balance so that the Hermetic element is 
predominant, with the Cabalist and Pseudo-Dionysian elements subservient to the leading Egyptian 
naturalism». From F. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition [1964], with an 
introduction by J. B. Trapp, Routledge, London 2002, p. 314. 
308 See Plato, Phaedrus, 274 c-e, for the legend on the origins of written language, 
309 G. Bruno, “On Magic”, from G. Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, and Essays on Magic, pp. 
114-115. 
310 “odds and ends”. A fundamental trait of Bruno’s philosophy resides in the constant awareness of 
the multiplicity in its particulars, even the most irrelevant ones, which possess the same ontological 
dignity as everything else as pervaded by the World Soul. 
 212 
or a speck of dust. This ontological uniformity implies something crucial about the 
ways of searching for truth, which can depart from the contemplation of the infinite 
universe or a lump of dirt. What draws our attention immediately is, again, memory 
and its relationship to writing, which will lead us to an understanding of the reason 
why the Egyptians and their hieroglyphics play such an important role in Bruno’s 
philosophy. As we saw in the previous section, Bruno is quite clear about the fact that 
order is an essential aspect of the art of memory, as retention is based on ordered 
images distributed within psychological spaces (subiecta) created for that purpose. 
Not only are the images derived from nature, it is man himself who becomes the 
growing and productive source of images on nature’s behalf; in this sense memory is 
a productive faculty. Simonetta Bassi draws a strong link between this productive 
aspect of memory and writing as «the art of memory, Bruno explains, operates just 
like the graphic arts in its two major applications, i.e. painting and writing: as internal 
painting it builds the images of the things which must be recalled by memory, as 
internal writing it places them in an architecturally ordered fashion, distributing the 
signs and the identifying notes. In a few words: memory recreates the world in an 
artificial space, using and playing with absence»311. Nevertheless, what is artificial 
becomes natural, for man is not abstracted and isolated within his own subjectivity. 
The play of absence allows the ordered system to work as the images, Bassi argues, 
collected and ordered through signs within the artificial space of memory, are signs 
themselves of a nature that cannot be depicted. Images, we should not forget, are 
nothing but shadows, which express the irreducible latency of the truth, that which is 
retained and kept in safety. The artificial constitution of the mnemotechnic 
construction is indeed as natural as the nature it represents or, rather, produces. The 
                                                
311 S. Bassi, L’arte di Giordano Bruno. Memoria, magia, furore, Istituto Nazionale per gli Studi sul 
Rinascimento, Studi e Testi n. 44, Firenze, pp. 55-56. My translation from Italian: «L’arte della 
memoria, spiega Bruno, opera come l’arte grafica nelle sue due specificazioni maggiori, cioè nella 
pittura e nella scrittura: come pittura interiore costruisce le immagini delle cose che devono essere 
richiamate alla memoria, come scrittura interiore le colloca in modo architettonicamente ordinato, 
distribuendo i segni e le note identificative. Insomma: la memoria ricrea il mondo in uno spazio 
artificiale, usando e giocando con l’assenza». 
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concept of “artificial” does not make sense in such a context. That is why we should 
really make an effort to think, when Bruno – or Bassi, in this instance – refers to an 
internal constitution, this interiority as our own human and creative perspective of 
exteriority: in other words, nature produces its own representation through the human 
mind. It is exactly this internal writing, as a perspective of identity, that allows the 
flow of knowledge between man and nature in their difference and it is in this sense 
that Bruno attributes a fundamental knowing importance to the art of memory. As we 
saw in the passage from the De magia, Bruno severely condemns Theut, the mythical 
inventor of alphabetical writing, for causing a brusque and devastating interruption of 
this flow. This condemnation has ancient roots in Plato’s Phaedrus and it is definitely 
not surprising to find it in an author such as Bruno, who had full access to the 
Platonic material translated by Ficino. Plato’s condemnation of writing is clear and 
severe and it is intimately related to memory, as one of the crucial criticisms is that, 
due to alphabetical writing, men’s recollection will develop from without and no 
longer from within themselves312. This could be read as an ante litteram criticism of 
the objectification operated upon nature, thanks to the loss of a direct contact with it 
as the closing up of the flow of memory from within man. Again, it is not an act of an 
objectivism against some sort of pre-existing subjectivism – as these two views are 
coessential – it is the closing up, the interruption of the identity between man and 
nature, an identity originally guaranteed by memory. Derrida clearly distinguishes 
between two kinds of memory, one as mere recollection and reproduction and one as 
a living memory, which we have been calling productive: 
 
Thoth is essentially the god of writing, the secretary of Ra and the nine gods, the 
hierogrammate and the hypomnetographer. Now, it is precisely by pointing out, as we 
shall see, that the pharmakon of writing is good for hypomnesis (re-memoration, 
recollection, consignation) and not for the mneme (living, knowing memory) that 
Thamus, in the Phaedrus, condemns it as being of little worth.313 
 
                                                
312 See Plato, Phaedrus, 275a.  
313 J. Derrida, Dissemination, translated by B. Johnson, Continuum, London 2004, p. 95. 
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Alphabetical writing interrupts the creative and symbiotic progress of man and nature 
guaranteed by oral transmission. Production here is not intended as technological or 
industrial reproduction or classification but as a constant re-creation of the myths and 
the legends and of public culture, as used to happen in archaic Greece. Yet we cannot 
ignore the great paradox of this Platonic condemnation, coming from the very 
philosopher whose written work will take words such as justice and love above their 
vicissitudinal contingencies and envisage a πολιτεία where all desire is kept under 
control and made functional to the Good. Bruno’s art of memory, as was seen in the 
previous chapter, proceeds in the opposite direction, as it is exactly a knowing and 
living memory that accounts for contingencies, details, particulars, variations that the 
abstraction of alphabetical writing cannot capture. Words – and even letters – are 
pushed back to their original function as ever-changing images of nature and not as 
universally valid descriptions of it. Language and words in Bruno’s sense end up 
being nature’s own act of creation and production. 
Here emerges the alternative route Bruno attempts in order to get to the origin. 
What moves Bruno is impressively similar to what moves Heidegger as, at the very 
opening of the modern age and at the apex of Renaissance culture, he fully perceives 
the crisis the Europe of his time has fallen into – religious wars, obscurantism and 
fear – culturally and politically, and seeks a way out through his nova philosophia, 
which is, as a matter of fact, a philosophy of the origin. Whereas Heidegger seeks the 
origin in the unthought that has given rise to Presocratic philosophy and Western 
thinking, Bruno goes even further by seeking such origin outside Presocratic thinking 
– which he nevertheless admires and which he identifies with. In a way the Greeks, 
by adopting the alphabetical writing, have already lost their memory and even though 
the λόγος still resounds in Heraclitus’ ears, it has already been delivered outwards, 
externalized and condemned to oblivion, that very oblivion that, according to 
Heidegger, will give rise to Western thinking. In Chapter I we saw how Plato shifted 
from a notion of truth as unconcealment to a notion of truth as correctness and that 
was related to a closing up of recollection: the shift is indicative because it is parallel 
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to the use of alphabetical writing. Heraclitus and Parmenides made use of writing but 
did that through poetry; Plato, nevertheless, employed dialogue, a further mediation 
between what is written and the resounding of original words. The memory of the 
Egyptians, on the other hand, is intimately connected to the Origin, as their 
hieroglyphics worked according to a system of images that was recorded in their 
temples in a «bi-univocal relationship between human mind – populated by the 
shadows of ideas – and the shadow of the true and the good, the natural image, a 
relation that is always necessary in a continuous description and production, for the 
shadow as an image is never something fixed»314. Here it is important to grasp the 
identity between the practice, as production of images, and knowledge in its 
necessary shadowy form. If in the De umbris idearum Bruno is still partially attached 
to a Platonic dualism and therefore the shadows are dependent on their archetype, 
from the De la causa onwards his monism becomes more and more evident and 
therefore the shadows reveal their independence as the necessary human form of 
knowing, together with their productive role within nature. Again, the artificial origin 
of images as shadows of something true and natural reveals them to be nothing but a 
cycle of natural production of reality, a cycle that necessarily, i.e. ontologically and 
gnoseologically, includes man. That is why Bruno, through his art of memory, works 
towards a practice that could actively reproduce the Egyptian experience. Bruno is 
not proposing to reintroduce hieroglyphics – which, at the time, were unreadable – he 
wanted to create a system within his own epoch to be able to get rid of the mediation 
of alphabetical writing. Bruno forces language within his system of images and 
breaks its chains by creating a «fantastic logic», as Noferi calls it. Bruno does not 
care if language cannot express what he achieves with his fantastic logic; as a matter 
of fact, he says in the De minimo, one of his later works: 
 
                                                
314 S. Bassi, L’arte di Giordano Bruno. Memoria, magia, furore, p. 59. My translation from Italian: 
«[…] una relazione biunivoca fra la mente dell’uomo – popolata dalle ombre delle idee – e l’ombra 
del vero e del buono, l’immagine naturale, relazione che di necessità è sempre in continuo 
descriversi e prodursi, dal momento che l’ombra come immagine non è qualcosa di fisso». 
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we will be inventors, if necessary, of new words, from all different origins, in harmony 
with the newness of our doctrine. The grammarians subject content to words; we, 
instead, will subject words to content.315 
 
This is a downright attack on the Western philosophical tradition: reversing the 
relationship between words and content is not a mere inversion of roles, it means that 
language has lost its privileged standpoint in relation to nature. The transcendence of 
language is annulled by the creative power of man. Coinciding with nature, man 
becomes part of a creative process that cannot be reduced to correctness, as the 
«grammarians» would have it: nature cannot be ontologically reduced to propositions 
because propositions ontologically belong to it and such an attack is directed to the 
advocates of the adaequatio intellectus ad rem as much as to the modern thinkers and 
scientists yet to come. Bruno uncovers ex ante the inadequacy of the Cartesian 
subject, isolated from nature – which ends up being relegated by rational doubt into 
the realm of uncertainty – and he consequently rejects any possibility of a 
mathematical reading of nature such as the one that will be advocated by Galileo 
shortly after his death. 
That is why Bruno does not attempt to build a final vocabulary or a fixed system 
of images: his horizon is always the infinite and its vicissitude. He really wishes to 
inhabit the world in a “more than Copernican” manner and his obsession with the 
infinite is mirrored in every aspect of the Nolana Philosophia, most importantly in 
his language, as Hilary Gatti points out: «Only by uniting the powers of the reason 
with those of the imagination would it be possible, in Bruno’s view, to widen the 
network of possible combinations of alphabets, numbers, geometrical figures, 
poetical structures, and images in order to catch, in even more sophisticated mental 
grids susceptible of extension to virtually infinite variations, at least some fragments 
                                                
315 G. Bruno, “De triplici minimo et mensura”, in G. Bruno, Opera latine conscripta, edited by F. 
Tocco and H. Vitelli, Florence 1889, p. 135. My translation from Latin: 
«Commodius, vocum authores erimusque novarum.  
Grammatici verbis, at nobis verba ministrent,  
Ii observent usum, quem nos indicimus ollis». 
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of a new science»316. It comes as no surprise, then, that James Joyce was inspired by 
Bruno, not only and definitely not most importantly, in terms of stylistic matters317. 
Here we can draw a fundamental link between thinking, writing and dwelling, which 
partly emerged in the previous chapter on Heidegger. Whether or not Bruno is 
historically right about the Egyptians being somehow closer to the origin, he is not 
looking for a philological proof; as a matter of fact, he was not – nor was anyone else 
in his time – aware that hieroglyphics were a system of signs and not just images. 
Nonetheless, he is transferring that propulsive energy deriving from his encounter 
with Egyptian culture and mediated by the Hermetic texts to found Western thinking 
on completely new premises. Nature is seen as the cradle of activity and creativity we 
are ontologically immersed in and not as a divisible, calculable external entity to be 
exploited through science and technology. Bruno does not reject the present for a 
nostalgic return to the Egyptian or Presocratic past: his praise and admiration for 
Copernicus and his discoveries take a completely different stance and direction if 
compared to what we actually call modernity. Bruno is the protagonist of a different 
modernity with respect to his illustrious and immediate successors (Bacon, Galileo, 
Descartes) and more Copernican than Copernicus himself318, as he is the first one to 
really draw the extreme consequences out of the heliocentric discovery and infer the 
                                                
316 H. Gatti, “Multiple languages of the new science”, in H. Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno, p. 
109. 
317 Joyce literally embraces Bruno’s ontology, which penetrates deeply into some of the characters 
in Ulysses, not to mention the linguistic experiments of Finnegan’s Wake. Joseph Voelker 
underlines how this results from Joyce borrowing Bruno’s conception of Nature: «Joyce borrowed 
the complex definition of Nature which all his women to some extent personify from his early idol, 
Giordano Bruno. Bruno considered Nature a paradoxical entity, an eternal, unchanging substance 
possessing simultaneously both spiritual and material attributes. As eternal ens, it takes upon itself 
all accidental shapes, from shellfish to emperor, in ceaseless alteration». From J. C. Voelker, 
“Nature it is”: The Influence of Giordano Bruno on James Joyce’s Molly Bloom, in James Joyce 
Quarterly, Vol. 14, n. 1 (Fall, 1976), pp. 39-48. 
318 «He called “stupid” those who tried to geometricize nature, that is, to make nature conform to 
preordained symmetries. He claimed to have understood Copernicus’ theory better than Copernicus 
himself and the proportional compass better than its inventor, Fabrizio Mordente. More generally, 
he scorned those who merely measured for measuring sake, or “played with geometry”. For Bruno, 
as Gatti has pointed out, mathematics is more of an “existential problem” than an “abstract 
intellectual exercise» from A. Saiber, Giordano Bruno and the Geometry of Language, Ashgate, 
Surrey 2005, p. 46.  
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infinite universe. We have given a detailed account of such matters in the first part of 
our work but it was necessary to stress it again in order to understand that Bruno’s 
rediscovery of Ancient Egypt is intimately connected with the new scientific 
discoveries of his time, which have the potential of evoking the lost identity with 
nature, which was proper to the Egyptians. 
For the Egyptians, the divinity was latent in every aspect of nature319, it was not 
a summa of human excellence; hieroglyphics allowed men to access this immanent 
divinity and conferred dignity on the world in its multiplicity: 
 
SOPHIA: […] “Now what evil,” questioned Jove, “could he [the Giant, the great 
antagonist of the gods: ed.] have brought to us that could be said to have been conjoined 
to so great a good? What indignity is there that could have accompanied such a 
triumph?” Momus answered: “With this he brought about that the Egyptians should 
come to honour live images of beasts, and should adore us in the form of those, whence 
we came to be mocked, as I shall tell you”. “And this, oh Momus,” said Jove, “do not 
consider as bad, because you know that animals and plants are living effects of Nature; 
this Nature (as you must know) is none other than God in things”. 
SAUL: So, natura est deus in rebus. 
SOPHIA: “However”, he said, “diverse living things represent diverse divinities and 
diverse powers, which, besides the absolute being they possess, obtain the being 
communicated to all things according to their capacity and measure. Whence all of God 
is in all things (although not totally, but in some more abundantly and in others less).320 
 
In this beautiful passage from The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast [Lo Spaccio de 
la bestia trionfante] Bruno does much more than state his own pantheism inspired by 
the Egyptian religion. He actually provides a narrative account for the dynamic and 
differentiating presence of the divinity «not only in a viper and scorpion but also in 
an onion and garlic»321, a presence that is intensive322 and that, as such, gives an 
account for the Heraclitean distinguishing of τὰ πάντα within the unity. Bruno is not 
                                                
319 Which also seems to be the case of Heraclitus taking care of the gods beside an oven, as we saw 
in the tale told in the previous chapter. 
320 G. Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, translated and with an introduction by Arthur 
D. Imerti, University of Nebraska Press, 2004, p. 235. 
321 Ibidem, p. 236. 
322 The notion of God’s presence in things with different degrees should not suggest the presence of 
any particular “hierarchy” in nature but the very ontological principle – which is intensive – of their 
ontic differentiation as beings – which is extensive. For the notions of “intensive” and “extensive” 
infinite and the “world soul”, please refer to Part I, chapter 2 of this work. 
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asking us to believe in any mystery cult or worship cats, dogs, stones or onions308; he 
is promoting a kind of thinking that is based, on the one hand, on the contemplation 
of the infinite and supported by the new scientific discoveries and, on the other hand, 
on the actual practice of the art of memory that takes into account the world as a unity 
and as a dynamic multiplicity of reciprocal bonds at once: 
 
In this, however, we need that wisdom and judgement, that skill, industry, and use of 
intellectual light that are revealed to the world by the intelligible sun, sometimes more 
and sometimes less, sometimes most greatly and sometimes most minutely. This custom 
is called Magic, and she, inasmuch as she depends on supernatural323 principles, is 
divine; and, inasmuch as she turns toward the contemplation of Nature and to the 
scrutiny of her secrets, she is natural.324 
 
Bruno’s practice of natural magic is nothing but his understanding of the bonds and 
relations that constitute nature, which was the standard understanding of his time. 
The novelty he proposes is the experience and manipulation of such bonds through a 
language of imagination, which tries to recover the Egyptian origin through the 
means and the tools available in his present, the art of memory. Thanks to this, he 
claims that he is able to capture the mystery of the multiplicity within the unity: «it is 
these alphabets, numbers, geometric figures, poetic structures, and groups of images 
working together that showed Bruno the power and interconnectedness beneath the 
surfaces of all linguistic and symbolic systems. Bruno’s philosophy of pluralism, or 
pluralist philosophy, is a philosophy of the many, the multiple, the vicissitudinal, the 
possible»325. As in Heidegger, language for Bruno is neither a medium for 
communication nor a scientific object to be analysed; it is an ontological and ethical 
way of engaging with the world, a proper dwelling. At this stage we could go as far as 
to say that, if there is a philosopher who reactivates the Heideggerian fourfold and 
fights the oblivion of the origin by actively engaging in memory while taking care of 
the gods, it is Giordano Bruno.  
                                                
308 Bruno would have considered a return to the actual Egyptian religion absurd, yet wished to 
awaken the man-nature relationship, which he thought the Egyptians enjoyed. 
324 G. Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, p. 239. 
325 A. Saiber, Giordano Bruno and the Geometry of Language, pp. 55-56. 
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Nevertheless, if Heidegger uncovers the oblivion of Being through the positing 
of the Seinsfrage and, as we saw in the previous section, he affirms that «thought is in 
need of memory», he fails to complete his job. Such failure depends on the fact that 
memory is essential for thinking as a renovated practice of the origin but, as memory, 
it is not characterized by a convincing horizon and it is limited to the restricted and 
elitist access to Being provided by Hölderlin’s poetry. Bruno, on the other hand, 
organizes his thought with the aim of being able to embrace anything that is 
seemingly irrelevant, odds and ends, minuzzarie, and in a way that any element in 
nature and any perspective could provide access to a truth that is always 
vicissitudinal, always in transit, as it is nature producing and creating itself through 
an act of knowing, which is, in fact, the art of memory as we have encountered it. 
Furthermore Heidegger, in his criticism of modern science and technology, has to 
assume the history of metaphysics as a uniform destiny and can only see the 
Copernican revolution as the Nietzschean slope leading us towards X, towards 
nihilism. Bruno, who belongs by historical and philosophical right to that revolution, 
is the advocate of a modernity that never saw the light of day, historically speaking, 
but that was potentially on the way. 
With the help of Bruno, then, we can finally give a better account of the 
Heraclitean tales reported by Heidegger, which we examined in the last chapter. We 
saw the connection between Heraclitus taking care of the gods beside an oven and 
Heraclitus playing dice with some adolescents, while rejecting his fellow citizens’ 
invitation to take part in the life of the πόλις. Heraclitus, just like Bruno, is taking 
care of minuzzarie and yet, we established with Heidegger, he was practising the 
essence of politics326. Bruno’s art of memory provides a proximity to nature akin to 
                                                
326 «And what if – thinking in a Greek way – the preoccupation with the gods’ presence coincided 
instead with the highest preoccupation for the πόλις? That is actually the way it is: as a matter of 
fact the πόλις, always thought in a Greek way, is the centre and the place around which revolves the 
manifestation of everything that is essentially being and therefore also the non-essence of 
everything that is. If it is so, then, […] the thinker that takes care of the essential proximity of the 
gods is the man who is authentically “political”», from M. Heidegger, “Heraklit. Der Anfang des 
 221 
the one encountered in Heraclitus, precisely through giving up on any ontological 
superiority of man over nature and yet providing him with the power of being the 
immediate productive and creative perspective of nature itself. This emerges 
practically in Bruno’s own view of politics, which we can consider as essential as the 
Heraclitean attitude. As Saverio Ansaldi writes: 
 
For Bruno, the material constitution of human activity should not rid itself of natural 
necessity in order to legitimate and justify its own power – as will be the case with the 
great authors of the 17th century, Hobbes and Locke, for instance. The human order 
always corresponds to the natural order, always belongs to that order, since it is the 
result of the freedom and autonomy of human power. In this sense, the human effort and 
labour do not produce “things” whose intrinsic value resides precisely in their essential 
difference with natural things. On the contrary, human activity – and the “labour” of 
human power – has no sense other than being capable of weaving and constituting 
“bonds” with the infinite power of material nature.327 
 
In this sense provided by Bruno, Heraclitus’ stove is not an artificial thing, a mere 
object, but a place for the gods to be found. The same applies to the πόλις and 
political activity, which becomes a sterile activity once it loses its proximity to 
nature.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
abendländischen Denkens”, in M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe. II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923-
1944 [1979], pp. 11-12. See n. 261 for the original text. 
327 S. Ansaldi, Giordano Bruno. Une philosophie de la métamorphose, Classiques Garnier, Paris 
2010, pp. 124-5. My translation from French: «Chez Bruno, la constitution matérielle de l’activité 
humaine ne doit pas d’affranchir de la nécessité naturelle pour légitimer et justifier sa puissance – 
comme ce sera le cas chez les grands auteurs de XVIIe siècle, Hobbes et Locke par example. 
L’ordre humain relève toujours de l’ordre naturel, il appartient toujours à cet ordre, tout en étant le 
résultat de la liberté et de l’autonomie de la puissance humaine. En ce sens, l’effort et le travail 
humains ne produisent pas des ‘choses’ dont la valeur intrinsèque réside précisément dans leur 
différence essentielle avec les choses naturelles. Au contraire, l’activité humaine – le ‘travail’ de la 
puissance humaine – n’a de sens que s’il est capable de tisser et de constituer des ‘liens’ avec la 
puissance infinie de la nature matérielle». 
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Chapter IX – Unity and multiplicity  
 
Section 1 – Power and creation 
 
Both in the Heideggerian interpretation of Heraclitus and in Bruno the ethical is 
directed, in the end, to an appreciation of particular things. The reason for such a 
convergence lies in the fact that our dwelling is dependent on how immediate our 
relation to the world is, so much so that a stove, a child’s game and other minuzzarie 
somehow become more essential than public assemblies. More essential here means 
closer to nature and to that thinking of the origin we have been after; in Spinoza, 
nonetheless, it also means more powerful. Empowerment does not derive from 
authority or in virtue of an institutional and imposing order, contexts that bind man to 
a situation of subjugation for they are violent and imposing. If man has to be 
empowered and free, we saw that bondage should be enhanced through a direct and 
immediate appreciation of nature, which is achieved through the practice of the art of 
memory as the creation and representation of the most fundamental bonds. This is 
what Bruno called natural magic, the practice of bringing down the abstractions of 
language through the power of imagination. We had left Spinoza dismissing 
imagination as the characteristic faculty of a fragmentary and inadequate knowledge, 
thus inappropriate for an understanding of particular things, something that not even 
common notions could provide. We have thus left unresolved how what Spinoza calls 
knowledge of the third kind could enlighten us on particular things, in order to 
develop our discourse on ethics. As a matter of fact, in Heidegger the ethical 
discourse, understood as dwelling; took us to the exploration of things, thus resulting 
in the fourfold. Heidegger’s understanding of a thing through the fourfold also 
embraced the essence of the political, as what is essentially political does not 
correspond to an institutional arrangement of power but to taking care of the gods, 
thus re-activating our proximity to nature by rejecting the technological interpretation 
of the world, which amounts to ceasing to treat things as objects. In this complex 
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framework, all the elements hold one another omni-relationally, for understanding 
ethics as dwelling and inhabiting requires us to be able to think more than one 
thought at once. The practice of ethics reveals itself to be much more and something 
radically different from a dialogue among different cultures, religions and political 
systems on how to live one’s life: inhabiting requires us to stop reducing the world to 
a bunch of rational counterparts discussing what is best to do. This is the overcoming 
of Admetus’ solution: dialogue as reducing to reason corresponds to abstraction, thus 
to the loss of an understanding of particular things in their essence, thereby to a loss 
of power. This means that, as long as ethics is merely understood as an extensive 
arrangement of objects, behaviours and abstract – institutional – relations between 
people, it cannot provide us with any freedom or power, just with violence and 
oppression.  
In a text called Subversive Spinoza [Spinoza sovversivo] Antonio Negri presents 
Spinoza as a possibility for liberation, attacking directly the extensive understanding 
of time: «Spinoza’s philosophy rejects time-as-measurement. It captures time-as-life. 
This is the reason why Spinoza ignores the word “time” – although he does fix its 
meaning between life and imagination. As a matter of fact, for Spinoza time does not 
exist except as liberation. Freed time turns into productive imagination, rooted in 
ethics. Freed time is neither becoming nor dialectics nor mediation. It is being that 
gets built, dynamic constitution, fulfilled imagination. Time is not measure but ethics. 
Thus imagination reveals the hidden dimensions of Spinozist being – of this ethical 
being that is being of the revolution, continuous ethical choice of production»328. 
Negri puts forth an unexpected thesis, by associating imagination with the 
                                                
328 A. Negri, “Spinoza sovversivo”, in A. Negri, Spinoza [1998], with forewords by G. Deleuze, P. 
Macherey and A. Matheron, Derive e Approdi, Roma 2006, pp. 292-293. My translation from 
Italian: «La filosofia di Spinoza esclude il tempo-misura. Essa coglie il tempo-vita. È per questo che 
Spinoza ignora la parole “tempo” – pur fissando il suo concetto fra vita e immaginazione. Infatti per 
Spinoza il tempo non esiste che come liberazione. Il tempo liberato si fa immaginazione produttiva, 
radicata nell’etica. Il tempo liberato non è né divenire, né dialettica, né mediazione. Ma essere che 
si costruisce, costituzione dinamica, immaginazione realizzata. Il tempo non è misura ma etica. Così 
l’immaginazione svela le dimensioni nascoste dell’essere spinoziano – di questo essere etico che è 
l’essere della rivoluzione, continua scelta etica di produzione». 
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overcoming of duration and therefore of the extensive perspective. In Chapter VIII 
we considered John Sallis’ hypothesis that imagination could somehow be the 
meaning of Being but only under certain conditions, namely «only insofar as 
imagination proves to be essentially linked to the horizon of ontological 
understanding. Only insofar as it can be shown to bear on the very constitution, the 
opening, of that horizon. In short, only insofar as imagination turns out to be in some 
respect identical with time»329. In Bruno we saw how the art of memory adopts a 
standpoint where time is identified with a systematically projecting play of images 
and not with duration. Grasping the relational nature of images as a mirror of the 
universe allows Bruno to acquire the ontological tension towards an understanding of 
the One. In Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Heidegger brings up, 
with respect to time, the role of memory as a thinking that re-produces the tension 
between what is concealed or retained and what is actual in virtue of being a gift: 
 
The remembering awaiting (remembering a concealed belongingness to be-ing, 
awaiting a call of be-ing) puts to decision the whether or not of the onset of be-ing. 
More clearly: temporalizing as this joining of the (hesitating) self-refusal grounds the 
domain of decision in according to the ab-ground. However, with the removal-unto 
what does not grant itself (that is after all what is ownmost to temporalizing), everything 
would already be decided. But what does not grant itself refuses itself hesitantly; in this 
manner it grants the possibility of gifting [italics mine] and enowment.330 
 
Time as “temporalizing” is the dimension of the gift, which is such only insofar as 
temporalizing is understood within the tension of memory, the recalling of what is 
retained or hesitantly «self-refused». If the Heideggerian thing has to be understood 
as gift, it has to be in virtue of what is self-refused, which on the other hand hesitates 
by revealing and delivering itself as temporalized. In the Contributions this is what 
Heidegger calls the ab-ground, the essential sway of time-space onto what is 
retained. However, if such «temporalizing» is understood as removing and 
obliterating what is retained, then it amounts to mere duration, in which everything is 
                                                
329 J. Sallis, Echoes: After Heidegger, pp. 99-100. 
330 M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 268. 
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«already decided». Thus, what we have called the perspective of extension, which is 
that of imagination, is a deficient one only insofar as it is not understood in terms of 
memory, which requires a role for time that is not the one of mere duration. This also 
affects the status of imagination, which could be isolated by a merely durational 
understanding or be activated by a mnemonic one: this is, from the perspective of the 
understanding, the difference between the object and the thing. In Spinoza this 
translates into the understanding of essences of particular things, which are not 
understood extensively, i.e. under the point of view of duration. Particular things 
understood intensively require time to adopt the perspective of what is retained, 
namely of substance, for particular essences are nothing but degrees of God’s power. 
This perspective, in Spinoza, is nothing but the understanding of things sub specie 
aeternitatis. We shall see that in Spinoza imagination will not only be a prerogative 
of inadequate knowing but that, under similar circumstances to the ones outlined 
above, it will proceed all the way to intuition as the knowledge of the third kind. 
We have encountered imagination in Spinoza as the characteristic feature of a 
fragmentary and inadequate knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the first kind and, 
nonetheless, we saw that Negri presents it as the ultimate ethical attitude, the highest 
form of proximity to being and therefore a source of freedom and power. We saw at 
the end of Chapter VI, quoting Pr. 28 in Part V of the Ethics, how that kind of 
intuition describing what Spinoza calls knowledge of the third kind could only be 
desired and achieved through the exercise of the second kind and not of the first as, of 
the two, only common notions can provide us with adequate ideas, as Spinoza 
describes in the proof of that same proposition: 
 
This proposition is self-evident. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we 
understand either through itself or through something else which is conceived through 
itself. That is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us or which are related to the third 
kind of knowledge (Sch. 2, Pr. 40, II) cannot follow from fragmentary or confused ideas 
which (same Sch.) are related to the second kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, 
that is (same Sch.) from the second or third kind of knowledge. […]331 
                                                
331 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 375. 
 226 
 
In virtue of this proposition we strengthened our idea that Spinoza’s Ethics provides 
us with the means to achieve knowledge of the third kind because having adequate 
ideas of nature and God, understanding their ontological structure through reason as 
expressed by the mos geometricus, steers our conatus, our desire to pursue adequate 
ideas. This means that, if we really understood the Ethics, we could not be content 
with reading it. This is evident also from the fact that the mind thrives with happiness 
when it experiences ideas in their adequacy and therefore a mind furnished with 
adequate ideas will be drawn to wish for more. Furthermore, we saw that in Spinoza 
truth never comes across as correspondence, given that there is no standard to match 
an adequate idea: either truth is its own reward or it is not truth at all. That is what 
Spinoza means by clear and distinct, which is another way of saying adequate. In the 
end, there seems to be no place for imagination. Nevertheless, we should not forget 
that imagination as knowledge of the first kind is not an utter gnosiological failure: 
the ideas it provides are, indeed, fragmentary and inadequate, but they do contain 
some knowledge about particular things and, ethically, they do not correspond to an 
unreal or false condition. The ethical condition is one of subjugation and passivity 
with respect to particular things, thus a real and concrete one. Imagination, as 
opposed to reason, provides us with a contact, however passive, with particular 
things, which is something reason alone cannot provide and without which no 
adequate ideas could ever be had. As a matter of fact, Lloyd comes to the aid of Negri 
by quoting his Savage Anomaly and giving credit to this position: «The world of 
passion and imagination comes into view as fitting object for rational investigation. 
“Reason traverses the imagination, liberating the truth it contains, and meanwhile the 
imagination constructs the passivity of the existent and, therefore, of reason itself” 
(Negri 1981:106). Negri’s interpretation of the relation between Spinozistic reason 
and imagination captures something important – that for Spinoza the power of 
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imagination is both constructive and destructive»332. This twofold role of the 
imagination was envisaged earlier, when it was presented with the option of 
understanding itself through duration or eternity or, to use Heidegger’s terms, of 
remembering its belongingness to what is concealed or self-refused.  
It may seem counterintuitive to investigate how there could be any productive 
faculty within an ontological setting where our minds and bodies are determined by 
causal chains that do not allow for any initiative of this sort, let alone “constructing 
being” in any sense. Nevertheless, this kind of reasoning is misleading, for it is only 
legitimate from the point of view of a Cartesian subject, where productive initiative is 
left to the individual’s choice. The causal chains do not just bind the individual mode, 
they determine its very existence by affecting it.  Furthermore, their productive drive 
is nothing but the power of their individual essence, which is not the prerogative of a 
metaphysically conceived individual but a degree of nature’s own power. Conceiving 
causal relations as mechanical impacts between existing objects amounts to 
misunderstanding nature in Spinoza. In Heidegger, Being delivers itself historically, 
in the being-there of truth, thus also understanding nature as Φύσις, as growth. The 
whole issue lies, again, in the understanding: either the understanding of this delivery 
is a mere projection of a subject upon the world or it is a projection of nature, the 
openness onto which what is retained can deliver its gift. Says Heidegger in the 
Contributions: 
 
Whoever ever wants to face the history of be-ing and intends to experience how be-ing 
stays away in its own essential sphere [Wesensraum] and for a long time abandons its 
sphere to what is precisely not its ownmost – which drives the propagation of “beings” 
before itself in order even to preserve what is not ownmost unto what is ownmost to 
which it does belong – such a one must be able to grasp above all that project-openings 
are thrown into that which, thanks to their clearing, again becomes a being and only 
tolerates be-ing as an addendum to it, an addendum that “abstraction” had devised.333 
 
                                                
332 G. Lloyd, Spinoza and the Ethics, p. 64. 
333 M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 315. 
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The «propagation of “beings”» before Being is intended as the obliteration of the 
essential sphere, of what is retained and kept safe and it amounts to abstracting things 
and understanding them as objects. Such obliteration is part of the historical delivery 
of Being itself as metaphysics, according to Heidegger. On the other hand, the re-
activation of what has been obliterated, the essential sphere that is retained, is also 
part of the historical delivery conceived as a mnemonic act. In Spinoza, the 
movement is analogous, although not expressed in historical terms but in terms of 
eternity: the only way for the essential sphere of substance to reveal what is retained 
– what is intensively understood – is the intuition of adequate ideas. The mind adopts 
intuition as knowledge of the third kind by understanding particular things as 
essences, as degrees of God’s power. Through this very understanding, it understands 
itself as powerful, i.e. as belonging to the sphere of essences. It sees itself sub specie 
aeternitatis. The standpoint of eternity is not alternative to a historical delivery of 
Being. Only a mechanical reading of Spinoza would reduce the modal reality to a 
merely causal network of objects. There are causal relations, indeed, but they do not 
occur between objects, for modes are not objects. Modes are not simply bound by 
causal chains, they are affected and relationally constituted by them, as we have 
already seen in Chapter III: the capacity of affecting and being affected constitutes 
their essence. Historical events are delivered as affections of substance in a particular 
moment and place. From the point of view of eternity, though, they affect the course 
of history proportionally to the intensity of their power. Therefore, just like in 
Heidegger, the very obliteration of the standpoint of Being/substance is a particular 
delivery/expression of Being/substance itself. This amounts to saying that ages 
dominated by superstition and fear will be understood through the knowledge of the 
first kind. Ages dominated by reason and science will be understood through the 
knowledge of the second kind. Ideally, the philosopher is a historical expression of a 
dwelling that takes the standpoint of what is retained by standing in the openness of 
the clearing. It is the standpoint of eternity that recalls what is «ownmost» to Being. 
In Spinoza’s terms, it is an understanding that occurs sub specie aeternitatis, thus 
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reaching the intellectual love of God «which arises from the third kind of knowledge» 
and «is eternal» (Ethics, Pr. 33, part V)334. Man, in that case, becomes the centre of 
intensity of nature’s growth and production. On the other hand, as we saw earlier, 
wherever subject is perceived as substratum, history is seen as a tool in its hands. The 
subject is not bound by causal relations but by choice: abstraction places on our 
shoulders the responsibility of an alleged autonomous decision. Production becomes 
technological and “industrial”, for it is the result of dominion upon an objectified 
nature. Whenever man is an affection of nature and he is himself affected, instead, he 
is an expression of a degree of power that is his essence. It is God himself or nature – 
Deus sive natura – that expresses a certain degree of power. The conatus of each 
mode, one’s striving to retain one’s own existence, can express itself in virtue of the 
fact that we are not isolated objects but we are at the mercy of other affections. 
Bruno’s natural magic rests on very similar premises: through imagination and the 
art of memory, shadows – the images of a truth that is revealed through its latency – 
are composed through a synthetic mathematics that “constructs” being through its 
imaginative – and not imaginary – organization. The contemporary examples of 
television and of the internet, with its logic of icons and links, may suggest how we 
can master the imagination. Still, this parallel is insufficient because it is dependent 
upon a support dictated by technology. The images we master depend on algorithms 
and calculations; they provide pre-determined paths. They end up impoverishing us 
and making us dependent and weak, thus far from the expression of our essence. As a 
matter of fact, Spinoza’s knowledge of the third kind, achieved in the first instance 
through the aid of synthetic logical reasoning, needs to do without it in the end and 
become pure intuition. 
A few remarks on the mind. If we keep on seeing the mind as a support, as if it 
were a RAM or a hard disk or a subject, for that matter, we shall keep on stumbling 
on abstraction. The reason is simple: if the mind is seen as a container or device for 
ideas, not only does it come to bear an unfounded ontological status but all ideas will 
                                                
334 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 377. 
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automatically become objects for it and thus be subject to a necessary abstraction: 
that is the reason why we cannot go as far as knowing particular things. Spinoza does 
not grant the mind a different status from that of an idea, the idea of our body. As 
Filippo Mignini rightly observes: «Not only is the mind a mode and not substance, 
but it has not got any absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc.: the 
mind considered as the faculty of ideas is a fiction (E 2 P48S: GII, 129, 20-27). In 
Prop. 49 of Ethics, Part 2, it is stated that intellect and will (the two faculties that 
according to Descartes constitute the mind) are nothing but volitions and determinate 
ideas. Therefore the mind is defined in relation to its ideas and not ideas in relation to 
mind. It is symptomatic that Spinoza did not, at the beginning of the second part, 
formulate an explicit definition of the mind, although he does define the notion of 
body»335. The mind conceived as a support is an ens rationis at best for Spinoza; as 
the idea of the body it is a phenomenological awareness of the affections of the body, 
although not a specific and certain knowledge of the body’s composition; whatever 
happens to the body, happens as well to the mind because they are the same thing 
seen in the light of two different attributes. As Spinoza establishes in Pr. 1 of Part V: 
 
The affections of the body, that is the images of things, are arranged and connected in 
the body in exactly the same way as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and 
connected in the mind.336 
 
Nevertheless, Spinoza claims that the mind can, in its own right, have adequate ideas 
of particular things by understanding them sub specie aeternitatis. We should 
                                                
335 F. Mignini, “L’intendere è un puro patire. Passività e attività della conoscenza in Spinoza”, in La 
Cultura, Year 25, n. 1 (1987), p. 142. My translation from Italian: «Non solo la mente è modo e non 
sostanza (cfr. 4.8), ma non ha alcuna facoltà assoluta di intendere, desiderare, amare, ecc.: la mente 
considerata come facoltà delle idee è una finzione (E 2 P48S: GII, 129, 20-27). In E 2 P49CD si 
afferma che l’intelletto e la volontà (ossia le due facoltà che secondo Descartes costituiscono la 
mente) non sono nulla al di fuori delle volizioni e delle idee determinate. Dunque la mente si 
definisce in relazione alle sue idee e non le idee in relazione alla mente. È sintomatico che Spinoza 
non abbia, all’inizio della seconda parte, formulato un’esplicita definizione di mente, mentre 
definisce la nozione del corpo». 
336 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 365. 
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assume, then, that the body could theoretically experience things sub specie 
aeternitatis as well, although, in Pr. 21 of Part V, Spinoza affirms: 
 
The mind can exercise neither imagination nor memory save while the body endures.337 
 
The body is at the mercy of affects as long as it endures and so is the mind; thus in 
our finiteness we are not provided with any special device called mind that, in virtue 
of its power, can act upon reality: our extensive is itself the explication of our power, 
our being active. As Deleuze rightly points out, «affections (affectio) are the modes 
themselves. The modes are affections of substance or of its attributes (Ethics, I, 25, 
Cor.; I, 30, dem.). These affections are necessarily active, since they are explained by 
the nature of God as adequate cause, and God cannot be acted upon. At a second 
level, the affections designate that which happens to the mode, the modifications of 
the mode, the effects of other modes on it. These affections are therefore images or 
corporeal traces first of all (Ethics, II, post. 5; II, 17, schol.; III, post. 2); and their 
ideas involve both the nature of the affected body and that of the affecting, external 
body (II, 16). “The affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies 
as present in us, we shall call images of things […] And when the mind regards 
bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines”»338. As affections of substance, our 
existence is the witness of our power and of our being active and such power includes 
all the affects that concur in its increase or decrease, the bodies involved in such 
activity as the causes of those affects and their own power. As Spinoza affirms in 
Axiom 2 of Part V, 
 
The power of an effect is defined by the power of the cause insofar as its essence is 
explicated or defined through the essence of the cause.339 
 
This axiom follows from Pr. 7 in Part III: 
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339 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 365. 
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The conatus with which each thing endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing but 
the actual essence of the thing itself.340 
 
The existence of a mode is the explication of its conatus, its striving for existence. 
Imagination falls into confusion because it cannot account for all the images that 
make up one’s affects, a situation that results in passive emotions and therefore in a 
decrease of power. From the perspective of infinity, nevertheless, our body and our 
mind do not exist in a particular moment, with a specific size or abilities; they are in 
essence, meaning that they are eternal in God, they are a degree of his power. That is 
the only way to account for the singularity of a mode in all of its affects, i.e. 
intensively. Any isolated image or group of isolated images that make up the story of 
a mode and include each detail of our life will only be an extensive and untruthful 
picture of a succession of events.  Therefore intuiting the essence of particular things 
is not a matter of analyzing affects and representing the causal chain of an event. We 
can only intuit what affects us in its essence because what affects us defines our 
power as our very essence is defined by what affects us (by Axiom 2, Part V). The 
real, ethical effort, then, lies in whether particular things are in agreement or not with 
us: in the first case our power is also defined by what causally affects us, thus making 
us happy; in the second case our power is diminished, thus making us sad. From the 
extensive point of view, an affect remains the same but how we understand it reflects 
the expression of our essence. I shall provide an example. If someone breaks my heart 
and I cannot explain myself why, it will affect me negatively and I shall throw myself 
into despair. On the other hand, if I deal with it through reason and understand the 
causes of what has brought me to this situation – “my cowardice or my partner’s 
selfishness and their consequences”, for instance – I might reach an adequate idea of 
the situation – “a relation generally needs a certain amount of courage and tolerance”, 
for example – learn from experience and suffer less. In the final instance, I could be 
quite used to heartbreaks and each time I have managed to deal with them in a 
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rational way, understanding the causes and finding a remedy but always in virtue of 
common notions that tell me how relationships function but telling me nothing about 
the particular affect I have suffered. This time it still hurts and in a particularly 
intense way, even though I know everything there is to know about relationships. 
Thus I come back to the images and the sensations of this particular instance, all 
those elements that make this misadventure real and existent: nothing changes in 
terms of how they depict the situation to a confused understanding of the first kind, 
extensively we are facing the same situation. The confusion and fragmentation of the 
first times is easily overcome by reason. But the intensity and the vividness of those 
images and sensations are still there and it is clear to me why. At the beginning of my 
unlucky history of heartbreaks, I was unable to deal with the confusion of my 
imagination, then I understood the causes of my suffering and imposed some order, 
which means that from the first heartbreak to now my power has increased and my 
suffering has been dealt with: all the heartbreakers have done to me and the 
heartbreakers themselves have empowered me. Reaching this conclusion, I no longer 
need to make sense of my last, intense heartbreak: I can feel its intensity and 
understand that it is a new and powerful expression of my existence. If an effect is 
understood by its cause, then, I have to understand myself through my heartbreaker 
and recognize that myself and my affects are my existence, which is always an 
affection of substance, i.e. an active expression of my essence. What made images 
and sensations confused in the first instance of heartbreak was the fact that I 
understood them as something external and foreign to the understanding of myself; 
but, as an affection of substance, I only exist through what affects me and the causes 
of such affects, I am not an isolated subject. 
Negri’s claims that «imagination reveals the hidden dimensions of Spinozist 
being – of this ethical being that is being of the revolution, continuous ethical choice 
of production» and that «reason traverses the imagination, liberating the truth it 
contains, and meanwhile the imagination constructs the passivity of the existent and, 
therefore, of reason itself» seem to acquire a clearer significance now. Imagination is 
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the raw material of our living in the world amongst things and other people; reason 
allows us to manage the affects that we know through imagination; intuition produces 
being by recognizing the raw material provided by the imagination as an active 
expression of our essence. Creation does not amount to the production of objects; it 
amounts to an affirmation of being sub specie aeternitatis. If through reason I get to 
an understanding of the causes of my affects, it is only through intuition that I can 
grasp, in a single gaze, the multiplicity of the affects that constitute my individuality 
as the “tip of an iceberg” – just like unity in Bruno is grasped through the constituting 
ordering of relations. Particular things exist as affections of substance only in virtue 
of the fact that they affect other modes and I understand them only as I am affected by 
them. Nonetheless, the reverse is just as valid: I exist only in virtue of the fact that I 
am affected by particular things and I affect them, for I am myself a mode. Whenever 
I act upon another mode, I extensively express my power and whenever I am acted 
upon, I am affected by something else’s power. Nevertheless, power is always active, 
for the reason that it is itself essence, thus a degree of the infinite power of substance. 
What we infer from this fact is that there cannot be any conflicting essences, although 
they may seem so in their extensive expression, otherwise that would imply that an 
essence can be passively acted upon and that is absurd. What intuition provides me 
with is exactly the awareness that particular essences are modes seen in the manner 
in which they affirm their existence on other modes. If I get stabbed, I am obviously 
weakened in that particular instance; as long as I understand this event as a contingent 
case of conflicting forces in which I succumb, my body is wounded and my mind is 
filled with confused images and emotions of pain. If those images are understood 
from the point of view of eternity, nevertheless, the fact that I get stabbed stops being 
a fact which happened in a certain moment and under certain circumstances, it is 
understood in the timeless necessity of the causes that made it happen not now, not 
tomorrow, not yesterday: from the point of view of substance the event is eternal. So 
is my essence, of which getting stabbed and not getting stabbed, being loved and 
getting my first heartbreak are particulars understood under a species of eternity and 
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through their causes: my stabber, my lover and my heartbreaker. Power does not fight 
power, essence does not fight essence; they overlap eternally and are responsible for 
our existence as affected affections. Particular essences are not distinguished within 
substance for, if they were, no mode could ever be affected by another mode, i.e. it 
could not exist. It may seem absurd to consider the understanding of seemingly 
dreadful events sub specie aeternitatis as beatitude and yet, as I once was healthy and 
thriving, now that I am stabbed and heartbroken, I can only understand myself 
through the causes of my states, which all empower me as long as and because they 
are adequately understood through God, as Spinoza affirms in Ethics V, Pr. 32: 
 
We take pleasure in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, and this is 
accompanied by the idea of God as a cause. 
Proof  From this kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible contentment of the 
mind (Pr. 27, V), that is (Def. of Emotions 25) the highest possible pleasure, and this is 
accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (Pr. 30, V), by the idea of God, as 
cause. 
Corollary  From the third kind of knowledge there necessarily arises the intellectual 
love of God [amor Dei intellectualis]. For from this kind of knowledge there arises 
(preceding Pr.) pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of 
Emotions 6), the love of God not insofar as we imagine him as present (Pr. 29, V) but 
insofar as we understand God to be eternal. And this is what I call the intellectual love 
of God.341 
 
That is the reason why Spinoza claims that «the more we understand particular 
things, the more we understand God», as the more particular things I understand, the 
more I am identified as a point of intensity where the power of particular things 
concentrates and the more I coincide with God himself sub specie aeternitatis. As 
Ansaldi rightly observes: «That is how the life of bodies is eternal: as a matter of fact, 
the God of Love cannot but conceive the eternal power of bodies or their essence, 
while the mind that knows sub specie aeternitatis cannot but conceive its own body 
under the eternity of its power»342. Our particular power is the power of what affects 
                                                
341 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 377. 
342 S. Ansaldi, Nature et puissance. Giordano Bruno et Spinoza, p. 122. My translation from 
French: «La vie des corps est ainsi éternelle: en effet, le Dieu de l’Amour ne peut que concevoir la 
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us but the same is valid for the modes that affect us: we grant them existence by 
affecting them. Creation is the increased power of acting resulting from the 
elimination of any fictional barrier: my mind and my body are neither a container nor 
a device; thus imagination is only fragmentary and confused when it is fictionally 
isolated. On the other hand, when those images are understood as constituting my 
mind through other modes, thus overcoming the distinction between me and another 
mode, which is merely numerical and not real, my power of acting becomes as great 
as my understanding in this sense is wide.  
That is what I take Spinoza to mean by intuitively grasping particular essences, 
the gnosiological realization of the identity of knower and known through an ethical 
effort. I would not read Spinoza’s ethical conclusions, then, as a retreat from life and 
a rejection of emotions; on the contrary, I believe he promotes a total and radical 
involvement in the vicissitude of the world. Spinoza makes it quite explicit in the 
incipit of his last, unfinished work, the Political Treatise, which sounds like a 
condemnation of moralists and a praise of human passions: «Philosophers look upon 
the passions by which we are assailed as vices, into which men fall through their own 
fault. So it is their custom to deride, bewail, berate them, or, if their purpose is to 
appear more zealous than others, to execrate them»343. We saw how Bruno himself 
conceived the approach to particular things as an imaginative one that would do 
without the abstracting mediation of language but that could be achieved only 
through a logic of images. Such a logic of images is one of the tools of natural magic, 
for it reveals the bonds that relate one thing to another and allows us to relate directly 
to as many particular things as possible: that is the way to access to the divine and 
not the abstractions of genera or species. Alternatively, the strongest bond of all, the 
bond of Love, so intense as to drive us to madness, leads us to the destiny of Actaeon, 
being devoured by nature, the very aim of our research. Nevertheless, both for Bruno 
and for Spinoza the aim is really to be able to dwell in the vicissitude of the world by 
                                                                                                                                                            
puissance éternelle des corps ou la perfection de leur essence, tandis que l’âme qui connaît sub 
specie aeternitatis ne peut concevoir l’essence de son corps que dans l’éternité de sa puissance». 
343 B. Spinoza, “Political Treatise”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 680. 
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trying to demonstrate, whether through the World Soul or substance, that nothing is 
isolated from nature. Our pretence of acting by individual choice or dominating 
nature itself through the arbitrary constitution of a subject not only amounts to 
fooling ourselves, for it is a plain absurdity, but it makes us weaker and unhappy. To 
establish why Heidegger could not see how such philosophies converge in his ethical 
addressing of dwelling, by undermining the metaphysical premises of technological 
violence, would require a whole new work but we are here to establish that they do. It 
is sufficient, then, to take a last look at Heidegger’s jug now, as we encountered it in 
Chapter VII: the jug, as a thing whose essence has to be looked for in the fourfold of 
earth, sky, mortals and divinities. All the extensive standards that «make the jug-thing 
into a nonentity in not permitting things to be the standard for what is real» disappear 
if we see the jug in the light of Bruno and Spinoza. In the understanding of the jug is 
its outpouring, its being empty, its satisfying the thirst of the mortal, its earthly fabric, 
its smashing on the floor, all affects that are understood in their living significance as 
gift that intensively expresses the power of all its affects. The god acquires a precise 
role within the fourfold as the relation to the totality, the One, which is what is kept 
safe and retained in our relation to the jug344. Reducing the jug to an object isolates us 
by obstructing any access to an ethical involvement with nature, to dwelling, thus 
making us weak and lonely before it. That is why man, the mortal, can only 
understand himself in essence within the fourfold, which means only from the point 
of view of eternity, that is the standpoint of unity and totality. What Lewis says of 
Heidegger in this respect, then, might be said of Spinoza as well: «Man dies insofar 
as he is attuned to the singularity of beings: only insofar as he lives but once only can 
                                                
344 As Lewis puts it: «Only those beings which to an extent withdraw from totality are pliant enough 
to allow the passage of the god as the look that looks out for the earthen aspect of the thing. 
Therefore, to understand what this “passing” involves would be to understand the position god 
occupies with respect to beings and therefore to being. The god can distinguish itself from being 
only by relating to those special beings which are fit for this. A hint requires a withdrawal, and this 
withdrawal presents itself sufficiently only in the face of man, but a hint also requires a giving, and 
that is why in addition [to] man’s face-to-face it needs the thing». From M. Lewis, Heidegger and 
the Place of Ethics, Continuum, London 2005, p. 138. 
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he have access to the uniqueness of the being which is suffocated by the self-
eternalized totality»345. 
 
 
Section 2 – Multitudo 
 
In Chapter VII we referred to Heidegger and his stepping into the political arena 
by attempting to reform the university. This issue might have been discussed entirely 
within Part II of this work, entitled Gnosiology, as its concern is the significance of 
knowledge and the way we should approach it. Nevertheless, we saw that any radical 
approach to knowledge, even on allegedly firm ontological foundations, is in need of 
an ethics because it embraces and subjugates the knower as much as the known, 
otherwise gnosiology would be restricted to epistemology and the whole scope of this 
work would decay immediately. If we do not know how we stand in the open region 
where things are known to us, then all we can say about things are their sizes, their 
colour, their shape or their weight but they will never be known to us as things. In 
Chapter VII we read Heidegger’s intention not as a nationalistic drive but as the 
endorsing of a destiny that befalls us on the account of the whole Western world and, 
transitively, of the rest of humanity that the Western world has so profoundly 
penetrated, often violently. Years after failing to achieve that historically, Heidegger 
declared the end of philosophy as metaphysics, claiming that we are still not thinking, 
being passively dragged on the track of the highest achievement of metaphysics, 
modern science and its essence, technology. Nevertheless, we saw in the last section 
that this is nothing but a particular historical delivery of Being, which answers to the 
name of metaphysics and only the practice of thinking can reveal it as such. 
Technology is a power of division, analysis and control; it is the ultimate extensive 
and coercive affect of our world in absence of a perspective of unity. Nevertheless, 
two philosophers, who lived at the dawn of the modern scientific revolution, before 
                                                
345 Ibid., p. 140. 
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and after its official birth, were thinking on a completely different track, demanding 
in their own unique ways not to sever man from nature, a risk that they immediately 
saw and diagnosed. Heidegger never acknowledged that, but we walked down a few 
paths to show that neither Bruno nor Spinoza fit into what Heidegger defines as 
metaphysics, least of all as modern metaphysics or the history of subject. 
Nevertheless, one step is missing, that which would describe how the being-with-one-
another of man that is finally reconciled with nature could possibly act on the 
political stage and give us some reasons for Heidegger’s failure in this instance. 
Nonetheless, it is not our intention or within the scope of this work to cover these 
philosophers’ political theories; whenever possible we shall remain on the level of the 
essence of politics in accordance with the path indicated by Heraclitus, who invited us 
to take care of the gods. We saw, nevertheless, that taking care of the gods amounts 
to relating to a totality through our being involved in the fourfold, «for this reason 
Heidegger’s statement “only a god can save us” is indeed a political one and not 
nearly so risible as has been imagined»346. Spinoza’s intellectual love of God has 
given us a few elements but we shall not be content. Such an ultimate understanding 
is not the province of an individual’s intellectual meditation, which would amount to 
the return of a contemplative thinking; it is a complete involvement with life and, as 
such, it cannot be carried out by a mere singularity. In Chapter I we mentioned the 
myth of Admetus and his attitude towards language: Apollo says to him that, as a 
man, he has to bear two thoughts at once as one single thought is only allowed to 
divinity. Admetus comes up with a stratagem and invents dialogue, a discourse where 
two equals exchange and contrast different thoughts and opinions. Nonetheless, the 
stratagem eludes Apollo’s instructions, as dialogue merely duplicates the thinker, thus 
not overcoming the problem of singularity. We observed that the university of 
specialization based on Schleiermacher’s model, which Heidegger fought against in 
vain, is a kind of university that is based on Admetus’ stratagem. In the course of our 
work we made an effort to find this dual thought by trying to think intensively and 
                                                
346 Ibid. 
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extensively at once and, in the previous section, we tried to understand what 
particular things are in essence. We have discovered that essence is always 
productive, thus never equal to itself or to anything else: in essence there cannot be 
equals because equals are mere extensive abstractions. Therefore, it is the collective 
experience we should look at, not as a sum of individuals but from the point of view 
of totality. We believe that Spinoza’s notion of multitude is able to provide us with 
food for thought in this sense. 
Spinoza’s notion of multitudo is hard to capture in a positive light at first, given 
Spinoza’s contempt for common people [vulgus], for instance, in the Appendix to Part 
I of the Ethics: 
 
We see therefore that all notions whereby the common people are wont to explain 
Nature are merely modes of imagining, and denote not the nature of anything but only 
the constitution of the imagination. And because these notions have names as if they 
were the names of entities existing independently of the imagination I call them “entities 
of the imagination” [entia imaginationis] rather than “entities of reason” [entia 
rationis]. So all arguments drawn against me from such notions can be easily refuted.347 
 
Common people are for Spinoza the cradle of imagination intended as superstition, 
confusion. We should not draw hasty conclusions from this passage, as what Spinoza 
depicts is a situation where the “many” are left in a state of ignorance, so much so 
that they are literally dominated by the knowledge of the first kind, i.e. imagination, 
which means that they are in a state of weakness. Imagination, though, is the raw 
material for production and, by a different understanding, can produce a multitudo out 
of a mob. As Saccaro Battisti rightly points out: «in the Spinozistic discourse the 
psychology of mass and individual psychology nourish each other, moved by that 
powerful spring of inadequate knowledge and human affects, which is imagination. 
We already know that imagination is a psycho-physiological part of human life and, 
within it, potentially of the explication of totality (and in this resides its being 
positive). Nonetheless it is also the condition of the constitution and growth of the 
                                                
347 B. Spinoza, “Ethics”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 243. 
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“passion” [pati: ed.] of the mind as consciousness of affects and fluctuations. All 
individual and collective conflicts and anxieties, then, get discharged on the political 
level. Such conflicts and anxieties are rendered even more complex and powerful by 
associated life instead of being equilibrated and reconciled»348. Passions are at the 
centre of Spinoza’s contribution to politics not because they are assumed to be a 
political issue but in virtue of the ontological condition of men, who exist as affected 
modes of substance. Any moralizing value judgement on passions as such originates 
from an arbitrary pre-conception of what is good and what is bad or from the 
conformity to common laws in a particular state. We should not forget that the 
conatus is the essence of modes as affirmation and preservation of their existence as 
power [potentia] and we saw that essences cannot give rise to conflicts, as they are 
pure affirmation. What we call conflicts from the extensive point of view are only 
caused by the necessary affirmation of nature’s power, which is indifferent to the 
destiny of single modes, for from an intensive point of view they are not numerically 
distinguished; they are – as we stated earlier somewhat imaginatively – reciprocally 
overlapping powers. Therefore, Spinoza does not expect each single extensive mode 
to undertake the path of rationality or of reducing men to reason just because it is in 
the interest of the state and our communal living. Spinoza makes this very clear right 
at the beginning of the Political Treatise: 
 
[7] Finally, since all men everywhere, whether barbarian or civilized, enter into 
relationships with one another and set up some kind of civil order, one should not look 
                                                
348 G. Saccaro Battisti, “Spinoza, l’utopia e le masse. un’analisi dei concetti di "plebs", "multitudo", 
"populus" e "vulgus"”, in Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, Year 39, n. 1 (1984), p. 467. My 
translation from Italian: «[…] nel discorso spinoziano psicologia della massa e psicologia 
individuale si confrontano e si alimentano l’una con l’altra, mosse da quella molla potente della 
conoscenza inadeguata e degli affetti umani, che è l’immaginazione. Già sappiamo che 
l’immaginazione è parte psico-fisiologica della natura umana e dell’esplicarsi in essa delle 
potenzialità della totalità del reale (ed in questo sta la sua positività), ma è anche la ragione del 
costituirsi e crescere del “patire” della mente nella coscienza degli affetti e delle fluttuazioni. Sul 
piano politico perciò vengono a scaricarsi i conflitti e le angosce individuali e collettive che la vita 
associata, invece di equilibrare e ricomporre, contribuisce a rendere più complessi e potenti». 
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for the causes and natural foundations of the state in the teachings of reason, but deduce 
them from the nature and condition of men in general.349 
 
This passage reveals something that up to now has been implicit throughout our 
encounter with Spinoza: that reason does not describe Being nor does it regulate its 
activity. Reason is characteristic of knowledge of the second kind, which is an 
understanding that is functional to men not being overwhelmed by the confusion of 
imagination. It is from such confusion, nevertheless, that bonds and relationships 
arise, including the most complex ones, such as the state. That is why Spinoza rejects 
any kind of contractualism as utopian and abstract. The intuition of particular things 
can only take place at the end of an ethical path, whereas reason only empowers us to 
the point of not being overcome by imagination, which is nevertheless recognized as 
the most fundamental condition of existence for men. Therefore, the passage from the 
Appendix of Ethics, Part I and the one we just quoted from the Political Treatise are 
not mutually exclusive. The former seems to condemn the vulgus in virtue of its 
being dominated by imagination, but only to the extent that the vulgus is understood 
as enslaved to its own superstitions. The latter passage, on the other hand, confirms 
imagination as a necessary and natural understanding of nature and, as such, it must 
be taken into account when considering the collective life of men. This is a crucial 
point that Spinoza addresses in further detail later on in the Political Treatise: 
 
We therefore conclude that it is not in every man’s power always to use reason and to be 
at the highest pitch of human freedom, but yet he always endeavours as far as in him 
lies to preserve his own being and (since every man has right to the extent that he has 
power), whether he be wise or ignorant, whatever he endeavours and does, he 
endeavours and does by the sovereign right of Nature. From this it follows that Nature’s 
right and established order, under which all men are born and for the most part live, 
forbids only those things that no one desires and no one can do; it does not frown on 
strife, or hatred, or anger, or deceit, or anything at all urged by the appetite. This is not 
surprising, for Nature’s bounds are set not by the laws of human reason whose aim is 
only man’s true interest and preservation, but by infinite other laws which have regard 
to the external order of the whole of nature, of which man is but a tiny part.350  
 
                                                
349 B. Spinoza, “Political Treatise”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 682. 
350 B. Spinoza, “Political Treatise”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 685. 
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What is sovereign is the power of nature that is expressed through its affections and 
the bonds between them. This whole dispute between reason and imagination, then, 
suggests that any collective reality cannot be seen as a uniform bunch of equal 
individuals, nor can anyone wish to correct the ones who do not conform to the laws 
of reason. If the political problem has to be addressed, it has to be addressed from the 
perspective of a self-determining reality that, in the case of politics, must be 
understood as a self-determining multitude and not as an enslaved and superstitious 
vulgus.  
Heraclitus playing dice with a few adolescents was considered as a truly and 
essentially political activity, whereas taking care of public assemblies was regarded 
as a foolish activity if compared to the former. Kids or adolescents were a politically 
irrelevant part of the πόλις and they generally were always in the history of Western 
political institutions. There is a further intuition we can grasp from this anecdote: if it 
is not institutions that define what is political, we can only see that the image of a few 
kids playing evokes exactly the kind of bonds that are not rationally imposed but that 
spring from an expression of nature. It is true that from Spinoza’s point of view even 
artificial institutions are natural, as they are effects of the infinite causal chains that 
make up our reality. Reality cannot be coerced in any circumstance; it is our 
understanding of it that characterises our dwelling: the understanding of the most 
spontaneous and creative kind of bonds, such as boys playing, as essentially political, 
brings what is institutionally political onto the same level as what is naturally 
political because it represents the fundamental collective bonds. Yet, intensively those 
bonds that do not advance any institutional claim increase their power if compared to 
those that would like to control and regulate them: in this sense a project like the one 
found in Plato’s Republic, that of bridling desire. In the same way the vulgus and the 
multitude are characterised by a different understanding of what, extensively, we 
would define as a mob. In this respect, with reference to an earlier work of Spinoza, 
the Theological-Political Treatise, Yovel rightly points out that Spinoza «does not 
envisage a radical, one-time revolution but a gradual growth of rationality from 
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within the domain of imaginatio, and he thinks it is the philosopher’s task to provide 
tools for dealing with the various forms of this transition – as he himself does in his 
theory of allegory, metaphor and non-scientific discourse generally. While part of the 
multitude, whose dogmatic discourse has been shattered, will eventually move onto 
genuine rationality, the majority will remain in the realm of the passions and 
imagination, which, in Spinoza’s plan, must be reorganized as an external imitation 
of reason»351. Yovel is right in affirming that Spinoza does not expect a whole mass 
to be educated to rationality but a few rational ones to arrange collective life in a way 
that would direct imagination to a semi-rational disposition. Nevertheless, his 
perspective is highly partial and incomplete because it does not address the problem 
in essence. If on a level of political organization Yovel may have a point and that 
could be a realistic arrangement, ontologically there is a purely numerical 
understanding of the multitude and a partition within it that prevents any further 
understanding of what collective reality is essentially about. Within a purely 
numerical framework it is even hard to conceive how any kind of intuitive knowledge 
could take place: «Spinoza regards the multitude as a category in itself. Individuals 
can rise above the level of imaginatio and attain the life of ratio (reason), even the 
supreme degree of scientia intuitiva (intuitive knowledge) but the great majority is 
incapable of this – and the multitude is defined by that majority»352. Spinoza’s views 
on the majority and the consequent praise of democracy are represented already in the 
Theological-Political Treatise as a dynamic and not as a numerical reality: 
 
For we have shown that in a democracy (which comes closest to the natural state) all the 
citizens undertake to act, but not to reason and to judge, by decision made in common. 
That is to say, since all men cannot think alike, they agree that a proposal supported by 
the majority of votes shall have the force of a decree, meanwhile retaining the authority 
to repel the same if they see a better alternative. Thus the less freedom of judgement is 
conceded to men, the further their distance from the most natural state, and 
consequently the more oppressive the regime.353 
                                                
351 Y. Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics. The Marrano of Reason [1989], Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 1992, p. 145. 
352 Ibid., p. 129. 
353 B. Spinoza, “Theological-Political Treatise”, in B. Spinoza, Complete Works, pp. 570-571. 
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It is not our intention to go through the details of political theory but it is important to 
underline that Spinoza considers democracy the system that is somehow closer to the 
natural state. This does not happen in virtue of a few rational men who drive the 
irrational majority towards a good decision but in virtue of a decision that is 
commonly felt to be the right one and that can be replaced by a new and better one. 
Through a common notion, by exercising reason, the multitude makes its choices, as 
expressed by its majority, thus acquiring adequate ideas that increase the power of a 
certain collective reality. But that is the kind of adequacy that is functional to the 
interest of the multitude in that particular moment. Nevertheless, it is not the 
rationality of such choices that makes the multitude, organized in a democratic state, 
close to nature: as was said, nature is not organized according to human reason. The 
nearness to nature is confirmed by the fact that the adequate ideas provided by 
reason express the freedom of a multitude that is mostly irrational and driven by 
desires and wishes expressed on the account of imagination. It is not a few rational 
individuals who empower a multitude; it is the multitude itself, as a collective entity, 
which produces its own adequacy and its dwelling, as Ansaldi also affirms by 
underlining how Spinoza inverts the perspective of his time: «for Spinoza it is 
“politics” that founds “ethics” and not the other way around. Or, even better: it is 
“political ontology” that determines the field of construction of ethical concepts to be 
applied to politics»354. 
Multitude expresses its power collectively; it is nothing like a sum of equal 
individuals or subjects. It is not numerical and it has to be understood intensively; 
therefore we cannot stop at how the multitude deliberates. In these respects we share 
Negri’s view: «In the recognition of the development of this human power, the 
fundamental passage of Spinoza’s thinking happens […]. This human power is shown 
                                                
354 S. Ansaldi, Spinoza et le Baroque. Infini, désir, multitude, éditions Kimé, Paris 2001, p. 361. My 
translation from French: «[…] pour Spinoza, c’est le ‘politique’ qui fonde l’‘étique’ et non 
l’inverse. Ou mieux encore : c’est l’’ontologie politique’ qui détermine le champ de construction 
des concepts étiques applicables à la politique». 
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in the first chapters of the Political Treatise as the basis of collective existence, of its 
movement, i.e. of its sociality, and of civilization. The absolute has, then, power as its 
own essence, and it becomes existence thanks to the actualization of power. This is 
the definition of the absolute, from a metaphysical point of view»355. This point of 
view is not the mere construction of a rationally deduced system of identity, such as 
the one found in the Ethics; it is the practical change of understanding within the 
existential sphere as the end of any mediation: the expression of power does not 
happen through dialectics or through a subject/object juxtaposition. We saw how the 
individual, through the understanding of particular things in their essence, is bound 
to see not only particular things but also himself sub specie aeternitatis: no 
subject/object relationship takes place but that of an intensive identity. Similarly, the 
collective reality of the multitude is expressed not by rationally deliberating what is 
best for all – which can change at any time – but through an understanding of itself 
that produces a new reality: what is rational is not the deliberation itself, for that 
would imply that it has been reached through a collective rational discourse, which is 
impossible; what is rational is the adequate understanding of what is best as a 
common notion supported by a majority; what is finally intuitive, on the other hand, is 
that this kind of understanding has allowed for the expression of what is “best” as the 
practical enacting of collective emotions and needs. In modern Western democracies 
this is distorted by a transcendent system that involves representatives on one side 
and the media on the other: the multitude, in this respect, is in servitude as it does not 
understand itself intensively but through mediations that instruct it as to what to 
believe to be the best. This is achieved by addressing the multitude as “individuals”: 
each individual is instructed as to what he or she thinks and invited to express it; each 
individual is abstracted as a single entity sharing the same amount of power with 
                                                
355 A. Negri, “Spinoza Sovversivo”, in A. Negri, Spinoza, p. 319. My translation from Italian: «Nel 
riconoscimento dello sviluppo di questa potenza umana, si verifica il passaggio fondamentale del 
pensiero spinoziano […]. Questa umana potenza viene poi mostrata nei primi capitoli del TP come 
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realizzarsi della potenza. Questa è la definizione di assoluto dal punto di vista metafisico». 
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everybody else, with the difference that neither he or she nor anyone else exerts any 
power and gathers around centres of intensity such as political parties, television or 
opinion leaders. That means that, intensively, the individual counts for nothing and 
has no power in a society based on free individuals. A multitude cannot be a 
gathering of equal individuals. Either it understands itself collectively or it is 
enslaved, since it has no freedom: «The term power and the term freedom overlap 
and the extension of the first equals the intensity of the second. […] These 
considerations are very useful as long as we consider the term absoluteness in the 
specificity of the Spinozistic political thought. In this perspective, as a matter of fact, 
the absolutum imperium will become a term that, meaning the unity of power, will 
have to adopt it as a projection of the potentiae of the subjects and define its totality 
as life, as always open, dynamic articulation of an organic being together»356. We 
contest Negri’s use of the term “subjects”, which would ontologically and practically 
obstruct such a perspective, but we praise his depiction of a vicissitudinal production 
of a collective reality that affirms itself through an understanding that turns into 
power. This happens in virtue of the fact that, within the multitude, I am not 
juxtaposed to the “other rational subject” in a situation of equality that is not only 
impossible but that finds its only solution in the sterilization of each other’s power 
because the only way to be “equal” is to abstract oneself. In the multitude the 
expression of power happens as mutual affectivity, as everyone being the “iceberg of 
everyone else’s tip”, as the overlapping of power, which makes the emergence of 
individuality indifferent: my individuality is nothing but being affected by others in a 
series of contingent relations. It is not surprising, then, to see Heidegger make a very 
similar point already in Being and Time, one that we quoted at the beginning of 
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Chapter VII but that is worth repeating: «by Others we do not mean everyone else but 
me – those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, 
for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom one is 
too»357.  
Distinguishing multiplicity within unity, then, has been a main centre of gravity 
around which not only our discourse on knowledge but also our ontological and 
ethical effort has orbited. This is the effort that Admetus was not ready to undertake 
when he invented dialogue; it is an emergency exit to the archaic truth of Apollo: 
man has to bear two thoughts at once. Distinguishing multiplicity within unity means 
rejecting the abstraction of man as rational subject in its dichotomy with objects. A 
multitude that understands itself intensively amounts to man breaking his isolation 
from nature. Heidegger did not see, within Renaissance thought, those philosophical 
drives that were attempting to avoid the abyss where man becomes abstracted from 
nature and where things become objects. He intuited that the problem was one of 
knowledge and in this he was correct; that is what led him to wish to reform the 
German university. The fragmentation of knowledge in universities, which continues 
stronger than ever in our day, and the increasing specialization have been the didactic 
tools for the abstraction of man and the dominion of technology. As such, technology 
is an overwhelming power that isolates objects as well as subjects. In this respect, 
Michael Lewis rightly points out that «Nothing exceeds téchne. The current age is 
defined by technology (Technik) in the sense that every being is technicizable or 
makeable. Heidegger would come to recognize the essence of technology (among all 
other phenomena of contemporary life) as precisely “being” in the form of its most 
extreme recession from the call to cover over this withdrawal ever more completely 
with beings»358 and later on he adds «If man has complete power to dispose over 
beings as he sees fit, then what he does not possess is power over being. He cannot 
choose to be called to his mastery. He cannot choose how the whole is to appear. He 
                                                
357 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 154. 
358 M. Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics, Continuum, London 2005, pp. 150-151. 
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is merely situated within it at a certain historical time and geographical place at which 
technology has allowed this mastery»359. Yet power over beings – which become 
objects in this sense – is not granted to man; it is granted to a subject, which is an 
abstraction of man understood as part of nature. What Spinoza has shown is that 
power lies in understanding particular things and oneself sub specie aeternitatis, 
therefore the power of technology, which is entirely based on an extensive 
understanding of beings, is translated into bondage and slavery for man understood as 
part of nature, following the annihilation of his power. The collective power of the 
multitude, which does not correspond to the “power of the many”, is not political in 
its expression of governmental institutions. What is essentially political in the 
intensive understanding of the multitude is that man understands himself through 
others, as a necessary expression of humanity, as opposed to the solitary and arbitrary 
abstraction of the subject. On the basis of such considerations, we could attempt to 
sum up Heidegger’s political failure in two main points. Firstly, although Heidegger 
had intuited that the political problem rotated around the problem of knowledge, in its 
essence, he identified the university as the place of knowledge: the search for a place 
that felt homely, deceived him and drove him to create a new sort of isolation. 
Secondly, his recovering of the ancient German notion of Gefolgshaft – a following 
of those who have the privilege to gather around a leader – although it recuperated 
some originary form of collectivism, fell into a Ptolemaic origin of orbiting around a 
centre. It did not take him long to understand the dangers and the rhetorical nature of 
such inspiration. His consequent retreat to the Black Forest and his poetical praise of 
the sylvan life and of peasant silence and immediacy amounted to become a refugee 
inside what he was trying to protect.  
 
 
 
                                                
359 Ibid., p. 152. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Nature Alive  
 
At the beginning of our enquiry we affirmed that memory is thinking. Where 
does memory dwell? «Memory, in the sense of human thinking that recalls, dwells 
where everything that gives food for thought is kept in safety»360. Memory dwells in 
nature, the only place where giving and keeping in safety coincide. If nature is only 
considered extensively, then it suffers memory loss: extension is the giving of the 
datum, the consumption of a fact; it does not keep, it consumes and abstracts. 
Whenever nature is also understood intensively, then, by giving, it always keeps the 
essence of its gift concealed; this is the thought-provoking and creative moment, 
when the gift of nature is not exhausted in its consumption, is not an object or a fact. 
It might appear as a bold statement but in these few lines above we have summed up 
the whole thinking experience of the present work. We have adopted, in some 
respects, a very traditional method: we have endorsed Heidegger’s task of thinking 
and looked for the answers in those places he had neglected. If this seems like a 
modest enterprise, I believe that, as philosophers, we no longer suffer the burden of 
having something to reveal. We have encountered a kind of lightness akin to 
Heraclitus’ sitting beside the oven, we can afford to decline the responsibility of 
providing answers to the public. In addition, we should have no more reasons to 
doubt because we have come out of the subjectivity cage. The ethics of thinking has 
meant shifting thinking upon nature.  
It is obvious that we do not understand nature as a mind undertaking intellectual 
activities. James Hillman, a great admirer of the Renaissance, inspired by Ficino361, 
                                                
360 M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 150. 
361 «To say “son of soul” is to speak in a Renaissance, Florentine mode, following Marsilio Ficino 
who was the first to place the soul in the centre of his vision, a vision which excludes nothing of the 
world’s affairs because the psyche includes the world – all things offer soul. Each and every thing 
of our urban life has psychological import». From J. Hillman, “Anima Mundi: The Return of the 
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re-worked the notion of World Soul within his activity as a psychologist. In his 
psychological practice Hillman claims to have detected that he could «no longer 
distinguish clearly between neurosis of self and neurosis of world, psychopathology 
of self and psychopathology of world»362 and that, furthermore, «to place neurosis 
and psychopathology solely in personal reality is a delusional repression of what is 
actually, realistically, being experienced»363. What he contests is the confinement of 
psychological activity in intra-subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, deriving from a 
severed and objective outer reality, as  «for all its concern with the outer world, social 
psychiatry too works within the idea of the external world passed to us by Aquinas, 
Descartes, Locke and Kant»364. Hillman attributes the greatest illness of the world to 
the fact that it has been deprived of its soul, by which he does not mean some sort of 
supernatural flux running through inanimate things. What he is addressing is the fact 
that in most of his patients, neurosis does not appear to be a series of environmental 
factors that mechanically cause a neurosis within the patient’s consciousness; it 
appears as affecting the world of the patient: the work pace, the noise, the threat of 
terrorism or illness, bad air are understood by Hillman not as a sickness of a single 
subjectivity but as a sick world. He founds his theory on what he calls “intelligence 
of the heart”, which is nothing more than imagination as we have encountered it so 
far. Inspired by Henri Corbin, who rediscovered some strands of Islamic philosophy, 
referring mainly to Ibn Al Arabi, he conceived of images as an interpenetration of 
consciousness and world, simply meaning that an image is nothing more than the 
world as it is expressed and understood through consciousness. Bruno’s shadows of 
ideas and Spinoza’s affects of thought are nothing more than this, in that they are the 
immediate expression of the world through humans, a truth that is revealed through 
its latency, i.e. concealment of Being, substance intensively understood or as World 
                                                                                                                                                            
Soul to the World”, in J. Hillman, The Thought of the Heart and the Soul of the world [1992], 
Spring Publications, Putnam CT 2007, p. 91. 
362 Ibid., p. 93. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid., p. 94. 
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Soul. Heidegger’s monolithic understanding of the history of metaphysics makes him 
unable to appreciate the radicalism of Bruno and Spinoza’s understanding of the 
world, which is nothing like an isolation of man into the shell of subjectivity. 
Furthermore, Heidegger fully inscribes modern science and technology into his 
understanding of metaphysics, thus giving the impression of an impossible 
conciliation between nature and technology, which only understands the former as 
standing-reserve. Again, Bruno’s and Spinoza’s understanding of Copernicus, on top 
of the interest and admiration for the scientific tools developed by their 
contemporaries, shows that science and technology can be understood differently. 
Even in Heidegger, though, a glimpse of the same admiration and appreciation can be 
found in his praise of scientists of the calibre of Heisenberg and Bohr, while attacking 
– and rightly so – the age of positivism: «That age also had its indolence, just as, 
conversely, the present leaders of atomic physics, Niels Bohr and Heisenberg365, 
think in a thoroughly philosophical way, and only therefore create new ways of 
posing questions and, above all, hold out in the questionable»366. Not surprisingly, it 
is again Hillman who suggests undertaking a similar view: «Technology is not 
necessarily the enemy of the heart; technology is not inherently soulless. We are less 
endangered by the brute facts of nuclear, genetic, computer, and chemical technology 
as such than we are by the brute anesthetized conception of these technical inventions 
as soulless mechanisms. Because they are conceived in the Cartesian-Christian 
fantasy, they become objective, brute and mute. Technical inventions have become 
the big repressed slaves, obedient to mechanical laws, disallowed breakdown, and so 
we fear them. We want the most from them at the least cost. Because the paradigm of 
our mindset allows soul only to subjective persons, technology is not considered part 
                                                
365 Unfortunately it goes beyond the aim of the present work, but a study of Brunian atomism in 
relation to contemporary Physics would be mostly rewarding. 
366 M. Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics”, in M. Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, p. 272. 
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of what Whitehead calls “nature alive”, a realm of speaking objects with faces, and is 
instead a fearful Frankenstein monster»367. 
Hillman, on the threshold between philosophy and psychology, points the way 
to a new practice, that of laying the world on the shrink’s couch. What about the 
philosopher? Does the philosopher feel at home in his practice? “Nature alive” is the 
cry of the philosopher who demands to dwell and feel at home whereas the university 
is the realm of Admetus, where dialogue and critical thinking take place, where 
philosophy is encoded as one of many Humanities, no matter how far it may be from 
Humanism. Is the philosopher forced to pick between being enframed as a specialized 
academic and retreating to the Black Forest? Philosophers are granted intellectual 
activity and relegated to cultural debates whenever they step onto the public scene. In 
the second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche laments: «being such an unloving and 
uncannily active concept – and word-factory, perhaps I still have the right to say of 
myself cogito, ergo sum but not vivo, ergo cogito. Empty “being” is granted me, but 
not full and green “life”: the feeling that tells me I exist warrants to me only that I am 
a thinking creature, not that I am a living one, not that I am an animal but at most a 
cogital. Only give me life, then I will create a culture for you out of it!»368. 
Dissociation of thinking from life is the condition denounced by Nietzsche, where 
thinking, in virtue of its being dissociated, is intended as science. According to 
Nietzsche life should dominate science. Production of culture from a conceptual and 
intellectual point of view is dissociation from life; production of culture from a living 
point of view is life, the thriving world of imagination, the world of the multitude, 
excluded from the production of culture in exchange for a college fee. A world that 
Bruno and Spinoza had widely experienced during the course of their vicissitudes and 
not in virtue of a vocation for martyrdom or exclusion, as Nietzsche instead seems to 
assume: «These outcasts of society, these long-pursued, wickedly persecuted ones – 
also the compulsory recluses, the Spinozas, the Giordano Brunos – always become in 
                                                
367 J. Hillman, The thought of the heart and the soul of the world [1992], p. 123. 
368 F. Nietzsche, “On the uses and disadvantages of history for life”, in F. Nietzsche, Untimely 
Meditations, edited by D. Breazeale, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp.119-120. 
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the end, even under the most spiritual masquerade, perhaps without being themselves 
aware of it, sophisticated vengeance seekers and poison brewers […]. The martyrdom 
of the philosopher, his “sacrifice for the sake of truth” forces into the light whatever 
of the agitator and actor lurks in him […]»369. Showing contempt and without being 
himself aware of it, Nietzsche spotted what had been his two closest figures in the 
history of philosophy. But then we also committed an act of hybris and turned to the 
history of metaphysics in order to make sense of Heidegger’s challenge. But that was 
not the history of metaphysics Heidegger condemned, for Heidegger only considered 
the history of a success. Bruno and Spinoza do not incarnate a success, they incarnate 
the perspective of the infinite universe, which is much better. Bruno walks down his 
path all the way, beyond the heavens of the fixed stars:  
 
[…] 
Henceforth I spread confident wings to space; 
I fear no barrier of crystal or of glass; 
I cleave the heavens and soar to the infinite. 
[…]370 
 
And so does Spinoza: 
 
The Jew's hands, translucent in the dusk,   
polish the lenses time and again. 
[…] 
Free of metaphor and myth, he grinds   
a stubborn crystal: the infinite   
map of the One who is all His stars.371 
 
 
                                                
369 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, translated, with a 
commentary by W. Kaufmann, Vintage Books Edition – Random House, New York 1966, pp. 36-
37.  
370 G. Bruno, “De l’infinito, universo e mondi”, in G. Bruno, Opere Italiane, vol. II, p. 31. 
Translation from Italian provided by www.positiveatheism.org:  
«Quindi l'ali sicure a l'aria porgo;  
Ne temo intoppo di cristallo o vetro,  
Ma fendo i cieli e a l'infinito m'ergo». 
371 J. L. Borges, "Spinoza," in Borges, A Reader: A Selection from the Writings of Jorge Luis 
Borges, edited by E.Rodriguez Monegal and A. Reid, New York: Dutton, 1981, p. 285. 
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